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EXCERPTS FROM *CULEX* IN THE ESCORIAL MS.

THE vv. excerpted begin at 58 *O bona pastoris* and proceed uninterruptedly to 100 inclusive *Compacta solidum modulatur arundine carmen* with the omission of 80 *Quam qui mente procul pura sensuque probando* and 86—88 *Illi falce deus—Ille colit lucos—Floribus agrestes herbae.* In these I shall merely recount such special readings as are in any way noticeable.

59 fastidat et probet illis
60 Omnia luxurie prauis incognita curis
62 assirio fuerint
64 non angit
65 in illa (u above i)
66 gratum
67 Alconis rerent (fe above) boetique thoreuma
70 gemmantis
72 letum recinente
73 degentem fraude remota
74 palmite litteus (litte^{9})
75 Thmolia

77 uallibus intus
80 *om.*
81 agnouit
83 Nec spoliis dum sancta deum fulgentibus ornet
84 Templa nec euētus (euentus) finem transcendit habendi
85 seuis
86—88 *om.*
89 ad est
92 Quolibet ut requie et uictu contentus habundet
93 Iocundoque leuet languentia
95 Fontis amadriadum
96 Emulus ascreo poeta
97 traducit
98 Dulcibus in studiis
99 Letus agit curas et dum non arte canora
100 Compacta solidum arundine

Then follow

154 *Quem circa fuse passim cubuere capelle
148 Hiis superat gelidis manans e fontibus unda
149 Que leuibus placidum riuis sonat orta liquorem
146 At uolucres patulis residentes dulcia ramis
147 Carmina per uarios edunt resonantia cantus
150 *Hinc illi geminas auium uox obstrepit aures
151 *Hinc querulas referunt uoces qui nautica [*sic*] limo
152 Corpora limpha fouet sonitus alit aeris echo
153 Argutis et cuncta fremunt ardore cicadis
157 *Seu libet ad fontem densa requiescere in umbra
155 *Excelsis sup̃ dumis quos leniter afflans
156 Aura susurrantis possit confundere uenti
159 Anxius insidiis nullis et lentus in herbis
158 *Concipit hic mitem proiectus membra soporem

It will be seen that this passage follows an order quite different from that of the complete *Culex* MSS and that the verses are in many points altered. Thus 154 is in the complete MSS *At circa passim fessae cubuere capellae:* 150 *Et quamquam geminas a. u. o. aures:* 151 *Ac querulae ref. uoces quis nantia limo:* 157 *Pastor ut ad fontem densa requieuit in umbra:*

155 *Excelsisque super dumis quae leuiter afflans:* 158 *Mitem concepit p. m. soporem.* This order of the Escorial excerpts is found also in the two Paris MSS, and seems to have descended to them from an early period. It can however have very little weight: for the order of the complete MSS agrees with their wording and forms a consistent whole, whereas the order followed in the excerpts is palpably confused, and the changes introduced, after the right order had been, perhaps consciously, to make the excerpt read better, abandoned.

The third excerpt begins at 225 and is continued to *uices* in 226.

225 Premia sunt dītatis ubi et pietatis honores?
226 In uarias abiere uices.

Over dītatis is written ″, the usual way of expressing something wrong. It is difficult to see what *dintatis* could mean[1]. In 226 *uarias* is a mere error for *uanas.*

The fourth excerpt is part of 294.

294 Dignus amor uenia est.

The fifth excerpt is 340—342.

340 Cur aliquis proprie fortune munere diues
341 Tendit in euectus celum super? omne propinquo
342 Frangitur inuidie telo decus.

[1] Possibly *sunt dintatis* is a corruption of *simplicitatis.* We saw above that *n* and *ci* are often interchanged: this gives us *-citatis*; *li* might be the last element of *cli*=*di*: this gives us *-licitatis.* But this is of course a mere suggestion.

In itself, however, it appears to me an improvement on the ordinary reading *pietatis.* There is a pathetic touch in the ghost of the gnat appealing to its *simplicitas*, the honest directness of purpose which had impelled it to sting the sleeping shepherd in the most sensitive part of his face, rather than allow him to be killed by the serpent.

And if, with Card. Bembo, we read in the immediately sequent verse *e* (or *ex*) *rure* recessit Iustitia et prior illa fides, how natural that the gnat should appeal to the prime virtue of rural life, its *simplicitas*! 'Adieu to all the virtues of the country, if the honest feeling of duty which led me, a simple gnat, to wake a man on the point of death, at the cost of my own life, is to go unrewarded, and my remains are to lack a grave!'

Here again the verses have been altered to suit the excerptor's purpose. The MSS of the complete *Culex* give 294 *Ne quisquam propriae,* 295 *Iret.*

The sixth and last excerpt is 413, 414 with which the poem concludes.

413 Parue culex pecudum custos tibi tale merenti
414 Muneris officium uite pro munere reddit.

In 414 the complete *Culex* MSS give *Funeris.*

ROBINSON ELLIS.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS ON THE *AETNA*.

In August of 1893 I had an opportunity of re-examining the Stabulensian fragment. As it is the only MS of *Aetna* which approaches *C* in antiquity, it may be useful to record here the notes which I made, as I did not always agree with Bährens. The fragment, which is known as *S*, is numbered 17,177 in the National Library of Paris.

The lines of the poem are numbered according to Munro's edition (Cambridge, 1867).

5 Cynthos, *not* Cinthos
19 I^{n} positā
22 littore
23 Quicquid et inantiquum
30 tumidis (*not* tumidisque)
37 Illi cyclopas *seems to have been written in the first instance, then between* i *and* c *was crowded in later* s. *Scaliger suggested* Illi *as an emendation.*
38 fontes
42 flegraeis
45 Imperium imponere
48 Costruitur
50 Iam /// coaceruatas
52 Prouocat a^{d}motisque ttia
57 Hic magno
62 seuus
63 Stant utrimque de ualidos (*sic, with a space after* de) ignes
69 cessat ụenit
72 enceladon
73 exspirat

81 *After* poen *the letter has been eaten away by a worm.*

82 tu$_a$ q' e aeace

I thought I saw the remains of a smudged a *after* e, *so that originally the scribe wrote* tuaque ea aeace, *i.e. began writing* eace, *then changed to* aeace

84 Quicquid et interius falsi sibi c̄ͤcia terrent

The second c *of* c̄ͤcia *seems to have been originally* r

89 ledam

90 danę prętiosus

91 ista sed istnnis

(*Possibly, as Bährens thought,* ismnis).

94 inmensus

96 Non totū & solido desunt

98 agiturque animanti

100 qua cummeat idem

105 Sed toritis

(*Bährens gives* tortis: *I seemed to detect after* r *an* i *only partially visible*).

106 Exilit inparibus

107 Vt crebor introssus carims (h)

111 Hęc st///~~ta~~ nata est facies sed liber spiritus intrat

The word after Hęc *was struck through, and only the two first and two last letters remain legible. The word was no doubt* stipata *repeated wrongly from* 110.

112 Effugiens molitus iter seu nympha per enni

113 molit

117 quis enim credit (non *omitted*)

118, 9 Esse sinus penitus tanto se mergere hiatu

(2 *vv. merged in* 1).

120 Nam ille ex tenui uocemque agat apta necesse est

ille *only just legible.*

121 Cumfluuia

122 Et trahat ex pleno quod fo(r)ntem contrahat amnem

123 riuis

126 adoperte auernis

129 Ospicium fluuium aut semita

134 classis & (~ *nearly erased*)

135 pignera
141 dimiss apedibus fodisse latebris
155 *The last word is very doubtful. Bährens gives* in āmū. *The* in ā *are clear: then there is an erasure, then perhaps* mī. *I greatly doubt whether the last letter was* ū.
157 confert immobilis
162 Namque illuc quodcuque uacat hiat impetus omis
165 continuat uentos aqua queque morantes
166 In uacuo desint
167 errantis
170 noto^{h}
184 uaries mẽdiumque
185 par signes
186^{b} *is omitted*
187 Haec illi tantarum sedesque arearum est
188 incendia
189 parui aut tenuis discriminis ignes
190 uo ponent ibi tempora nera (? uera)
191 ipse cogunt
192 moneat contingere toto
195 arcent adhitus
195^{b} aethne succurrat inanis
196 cernes
197 quin torq///// ////na
198 imperat *is not legible*
199 glomerant˜nymbus
200 uoluuntur
201 nunc
202 incendia
203 magnos miratur Iuppiter ignes
206 tantum premit
207 is xasorum
208 . faciunt sua nec corporis ulli
209 robustis uiribus omnes
210 turb ice uo

(*This was all I could read*)

212 *nothing legible but* tata di

213 nome tibus aer
214 *has been cut away.*
216 corpore *is legible.*
217 Impetus est idsi
218 Hinc princeps magnosque sub hoc duce
220 Vna *is not legible*
221 cohibetur inest
222 inmensus
223 laborantis
224 fuere
226 rebus
227 Sacra peringentem capitique attollere caelum
228 quot sụnt natalia
229 ad
230 mundo
231 luna est
232 Hęc breuior cursu bis senos peruolet orbes
233 monet sidere
234 Ordine quae uesuo errant incondita cura
I thought I could trace a partially erased ſ *after* uesuo.
235 signorum tradita iura
236 Nub ęlo denuntiet imbres
This was all that I could read.
237 pelleat
238 uarient primaque iuuente (*I think*)
239 Cura ęstate *stroke under* e *doubtful.*
240 hiemps
244 tendant
245 praediscere
246 setius incubet
248 digesta
250 iocunda
254 *nothing legible but* mortalis
255 *I could read* . perquirere uelle
257 *agrees with C: but the last word is illegible.*
258 Torquemus miseri in paruis premimurque labore
Torquemus, *I think, not* Torquemur.
259 *has been cut away.*

261 rura
264 sillisque
268 fenialia
280 *the word after* torqueat *is omitted.*
281 repente qes
287 ad mittat cogitat
291 delecta sono premit una fugatque
292 Torrentes auras pulsata corpora denset
293 Nam ueluti sonat (*the rest omitted*).
296 magnisque cortina
297 asta regentis
298 inpellens
299 aliter *is omitted.*
300 augusto
302 *has been cut away.*
303 Vt cum densa cremant inter se corp (*rest cut off*)
346 *has been cut away.*

With this end the notes I have taken. Though incomplete, they may be of some use for future collaters.

105 sqq.

et qualis aceruus
Exilit inparibus iactis ex tempore saxis,
Vt crebro introrsus spatio uacuata charibdis
Pendeat in sese, simili quoque terra futurae
In tenues laxata uias, non omnis in artum
Nec stipata coit.

108 *futurae C, figura* Sloane 777, *figura est* Munro, who places a colon after *uias.*

There is this objection to *figura est,* that the sentence is then unnaturally broken up, and an asyndeton introduced with the words *non omnis in artum* which spoils its flow. Besides the qualitative genitive *figurae* seems preferable to the ablative, as slightly more recondite. I would therefore write *similis.*

similis quoque terra figurae
In tenues laxata uias non omnis in artum
Nec stipata coit.

188—190.

Nunc opus artificem incendi causamque reposcit
Non illam parui aut tenuis discriminis ignes
Mille sub exiguo ponentibus tempore uera[1].

This is the reading given by the admirable Cambridge MS (*C*). The Gyraldinus is *reported* to have had *Non illam paruo aut tenui discrimine signis Mille sub exiguum uenient tibi pignora tempus.* Haupt accepted this with *signes* for *signis.* Munro was less easily convinced, and gives 189 as *C*, only placing a colon after *discriminis*: thus making *ignes* nominative to *Mille sub exiguo ponent tibi tempore ueram*, as he writes 190.

In my first article on the *Aetna* (J. of Philol. XVI. 292 sqq.) I tried to shew that the variants reported from the Gyraldinus, when they come into conflict with the readings of *C*, a codex of the first authority and written in the Xth century, must always be accepted with caution. The more I have studied the poem, the more confirmed has this belief become. It is astonishing in how many cases the readings of *Gyr.* bear the look of clever conjectures. vv. 189, 190 are a good example. How far removed is *sub exiguum uenient tibi pignora tempus* from *sub exiguo ponentibus tempore uera*! At any rate it seems dangerous to admit *Gyr.* to be *certainly* right. But I doubt Munro's reconstitution. It is hard to see why a thousand *fires* should be selected as exhibiting the true cause of Aetna's outbursts. The words *Non illam parui aut tenuis discriminis* suggest an antithesis: this would be supplied by writing *ingens* for *ignes*, and retaining the following v. as in *C*, except that, for *ponentibus* of *C*, *ponet tibi* (the Rehdiger MS has *ponent tibi*) must be read.

Non illam parui aut tenuis discriminis: ingens
Mille sub exiguo ponet tibi tempore uera.

[1] I have written out the whole of *Aetna* as contained in *C*

'A cause indeed which is not of small or slight significance: it is overpowering and will set before you a thousand facts in a brief moment of time.'

Observe that both *ingens* and *mille* have thus a predicative force: a fact which gives extra support to my emendation.

227.

C gives as follows

Sacra per ingentem capitique attollere caelum.

The Gyraldinus is reported to have had

Ingenium sacrare caputque attollere caelo

which has ever since been considered a conclusive proof of the genuineness of these *marginalia*, and appealed to in support of *all* the other (many of them violent) changes for which the same marginalia are quoted. In my first article (p. 298) it was suggested that, clever as it undoubtedly is, it does not carry absolute conviction. For allowing, which it is difficult to grant at the outset, that *Ingenium sacrare may* have been first *transposed*, then gradually altered to *Sacra per ingentem*, we still have to account for the change *capitique att. caelum* from *caputque att. caelo*. There are critics who are contented to explain such perversions as consequences of *metre*; and it is true that metre accounts for many extraordinary, many nonsensical corruptions. On this view, *caputque att. caelo* having ceased to scan after *Sacra per ingentem*, it was altered, without consideration of sense or meaning, to *capitique attollere caelum*. So great is the unsatisfactoriness of this reasoning, that it seems desirable to *attempt*, at least, a different explanation. Taking *C* as our one trusty guide (here happily reinforced by the Stabulensian fragment) we may accept the words *Sacra per ingentem* as correctly copied from the archetype. What then are these *sacra*? They must be the *sacra caeli* or *caelestia*, the mysteries of the sky, i.e. the divine operations of which the sky and the ether are the scene, as our poet goes on to say

Scire quot et quae sint magno natalia mundo

Principia, occasus metuunt an saecula pergunt:
Solis scire modum et quanto minor orbita lunaest.

In connexion with these, *tollere* or *attollere* can only mean the *exaltation* of nature's operations: and how is this effected? by human *genius*, which first examines these operations, then lauds them as divine. I conceive then that the poet may have written

Sacra per ingenii caelestia tollere captum

'to exalt the sanctities of the sky by the grasp of intellect': and would suggest that the classical, yet rare sense of *captus* was the chief cause of the corruption of the verse. Even if my attempt should be thought hazardous, it is something to be able to shew that the reading of *Gyr.* is not *certainly* right, and ought not to be alleged as a reason for accepting everything which is stated to have been found there, however violent it may be, and however wide of our lode-star, the unique MS of Cambridge.

231—3 are thus written in *C*

Solis scire modum et quanto minor orbita luna·est
Haec breuior cursu bissenos peruolet orbes
Annŭs ille monet.

The Paris and Escorial excerpts (the latter I collated at the Escorial in Easter of 1892) give *Haec breuior cur bissenos cito p. o.*, which looks to me like an interpolation, though Haupt, after Wernsdorf, writes from it *cita*. The same excerpts have *meet* for *monet*: and this seems to be right.

Munro changed *et* in 231 to *ut*, thereby, as I think, doing violence to the natural connexion of the clauses: for surely the poet meant 'to know the measure of the sun's course, and by what degree the circuit of the moon is less'. It would be treating the poet less harshly to insert *ut* in 232 after *cursu*.

247, 8 are thus written in *C*

Et quaecumque iacent tanto miracula mundo
Non digesta pati nec aceruo condita rerum.

Another case where it is impossible to trust *Gyr.* It is said to have had *congesta*. But *digesta* points to *disiecta*.

251, 2.

Sed prior hec dominis cura est cognoscere terram
Et quae nunc miranda tulit natura notare.

dominis C, hominis Rehd. *Et quae nunc* all extant MSS. *Quaeque in ea* is reported from *Gyr.*

Here we have a more doubtful case. *Et quae nunc* must be wrong: but it does not follow that *Quaeque in ea* is right. The poet may perhaps have written

Et, quae non *miranda tulit natura? notare*

a construction which will recall many passages of Greek tragedy. Ag. 556 τί δ' οὐ Στένοντες, οὐ λαχόντες ἥματος μέρος ; and the recurring ποῖος οὐ.

269.

Sic auidi semper qua uisum est carius istis.

No critic has suggested that *istis* may be a corruption of *itis.* In 254 the poet addresses the human race *Nam quae, mortales, superest amentia maior* (for with Scaliger I would write *mortales*[1], vocative) and to this vocative he returns in *itis.* 'Thus it is, O race of mortals, that ye are ever eagerly advancing where something more precious than before has come into view'.

272.

Scire quid exculto natura terra cohercet.

exculto C and *S* (fragm. Stabulense), *occulto* Rehd. and Vatic. 3272. *nature terra* Vat. *terrae natura* is reported from *Gyr.*

Another v. l. of *Gyr.* which raises doubt. First, one has no right to assume that words are freely *inverted* in MSS; we saw this on 225 *Sacra per ingentem.* If *CS Rehd. Vat.* agree in the order *natura* (*nature*) *terra* it is rash to change this order and substitute *terrae natura.* Secondly, the *exculto* of *CS* points in a different direction. It is wrong: but it appears to me to suggest something out of the common. It can hardly

[1] *C* has *mortalis.*

be a mere corruption of *occulto*: but it may well be of *occulto ex.*

Combining this with *naturae* of Vat. we get

Scire quid occulto ex naturae terra coercet

'to know what earth confines in her womb by nature's secret ordinance'. A very natural expression in reference to the underground workings of a great volcano. Again, then, I reject *Gyr.* and prefer to follow the guidance of *C*, here supported by the XIth century Stabulensian fragment.

281.

Vnde repente quies et multo foedere pax sit.

Munro retains *multo*, comparing Tacitus' *multa pace.* The learned and acute Jesuit scholar, Père Oudin, has discussed this passage in the *Journal des Savans* for 1715 (T. LVII. p. 597). He is dissatisfied with *multo*, and conjectures either *inulto* 'une paix faite par un traité sans garant, dont l'infraction ne sera pas vengée', or *muto.* It seems worth while to mention this, of which neither Haupt nor Munro seems to have known, as Oudin was not only a most finished scholar, of the Delrio and Commire type, perfectly trained in the refinements of metre and grammar, but one of those Frenchmen who anticipated at the beginning of the 18th century the line of criticism of which Germany is now the acknowledged exponent. Witness his interesting dissertation on the much debated authorship of the *Culex*: a criticism of which Hildebrandt takes account and to which I hope some day to return.

Gyr. is reported to have had *reperta* for *repente* and *pax est.* I doubt the genuineness of either.

313—315 are thus given by *C*

Vallibus exoriens caligat nubilus aer
Flumina parua ferunt auras uix proxima uento est
Eminus adspirat fortis et uerberat humor.

314 *uis* Vat. rightly. 315 *fortis* most MSS, *fõtis* Vat. Perhaps *fontis.*

It is difficult to follow Munro in his explanation of 315, 'humor adspirat fortes auras et uerberibus impellit'. The passage cited by him from Aen. v. 607 *uentosque adspirat eunti* seems to call for a *direct* object accus. like *fontis*; whereas *fortis* only *suggests* somewhat remotely *auras*, and that after an interrupting clause (*uis proxima uento est*). Nor yet again can *fortis* convey a *result* forming part of *adspirat*, as if the meaning were 'humor adspirat eas (= in eas) et fortis facit', for such a construction of *adspirare* does not seem supported by examples, even if a proleptic use of the adj. were admissible. Nor does it seem possible to construct *fortis* with *uerberat*, 'lashes them into vigorous action': for the same reason.

Reading *fontis*, I would translate: 'moisture from a distance blows its sluices (upon the air) and acts on it like a lash'.

323—325.

Haud secus adstrictus certamine tangitur ictu
Spiritus inuoluensque suo sibi pondere uires
Densa per ardentes exercet corpora uires.

So *C*. The corruption in the double *uires* may perhaps be explained by supposing the second of the two to have been originally *giros*. 'The wind keeps the condensed particles moving restlessly along burning circles', i.e. driven round and round in circles which gradually become hotter.

354, 5.

Non cinerem stipulamue leuem, non arida sorbet
Gramina, non tenuis plantis humus excita predas.

This passage has already been treated in J. of Philol. XVI. p. 303. It was there suggested that in *predas* was concealed *apludas*, a view subsequently confirmed in my article on the Rehdiger MS of *Aetna* (Vol. XX. p. 229) by other curious misspellings of the same word in Glossaries.

The whole verse is now clear to me. Jacob acutely saw that *humus* might represent the superlative termination, and altered *plantis humus* to *lentissimus*. It is more probable that *plantis humus* is *placidissimus*. The same confusion of *n* with

ci is found in[1] Manil. v. 480 *Nunc tanto gestu* for *tacito*: and the corresponding confusion of *n* with *ti* in another passage of the same poet II. 9 *lances* for *latices*.

Write therefore

Gramina, non tenuis plaCIDissImus excit apLVdas

'in its utter calm, it sets in motion no slightest particle of chaff'. For *excit* cf. Stat. Theb. IV. 146 *Suus excit in arma Antiquam Tiryntha deus*.

385, 6 are thus in *C*.

Nunc superant quaecumque regant incendia siluae
Quae flammas alimenta uocent quid nutriat aethnam
Incendi poterunt.

The form of the sentence seems to me to indicate an opposition between the two clauses *Nunc superant quaecumque* and *Incendi poterunt*. 'In this state of circumstances (*nunc*) let the materials of fire be as abundant as they may, it will be possible for them all to become inflammable'. Either *superant* or *regant*, therefore, should be a subjunctive. On the former hypothesis, Munro's *rigant* seems preferable to Jacob's *tegunt*, Bährens' *gerant*, or Wagler's *creant*. I prefer the latter, and would change *regant* into *rigent*.

Nunc, superant quaecumque, rigent incendia siluae.

'Now, let the founts of matter (so Munro: but perhaps, the forests of Aetna) pour freely all their abundant stores of fire, each kind of aliment meant to call out the many flames that Aetna feeds (reading *quot nutriet Aetna*): they will take fire without difficulty'.

Both the inversion *superant quaecumque* for *q. superant*, and the position of the imperatival subjunctive *rigent*, are calculated to give clearness, partly to the clause in which they occur, partly to the answering clause *Incendi poterunt*. As given in all the editions which I have seen, it is difficult to make out the exact drift of the passage.

[1] This interchange of *n* with *ci*, *ti* is specially frequent in the Madrid MS of Manilius: of which I am publishing a collation in the *Classical Review* for 1893, 1894.

412—414 are thus written in *C*.

Totus enim denso stipatur robore cardo
Pertenuis admissa uias incendia nutrit
Cunctanterque eadem et pigre coepta remittit.

412 *stipatus* Le Clerc, seemingly: it is not in Scaliger. *cardo* C, *tarde* the Helmstadt MS collated for Jacob by Lachmann, *tardans* Rehd. *paruo* marg. *tarda* Vat. Perhaps *carbo*. 414 *concepta* Munro.

Though all editions which I have seen have *tarde* or *tarda*, its correctness appears to be very doubtful. *Cardo* which is in *C* must, I think, be *carbo*. It would be no far-fetched comparison to speak of a mass of *lapis molaris* or lava-stone as a carbonized or rather carbonizing substance, of course in reference to its slow and gradual burning. Nor is there any difficulty in making the stress of the sentence lie in *tenuis*; lava admits fire *only through narrow passages*, and *therefore* is slow (*cunctanter*) in taking fire or in becoming extinguished.

425.

Cerne locis etiam similes adsiste cauernas.

Not a word here requires alteration: all that is required to make the v. clear is to interpunctuate after *etiam*. 'Test the point again by particular regions: place yourself by caverns of the same kind'. *C* alone here preserves the right word *adsiste*: it has been corrupted in the later MSS, *adscisse* Rehd., *adisse* Vat., *adsisse* Helmst.

504—6.

Emicat examen plagis ardentia saxa
Scintillas procul esse fides procul esse ruentis
Incolumi feruore cadunt.

So *C*.

From the last clause *Incolumi feruore cadunt* (506) we may elicit that the line preceding contained something standing in close connexion with the fact there stated (in 506), namely that the stones fall without losing any part of their glowing heat. D'Orville corrected *esse* to *este*, and this seems very likely.

'Away, away, if you wish not to be burnt to death: *for* the stones fall red-hot as they issued from the volcano'.

But *fides* has, thus, no meaning. I would alter it to *pedes*, then accepting Scaliger's *scintillant*, constitute the whole passage as follows

> *Emicat examen plagis, ardentia saxa*
> *Scintillant. procul este, pedes, procul este, ruentis!*
> *Incolumi feruore cadunt.*

'At each blow a swarm of sparkles shoots out, the burning rocks flash fire: away, feet, away with all your speed! for these rocks lose nothing of their glowing heat in falling'.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON HERODAS.

THE subject of the first poem is well illustrated by the following verses of Naumachius p. 149 of Boissonade's Poetae Gnomici Graeci, from a poem containing precepts on marriage.

The unmarried maiden is thus addressed:

Μήτε γραῦν ποτὲ σοῖσι κακὴν δέξαιο μελάθροις·
πολλῶν γρῆες ἔπερσαν ἐύκτιτα δώματα φώτων.
μηδὲ μὲν ἀκριτόμυθον ἑταιρίσσαιο γυναῖκα·
κεδνὰ κακοὶ φθείρουσι γυναικῶν ἤθεα μῦθοι.

33 sqq.

γυναῖκες ὁκόσους οὐ μὰ τὴν Αἴδεω κούρην
ἀστέρας ἐνεγκεῖν οὐρανὸς κεκαύχηται
τὴν δ' ὄψιν οἷαι πρὸς Πάριν ποθ' ὥρμησαν
θεαὶ κριθῆναι καλλονήν.

Attention has before been called to the resemblance of the first two of these vv. to Catullus LXI. 203, 4. But the two last have also a close parallel in the same poem—17, 18 *Qualis Idalium colens Venit ad Phrygium Venus Iudicem.* The combination does *not* seem to me to be adequately explained by the fact that other poets use the stars as symbols of multitude, and that the judgment of Paris was a frequent subject of poetry and art. *If* Herodas belongs to the 3rd century B.C., which still appears to me very uncertain, then I should believe that Catullus directly imitated him in LXI.: *if*, on the other hand, as has been suggested in *Classical Review*, v. p. 457, the somewhat close resemblances to Catullus and Vergil in Herodas point to his date being after these poets, we should have to suppose that the scenes of the Mimiambist are fancy sketches

for which a literary colouring has been found in the Ionic dialect modified by Dorisms in which they are artificially worked up. That this is the most probable theory I will not say: but it is a conceivable one: and it has not been fairly presented hitherto. Bentley thought it worth his while to refute the arguments of Boyle in support of the genuineness of the Letters of Phalaris by an exhaustive dissertation in which no corner of classical antiquity was left unexplored: who can say that anything of the same kind has been, I will not say, effected, but attempted for the incomparably superior Mimiambi of Herodas? Even the name of the poet can hardly yet be thought definitively settled. Observe too that the question does not lie between the 3rd century and the end of the 1st B.C. It is possible that Herodas lived between 200—100 B.C., or in the earlier half of the 1st century. Such a possibility, to the best of my knowledge, has hardly been mentioned, certainly not examined. All the arguments hitherto adduced in support of the Alexandrian epoch of Herodas are more or less unconvincing. Such for instance are the references to the Ptolemies in I. 30 *θεῶν ἀδελφῶν τέμενος*, a commonplace allusion which might belong to any period: again the use of the name Ake for Ptolemais: the old name might well linger on after the introduction of the new, or, as in the case of Sikyon, which was for a time known as Demetrias, have lasted on and never died out, or the preference for Ake might be determined by metrical considerations. The kind of argument which I should suppose to be more convincing might be found in the words *καθόδῳ τῆς Μίσης*, if they are genuine. The cultus of this rarely mentioned goddess can hardly be very early, the only two passages where the word occurs in this form are in Hesychius, whose citations are from writers of the most varied date, and the Orphic hymns, universally ascribed to a late period. Perhaps we may look for new light on this obscure divinity from hitherto undiscovered inscriptions of Asia Minor.

If the story to which Battaros alludes in II. 71, 73 can be referred to Philip, son of Demetrios, king of Macedonia, B.C. 220—179, we should of course obtain a much later date for the composition of that poem.

That it might so refer is I think possible for the following reasons.

1. Philip was from the first moment of his accession one of the most notable and notorious figures in the Greek world; just such a person as Battaros would be likely to introduce into a story. Polyb. VII. 12. 3 *διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιφανές, καὶ διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως λαμπρόν, ἐκφανεστάτας συμβαίνει καὶ γνωριμωτάτας γεγονέναι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὰς εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ὁρμὰς τοῦ βασιλέως τούτου.* Polybius goes to the length of calling him the common favourite of the Greeks (*κοινός τις ἐρώμενος τῶν Ἑλλήνων* VII. 12. 8) during his earlier and good period. The change to cruelty and hateful vices which marked his later life only made him more talked of than ever.

2. The violent and irascible character of Philip would suit a story of sudden outrage such as seems to be alluded to in the vv. of Herodas. Plutarch, Life of Aratus, tells an anecdote which may be quoted in illustration. *Ἐδόκει δὲ ὁ νεανίσκος* (the younger Aratus) *ἐρᾶν τοῦ Φιλίππου· καὶ τότε λέγων εἶπε πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς οὐδὲ καλὸς ἔτι φαίνοιτο τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα δράσας* (Philip's intrigues in Messenia), *ἀλλὰ πάντων αἴσχιστος. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐκείνῳ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπε καίπερ ἐπίδοξος ὢν ὑπ' ὀργῆς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξυλακτήσας λέγοντος αὐτοῦ.*

3. It was some such offence, probably some remonstrance with him on an intended or accomplished act of cruelty, that caused the death of many of Philip's friends (Plut. De discernendo adulatore ab amico IX. *ὕποπτοι οἱ τὰ βελτίω ζητοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες ἄχθεσθαι καὶ δυσκολαίνειν τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τῶν φίλων· ὃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ Δίωνα, καὶ Σάμιον Φιλίππῳ καὶ Κλεομένῃ Πτολεμαίῳ διέβαλε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν*), notably the poets Kallias and Epikrates whom he forced to swallow hemlock at a banquet (A. P. XI. 12, cf. Paus. VII. 7. 5), and *Samos*, the son of Chrysogonos (Polyb. VII. 12. 6, v. 9), a youth who had been brought up with Philip, and who, as early as the Aetolian campaign in which Thermus was sacked and its sacred buildings and porticoes burnt, gave proof of the poetical genius which he afterwards attained to (Polyb. V. 9).

4. The curious word ὁ *βρέγκος* looks like a *personal* description of Philip perhaps from some peculiarity in the conformation of his head: it might = *εὔβρεχμος*. In this connexion, cf. A. P. IX. 519. 3 *Πίομαι· ὡς ὄφελόν γε καὶ ἔγκαρον ἐχθροῦ ἀράξας Βρέγμα Φιλιππείης ἐξέπιον κεφαλῆς, Ὅσπερ ἑταιρείοιο παρὰ κρητῆρι φόνοιο Γεύσατ' ἐν ἀκρήτῳ φάρμακα χευάμενος.* This epigram is attributed to Alkaios the Messenian, as is also the other[1] in which the execution by poison of Kallias and Epikrates is recorded[2]. I would call attention to the fact that the word *βρέγμα* is here applied to the head of Philip. Now in two of the three epigrams (A. P. VI. 114, 115, 116), in which is recorded the dedication at the base of Mount Orbelos in Thrace of the skin and horns of a fierce bull, the terror of the neighbourhood, which King Philip had killed, the same word is found, as I think, more than probably, *twice*. 115. 3 (*ταῦρον*) *Δαρδανέων ὀλετήρ, ὁ κεραύνιος εἶλε Φίλιππος, Πλήξας αἰγανέᾳ βρέγμα κυναγέτιδι.* Similarly, in 116. 3, where the Heidelberg MS. gives (*βοὺς*) *Αὐτοῖς σὺν κεράεσσι τὸν ὑβρέχμῳ* (corr. *ὑβρέχμᾳ*) *κυδιόωντα*, the Planudean codex has *τὸν βρεγμῷ κ.*[3], whence Jacobs conj. *κέρασιν τὸν βρεχμῷ*. Whether this is right or not, the two poets seem to agree in using this *βρέγμα, βρεχμός* of the bull subjugated by Philip: a coincidence with the epigram of Alkaios which is remarkable[4]. The word, speaking generally, is by no means a common one. If it was *either* a favourite word with Philip, *or* suggested

[1] XI. 12, where however the inscription is simply *Ἀλκαίου*. This epigram is followed by a duplicate of IX. 519, on which D'Orville constructed a theory of a twofold edition of the epigram, ad Chariton., pp. 580, 1, ed. 1783.

[2] Among the epigrams attributed to Alkaios in the Anthologia no less than five refer to acts of Philip, or events in which he bore a prominent part, A. P. IX. 518 to the conquest of Makynon in Aetolia: IX. 519 to the cruelty of Philip: XI. 12 to his poisoning Kallias and Epikrates at a banquet: Append. Planud. XVI. 5 in Didot's A. P. *Ἄγαγε καὶ Ξέρξης* on the liberation of Greece by T. Quintius Flamininus which followed the battle of Kynoskephalai: A. P. VII. 247 inscription over the fallen in that battle.

[3] See the new edition of Stadtmüller in the small Teubner series. Stadtmüller adopts the conjecture of Salmasius *τὸν ὕβρεϊ*.

[4] It is of course quite possible that, as in so many other cases in the Greek Anthology (see Reitzenstein *Epigramm und Skolion*, passim), one of the two epigrammatists is much later than the other.

some personal peculiarity of which he was proud, *or* some practice or habit which he liked to have associated with himself e.g. attacking the front of the skull in fighting; any of these reasons might determine its recurrence in three poems in which he is the prominent figure.

5. Such an explanation would make γελᾷς, v. 74, intelligible. For a man of Battaros' profession to quote a king in illustration of what he had himself felt or done might easily excite a smile: it would seem a ridiculous piece of rodomontade.

6. The vv. might then run thus

ὦ Γῆρας,
σοὶ θυέτω, ἐπεὶ τὸ αἷμ' ἂν ἐξεφύσησ' ἂν
ὥσπερ Φίλιππος ἐν Σάμῳ κοτ' ὁ βρέγκος.

'Let him thank old age that he escaped unhurt: else I should certainly have made the blood spurt, as strong-pated Philip did once upon a time when he was provoked at Samos.'

ἐν Σάμῳ would of course to the ordinary reader mean 'at Samos': to those who knew the private history of Philip, it would suggest his unhappy and too incautious friend, the poet Samos or Samios, as he is otherwise known.

II.

With the subject of this may be compared the words of Lucian's Abdicatus 21 πότε ἀπόκοιτος ἐγενόμην; τίνας ποτοὺς ἀκαίρους, τίνας κώμους ἐγκαλεῖς; τίς ἀσωτία; τίς πορνόβοσκος ὕβρισται; τίς ἠτιάσατο; οὐδὲ εἷς.

4. I have suggested (*Academy* for 1892, Nov. 5) that the end of this verse may have been ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω οὐδ' ἄρτους. This certainly agrees well with the preceding words

οὐδ' εἰ Θαλῆς μὲν οὗτος ἀξίην τὴν νηῦν
ἔχει ταλάντων πέντ'.

39, 40. κοὐκ ἐπηδέσθη
οὔτε νόμον οὔτε προστάτην οὔτ' ἄρχοντα.

The words are almost pure prose and read like a piece of De-

mosthenes. Here again Catullus supplies at least one parallel, XLIV. 11 *Orationem in Antium petitorem,* which would be the actual words of the heading of the oration.

III.

7. *αἱ ἀστρᾰγάλαι* like *Γυλλί*, I. 67, makes it probable that Herodas sometimes allowed a trochee in the first foot of the choliambic. Crusius retains both, but considers the second *α* of *ἀστραγάλαι* to be lengthened, which is surely very doubtful. A. Palmer's *αἱ στρογγύλαι* is, to me, very seductive.

12 sqq. *τήν γε μὴν παίστρην*
ὅκουπερ οἰκίζουσιν οἵ τε προὔνικοι
κοἱ δρηπέται, σάφ' οἶδε κητέρῳ δεῖξαι.

Scott, Fortunes of Nigel, XI. of a page-boy, 'He is by this time playing at hustle-cap and chuck-farthing with the most blackguard imps upon the wharf.'

14. *κἦ μὲν τάλαινα δέλτος.*
Hermipp. fr. 47 (in Kock's Fragm. Com. Graec. I. p. 238)
τὴν δὲ τάλαιναν πλάστιγγ' ἂν ἴδοις
ἐν τοῖσι κορήμασιν οὖσαν.

25. If Maron is not *Maro* (Vergil), but a Greek name, I would suggest that the reason why this name is chosen is that it localizes the poem by an allusion to one of the *δῆμοι* of Alexandria. Satyrus ap. Theophilum in Meineke's Analecta Alexandrina, p. 346 *Σάτυρος ἱστορῶν τοὺς δήμους τῶν Ἀλεξανδρέων, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ Φιλοπάτορος τοῦ καὶ Πτολεμαίου προσαγορευθέντος τούτου μηνύει Διόνυσον ἀρχηγέτην γεγονέναι· ὅθεν καὶ τὰς προσωνυμίας ἔχουσιν οἱ κατ' αὐτοὺς δῆμοι Ἀριαδνίς ... Θεστίς ... Θοαντίς ... Σταφυλίς ... Εὐαινίς ... Μαρωνὶς ἀπὸ Μάρωνος υἱοῦ Ἀριάδνης καὶ Διονύσου.*

40 sqq.
ἦ τοῦ τέγους ὕπερθε τὰ σκέλεα τείνας
κάθηθ' ὅκως τις καλλίης κάτω κύπτων.
τί μευ δοκεῖς τὰ σπλάγχνα τῆς κακῆς πάσχειν
ἐπεὰν ἴδωμι;

Luc. Bis Accusatus 31 *παρέκυπτεν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέγους ἀδόντων ἀκούουσα.* Nigrin. 24 *πῶς γὰρ οἴει τὴν ψυχὴν διατεθεῖσθαί μοι ὅταν ἴδω τούτων τινα;*

49. With all deference to the German editors, I must decline to accept this reading as certainly right, until some passage is cited to support the sense assigned to it by them, 'so that one can't wag a tooth i.e. say a syllable against it.' I am not aware that speaking sets the teeth in motion: and as this is an absurdity, and it is difficult to believe a proverbial expression based on anything untrue to nature, either a different sense must be found, or conjectural emendation be called in. The Cobet to find such an emendation may not be in existence: but that is no reason for retaining as satisfactory a reading for which in the sense assigned no adequate support has yet been produced. Meanwhile it may be worth while to cite an out-of-the-way passage from a Greek epistle of Fronto to Domitia Calvilla which might conceivably help to clear up the obscurity.

p. 243 in Naber's edition of Fronto.

ὅ τοι γέλως οὕτως τὸ πρὶν ἄδολος εἶναι πεφυκὼς ὡς καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας τῶν γελώντων ἐπιδεικνύειν, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤδη περιέστηκεν κακομηχανίας καὶ ἐνέδρας, ὡς καὶ τὰ χείλη κρύπτειν τῶν ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς προσγελώντων.

Can the idea in Herodas be, that the mischief done to the roof of the lodging house is so obviously traceable to the scapegrace boy Kottalos, that everyone who is told of it smiles involuntarily and undisguisedly—*so that not one tooth is left which is not exposed to sight by the broadness of the grin*?

71, 2. *πρός σε τῶν Μούσεων*
καὶ τῶν γενείων τῆς τε Κοττίδος ψυχῆς.

Is not Κοττίδος a hypocoristic abbreviation of the boy's own name Kottalos? It is an appeal to the schoolmaster's *pity*.

93. *λάθοις τὴν γλῶσσαν ἐς μέλι πλύνας.*

In the cultus of Mithras, as described in the third century A.D. by Porphyry, de antro Nympharum 16, it was a symbol of purifi-

cation to wash the hands in honey, instead of water. *ὅταν μὲν τὰ Λεοντικὰ μυουμένοις εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἀνθ' ὕδατος μέλι νίψασθαι ἐγχέωσι, καθαρὰς ἔχειν τὰς χεῖρας παραγγέλλουσιν ἀπὸ πάντος λυπηροῦ καὶ βλαπτικοῦ καὶ μυσαροῦ.* Mithraicism was introduced into Asia Minor long before it spread to Greece and Italy: see C. W. King 'The Gnostics and their remains' Part II. p. 113 sqq. Ed. 2, and the peculiarity of the word *πλύνας* in connexion with *ἐς μέλι* appears to me not improbably to allude to a rite which, at any rate, later became a recognized part of the Mithraic initiation.

IV.

4. Asklepios is invoked with Koronis and Hygieia whom he touches with his *right* hand *ἥς τε χειρὶ δεξίᾳ ψαύεις.* Again in 19 Kokkale is told to place the votive picture or, as Bücheler thinks, the oblation-dish *on the right* of Hygieia. Compare with this Apollod. III. 10. 3 *παρὰ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶς λαβὼν (ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φλεβῶν τῆς Γοργόνος ῥυὲν αἷμα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ῥυὲν πρὸς φθορὰν ἀνθρώπων ἐχρῆτο· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν πρὸς σωτηρίαν.*

93, 4. I suggested in the *Academy* l. c. that these verses should be written thus

καὶ ἐπὶ μὴ λάθῃ φέρειν αὐτή.
Κοκκ. *τῆς ὑγιίης δῶ;*
Κυνν. *πρόσδος.*

The allusive meaning of *ὑγιίης* is explained by Bücheler and Crusius.

V.

43. I cannot think that Blass and Meister are right in their *ἤδη 'φαμαρτεῖς.* An imperative seems absolutely required. Yet the v. as given in Crusius, ed. 1, from the papyrus

ἤδη 'φαμάρτει σοὶ ἐὰν οὗτος ἡγῆται[1]

[1] In ed. 2 Crusius gives

ἤδη 'φαμαρτεῖς οἵ σ' ἂν οὗτος ἡγῆται.

though the shortened *ἐὰν* is by no means without parallels does not look quite right: the emphatic position of *σοι* is not called for, and *ἐὰν* is hardly the proper word. I do not think *σφι* (Büch.) was intended by the writer of the papyrus, judging from the facsimile: but none of the proposed emendations satisfy. Possibly *σοι ἵν' ἂν* 'wherever he guides you.'

77. If the facsimile may be trusted the letter before *-ην* is rather *σ* than *τ*. Is it not possible that there was here an original error of copying? Bücheler's suggestion of *Μηντύραννος* or *Μηνοτύραννος* seems very plausible. Menotyrannus was one of the titles of Attis, Orelli Inscriptt. 1900, 1901, 2264, 2353. Bitinna has before, v. 14 *ἦρ' οὐχὶ μᾶλλον Φρύξ;* alluded to Phrygia, the land from which slaves were imported, and the chief seat of Attis worship. In the introduction of an adjuration by Menotyrannus, we should have a similar allusion: and as it seems to me a very probable one. I would read therefore *οὐ Μην-* or *Μηνο- τύραννον.* But *οὐ τὴν τύραννον* has yet to be supported by parallel instances: would any one have known who was meant?

85. Judging from the facsimile, in the papyrus after AM. ΛΙ the remains of an H are visible, and of a N before EOPTHN. But between the I of AM. ΛΙ and the remains of the H it is not possible to smuggle in a T. In the *Classical Review* I suggested that the word ended in *-ῖτιν*: the facsimile might seem to point to *-ῆτιν*: but such a compound as *ἀμελειῆτιν* is hardly probable. That it cannot be *ἀμέλει τὴν ἑορτὴν ἐξ ἑορτῆς* I now maintain on *two* grounds, (1) it does not agree with the letters of the papyrus, (2) it is feeble. Either *ἀμελησῖτιν* or *ἀμελητῖτιν* would approximate to the traces of the MS.

VI.

23. *μὰ τούτους τοὺς γλυκέας.*

If this means children, compare Luc. Philopseudes v. *οἷα μὲν εἶπεν, ὅπως δὲ αὐτὰ ἐπιστώσατο, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἐπώμνυτο τοῖς πλείστοις παραστησάμενος τὰ παιδία.* xxvi. *καὶ ὁ Εὐκράτης ὥσπερ ἀναμνησθεὶς πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν τῶν υἱέων, οὕτως ὀναίμην,*

ἔφη, τούτων, ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτοῖν τὴν χεῖρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ, ὦ Τυχιάδη, πρός σε ἐρῶ.

33, 34.

Νοσσίδι χρῆσθαι
τῇ 'μῇ, δοκέω,

'*my* friend, I suppose,' ironical, and indignant (*Academy* l. c.). But the suggestion of the well-known name Medokos or Amadokos is undeniably seductive, and suits either the 3rd or 2nd century B.C.

63. Possibly *κατ' οἰκέ(τ)ην* as a slave, liable to be called to account and punished, if he was found selling anything illicit. Isocr. Areopag. 30 *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν ὥσπερ οἰκέτης.*

65. The facsimile points to 'Αλλ' ἔργ', *ὁκοῖ' οὖν ἔργα τῆς 'Αθηναίης*, not *ὁκοῖ' ἔστ'*. 'As for the work—it is such work, I tell you, as Athena produces.'

67. It was suggested in the *Classical Review*, that *ἓν* had formed part of the erased portion of this v. But the remains of the letters hardly suit *ἐγὼ δ' ἔν*, as I there conjectured. Possibly *δόξειας· ἓν μήν* (*μέν* ?): *ἓν* is a natural inference from *δύο γὰρ ἦλθ' ἔχων, Μητροῖ.*

VII.

104. Perhaps *εἰ δὲ τῶνδέ σοι χρείη*[1].

ROBINSON ELLIS.

[1] Since this was written, Sitzler of Baden-Baden has published in the *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft* an invaluable monograph on Herodas, in which all that has been written on him is brought under review. The fasciculus is no. 75 and includes a résumé of all that has appeared in 1888—1891 on the Greek Lyrici (except Pindar), Bucolici, and Anthologia Palatina. Berlin, Calvary, 1894.

DID AUGUSTUS CREATE EIGHT NEW LEGIONS DURING THE PANNONIAN RISING OF 6—9 A.D.?

MOMMSEN, as is well known, holds the view[1] that after Actium Augustus in his desire to get rid of the huge armies of the Civil Wars, and to keep military expenditure within the narrowest possible limits, retained only eighteen legions. Of these twelve, numbered consecutively I—XII, were probably taken from his own army, the other six, two numbered III[2], one IV[3], one V[4], one VI[5] and one X[6], from the armies of Lepidus and Antonius:—an arrangement which by making XII the highest number on the list and completing the total by duplicate legions, might have been intended to convey the impression that the number of legions retained was less by one third than was actually the case. This number, eighteen, Mommsen thinks, was not exceeded by Augustus during by far the greater part of his principate, and was in fact only increased, when the rising of the Dalmatian and Pannonian tribes in 6 A.D. seemed for the moment to place Italy and even Rome within measurable distance of being overrun by barbarian armies[7]. At this crisis, Augustus, if Mommsen's view is correct, suddenly rushed to the other extreme, and regardless of his former policy of keeping down the army, enrolled not only numerous corps of freedmen called cohortes voluntariorum, but no less than eight new

[1] Res gestae divi Augusti 2nd ed pp. 70—76.

[2] III Augusta: III Cyrenaica: III Gallica.

[3] IV Macedonica: IV Scythica.

[4] V Alaudae: V Macedonica.

[5] VI Victrix: VI Ferrata.

[6] X Gemina: X Fretensis.

[7] Momms. loc. cit. p. 72 'Itaque quam supra proposui coniecturam octo legiones a XIII ad XX creatas esse eo ipso anno 759 propter bellum Pannonicum egregie cum iis conciliatur, quae de rebus per eos annos gestis, dilectibusque institutis tradita accepimus.'

legions, numbered XIII—XX, thus at once increasing the legionary forces of the empire by very nearly one half.

I think it must be admitted that so sudden and so decided a change of policy, involving the addition of at least 40,000 men to the legionary army, can only be accepted on strong and definite evidence. In itself the simultaneous creation of eight new legions seems highly improbable. Certainly on no other occasion in the imperial history did anything similar take place: and the improbability appears by no means less, when this precipitate action is contrasted with the excessive desire which Augustus had hitherto, according to Mommsen, manifested of making his army appear a small one:—a desire which led to the apparently shallow device of manipulating the legionary numbers in the way already mentioned.

No doubt the crisis was a severe one: Velleius Paterculus might perhaps be suspected of exaggerating its severity in order to magnify the glory of his hero Tiberius: but we have no reason to doubt his statement[1] that the rebel army amounted to 200,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, while Suetonius[2] does not hesitate to describe the war as 'gravissimum omnium externorum bellorum post Punica.' Further than this it seems extremely probable from the statements of Velleius and Dio Cassius that Augustus did on this occasion raise some new legions. Velleius[3] says "Quin tantus etiam huius belli metus fuit, ut stabilem illum et firmatum tantorum bellorum experientia Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret. Habiti itaque dilectus: revocati undique et omnes veterani: viri feminaeque ex censu libertinum coactae dare militem." Dio Cassius[4] says *πέμπει τὸν Γερμανικὸν καίτοι ταμιεύοντα στρατιώτας οἱ οὐκ εὐγενεῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξελευθέρους δούς, ἄλλους τε καὶ ὅσους παρά τε τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν γυναικῶν δούλους πρὸς τὰ τιμήματα αὐτῶν σὺν τροφῇ ἐκμήνῳ λαβὼν ἠλευθέρωσεν.* Both statements are vague, but I think that prima facie they make it probable that Augustus created both new legions, composed at any rate partly of *εὐγενεῖς*, and new bodies of

[1] Vell. 2, 110.
[2] Suet. Tib. 16.
[3] 2, 110—111.
[4] 55, 31.

libertini[1]. The latter supposition is confirmed by a statement of Macrobius[2]; the former can only be confirmed, if at all, by circumstantial evidence. Mommsen considers that the four following considerations furnish us with such evidence.

(1) All the legions of which mention is made earlier than 6 A.D. belong to those numbered I—XII. Of those numbered above XII, there is no trace that any existed before that date, when legio XX is mentioned as serving in Pannonia under Valerius Messalinus[3].

(2) A number of legions are mentioned on coins as having contributed veterans to the various military colonies established by Augustus in the earlier part of his principate in Africa, Sicily, Macedonia, Spain, Achaia, Asia, Syria, Gallia Narbonensis and Pisidia[4]: all the legions so mentioned belonging to legions I—XII, those from XIII—XX being conspicuous by their absence, a fact not easily explained, if they were in existence like the rest from the beginning of the reign.

(3) Duplicate legions are found under the numbers III, IV, V, VI, and X—a fact best explained by supposing these legions to have been taken from the armies of the other triumviri—while no duplicate legion is found among those numbered XIII—XX.

(4) The original eighteen legions are found distributed indiscriminately over the whole empire, whereas of the other eight, all, when first becoming known to us, are found on the Rhine or the Danube, XVII, XVIII, and XIX in lower Germany in 10 A.D. with Varus[5], XIII, XIV and XVI in upper Germany in 14 A.D.[6], XX and XV in Pannonia, the former in 6—7 A.D.[7], the latter in 14 A.D.[6]

This view of Mommsen, supported on these arguments, has been approved first by Marquardt[8], and more recently by Domaszewski[9], and may be said to be generally accepted.

[1] Suet. Aug. 25.

[2] Sat. 1, 11, 33 Caesar Augustus in Germania et Illyrico cohortes libertinorum complures legit, quas voluntarias appellavit.

[3] Vell. 2, 112.

[4] Mon. Ancyr. 5, 35—36.

[5] The proofs of this will be given below.

[6] Tac. Ann. 4, 5.

[7] Vell. 2, 112.

[8] Staatsverw. ii. p. 445.

[9] ibid. 2nd edition and West-Deutsche Zeitschrift, Korrespondenzblatt 1891, p. 59.

Pfitzner indeed has rejected it[1], but on entirely uncritical and gratuitous grounds[2]. C. Robert has contested it, but mainly on the grounds that the Pannonian rising was not so formidable as Velleius represents it, and that the statements referred to above of Velleius and Dio Cassius point rather to the strengthening of existing legions than to the creation of new ones[3], and Mommsen has successfully vindicated his view in these respects[4]. More recently fresh objections have been raised by Patsch[5], (1) on the general ground of the improbability that Augustus would have sent newly raised legions of untried soldiers to so critical a campaign, (2) because Velleius distinctly describes the army of Varus as 'exercitus omnium fortissimus disciplina manu experientiaque bellorum inter Romanos milites princeps[6],' and (3) because several inscriptions relating to legio XX are found in Pannonia and Dalmatia, from which the legion was confessedly removed before 14 A.D. and almost certainly in 10 A.D., mentioning soldiers of the legion who had served as many as 17 campaigns[7].

The objections however have been answered by Domaszewski[8] who points out that Augustus may probably have done in this case what Claudius did in 43 A.D. on the creation of duplicate legions numbered XV and XXII, viz. have formed the new legions half of recruits, half of old soldiers taken from existing legions[9]. Mommsen himself however apparently thinks no such explanation necessary, and lays stress, regardless of the passage in Velleius, on the fact that the legions of Varus did consist of recruits[10].

[1] Gesch. der röm. Kaiserlegionen p. 13.

[2] It is extremely desirable that Pfitzner's book should be recognized in England, as it is in Germany, to be thoroughly untrustworthy. No statement in it can be safely accepted, which is not confirmed by references, and comparatively few of his statements are so confirmed. It is unfortunate that Prof. Bury in his admirable history of the Empire should have based almost all his statements with regard to the legions on this uncritical work.

[3] Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions 1868, pp. 94—107.

[4] Res gest. d. Aug. 2nd ed. p. 73 note.

[5] West-Deutsche Zeitschrift 1890, p. 332 foll.

[6] Vell. 2, 119.

[7] e.g. C. I. L. v. 948, iii. 7452.

[8] West-Deutsche Zeitschrift, Korrespondenzblatt 1891, p. 59.

[9] This is clearly an answer to all three objections of Patsch.

[10] Res gest. d. Aug. p. 73 'neque

When we turn to the four arguments on which Mommsen relies, it must be admitted that together they have a certain cumulative force which, in the absence of arguments on the other side, may make his conclusion a not improbable one. Still they are not impervious to criticism.

(1) If it is true that none of the eight legions, XIII—XX, are mentioned before 6 A.D. it is no less the case that of the other eighteen at least six—III Aug. IV Scyth. VI Ferr. VII, IX Hisp. and XI—cannot be proved to have existed before the end of Augustus' reign, while in the case of one other—III Cyrenaica—the inference that it existed earlier is based on mere conjecture as to the origin of its cognomen[1].

(2) The argument derived from the coins of the military colonies is partly the same argument put in another form, because of the 11 legions admitted above to have existed certainly in the earlier years of Augustus, legions I, II Aug.[2], IV Mac.[3], V Alaud.[4], V Mac.[5], VI Victr.[3], VIII Aug.[5], X Gem.[3], X Fret.[6], and XII Fulm.[6], in fact all but III Gallica[7], are only proved for this earlier period by these coins in question. The other seven legions equally with the eight of Mommsen are absent from these coins. This absence however neither in the one case nor the other proves anything as to the non-existence of the legions, for it must be noted that while Augustus says that he planted military colonies in ten provinces, the coins adduced by Mommsen come only from four, and the possibility must not be left out of account that veterans from some of the legions above XII were sent to colonies in Narbonensis or Africa[8] or Macedonia.

(3) The argument that we find duplicate numbers among

postrema causa cladis Varianae haec fuit Germanos rem habuisse cum exercitu tironum.'

[1] Cyrenaica is taken to point to the legion having belonged to Lepidus. The two legions IV and V called Macedonica are supposed to have been present at the battle of Philippi. On one inscription (C. I. L. iii. 551) leg. VIII is called Macedonica.

[2] C. I. L. ii. p. 458.

[3] Eckh. i. p. 37.

[4] Eckh. i. 12, C. I. L. ii. suppl. p. lxxxviii.

[5] Eckh. iii. p. 356.

[6] C. I. L. iii. p. 95.

[7] This is proved to have belonged to Antonius by Tac. hist. 3, 24.

[8] An inscription C. I. L. viii. 8837 proves that veterans of legio VII were settled at Thubuscum in Africa.

the legions I—XII and not among the other eight is to a certain extent weakened by the fact that with the exception of legio X, of which there were two, all the duplicate numbers occur in the first six legions, so that VII, VIII, IX, XI and XII are in this respect in the same position as the last eight.

(4) The argument that all these eight legions are, when first heard of, on the Rhine or Danube, has undoubtedly considerable force, especially when added to whatever weight may be assigned to the previous arguments. But here again I would point out (1) that legions XIII, XIV, XV, XVI are not found on these frontiers till 14 A.D., while, as it will appear below that fifteen legions were concentrated in Pannonia in 6—9 A.D., there must have been a considerable redistribution of legions after that date, and there is nothing antecedently improbable in supposing that some of these four legions may have come to Pannonia from the East, and only after the rising were stationed permanently in Pannonia and Germany, (2) it is not altogether safe to draw conclusions from consecutive legions being found in one or two provinces, for in 14 A.D. legions IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI[1] are all found either in the Danube provinces or in Tarraconensis—a fact which I think may fairly be placed side by side with the fact that, probably in 6—9 A.D., certainly in 14 A.D., legions XIII—XX were on the Rhine and Danube.

I cannot help thinking that these considerations detract something from the probability which is all that Mommsen claims for his arguments[2], while in what follows I shall attempt to show that apart from these particular objections, there are other considerations, based on facts which Mommsen himself admits, which make it almost necessary to assume that the army before the Pannonian rising must have numbered at least 22 legions.

To state the conclusion in advance which I shall attempt to establish, I should accept half of Mommsen's theory. I think the evidence of Velleius and Dio Cassius and the critical nature of the Pannonian rising make it probable that a certain number

[1] IV, VI and X were in Spain: V in Moesia, VII and XI in Dalmatia: and VIII and IX in Pannonia.

[2] loc. cit. p. 73 note 'haec quae proposui etsi coniecturarum terminos non excedere probe scio.'

of new legions were enrolled at this time. These new legions however were not eight in number but four; and so legions I—XVI, which including the duplicate legions amounted to 22, existed before the rising, and only legions XVII—XX were raised at this time, the first three by Augustus himself in Italy, the last by Tiberius in Pannonia. In favour of this view I shall adduce (1) the improbability of such an unparalleled increase in the number of legions when viewed in relation to the general policy of Augustus, (2) certain considerations which seem to put legions XIII—XVI in a different category from the other four, (3) a review of the imperial armies before the rising, by which it will be seen that the number eighteen is not large enough to satisfy the requirements of the case, and (4) a consideration and reconciliation of four passages from Tacitus, Velleius and Suetonius regarding the number of legions under the command of Tiberius at this time.

(1) With regard to the general improbability, I will add no more to what I have said. Strong and definite evidence would of course more than cancel this consideration, but Mommsen's four arguments do not amount to this, and I think are outweighed by it. It is perhaps not out of place to mention here that in any case the original number of legions could hardly have been the symmetrical eighteen which Mommsen supposes. For in the year 16 B.C. we learn from Velleius that M. Lollius suffered a defeat in Germany and that the eagle of a legio V was lost[1]. It has usually been assumed that this was the legio V Alaudae, which we know to have been in Lower Germany between 14 and 69 A.D. But Domaszewski rightly points out[2] that from all our evidence the annihilation of a legion or the loss of its eagle, the latter being involved in the former, was always followed by the disbanding and disappearance of the legion. The three Varian legions XVII—XIX were never replaced by legions of the same number: the four legions—I, IV Mac. XV Prim. and XVI—whose eagles were disgraced by surrender to Civilis and the oath of allegiance to the Gallic empire[3], were

[1] Vell. 2, 97.

[2] Archaeolog.-epigraph. Mittheilungen XV., p. 189.

[3] Four of the eight German legions took their aquilae with them, hist. 2, 89: these, as appears from hist. 2, 100,

disbanded by Vespasian: the two legions destroyed respectively in the Suebo-Sarmatian[1] and Dacian wars[2] of Domitian are supposed to have been XXI Rapax and V Alaudae, the latter of which probably, the former certainly, disappeared about that time, while legio IX Hispana in Britain similarly disappeared under Hadrian, in whose reign there is known to have been a disaster in that province[3], and its place was taken by VI Victrix. It was therefore probably not legio V Alaud. which lost its eagle under Lollius, but another legion of the same number, very likely that described on one or two inscriptions[4] as Gallica, while legio V Alaudae which was almost certainly in Spain during the early years of Augustus[5] was perhaps not sent to Germany till after this event. On Mommsen's view therefore the original number of legions must have been nineteen, on that here advocated twenty-three[6].

(2) Legions XIII and XIV are both called 'gemina.' Mommsen supposes that they were so called, because they were raised at the same time[7]. But then on his view all these eight legions were raised at the same time. Why then should two of them be singled out as geminae? If this was the origin of the cognomen it would seem to point to these legions having been created on a different occasion. But this is not the technical meaning of the term gemina, which we know both from Caesar[8] and from Dio Cassius[9] meant that a legion was created by the fusion of two or more legions into one. That after Actium or after taking over the legions of Lepidus, there were natural opportunities for such fusion is obvious, but I know of no such oppor-

were V, XXI, XXII and I Italica. It was the four whose aquilae remained in Germany that were disbanded: these are described in hist. 2, 100 as vexilla only.

[1] Suet. Dom. 6.

[2] Dio Cass. 68, 9.

[3] See Momms. röm. Gesch. v., p. 171 and the passage quoted by him from Fronto 'Hadriano imperium obtinente quantum militum a Britannis caesum.'

[4] C. I. L. iii. 293 and 294.

[5] See coins of leg. v. Eckh. 1, 12, 19.

[6] Would this to any extent explain Dio Cass. 55, 23 *τρία δὲ δὴ τότε καὶ εἴκοσι στρατόπεδα ἦ, ὥς γε ἕτεροι λέγουσι, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι πολιτικὰ ἐτρέφετο*, 23 referring to the original number, 25 to that at the end of the reign?

[7] loc. cit. p. 73, note ad fin.

[8] Caes. b. c. 3, 4 (legionem) quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat.

[9] Dio Cass. 55, 23 *τὰ δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν...ἀνεμίχθη, ἀφ' οὗπερ καὶ Δίδυμα ὠνομασμένα νενόμισται.*

tunity later in the reign, and certainly the occasion of the Pannonian rising was one much more likely to lead to the converse process adopted by Claudius in 43 A.D. As far therefore as the cognomen 'gemina' is concerned, it points to these legions as belonging to the original army of Augustus[1]. Further than this, a certain light, not always very clear, is thrown upon the origin of some of the legions by the ensigns or emblems which belonged to them. Domaszewski has shown[2] that most of these emblems, though not all, were signs of the Zodiac. Thus the emblem of those legions which had formed part of Caesar's army was apparently the Bull, Taurus being the sign of the Zodiac for the month in which Venus Genetrix, the patron-goddess of the Julian gens, is in the ascendant[3]. The legions created by Augustus himself apparently had the goat as their emblem, because Capricorn was the sign of the Zodiac for the month in which Augustus was born[4]. Now if legions XIII and XIV were twin legions in Mommsen's sense of the term, they would naturally both have the same emblem: but as a matter of fact, while legio XIV has the Goat, legio XIII has the Lion. They at any rate therefore had no common origin, even if Domaszewski is wrong in inferring that legio XIII may have been formed from some of the legions of Lepidus—an inference based on the fact that an African legion numbered XVI, probably anterior to the battle of Actium, is also proved to have the Lion for its ensign. With regard to legions XV and XVI there is little or nothing to be said, though it perhaps deserves notice

[1] The only other legions called gemina are legio X which was confessedly one of the original legions; and the legion enrolled by Galba in Spain and at first called Galbiana, Tac. hist. 2, 11 and 86. It was probably afterwards gemina, because its full complement was made up of soldiers from the disbanded legions of the Vitellians. There were also two alae in the army of Upper Germany at the end of the 1st century, ala I Flavia gemina and ala II Flavia gemina. These were in the same way probably alae created by Vespasian out of the fragments of several of the alae disbanded on account of their behaviour in the war against Civilis.

[2] Archaeol.-epigr. Mitth. xv., p. 182 foll. See also die Fahnen im röm. Heere.

[3] The Bull is the emblem of III Gall. IV Mac. V Mac. VII VIII Aug. X Fret. X Gem.

[4] Thus legio II Aug. XIV and XXII have this emblem.

that legio XVI has on two inscriptions the cognomen 'Gallica[1],' which may possibly point, as in the case of III Gallica and V Gallica, to its being a Caesarian legion, while if XVI was one of the original legions, XV would necessarily be so too.

Turning to the remaining four legions XVII—XX, we may note (1) that, supposing four legions to have been created later than the rest, they would necessarily be these four, i.e. those with the highest numbers, just as XXI and XXII are generally allowed to have been formed after the defeat of Varus, (2) that whatever weight there may be in Mommsen's argument as to legions consecutively numbered being found together, it applies with peculiar force to legions XVII—XIX, which are found together in lower Germany and immediately after the Pannonian rising[2], whereas there is no other instance that I know of in which three consecutive legions are found together. If, as will presently be suggested, three of the German legions were immediately on the rising drafted off to Tiberius, Augustus would naturally fill their places with the newly raised legions. (3) The reason why legio XX is not found with the other three—a point which might at first sight seem against the supposition that they were raised at the same time,—is really rather confirmatory of it. For legion XX was raised by Tiberius himself, no doubt on the first news of the rising. That this was so is, it seems to me, conclusively proved by Domaszewski[3] from Tac. Ann. 1, 42 where Germanicus, who is addressing the two legions I and XX, but in the camp of the former, says "Primane et vicensima legiones, illa signis a Tiberio acceptis, tu tot praeliorum socia, tot praemiis aucta, egregiam duci vestro gratiam refertis?" He addresses himself directly to legio I, which naturally in its own camp would be standing nearest to the tribunal—tu tot praeliorum socia—while legio XX standing behind or further off is spoken of

[1] Wilm. 1563: Inscr. R. N. 2866.

[2] The legions of Varus seem to be identified with certainty as XVII, XVIII and XIX. XIX is mentioned as one of them by Tacitus ann. 1, 60: a soldier of leg. XVIII is mentioned in an inscription from Vetera as killed 'bello Variano' Bramb. 209, while all three legions are conspicuous by their absence from all records, literary and epigraphical, throughout the empire.

[3] West-Deutsche Zeitschrift, Korrespondenzblatt 1893, p. 262 foll.

as "illa." Legio XX then was enrolled by Tiberius and kept for use against the Pannonian rebels[1]. There is therefore good reason why the three legions, if raised by Augustus in Italy, should be together in Germany, and why the fourth legion, as raised by Tiberius himself, should be in Pannonia.

(3) But there arises the general question as to the number of troops in the different provinces before the Pannonian rising. Undoubtedly the two most important frontiers were the Rhine and the Danube. On the former there had been almost continual warfare, first under Drusus, then under Tiberius, with the result that all Germany was practically conquered between the Rhine and the Elbe[2]. On the latter, a series of wars had gradually led to the conquest of Dalmatia, Pannonia and Moesia, so that at this time the Danube was the frontier, political if not at all points defended by troops, from Raetia and Noricum to its mouth. It was manifestly impossible for these results to have been achieved without a considerable number of legions. In 5—6 A.D. preparations were made for joining the Elbe line with that of the Danube by taking in the Bohemian kingdom of Maroboduus. The attack was to have been made both from Germany and Illyricum. From the former the legate, Sentius Saturninus, was to lead up his legions by way of the Hercynian Forest; from the latter Tiberius himself was to lead the Illyrican army from Carnun-

[1] Previous to this correct explanation of Domaszewski, the passage has been explained to mean that legio I received its signa from Tiberius, and as it was impossible to suppose that legio I was wanting from the original list, it was thought to have been in some way involved in the defeat of Varus, in consequence of which it was reconstituted by Tiberius. See Momms. res gest. p. 68, note 1. Now all is plain. Legio XX was created by Tiberius in Pannonia, where we find it still 'semiplena' (Vell. 2, 112) during the war while legio I—called Germanica on one or two inscriptions—had shared the German campaigns of Tiberius. The cognomen Valeria of legio XX has generally been explained from the fact that the legion served under Valerius Messalinus: but Domaszewski points out (1) that no other instance is known of a legion receiving its name from a subject, (2) that Nero, the cognomen of Tiberius, was a Sabine word meaning 'fortis et strenuus' (Suet. Tib. 1, Aul. Gell. 13, 23), and that therefore Valeria was most probably equivalent to 'valens' and was chosen as a reminiscence of Nero, the creator of the legion. Conf. cohors I Breucorum Val(eria) v(ictrix).

[2] Mon. Ancyr. 5, 26, 10—12.

tum[1]. The strength of these combined armies we know from a passage of Tacitus[2], where Maroboduus, referring to this occasion, boasts that he had been threatened by twelve legions "se duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse." Of these twelve legions, Mommsen supposes that five belonged to the German army, arguing from the year of Varus' defeat when he had certainly three legions and Asprenas two[3], and that Tiberius in Dalmatia and Pannonia had seven[4].

According to Mommsen himself therefore, twelve out of the eighteen legions, which he supposes to have formed the imperial army at the time, were in Germany, Dalmatia and Pannonia. But in addition to the Illyrican army of seven legions, Mommsen evidently supposes at least one to have been in Moesia, for he goes on to say "und die Zahl von zehn (Vell. 2, 113) kann füglich bezogen werden auf den Zuzug aus Mösien und Italien" (i.e. presumably one from Moesia and two from Italy). There remain therefore only five legions for the rest of the empire. But we know that the garrison of Spain at this period was three legions. This is proved for 14 A.D. by Tacitus[5], while the testimony of coins proves the existence of the same three legions there,—viz. IV Mac. VI Victrix and X Gem.—under Augustus[6]. Then Africa was certainly garrisoned by one legion, III Augusta, under Augustus, as it was afterwards[7]. We learn from Strabo that under Augustus three legions were posted in Egypt, one in Alexandria and two in the country districts[8]—an arrangement which probably existed up to the

[1] Vell. 2, 109.

[2] Ann. 2, 46.

[3] Vell. 2, 117 and 120.

[4] röm. Gesch. v., p. 37 note 1. "Nimmt man an, dass von den zwölf Legionen, die gegen Maroboduus im Marsch waren, so viele als wir bald nachher in Germanien finden, also fünf auf dieses Heer kommen, so zählte das illyrische Heer des Tiberius sieben." In the Res gest. d. Aug. p. 72, Mommsen does not apparently accept this statement, or at least supposes that it may refer to some later occasion, perhaps after the Pannonian rising was put down. The note quoted above however clearly gives up this view.

[5] Ann. 4, 5 Hispaniae recens perdomitae tribus habebantur.

[6] Eckhel i. 37, conf. C. I. L. ii. suppl. p. lxxxviii.

[7] Tac. hist. 4, 48 legio in Africa...sub Augusto Tiberioque principibus proconsuli parebat.

[8] Strab. xvii. 1, 12.

dislocation of legions at the Pannonian rising: while lastly the important Syrian frontier which in 14 A.D. was garrisoned by four legions had, as we know from two passages of Josephus[1], at the time when Varus was legate of the province, i.e. between 6—4 B.C., three.

It would therefore appear that previous to the Pannonian rising, instead of the eighteen legions which Mommsen supposes, there must certainly have been 23, or if, as I shall argue below, the Moesian legion was included in the Illyrican army of Tiberius, twenty-two. How Mommsen, who himself supposes, as will have been seen, thirteen legions on the Rhine and Danube, would provide for the other military provinces, I do not know. He leaves this side of the question undiscussed, but the difficulty seems to me to be entirely fatal to his view.

(4) On the other hand, supposing the number of legions to have been twenty-two at the time, or in other words, that XIII—XVI were in existence before 6 A.D., I think we can get a probable and consistent account of what took place. In order to do this, we must start from four statements made by our authorities; (1) that of Tacitus already alluded to that Maroboduus in 5—6 A.D. was threatened by twelve legions[2], (2) a statement of Velleius[3] that after reinforcements had come to him, Tiberius had ten legions, concentrated in a single encampment, (3) another statement of Velleius[4] that five legions were brought over to Tiberius from transmarine provinces by A. Caecina and Plautius Silvanus, and (4) the statement of Suetonius[5] that Tiberius was in command of fifteen legions in this war. With a very slight modification of statement (3), which is manifestly not entirely correct, I propose to accept all these statements and to show that they are consistent with one another and with our other data.

In the first place Maroboduus was threatened with twelve

[1] Joseph. Ant. Jud. xvii. 10, 9 and bell. Jud. ii. 3, 1.

[2] Tac. Ann. 2, 46.

[3] Vell. 2, 113 iunctis exercitibus quique sub Caesare fuerant quique ad eum venerant, contractisque in una castra decem legionibus.

[4] Vell. 2, 112 exercitui quem A. Caecina et Silvanus Plautius consulares ex transmarinis adducebant provinciis circumfusa quinque legionibus nostris etc.

[5] Suet. Tib. 16 per quindecim legiones...triennio gessit.

legions, and, as Velleius shows, these were the legions of Germany and the 'exercitus qui in Illyrico merebat.' That this last expression is inclusive of the Moesian legion or legions, and not exclusive of it, as Mommsen assumes, is I think made probable (1) by such passages as Tac. hist. 1, 76—fiduciam addidit ex Illyrico nuntius, iurasse in eum Dalmatiae ac Pannoniae et Moesiae legiones,' and hist. 2, 85 where the expression Illyricus exercitus includes the Moesian legions, (2) by the improbability that the Danube army would be larger than the Rhine army at this time. During the Julio-Claudian emperors, the German legions were eight, the Illyrican never more than seven, frequently less, and the same proportion was observed during the Flavian times. It was not indeed till the 2nd century that the Danube line was considered to require more legions than the Rhine. For the same reason I believe that the German legions numbered six, and the Illyrican six. It is generally assumed that Varus had only five legions in 10 A.D. This however is by no means certain. In addition to the three legions of Varus himself and the two of Asprenas, there were also sufficient troops at Aliso to resist the attack of the Germans, and finally to cut their way to the Rhine[1]. That this was a sixth legion is very probable, though of course not certain, and indeed Mommsen himself is quite ready to assume the presence of another legion in order to explain the supposed need for reconstituting legio I[2]. We will suppose therefore that there were six legions in Germany and six in Illyricum, and that these were all being concentrated against Maroboduus when the Pannonian rising took place[3]. In such a crisis the six legions forming the Illyrican army were not enough. But

[1] Vell. 2, 120, 4.

[2] Res gest. d. Aug. p. 68 note 1. Itaque ut primae legioni etiam ante cladem Varianam locus inveniatur, fortasse sumi potest eam cladem ad quartam legionem, non aequabiliter tamen, pertinuisse.

[3] It is perhaps necessary to remark that this by no means implies that the full complements of all these legions were taken away from their own head-quarters. Probably the same thing took place in this case, and in the case of the five Oriental legions to be noticed directly, as in the Civil war of 69 A.D. when legions are described as marching to Italy, which undoubtedly left a certain proportion of their soldiers behind in Germany.

there were no legions so near at hand as the German, and it was the obvious course for Tiberius to take some of them. If he took half the German army, i.e. three legions, and hastily raised a new one himself—legio XX Valeria Victrix—we have the situation described by Velleius in statement (2), the number of his legions being ten. Meanwhile in Italy Augustus with all possible haste was raising three new legions XVII, XVIII and XIX, which he naturally sent to Germany to take the place of the three which had joined Tiberius, while orders were sent to the transmarine provinces, i.e. no doubt Syria and Egypt, to send across five more legions. The arrival of these—perhaps three from Egypt and two from Syria—led as far as Moesia by Plautius Silvanus legate of Syria[1] and there joined by A. Caecina legate of Moesia, the bulk of whose army, as I suppose, was already with Tiberius,—brings us to statement (3) and also accounts for the fifteen legions mentioned in statement (4). With regard to these five legions Velleius is inaccurate in two respects, (1) in representing Caecina as helping to lead from across the sea, whereas he could only have joined them in Moesia, (2) in placing their arrival at the beginning of the war, for it is quite clear that some considerable time would elapse before they could have arrived on the scene. There is little doubt therefore that chronologically statement (3) should follow statement (2), although from the order in Velleius it might be inferred that these five legions helped to make up the total—ten.

Mommsen explains these numbers differently. According to him, Tiberius had seven to start with in Pannonia: three were then received from Moesia and from the new levies in Italy, thus making the number ten, while five others came from the Eastern provinces and from Germany, the latter being replaced by three new legions from Italy[2]. There are two

[1] See Liebenam, die Legaten p. 369.

[2] This seems the only explanation of the note in röm. Gesch. v. p. 37. 'Nimmt man an, dass von den zwölf Legionen, die gegen Maroboduus im Marsch waren, so viele als wir bald nachher in Germanien finden, also fünf auf dieses Heer kommen, so zählte das illyrische Heer des Tiberius sieben, und die Zahl von zehn kann füglich bezogen werden auf den Zuzug aus Mösien und Italien, die fünfzehn auf den Zuzug aus Aegypten oder Syrien und auf die weiteren Aus-

objections to this view, (1) It entirely sets aside the statement of Velleius that five legions came from transmarine provinces, and supposes that of the five only two really did so, while the other three came from Germany, (2) This explanation only accounts for five of the supposed eight newly raised legions. For if all the eight were, as Mommsen argues, sent to the Rhine or the Danube, we should get according to his reckoning twenty-three legions for these two frontiers,—i.e. the original twelve: one from Moesia, two from the East, and eight new legions, whereas fifteen was the maximum concentrated under Tiberius, and Varus in Germany on Mommsen's view had five. I see no way out of these difficulties except by the explanation which I have suggested.

The rising was hardly over, and the fifteen legions probably not dispersed, when the disaster happened to the three legions of Varus. Two fresh legions—XXI Rapax from the vernacula multitudo in the city, and XXII afterwards Deiotariana from soldiers once belonging to the Galatian army,—were enrolled[1]; so that Augustus had seventeen legions to dispose of, besides the three in Germany, one in Syria, three in Spain, and one in Africa. Of these seventeen, five, including the new legio XXI, were sent to make up eight on the Rhine: three to make up four in Syria: two, including the new legio XXII, to Egypt: thus leaving seven for the Danube provinces, two for Dalmatia, three for Pannonia, and two for Moesia. In this way we arrive at the numbers given by Tacitus for all the provinces for the year 14 A.D.[2]

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hebungen in Italien, von wo die neu ausgehobenen Legionen zwar nach Germanien, aber die dadurch abgelösten zu Tiberius Heer kamen.'

[1] I do not give the proof for this here, because the supposition is practically accepted by all who have treated the subject.

[2] Ann. 4, 5.

THUCYDIDES AND THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

That Thucydides is unquestionably our one first-class authority for the story of this episode of Greek History is rightly and candidly admitted by Holm [Gesch Sic II pp 343, 367] and Cavallari [Topografia p 196, Lupus pp 114—5]. Nor does Freeman dispute this; but he is inclined to put more faith in Diodorus than others do, regarding that writer as in part a follower of the Syracusan eye-witness Philistus[1]. Holm and Cavallari regard him rather as a follower of Ephorus and Timaeus, inferior authorities. All agree that in the use of his authorities Diodorus is not always intelligent. The question then is, what use can be made of Diodorus? Holm says 'Diodor ist nur da zu benutzen, wo er in wohl zusammenhängender Darstellung Thukydides ergänzt, sonst überall zu verwerfen, wo er Thukydides widerspricht.' Cavallari says 'Quindi, quando troviamo delle contraddizioni tra Tucidide e Diodoro, è impossibile che ci serviamo di quest' ultimo; solamente là dove Diodoro completa Tucidide senza contraddirlo, ce ne potremo servire.' We are by these opinions reduced to make but a very small use of Diodorus. And even this *minimum* of trust rests on a strange basis of reasoning. Because we cannot trust a writer where he conflicts with another writer, therefore we can only trust him when he gives us his version of something which the other does not mention at all. Such is historical criticism, even in eminent hands. The position of Freeman is surely far more logical; but the frequent exposure in his notes of the manifold insufficiency of Diodorus is not calculated to lend much support to the latter's authority.

[1] See Freeman vol III preface, note on p 1, and Appendix I, in particular p 610.

Plutarch is a better writer than Diodorus, more intelligent in the use of his authorities (of whom Thuc is the chief), and it is certain that he used Philistus and used him critically[1].

Other writers who touch on this episode need not be mentioned here. And the temporary siege works of both sides have disappeared.

It is then on Thucydides that we really depend. This justifies an attempt to make out with all possible minuteness what his evidence really amounts to. Vast pains have been well spent on this by Arnold, Poppo, Classen, Grote, Thirlwall, Leake, Holm, Cavallari, Freeman, and others: but in my opinion there are still points, historical and topographical, on which no satisfactory conclusion has been reached. Some of these I now attempt to handle. I did a hard week's work on the ground at Syracuse in 1883, of which I kept careful notes. In the same year I wrote a series of papers on the subject for lecture purposes. After more than ten years waiting, and in the light afforded by the great modern writers, I have recast such parts of these papers as contained something that I believe to be new. This is therefore not a complete treatise, but an attempt to clear up a few points in the story without thrashing old straw.

The new Syracusan wall.

Thucydides VI 75 § 1 tells us *ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν ὅπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν ἦν ἄρα σφάλλωνται καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ ἄλλο.*

Here three works are mentioned as being carried out in the winter of 415—4 BC. We are concerned with the first of these, of which we learn four things:

(1) it was right against the city of Syracuse.
(2) it encompassed the Temenites.
(3) it was a wall running all along the ground looking to ['facing' or 'towards'] Epipolae.

[1] Holden, Introduction to Plut Nik § 17.

(4) it was meant to render an investment (which, if they should meet with reverses, must be taken into account) a matter of difficulty; and this by increasing the extent of the investment works that their enemy would have to build.

From the last of these it may be gathered that, before this new wall of defence was built, an enemy might have built an investing wall from sea to sea without having to make it much (if at all) longer than the westward walls of Syracuse itself. The new wall would throw back the enemy's works so that, instead of running nearly in a straight line from sea to sea, they would form two sides of a triangle. It may be added that, while the salient angle represented more or less by their own new wall enabled them to move on interior lines to the succour of threatened points in it, the reentering angle necessarily formed by the besiegers' lines would compel the enemy to move at a disadvantage on exterior lines for such purposes. This Thucydides does not add; but the point would hardly escape the notice of (say) Hermokrates, and the practice[1] of Gylippus shews that such little matters of strategy were well understood.

Next we may observe that, the more acute the salient angle is the more acute the reentering angle will be: and thus the advantage of defence over attack is up to a certain point proportionately increased. There would probably be counterbalancing disadvantages in too great a degree of acuteness, but we shall not need to enter into the question further for the present purpose.

Next it may be pointed out that, under the conditions of (*a*) the shape and position of the city, facing the land on the west side only, and (*b*) the state of poliorketic arts and machinery, one bold projection of the new work to the West would effect the intended result at least as well as either a number of small projections or one long projection running at a very obtuse angle or even almost parallel to the existing city wall. To me it seems obvious that the one bold projection does its work better, but I leave this to appear gradually as the discussion goes on.

[1] Thuc VII 3 § 4.

We are therefore to find out if possible from the words of Thucydides what line this new wall did actually follow. I take the evidence in detail.

(1) *παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν.* It is usually held that these words compel us to believe that the new wall ran generally speaking nearly North and South, forming roughly the base of the triangle of which the apex is at the western end of Epipolae. Some authors make the line straighter than others, but I believe I am right in saying that all now in one line or other carry it right across the lower end of Epipolae or the lower ground between Achradina and Epipolae, whichever form of words be preferred. That is, all reckon the direction implied in *ὁρῶν* from Achradina (or the Outer City) only. When I reflect that the Island was the oldest part of the city, to which sentiment would chiefly adhere; that it is almost certain that the Agora and other public places of the joint city lay in the low ground between Achradina and the Island, over which the Theatre rises and probably rose then; when I try to put myself in the place of a Syracusan of 415 BC; I cannot see the reasonableness of this assumption. I rather infer that the direction should roughly speaking be taken as at right angles to a line drawn from between the Island and Achradina to the end of Epipolae. I would not press this in minute detail, but it serves to give generally the direction I conceive to be naturally implied in the Greek words. However at present I go only so far as to leave this question open without prejudice, proceeding to inquire whether any further references or allusions fit in better with one or other of the two suppositions.

(2) In the fight over the first counterwork we are told that the Athenian 300 *αἱροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα· καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλιπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν Τεμενίτην.* It is I think generally allowed that this refers to the part enclosed by the new Syracusan wall. We know of no other Syracusan *προτείχισμα* as yet. The three detached redoubts or camps on Epipolae [VII 43 § 6] were not yet built. The *προτείχισμα* of the Athenian *κύκλος* seems to have been an advanced work to strengthen that important part of their lines. Is not 'the outwork encompassing the Temenites' a

very strange expression for a long strip of ground added to the city by a wall running almost North and South across the East of Epipolae? Why this particular and emphatic notice of the inclusion of the Temenites? Is it not remarkable that we find stress laid on this inclusion in the only two passages where Thucydides refers to the new wall?

(3) The first counterwork is dealt with fully under another head. Here I will only point out that if (as I believe) it ran out from the city-wall proper close by the point where the *προτείχισμα* joined that wall, then the starting of the counterwork would be much easier, it being in its first portion commanded by the wall of the *προτείχισμα*. Again, the *πυλὶς* mentioned falls into a far more natural and useful position on this theory than on any other.

(4) In describing the building of the counterworks Thucydides uses the words VI 99 § 3 *ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι*, 101 § 2 *ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως*, VII 4 § 1 *ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι*. Why is he so particular to note that each work rested on the city? What other starting-point was possible? He may have meant little by this thrice repeated expression. We are all flat at times. But a clear and significant sense is got at once, if we render 'they began from the city'; that is, not from the *προτείχισμα*, which itself was built *πρὸς τῇ πόλει*. And I hold that in all three cases the counterworks are more easily understood if we accept this view.

(5) In VI 98 § 2 the Athenians build the *κύκλος*, in 99 § 1 they go on building to the North; having in 100 taken and destroyed the first counterwork, in 101 § 1 they work to the South and fortify the cliff of Epipolae over the swamp. They then take and destroy the second counterwork. In 102 the Syracusans attack the *κύκλος* and are not far from taking it. Yet in 103 § 1, in spite of this recent activity of the Syracusans on the high ground, though their own fleet have just entered the Great Harbour (102 § 3) and the completion of the northern section of their lines would seem to be now more than ever urgent, the Athenians continue the building of the southern section, and a double wall to boot. It may be that this was mere fatuity. But on my theory of the *προτείχισμα* a good reason

at once appears. If the southern section clearly must run far nearer the Syracusan works than the northern one—which is my view—then it would be an obvious gain to get this part built and done with while they were still fresh, and while the enemy (sure to molest them if they could) were cowed by their first defeats. Whether this gain would not be more than outweighed by the loss of other advantages, was for Nikias to consider. If he did consider it, and decided rather as an engineer than as a strategist[1], I can only say that in so doing he was true to what we know of his reputation and character.

(6) It may be said that the northern section of the Athenian lines would have run as near to the wall of the quarter of the city called Tycha as the southern did to the *προτείχισμα*. Possibly, had Tycha existed then. But I at present believe that it did not, and have given my reasons in the *Classical Review* of March 1894. Till some sound reason is shewn for the contrary belief, I venture to assume my published conclusions. An additional note on the subject is given below.

(7) Lastly I would point out that in the course of the narrative we read of many operations taking place on the ground West of Achradina and North of the Temenites. For these operations more room is left on my theory, and this is so far a gain. When we find the armies cramped for want of room, as VII 5—6, we are told that this was owing to an unwise choice of position, and that it was soon after remedied.

Hitherto I have dealt with the course of the new wall on the northern side of the Temenites only. But its southern course is also matter of dispute. I believe that it curved round along the cliff edge to the eastward and joined the wall of Achradina on the high ground, never descending to the swamp and the harbour. I believe with Cavallari Holm and Freeman[2] that a wall already [dating possibly from Gelon's time] ran in continuation of the western wall of Achradina down to the Great Harbour. This I hold to be referred to in VI 3 § 2 *ὕστερον δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἔξω [πόλις] προστειχισθεῖσα πολυάνθρωπος*

[1] For Nikias as engineer see Thuc III 51, Arist Birds 363, Plut Nik 3. His strategic blunder was in giving up his base at Thapsus.

[2] See their maps and the one in Lupus marked II A.

ἐγένετο. Those who do not believe that such a wall existed in 416 BC are of course driven to carry the new wall down to the harbour. But I do not purpose to discuss this question at length, for I have nothing new to add to what has already been written. I have only to remark that on my supposition we get more room for the operations on this side also.

General Plan of the works.



N = the Island. A = Achradina [ἡ ἔξω πόλις]. CD = western wall enclosing Outer City. T = Temenites. O = Olympieum. P = Plemyrium. L = Lysimeleia. R = Labdalon. K = κύκλος with Athenian lines running from it. E, F, G = first second and third Syracusan counterworks.

The plan does not aim at minute accuracy. For instance the outwork T may be carried a little too far to the West. But it is sufficiently accurate to illustrate my views.

Further note on Tycha and Neapolis.

In my paper on Tycha referred to above [p 50] I did not discuss the passage of Cicero[1] [II in Verr 4 § 119]. Perhaps it will be as well to refer to it now. He is describing the quarters of Syracuse, and says *tertia est urbs quae, quod in ea parte Fortunae fanum antiquum fuit, Tycha nominata est, in qua gymnasium amplissimum est et complures aedes sacrae; coliturque ea pars et habitatur frequentissime. quarta autem est quae, quia postrema coaedificata est, Neapolis nominatur; quam ad summam theatrum maximum, praeterea duo templa sunt egregia, Cereris unum, alterum Liberae, signumque Apollinis qui Temenites vocatur pulcherrimum et maximum.* Out of this rhetorical description questions arise

1. Is the explanation of the name Tycha to be accepted ?
2. If so, does this tend to shew that Tycha existed as a fortified quarter before Neapolis ?
3. Is the statement that Neapolis was the last quarter covered with buildings (a) an independent statement, or (b) an etymological inference, and generally (c) trustworthy ?
4. What is the relation of Cicero's Neapolis to the Τεμενίτης of Thuc VI 75 § 1 and τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον of Diodorus XIV 63 ?

I will deal with these in order.

1. If we accept this explanation, it must be with due reserve, and in default of others[2]. As he says *fuit*, it is natural to infer that the temple did not exist in 70 BC. This is a suspicious circumstance, unless we are to suppose that it was destroyed when Marcellus took the city, which can hardly be inferred from Livy XXV 25 and Plut Marcell 19. Besides, if the explanation be Cicero's own, it is of no authority whatever; if based on information given him at Syracuse, we must not

[1] Lupus p 241 thinks this description borrowed mainly from Timaeus. But had not Cicero just visited Sicily to get evidence against Verres? It is plain too from Tusc v § 64 that he visited Syracuse in 75 BC while quaestor at Lilybaeum.

[2] See Lupus p 110.

forget that his Syracusan friends also told him that the tomb of Archimedes did not exist[1].

2. If the existence of a temple on a spot makes it probable that the said spot was then fortified, and if there be reason to think that a temple of Τύχη[2] existed in the part afterwards the quarter Tycha before the temples in the part afterwards Neapolis, this would lend some little countenance to the view that Tycha was the earlier quarter of the two. But, while the great antiquity of the Olympieum is undisputed, the *φρούριον* of Thuc VI 75 § 1 was apparently a new fortification: and in 395 BC, when Imilkon attacked Syracuse, we read [Diod XIV 63] *κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον καὶ τοὺς νεὼς τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.* As Imilkon never succeeded in establishing an effective siege, we must regard this as an open suburb[3]. And, as Cicero is our only authority for the some-time existence of the temple of Τύχη, we can draw no inferences as to the relative antiquity of either the temples or the quarters of the city. We may however observe that Cicero places the Temenite Apollo in Neapolis. If the supposed temple of Fortune was older than that of Apollo, it is surely astounding that we have no reference to it. I will now venture to suggest that this temple of Fortune, if it ever existed, was erected in honour of the destruction of the Athenians, in which Fortune had played no inconsiderable part.

3. When Cicero tells us that the Neapolis *postrema coaedificata est,* I believe we are face to face with a statement which is either a mere echo of information derived from those who lionized him at Syracuse or a mere etymological inference of his own. If he aired his Greek scholarship by making such a suggestion, is it likely that Greeks of a subject city would correct him? Would not the rising Roman, whose patronage was just then so important to them, be in their eyes *supra historiam,* even if (which is most unlikely) they were competent to correct him? As historical evidence I believe these words of Cicero to have no value whatever.

[1] Cic Tusc v § 64.

[2] On Τύχη in connexion with Himera see Holm I p 408.

[3] Grote part II c 82.

4. The Neapolis of Cicero includes an upper part, the Temenites and its neighbourhood on the high ground; the lower terrace, in which the theatre is cut, and which is probably to be reckoned with the preceding[1]: and doubtless also some of the lower ground, called by some topographers the Roman Neapolis. It would seem then that it includes the Temenites and exceeds it to the South. The *προάστειον* of Diodorus can hardly be taken to include Temenites, for Imilkon never secured a footing on the high ground[2]. It would seem then that Cicero's Neapolis includes the *προάστειον* and exceeds it to the North. My conclusion then is that the upper Neapolis, having once been fortified, remained so[3].

I am not dealing with mere groups of houses, but with walled quarters of the city. And it seems to me *a priori* most unlikely that, after the Island and Achradina were occupied[4], the next step in advance should be made along the high ground to the North. We then look for positive evidence, and find that it consists of (a) an emendation [Τύχην or Τύκην for Ἰτύκην] in Diod XI 68, (b) an inference therefrom that the quarter Tycha existed in 466 BC, that is, that Diodorus is using his authorities intelligently, and (c) a literal and uncritical acceptance of doubtful details in a rhetorical passage of Cicero. I hold that no part of this evidence is of any real value, and that the indications in Thucydides are decidedly the other way.

If Marcellus did, as Livy XXV 25 § 5 says, encamp *inter Neapolim et Tycham*[5], it would seem that a considerable space parted the southern wall of Tycha from the northern wall of

[1] See maps in Cavallari and Lupus.

[2] Grote pt II c 83 thinks that he did, but the passage cited (Diod XIV 63) says nothing of the kind. Surely the *προάστειον* is more naturally the lower Neapolis.

[3] What authority Grote had for saying that the new wall including Temenites was pulled down after the Athenian siege I cannot discover. Grote pt II c 82.

[4] See Lupus pp 30—1 on the southern side of Achradina being its natural outlet. This supports my view that the tendency would be southward rather than northward. And if the dwellers on the piece known as Tycha were [Lupus pp 34—6] mainly Sikels, I doubt all the more their being allowed to fortify it.

[5] Lupus p 229 argues that these two quarters had then no separate

Neapolis in 212 BC. Compared with this the words of Plutarch Marcell 18 are strange. He speaks of *τὴν ἔξω πόλιν, ἧς τὸ μὲν* Νέαν *τὸ δὲ* Τύχην *ὀνομάζουσι.* This by itself would rather suggest that they were conterminous. I fancy Livy's account is right. And this is a further inducement to believe that the wall enclosing Temenites ran as I have maintained it did, and that it was not pulled down. Indeed, why should the Syracusans want to pull it down? The Athenian lines, and their own third counterwork, it was natural to destroy. They were a nuisance.

It is very hard to come to positive conclusions from such doubtful indications, appearing as these indications do only here and there amid the general silence of the authors. However I feel bound to try and form an opinion as to the date of the fortification of Tycha as a city quarter. I believe this took place at the time when Dionysius built the northern wall of Epipolae. Diodorus XIV 18 says *ἔκρινε δεῖν τειχίσαι τὰς* Ἐπιπολὰς *ᾗ νῦν τὸ πρὸς τοῖς* Ἐξαπύλοις *ὑπάρχει τεῖχος.* The strength of the Hexapylum, and the fact of its leading into Tycha[1], appear from Livy XXIV 21 § 7, 32 §§ 5—7, XXV 24 §§ 1—7. We cannot be certain, but I believe with Grote[2] that this date [400 BC] is the most probable one. I can find no authority for dating the construction of the Hexapylon or Hexapyla, but I know of no other date so probable as this. The work commanded the northern road at its descent from Epipolae. It may be that it belongs to the works referred to in a very unsatisfactory passage of Diodorus [XV 13], which Grote [c 83] takes of the southern wall of Epipolae. He may be right, but the words are so indefinite that other works may also be meant. Grote's account of the works of Dionysius is not worthy of him; and he strangely marks Tycha in his map as still unfortified while in his text he admits that it was now included.

walls of their own. I do not see that Livy's account proves this. If it does, then both the building and unbuilding of the walls of Tycha are alike wrapped in mystery.

[1] Lupus pp 35, 211, 228, argues that it was not included in Tycha. Possibly, but I agree with Weissenborn that it had a gate opening into Tycha.

[2] Grote pt II c 82.

I must now drop this subject from sheer consciousness of having said enough and more. Yet those who have studied these matters will see that I have omitted a great deal. I am glad to find that Col Leake also held that the new wall of Thuc VI 75 § 1 ran in much the same way as I suppose it to have done, and that this *προτείχισμα* was the only projection from the wall of Achradina at the time of the Athenian siege. I only saw his paper lately, and am sorry that I cannot agree with some of its details. But I value it highly.

Labdalon and the σκεύη.

Thucydides, after describing the victory by which the Athenians made good their footing on Epipolae, and how the Syracusans declined battle on the day after, adds [VI 97 § 5] *ὡς οὐκ ἐπεξῄεσαν αὐτοῖς, ἐπαναχωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ ᾠκοδόμησαν, ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς ὁπότε προΐοιεν*[1] *ἢ μαχούμενοι ἢ τειχιοῦντες τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.*

That Labdalon was on the northern edge of Epipolae is now I think generally admitted. I am here concerned solely with its purpose and its relation to the events of the siege. To keep a watch upon the Syracusan post at Megara [75 § 1] was one purpose. Another was to serve as a depot for baggage and military gear. The latter is the main point of my inquiry.

The Athenians had surprised Epipolae early in the morning. The same day—still early, it would seem—they repulsed the hasty and disorderly attempt of the Syracusans to drive them from the position they had occupied. Next day they offered battle to the Syracusans without success. After this, we are told, they built the fort Labdalon. Now, while the army had been holding Epipolae for more than a day, doubtless the baggage train was not idle. A vast quantity of material was gathered together on the high ground, for the safe keeping of which a defensible post must be provided. So the Labdalon fort was built and a garrison [98 § 2] left in charge.

[1] *προσίοιεν* MSS.

Meanwhile the Athenians built the *κύκλος*, and from it were at first carrying their wall to the north. Then they left this and worked southward to the edge of the cliff, and thence carried a double wall down to the Great Harbour. All this time we hear nothing of Labdalon. But Gylippus, who in his march to Syracuse must have passed close by it—unopposed, as it seems—resolved to take the place; which by a piece of good but commonplace strategy he presently did.

The notable feature in the account [VII 3 § 4] of the capture is that we have no hint of any goods or gear being taken in the fort. Of the garrison we read *καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν*, words sounding as though the force there was small: which would be natural enough if they had no store of goods to guard, and if men were (as they were) greatly needed elsewhere. This weakness will also explain why they did not attempt to bar the passage of Gylippus.

But, if the *σκεύη* and *χρήματα* were not there, where were they? In 4 § 5 we learn that most of the *σκεύη* were stored in the forts on Plemyrium, and in 24 § 2 we are told that, when Gylippus took that post also, a vast quantity of *χρήματα* and *σκεύη* and stores of all kinds fell into his hands. The Athenians had made it their storehouse [*ὥστε ταμιείῳ*], and its loss was a great blow to them.

Plemyrium however was not occupied till after Labdalon had been lost. Clearly then there was a third depot in which the *σκεύη* and *χρήματα* were lodged after leaving the one and before being placed in the other. That this was no other than the *κύκλος* seems to me practically certain. Not only does it at once suggest itself as a suitable place, but we find that when Nikias was left there with a handful of men [VI 102 § 2] he beat off a Syracusan attack by setting fire to the *μηχαναὶ* and other timbers that were stacked in front of the wall [of the *κύκλος*]. This wood lay, I take it, in the *δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα*. And it is no great effort of imagination to suppose that, while the less bulky and more valuable goods were inside the *κύκλος*[1] itself, the bulkier and less valuable would be stored in the outwork covering it in front.

[1] See on the *κύκλος*, p 64.

I may at least claim that on my theory the course of events is all clear. If I have now and then to be content with slight indications, they are at least all in my favour, and there is not a trace of any hostile evidence whatever.

The κύκλος.

As I fully agree with those who hold that this word, wherever used by Thucydides in describing the siege of Syracuse, means a round work or ring-fort from which the investing lines were meant to run North and South in two sections to the sea, I will not here discuss the general question. Whether in two or three challenged passages this sense can be fairly maintained, and whether the other sense 'line of investment,' sometimes attributed to it, can really be justified by good and clear authority, are the points into which I propose to inquire.

(1) In VI 99 § 1 we read *καὶ τῇ ὑστεραιᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος*. Now one can perhaps hardly say that this might not mean 'that part of the investing line formed by the northern wall,' though I confess to a belief that Thucydides would then have preferred to write *τοῦ κύκλου τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τεῖχος*. But it is surely much more natural to understand it 'the wall to the North of the *κύκλος*[1].' And to me the expression below [§ 3] *κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες* seems to respond to the *πρὸς βορέαν* above[2]. For I render *κάτωθεν* 'on the southern side of.' That this is sound Greek is beyond a doubt. For instance VI 2 § 4 *τηρήσαντες τὸν πορθμὸν κατιόντος τοῦ ἀνέμου* 'when the wind set down the strait from the North.' So Herodotus I 142 *τὰ ἄνω αὐτῆς χωρία..... τὰ κάτω*, compared with I 72 (of river Halys) *ῥέων ἄνω πρὸς βορέην ἄνεμον*, and *ἀναπλώουσι* in VI 28. We may also render

[1] See however note on p 60.

[2] I wish some competent scholar would fully discuss the meaning of *τῶν κάτω* in Thuc VIII 5 § 4. Herod V 25, VII 135, uses a different expression, and I 177 only illustrates the commoner usage. Thuc goes on VIII 6 to speak of Pharnabazus, who held the coast to the North of Tissaphernes.

κάτωθεν 'on the harbour side of[1],' but this seems to me weaker and less clear, though topographically it will make no difference. To render it 'on lower ground than' is I think out of the question. In any case the κύκλος is surely a ring-fort.

In 101 § 1 we find τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους. Here ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου means 'with the κύκλος as their central or determining point[2].' There is no ἀρξάμενοι, as in the case of all three Syracusan counterworks[3]. Most likely the strong position on the cliff edge was secured first, and the gap between it and the ring-fort filled in afterwards. But ἀρξάμενοι is in any case not needed, if κύκλος = ring-fort. For such a work could only be meant to serve as a starting point for the investing lines. In the case of the counterworks it was clearly necessary to state that they began from the city wall and extended gradually outwards. It is also here quite needless to insert (as some would) ἐς or πρὸς before τὸν κρημνόν. But to render this passage 'beginning at one end of the unfinished circle[4]' is simply prodigious.

It is hardly less so in 102 § 2 to render αὐτὸν τὸν κύκλον 'the lines themselves[5],' and ἐν αὐτῷ 'there' = in the lines. Not only does the whole context go against giving this sense to κύκλος, but when Nikias does stay behind between the two walls [VII 43 § 2] this is put plainly, ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν[6]. Furthermore, it is not clear that any length of wall had as yet been built in double; for surely in 103 § 1 τείχει διπλῷ is emphatic.

I come now to the passage VII 2 § 4. Thucydides tells us that at the coming of Gylippus the double Athenian walls were completed to the Great Harbour, save a little piece then in course of completion at the sea end. He adds τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι

[1] Cf καταβᾶσι VI 101 § 1, ἄνω VII 4 § 1 = up along the slope of Epipolae, § 2 — up from the Harbour to the high ground.

[2] So too Classen *ad loc.*

[3] See p 49.

[4] Jowett's translation.

[5] Jowett.

[6] Freeman III 664 seems to take this also of the κύκλος. Surely this is unnecessary.

τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελείπετο. Here it does at first sight seem as though κύκλος must mean the 'line of circumvallation' as Jowett [on VI 98 § 2] maintains. This Classen admits, so, in order to save the sense of κύκλος, he follows Stahl in striking out the words τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον. Here we have two desperate alternatives. I will not repeat the criticisms of Freeman, which are [III pp 665—6] exactly the same as what I wrote down eleven years ago, with one exception. He accepts Grote's view, that τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου = ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, and I do not. I hold that τὸ ἄλλο τοῦ κύκλου is as if he said τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου. Only he is not here expressing the two directions in terms of North and South, but simply in terms of relation to a common starting point, the κύκλος. He has first mentioned the section from the κύκλος to the Harbour [= southern]: he goes on to speak of the section on the other side of the κύκλος [= northern], and to make this quite clear he puts in πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν. The words τοῦ κύκλου are in the nature of an afterthought[1]. They are strictly speaking suggested and governed by the notion 'from,' which the author here began to feel necessary. Why? Because he had not said from what point the southern or Harbour section was to be reckoned. And τῷ ἄλλῳ is dative because of παραβεβλημένοι, and also has τῷ πλέονι tacked on to it by way of correction. Therefore we must not render 'on the other side of the ring-fort stones lay ready piled most of the way,' but rather 'for the other section—the greater part of it at least—, running from the ring-fort to meet the sea at Trogilus, stones lay ready piled.' That is, ἑτέρωθι would not have expressed the purpose of the stone-heaps, which Thucydides means to express: and it serves no good end to explain that which is

[1] Cf VIII 16 § 3 καθῄρουν αὐτοὶ τὸ τεῖχος δ ἀνῳκοδόμησαν [ἐνῳκοδόμησαν Dobr, Cl, Hude] οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Τηίων πόλεως [τὸ] πρὸς ἤπειρον, where 'on the mainland side of the city' = 'towards the mainland, looking from the city.' Perhaps VI 99 § 1 should be taken in the same way, τὸ πρὸς βορέαν not agreeing with τεῖχος. The τῷ ἄλλῳ here is certainly harsher, but I cannot think that it is impossible.

written by that which there is reason to think was intentionally avoided, unless that very avoidance throws some light upon the matter.

My conclusion then on this first point is this. So far as the narrative of Thuc VI, VII, goes, there is every reason to prefer the sense 'ring-fort.' This I hold should only be abandoned in case general usage in Thucydides and elsewhere is found so strongly hostile as to forbid such an interpretation.

(2) That the word κύκλος is used of the vault of the sky, of the sun and moon, of a wheel or round shield, of the Agora of a city, etc, etc, is well known. In some usages the notion of roundness clearly predominates, in others that of included area. We have no word so graphic as 'umfang' to express this. Closely connected with it is the sense 'orbit,' 'period,' 'revolution,' in which the notion of completeness clearly appears.

We have here to deal with it as applied to enclosure or fortification. At starting let me say that I do not admit arguments drawn from the adverbial expressions κύκλῳ or ἐν κύκλῳ in support of extensions or limitations of the meaning of κύκλος. These usages are naturally much looser, and any illustrations derived therefrom are merely incidental.

An enclosure may be regarded (a) from inside or outside (b) in relation to its shape (c) as complete or incomplete, in fact as being or not being strictly an enclosure. As to shape, we are only so far concerned with it that, in cases where the notion of roundness suggests itself, we should not be surprised if the enclosure were really circular. To make more of the notion of 'roundness' conveyed by the word is, as instances will shew, not generally possible in discussing enclosures of a military kind.

I shall then treat the subject in order (*α*) enclosures from inside, complete or incomplete, (*β*) enclosures from outside, complete or incomplete. The former are defensive, the latter offensive.

(*α*) Thuc II 13 § 8 (of the defence of Athens) τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδιοι ἦσαν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεος, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. [See also Xen Hell II 4 § 11, Isokr XVIII § 53, p 379.]

Herod I 98 (of the seven ramparts of Agbatana) *μεμηχάνηται δὲ οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ τεῖχος, ὥστε ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου κύκλος τοῖσι προμαχεῶσι μούνοισί ἐστι ὑψηλότερος..... τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι τεῖχος κατὰ τὸν Ἀθηνέων κύκλον μάλιστά κη τὸ μέγαθος.*

Plato, Laws p 745 b *θέμενον Ἑστίας πρῶτον καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα, κύκλον περιβάλλοντα.*

Demosth p 325, de Cor § 371 [that he provided for defence not by stones or bricks, but by appliances of warfare] *ταῦτα προυβαλόμην ἐγὼ πρὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅσον ἦν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ δυνατόν, καὶ τούτοις ἐτείχισα τὴν χώραν, οὐχὶ τὸν κύκλον †μόνον† τοῦ Πειραιῶς οὐδὲ τοῦ ἄστεος.*

Strabo p 270, VI 2 § 4 [of Augustus repopulating Syracuse with a colony] *πεντάπολις γὰρ ἦν τὸ παλαιὸν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίων ἔχουσα τὸ τεῖχος. ἅπαντα μὲν δὴ τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον ἐκπληροῦν οὐδὲν ἔδει.*

These notable passages all regard *κύκλος* from the inside, as a defensive *enceinte*. And in most of them the ring, whatever its shape, is complete. Demosthenes uses it of the Piraeus, the entrances to the basins of which were probably defended by chains. This hardly makes an exception on the ground of discontinuity. And it may be that, as opposed to *τὴν χώραν, κύκλος* here means no more than an 'included area.' It clearly does so in the passage of Strabo [cf also p 655, where he uses it, like Thuc's *περίπλους*, of the circuit of an island]. It is curious to observe that Thucydides, having used *κύκλος* of the *ἄστυ*, when he goes on to speak of Piraeus and Munychia [II 13 § 9] uses *περίβολος*[1].

The word *κύκλος* is then freely used of defensive works, which naturally are in most cases complete circuits. I cannot point to a single instance of its use to represent an incomplete circuit.

(*β*) The verb *κυκλοῦν*, especially in the middle voice, is used of enclosing with hostile intent; but the substantive *κύκλος* is rare. One remarkable passage however calls for consideration.

[1] *περίβολος* of the *ἄστυ* I 89 § 3, 93 § 3, of cities generally 90 § 2, of Munychia Piraeus etc Strabo p 395, IX 1 § 15.

Xen Hell v 3 § 16 (of the siege of Phlius by Agesilaus) *ἐνέβαλέ τε εἰς τὴν χώραν καὶ ταχὺ περιτειχίσας ἐπολιόρκει αὐτούς.* § 22 (of the sallies of Delphion and his picked men) *πολλάκις δὲ μεθ' ὧν εἶχε περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ ἐκθέων ἀπέκρουε φύλακας ἄλλοτ' ἄλλῃ τοῦ περιτετειχισμένου κύκλου.*

Here *κύκλος* seems to mean the investing wall of the besiegers. But it is joined with *περιτειχίζειν*, a verb nearly always used of besiegers[1]. And it clearly goes all round the place. It is like the [double] lines round Plataea, which in Thuc III 21 § 2 are called *περίβολοι.*

At present then I am unable to find a single instance of the use of *κύκλος* by itself to signify besieging lines that do not actually surround the place besieged. The word is usually applied to a defensive ring-wall, and, whether defensive or offensive, the circuit is regarded as complete.

But this was not so in the case of Syracuse. The walls intended to cut off the city on the land side were an *ἀποτείχισμα*, not a *περιτείχισμα* at all. True, we do find *περιτειχίζειν* etc used of these works[2]: but *ἀποτειχίζειν* etc more often, and in the most striking passages, as VI 101 § 2, 103 § 1, 104 § 1, VII 1 § 1, 6 § 4, 42 § 3. So too in the case of Potidaea, I 64—5. *περιτειχίζειν κύκλῳ* or *ἐν κύκλῳ* is used strictly of Plataea II 78 § 1, loosely of Mytilene III 18 § 4.

I conclude finally that we have no clear and sufficient authority for applying *κύκλος* to such lines of investment as those constructed or designed by the Athenians before Syracuse.

If it be urged that completeness was meant to be given by a naval blockade, and that this is in effect part of the *κύκλος*, we may ask, how then are we to render VI 98 § 2 *ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους*—what is the force of this aorist? The question is an old one, but it comes in properly at this point.

I have now only to add an imaginative description of the scene in VI 98 § 2. After saying that they built the *κύκλος*

[1] Not always, see Thuc v 2 § 4 *περιτείχισμα* [one is tempted to conjecture *προτείχισμα*], Aristoph Birds 552.

[2] Was it a misunderstanding of some passage containing *περιτειχίζειν* that occasioned the error in Diodorus XIV 18?

speedily, the writer adds καὶ ἔκπληξιν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας. What I picture to myself is this. Nikias or Lamachus picks a spot. A stake is driven to serve as centre, and from it a rope is stretched by a man. The length of this radius is fixed by the general. The man then walks round, describing a circle. Men follow him with stones, which they lay in the line of his tread. Along this line building at once begins. By the time he gets round to the point whence he started the wall is already well begun, the fatigue parties bringing up the stones with orderly speed, and the λιθολόγοι laying them on a well understood plan. To the Syracusans, the discipline of whose fatigue parties[1], like that of their troops in battle, was probably much below the Athenian standard, this orderly and methodical progress was astounding.

And now, what was the δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα of the κύκλος [102 § 2]? That it was not meant to protect the men while engaged in building the κύκλος [whatever that word may mean], is the one point upon which I think we may feel assured. To build wall A, in order to cover wall B while building, is a piece of absurd clumsiness of which even the Spartans before Plataea would hardly have been capable.

I believe it to have been an outwork of lower and less elaborate wall, covering that part of the ring-fort which faced the enemy. It would be an arc of a circle, described from the same centre as the ring-fort itself, but with a longer radius. It would at each end abut on the investment wall running from the ring-fort[2]. It happened to be about 1000 feet in length. As we do not know its depth, that is the difference between its radius and that of the ring-fort, we can only get a general notion of the size of the latter. If however I am near the truth in my reconstruction of this part of the works, it will follow that the κύκλος is represented on far too large a scale in such maps as those of Lupus and [above all] Freeman. These also make the προτείχισμα to have a straight front, not a curved one: why, is hard to see. Even Holm, who curves it, does not bring it round to join the investment wall on each side, thus losing half the utility of the outwork.

[1] Cf vi 69 § 1, 100 § 1, vii 3 § 3. [2] See plan on p 72.

We may now ask, why should the ring-fort specially need an outwork? I can only answer that on my theory of the use of it as a depot for military stores all is clear[1]. Such a depot was exposed to risks beyond the rest of the lines. For instance, fire-darts or other incendiary missiles hurled over the wall among the *χρήματα* and *σκεύη* might at any time cause irreparable damage.

The Syracusan Counterworks.

The first of these works is thus described VI 99 § 3 *ἐτείχιζον οὖν ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες, τάς τε ἐλάας ἐκκόπτοντες τοῦ Τεμένους καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καθιστάντες.* In 100 § 1 we read *ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ὠκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτειχίσματος.*

From this I gather that it ran out from the city athwart the Athenian (intended) line of investment on the southern or harbour side of the *κύκλος*. Also that it was a wall of stone with wooden towers at intervals. That the work itself was in any sense a stockade I do not infer. The use of stakes (a) to carry platforms in the towers, and perhaps all along the southern side of the wall, (b) to form temporary stockading at the exposed end, towards the enemy[2], for protection of the builders as the wall proceeded, is to my mind quite enough to suppose in the way of woodwork. No doubt like other walls this one had battlements or a parapet, probably rude. The face of the wall would be to the North: any platform would be on the southern side. That a line of stockading ran all along both sides of the wall I certainly do not believe[3].

The account of the taking of this work may be given as follows. Part of the Athenian army made a feint against the city [the northern part of the wall of Achradina, I take it], part marched upon the stockade which ran by the postern [so I render *τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα*]. Meanwhile a body

[1] See on Labdalon p 57.

[2] See § 2 *καὶ φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους.*

[3] As supposed by Holm, whose map is absurd in respect of this first counterwork.

of 300 picked men had been ordered to make a sudden rush upon the counterwork [*τὸ ὑποτείχισμα*]. We then read *καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ τριακόσιοι αἱροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα, καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλιπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν Τεμενίτην.* Now are we to infer (as some do) that the *σταύρωμα* is merely another name for the whole or part of the *ὑποτείχισμα*, or that in making a rush upon the *ὑποτείχισμα* they came upon the *σταύρωμα*? The latter, I think. Thucydides mentions the picked body *before* the two divisions of the army and says *προὔταξαν θεῖν δρόμῳ* and so forth. Now from *προὔταξαν* I infer that the picked men started first. This was to see what speed could do in the way of a surprise. In fact this small body moving quickly did all that was needed. But if they had failed, there was still the larger force marching [*ἐχώρουν*] on the stockade. That is, the small picked body were meant to turn the end of the counterwork and secure it by a rush. Finding no resistance, they went on to storm and carry the stockade. This done, up came the larger body, and together they followed the flying Syracusans into the Temenite outwork. Out of this they were presently driven in some disorder. The Athenian army then withdrew [from the *προτείχισμα*, I take it], pulled down the stonework of the counterwork and tore up the stockade [*τήν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθεῖλον καὶ τὸ σταύρωμα ἀνέσπασαν*] and carried off the stakes to their own lines. It is to be noted that the *σταύρωμα* and the *ὑποτείχισις* are spoken of as distinct. I now proceed to give a plan shewing how I understand this obscure affair. The counterwork is shortened, and the curve of the Temenite wall sharpened, to save room.

I have placed the *πυλὶς* in the city wall, not in that of the *προτείχισμα*, because I imagine that the gate in the latter, through which the Athenians followed the flying Syracusans, would be of considerable size. This may be wrong: the *πυλὶς* may have been in the wall of the *προτείχισμα*. So too the *σταύρωμα* may have run diagonally, not at right angles to the counterwork. But these points are not vital to my interpretation.

I have not made the stakes a structural part of the counter-

work itself. I do not see that the words of Thucydides compel us to do so. Therefore I have only allowed for them as applied to purposes that seemed to me conceivable when I studied the narrative on the ground. If stakes could be driven so firmly



A = The *προτείχισμα* inclosing Temenites, E = its wall, F = its probable gate. BC = wall of Achradina, D = the *πυλίς*, G = a probable gate of communication. HI = the *ὑποτείχισμα*, KK = a section of it complete with wooden towers and scaffold gangway between them, HK = a section being built, with *σταυροὶ* meant *προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους*. O = *τὸ σταύρωμα το παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα*. L = the Athenian 300, M = part of Athenian army marching *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν*, N = part marching *πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα*. Of the Syracusans, some had left their post and gone into the city; others had remained but were under cover in the noonday heat, probably at H; a third section were on guard at O, but were slack in their watch.

as to check the invading army day after day in the combats obviously expected by the besieged, then the changes of 23 centuries must have completely metamorphosed the upper grounds of Syracuse. As a mere temporary shift, or to bear

vertical pressure, they are intelligible enough. And the Athenians seem to have pulled them up with no great difficulty.

This is one of the passages that cause me to doubt whether Thucydides himself ever visited Syracuse. It reads to me like the work of a man making the best story he could out of the account of an eye-witness. If it be the work of one who had been on the ground, it is inexcusably obscure.

The second counterwork (VI 101) presents no real difficulty. It was a line of palisade running out from the city wall, with a ditch beside it, in a W or WSW direction across the swamp. The ditch would probably be on the northern side of it, towards the enemy. The ground would be well suited for driving stakes, and we are not told that the Athenians pulled these stakes up. The movements that led to the capture of this work are also comparatively easy to understand.

The third counterwork is described thus [VII 4 § 1] *καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποτειχίσαι.*

From this I infer that

(1) it was strictly a built wall, no doubt of stone: we hear nothing of *σταυροὶ* in connexion with it.
(2) it was a single line of wall.
(3) it ran up (*ἄνω*), or inland: both renderings give the same topography, but I do not venture to decide between them.
(4) it rested on, or started from, the city wall.
(5) it ran along Epipolae.
(6) its object was to cut the intended line of the investing wall, and so prevent investment by *ἀποτειχισμός*.

In VII 5 § 1 we hear of the continuation of the wall, in 6 § 1 of its having almost reached the point of crossing the line of investment, in 6 § 4 it is actually carried past that point. So far all seems fairly clear; and surely there is nothing at present

to suggest that the wall ran in any other than as near as possible a straight line right along Epipolae.

After this difficulties begin, and it will be best, before attempting to deal with them, to look ahead and see what evidence we have as to the wall in its final form and extent.

In his letter [11 § 3] Nikias speaks of it as a single wall built past the Athenian lines, and adds that the investment of Syracuse cannot be continued unless this *παρατείχισμα* be first taken by a strong force. Demosthenes on his arrival [42 § 4] came to much the same conclusion. He saw that the wall was a single one, and if he could only master the approach to Epipolae [*ἀναβάσεως*, cf *προσβάσεις* VI 96 § 1]—that is, by Euryalus,—and also carry the camp [really 3 camps] on it in due course, he could thus take the wall with ease. That is, he would turn it and take it in rear. From this we may infer that the wall now ran the whole length of Epipolae, and could only be attacked successfully in the way described. And in 43 § 1 we find that a front attack made with engines was an utter failure.

Now comes the story of the night attack [43] from which we learn that there was a Syracusan fort [*τείχισμα*] commanding the approach by Euryalus, on which fort we may fairly infer that the wall abutted; and also that the wall had battlements [*ἐπάλξεις*], no doubt on its southern face. In all this again there is nothing to shew that the wall ran in any other than an approximately straight line from end to end.

I now go back to the passage out of which the difficulties arise. Thucydides tells us [7 § 1] that just after the wall had crossed the intended line of investment the succours from Corinth arrived, *καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. So stands the traditional text. Only two solutions are worth serious consideration.

(1) Holm, Classen, Hude, throw out *μέχρι* as having been added by a scribe who misunderstood the words of 4 § 1 *πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν*. They then take *τὸ λοιπὸν* with *τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. That is, the new-comers helped the Syracusans to build the rest of the cross-wall. The sense is of course possible: but who can believe that *μέχρι* is an insertion?

This is a desperate and inadmissible remedy, and rests on a wilful assumption of no inherent probability.

(2) Grote and Freeman assume that Gylippus, when once they had crossed the Athenian line, set his men to work at the other (or western) end of Epipolae, and so built back to the cross-wall. The latter says [III p 258] 'As soon as that wall had secured its first object by being carried westward of the Athenian wall, the obvious course was to begin the work again at the west end [of Epipolae, he means]. By that means a smaller extent of ground was left exposed while the wall was building, and the important hold on Euryalos was secured.' His views are developed in an appendix. He thus makes the two parts of the *παρατείχισμα* meet end to end in one line. To him *μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους* means this, to Grote it means that the new part (called *τὸ λοιπόν*) abutted on the cross-wall at an angle. For Grote first carries the cross-wall diagonally to the northern edge of Epipolae; wrongly, I think, for the subsequent movements are on his theory far more difficult to understand. If then the text be all sound, I should accept Freeman's view, believing however that they began building again not only from the western end but all along the line.

It must nevertheless be admitted the phrase *τὸ λοιπὸν* is on this supposition isolated and very obscure. The rest, of what? No doubt our author does bring in new details suddenly and obscurely with the definite article, as VI 98 § 2 *τὸν κύκλον*, 100 § 1 *τὴν πυλίδα*, VII 53 § 1 *τὴν χηλήν*, as Holm points out in another connexion; but this *τὸ λοιπὸν* is to my mind much more awkward. Indeed I can hardly believe that Thucydides left it thus. And therefore I venture to hazard an emendation of the text, so slight that it hardly deserves the name. It is to read *τεῖχος* for *τείχους*. Then *καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τεῖχος* = 'and helped the S to build the rest of the wall to the crossing-point.' That is, from its furthest western point to the point where it crossed the Athenian line. Here two questions arise, (1) is *τεῖχος* too far removed from *τὸ λοιπόν*, (2) can *τὸ ἐγκάρσιον* mean that part of the wall where it had just crossed the Athenian line?

(1) It is true that such combinations as 4 § 7 *τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς* are briefer and simpler. But the arrangement is essentially the same, and the tendency to separate an important substantive from its article is noticeable everywhere [as *ὁπλίτας* 50 § 1, *τελευτὴν* 6 § 1, etc]. And I observe that, where *τειχίζειν τεῖχος* occurs, the verb often throws forward the noun to the end of the clause, as VI 75 § 1, 99 § 1 *οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος*, VII 4 § 1, 5 § 1, I 64 § 3 *ἀπετείχισε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλλήνης τεῖχος*. In VI 99 § 3, the first mention of cross-walls, *τεῖχος* is so far from *ἐτείχιζον* that he puts in *ἄγοντες*, which relieves the construction. The same happens where the verb is not *τειχίζειν* but one implying it, as *ἀπετετέλεστο* VII 2 § 4, *ἐτελεύτα* VIII 90 § 4. But, where the noun changes, it more commonly and naturally seems to come near the verb, as VI 91 § 6 *τειχίζειν δὲ χρὴ Δεκέλειαν τῆς Ἀττικῆς*, 98 § 2 *ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον*, 101 § 1 *ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνόν* [where *ἐτείχιζον* is drawn back by *ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου* preceding]. I am not seeking to establish a law, but to shew that my proposal is from this point of view an admissible one: so let this suffice.

(2) *ἐγκάρσιος* = 'athwart.' When you have the direction of A given in the context, and B is *ἐγκάρσιον* to A, it means that the two lines cut each other,—nearly or quite at right angles, in the instances known to me. The word is rare. More common is *ἐπικάρσιος*, chiefly in Herodotus and Polybius, and the sense of the two seems to be identical. Herod IV 101 is the most notable passage: there *τὰ ἐπικάρσια* is the coast-line of Scythia, being the 'cross parts' at an angle to the inward measurement [*τὰ ὄρθια τὰ ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν φέροντα*]. *μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου* then I render 'as far as the cross part,' the part where it had just crossed the Athenian wall and from a *ὑποτείχισμα* become a *παρατείχισμα*. The use of the neuter[1] singular is like 4 § 1 *πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον* = 'to the cross,' 'athwartways.' The radical difference between the two ex-

[1] Leake well compares Xen Hell IV 3 § 23 *πρὸς τὸ σιμόν*, V 4 § 54 *πρὸς ὄρθιον*, both with *διώκειν*. For the fully developed adverbial sense cf Aesch Prom 212 *πρὸς τὸ καρτερόν*, Agam 130 *πρὸς τὸ βίαιον*.

pressions is that *πρὸς* only gives the direction, while *μέχρι* limits the extension.

That *τεῖχος* might easily become *τείχους* with *τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου* preceding it is no great stretch of fancy[1]: and that *ο* and *ου* are sometimes interchanged may be seen even if we go no further than the variants given by Hude on the Sixth Book. Thus VI 1 § 1 *τοῦ πλήθους* [*τὸ πλῆθος* ABEFM], 77 § 1 *ἀμύνοντες* [*ἀμύνουντες* F], 82 § 2 *ἀμυνούμεθα* [*ἀμυνόμεθα* ACEFM], 83 § 2 *οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα* [*οὐκ ἄλλο ἐπόμεθα* ABCEG et similia F], 91 § 6 *πυνθανόμενος* [*πυνθανομένους* AB et ? F pm]. I now leave my suggestion to its fate.

To sum up, I hold with Freeman that the third counterwork ran right along Epipolae in as straight a line as the ground allowed, and joined a fort at the western end. To illustrate the movements on Epipolae connected with this wall, I must give a plan.



A = Athenian *κύκλος* with its *δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα* and investment walls joining it. B = northern end of Athenian wall. CD = Syracusan third counterwork as in Thuc VII 5 § 1—6 § 3 [in 5 it would only have got about as far as E]. F = position of armies in the battle 5 §§ 2, 3, [1 = Syr. 2 = Ath]. G = position in the battle 6 §§ 1—3. HC = continuation of Syracusan wall with fort at end. K = Euryalus. L = Labdalon. MMM = the three Syracusan *προτειχίσματα* on Epipolae. N = post of the 600.

[1] This false syntactical adaptation is well known to occur in MSS. See Madvig Advers I pp 52—9. Prof Tucker finds several instances in Thuc VIII.

The shape of Epipolae is of course not exactly given, and the three προτειχίσματα cannot be placed with certainty. Now that the existence of the great northern aqueduct marked by Schubring has been disproved by later research [Lupus pp 260—5], there is nothing, so far as I see, with which to correlate them. I cannot think that they were on the line of the counterwork: had that been their position, we should probably have had some slight indication of it in the words of Thucydides. As it is, we only learn [43 §§ 3—6] that the men who escaped from the fort H carried the alarm to the three camps and to the 600. The main body of the Athenians seem to have been advancing direct on these bodies of the enemy: and meanwhile another party [§ 5 ἄλλοι δὲ] were attacking the wall. What little we can infer from this is against placing the camps along the line of wall. The positions of the armies in the two battles F and G can only be judged by reference to the text, which is too long to quote here.

That this third counterwork was a vast undertaking will not be denied. If we measure from the wall of Achradina, it was over 3 miles in length: if we assume the existence of a walled quarter Tycha at this time, not less than $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles. But the Syracusans were good builders, and their all was at stake. They would have a vast number of willing hands to carry out the work, for non-combatants would help in many ways. The Athenians had collected some of the stones [5 § 1], and easily cut stone was plentiful all along the line. Indeed I doubt whether the Athenian lines, with their κύκλος and double walls, were not a greater feat of constructive energy.

The χηλὴ *and* Λυσιμέλεια.

Thucydides VII 53 §§ 1—2, speaking of the battle in which Eurymedon fell, and the defeated Athenian ships many of them had to make for the shore beyond the narrow face of their own camp, tells us that Gylippus in support of the Syracusan fleet παρεβοήθει ἐπὶ τὴν χηλὴν μέρος τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς. The advance was made in some disorder, and the

Etruscan contingent, sallying forth from the Athenian lines, routed the leading troops of Gylippus *καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην.*

The meaning of *χηλή* is a mole or shore line, natural or artificial, that takes the force of the sea waves and protects something behind from their impact. The needful references are given in Liddell and Scott. The swamp Lysimeleia was directly to the West of the Great Harbour, north of the mouth of the Anapus. Between it and the sea was the *χηλή*, a strip of slightly raised shore, whether wholly natural or partly artificial can hardly be determined.

There is no real difficulty in the passage, but it does surprise me to find that modern writers do not explain the movements of the forces on this ground. They seem to speak of Gylippus and his army without asking where they stood that day before making this movement on the *χηλή*. If we are trying to understand Thucydides, the question must be asked and a reasonable answer found. Gylippus can hardly have been operating from the city, for the Athenian lines came right down to the sea between Syracuse and the Lysimeleia.

I have no doubt whatever that he was with his army in or near the *πολίχνη* at the Olympieum. That post was strongly occupied with horse and light troops [4 § 6, 37 §§ 2—3], who had already given the Athenians much trouble. Besides, he had lately [50 § 1] returned from the West with a new force. There was nothing to gain by throwing this reinforcement into the city, which was now no longer in danger: and the men would be more useful and more easily fed outside. Again, the main object was now [51 § 1] to prevent the Athenians from retreating by land. And the operations contemplated from the city were naval, and of these Gylippus seems never to have taken the direction. Furthermore, his new troops had as yet seen no fighting; and he could on the side of the Olympieum employ them in operations where a repulse would not endanger the city. So we find that he did not employ them till a favourable moment [*ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας*], and the result of their disorderly rush fully justified the judgment of the Spartan.

When then we read that he advanced *μέρος τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς*, we are to understand the words as referring wholly or in great part to the *στρατιὰ πολλή* brought in by himself quite recently.

I think the passage is on my supposition now as clear as can be. I hope I have got at the right meaning. If I have, this little matter well illustrates the difficulties caused to readers of Thucydides by the omission of details. On the task of bridging over these little gaps in the story conjecture is perhaps as well employed as on 'restoration' of his traditional text.

W. E. HEITLAND.

PLATO. *PHAEDO, CHAPTER XLVIII.*

Mr Archer-Hind in his edition of the Phaedo has devoted an appendix to the discussion of this difficult chapter, wherein, after criticising previous interpretations, he propounds a novel solution entirely at variance with those of Professor Geddes and other editors. While cordially agreeing with the general tenor of his criticism, more particularly as regards (*α*) the understanding of δεύτερος πλοῦς, (*β*) the Platonic attitude towards phenomena, I cannot but feel that his own view, though far more consistent with the spirit of the dialogue than such as attribute to Plato any serious fear of soul-blindness from the excessive brightness of Becoming, is nevertheless attended by certain grave difficulties which justify one in doubting whether the passage has as yet found its true solution. In view of these difficulties I would venture to suggest a different interpretation, which depends upon a recognition of the eclipse as an integral part of the simile, together with a special stress on the peculiar significance of τυφλωθείην. My objections to Mr Archer-Hind's position are as follows.

The final words of chapter xlvii and the opening words of chapter xlviii show that the Platonic Socrates is no longer about to describe any apprehensions of danger consequent upon searching for immediate knowledge of the Good; indeed the impossibility of this πρῶτος πλοῦς had been the object of demonstration in the preceding chapters, and accordingly the only matter for deliberation was the best method of setting about the δεύτερος πλοῦς, and the dangers which might beset a faulty procedure therein; now the most obvious plan of investigation would have been a minute examination of ex-

ternal nature; why then did Socrates desert *πράγματα* for their apparent *εἰκόνες* in *λόγοι*? Why was it the concept rather than the object of the concept with which he specially busied himself? It is this question, concerned altogether with the *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, that is to be forthwith answered by the simile. Accordingly the clause *τοιοῦτόν τι—αὐτῶν* must refer to a rival method of prosecuting the second-best course, and is not to be regarded as the description of results apprehended from seeking immediate familiarity with the Good itself or its special determinations in the world of ideas, which, as Mr Archer-Hind justly remarks, were regarded by Plato as forms of the *ἀγαθὸν* itself. Hence *πράγματα* must refer to material particulars and not the ideas. Moreover, apart from this criticism, it is difficult to believe that *πράγματα, ὄμμασιν* and *αἰσθήσεων* can all be used metaphorically in a single sentence, without a hint of this usage in the context. Dr Jackson indeed has suggested, and Mr Archer-Hind is inclined to accept the suggestion, that this clause *βλέπων—αὐτῶν* is very probably an interpolation[1]; but, not to speak of the unpleasing rhythm which is produced by the excision of these words, the subsequent clause *ἴσως—ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις* distinctly implies a previous antithesis between *λόγοι* and *πράγματα* in a relation which Plato wishes to modify as regards a single aspect thereof; if he is merely pointing out that, while *ἔργα* and *λόγοι* are both *εἰκόνες*, *ἔργα* are preeminently such, he need not apologise for incorrectness in the simile (*ἴσως—ἔοικεν*); the remarks in fact are unnecessary and pointless if the suspected clause be cut out. Lastly, in a simile where we find the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν* on one side and the sun on the other, it is very improbable that no importance should be attached to the eclipse of the latter, more especially when this eclipse is introduced as parallel to a state of affairs in which immediate contemplation of the Good is recognised as an impossibility. It would appear that, if the eclipse be recognised as an integral part of the analogy, a good sense may be obtained not open to any of the above objections.

[1] See also Dr Jackson's paper "On Plato's *Republic* VI 506 D ff" in the *Journal of Philology* X 136—138.

In that case the sun itself would be paralleled by the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν* regarded as pluralised in *τὰ ὄντα* which itself *ξυνδεῖ καὶ συνέχει* (cf. 99 C); *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* would correspond to *τὰ γιγνόμενα*, i.e. *τὰ ὄντα* considered as eclipsed (cf. Rep. 508 D *τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*, in a rather different sense but with a similar implication); the image of *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* in water would answer to the images of eclipsed *ὄντα* in *λόγοι*, i.e. Socratic universals. On this interpretation *τὰ ὄντα* are represented as the flashes of light which are unified in the originating sun; Being is merely the pluralisation of the Good; but, inasmuch as the latter is something more than the totality of rays, it may be said, as in the Republic, that the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχει*: the Good itself is eclipsed, but its light shows partially amid the darkness of the visible world; the problem is to piece it together by a study of these partial manifestations, best investigated by their reflection in universal *λόγοι*.

There is however, as Plato plainly admits (*ἴσως—ἔοικεν*), a flaw in the simile. This flaw cannot, I think, be adequately explained unless the eclipse be taken into account: as I understand the chapter, the confusion arises as follows. Just as the image of *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* is only valuable in so far as it reflects *ἥλιος* itself, so *λόγοι* as reflections of *πράγματα* are only valuable in so far as they represent the truth which resides in *πράγματα*: *λόγοι* therefore do not take any account of the non-ent through which reality is interfused, and strive to represent merely the idea in so far as it can be appreciated by a study of particulars; accordingly the mental concept or general notion is in reality purer and more perfectly representative of the idea than the particulars whose fragmentary truth it collates and unifies; from this point of view, therefore, particulars are only imperfect reflections of the general notion; in no sense however can it be said that *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* is merely an image of its own reflection, so that the simile, though otherwise accurate, needs rectification in this single respect. From this standpoint it becomes possible to understand the full force of *τυφλωθείην*. At first sight it might appear

that the blindness which Socrates feared from an examination of phenomena themselves, as distinct from their reflection in λόγοι, was altogether parallel to that which afflicted the sun-gazers and due to a similar glare, and this, in fact, is the sense in which the word has been generally understood. When, however, the flaw in the simile has been noticed and its nature explained, it becomes evident that some different interpretation is required, for λόγοι are now recognised as shining with a fuller truth than ἔργα, so that a man would turn his eyes to the latter rather than the former if he apprehended blindness from excess of light. Moreover on general grounds, as Mr Archer-Hind has pointed out, it is inconceivable that Plato should have spoken of phenomena as dazzling from surpassing brilliance. It remains to understand *τυφλωθείην* as doing double duty: while ingeniously utilised for the purposes of the simile so as to preserve a superficial parallelism by virtue of its most obvious implication, it must be regarded as referring in reality to loss of vision apprehended not from the brightness but the darkness of Becoming; soul-blindness will assuredly follow the mere physical gazing at external nature; if this affliction is to be avoided the soul's eye, reason, must be turned to the conceptual study of truth; just so in Republic 527 D we read: *τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται·* and in the Phaedo itself, 96 C, *οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην* is spoken from a very similar standpoint. The forcible irony of the passage on the above interpretation is in keeping with the general attitude of Socrates at this point of the dialogue: he ascribes his original abandonment of physical enquiry not to its utter emptiness, but to his own stupidity (96 C); when he has devised a superior method of investigation he chooses to speak of it in comparison with physics as no better than a muddle (*εἰκῇ φύρω* 97 B); in the present instance advantage is taken of a blemish in the simile to express contempt of mere physical enquiry under the guise of deferential awe.

Socrates, then, speaks in effect as follows: "When I recognised that the ἀγαθὸν itself was not directly cognisable, that, like the sun in eclipse, it was obscured by the darkness of material nature, through which, nevertheless, it flashed a partial light, I recognised that complete knowledge of the Good must be approached by a study of its broken radiance, and that soul-blindness would best be avoided by examining the reality of particulars clearly reflected in mental concepts. The simile, indeed, is not perfect for, since λόγοι have a fuller and purer truth than ἔργα, the latter are in reality the εἰκόνες, but let that pass; my δεύτερος πλοῦς was as I have described: I saw that I might obtain reflections of Being as it shows in Becoming, and thus progress towards that complete agathology which must be the ratification of every argument: at present, inasmuch as such knowledge has not yet been obtained, I do not pretend to prove the soul's immortality, and you must be content if I give you a probable demonstration."

It appears to me, then, that every word in this chapter is genuine and indispensable, and that the whole simile, if understood as suggested, is in harmony with the stage of doctrine which Plato had reached in the Phaedo and the Republic.

COLIN E. CAMPBELL.

ἤδη AND δή IN HOMER.

In spite of all that has been written concerning ἤδη and δή it must be confessed that we are far from possessing a full and satisfactory account of the two words. Their close connection, which has often been disputed, is now etymologically certain. But their precise inherent sense, the variations to which this is subject, and the causes of the variations, are matters upon which the utmost uncertainty still prevails. When Liddell and Scott in their seventh edition distinguish ἤδη from νῦν as referring either to the immediate past or to the immediate future, and as an instance of the former quote Il. H 282 νὺξ δ' ἤδη τελέθει 'it is even now night,' this obscurity is manifest even in the case of ἤδη. δή, however, is by reason of the same obscurity almost always omitted in translation; and where, as in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, its force is explained, I believe the explanation to be generally either mistaken or at least imperfect. Accordingly, it is worth while to consider the usage within the manageable limits of Homer with a view to classification.

To commence with a question of order: The position of ἤδη in the Homeric sentence seems to have been regarded as too obvious to need mention. But, in fact, the word always appears either first or second in the clause: in the latter case, however, we must, as is natural, disregard enclitics. The statistics are as follows:—

(1) ἤδη occurs 149 times:

(2) in 46 of the occurrences it is first in the sentence, in 38 of them first also in the line:

(3) there are 11 instances where ἤδη follows an introductory vocative or exclamation:

(4) in 53 cases it follows an introductory word, with or without δέ or enclitics: namely, the demonstrative article in 10 cases, ἀλλά in 10, ἤ or ἦ in 23, νῦν and τότε in 7, ἀλλ' ὁ μέν in 3:

(5) not different are the cases where a single noun precedes, being placed first in order to connect by way of antithesis with the previous clause: such a case is Od. θ 536—7

> κέκλυτε Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες·
> Δημόδοκος δ' ἤδη σχεθέτω φόρμιγγα λίγειαν,

where the proper name comes first to mark the transition.

Regular cases of this nature are, if we include Od. υ 90 (ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη·) where δέ is replaced by ἀλλά, 6 in number:

(6) the next group consists of 5 cases, where ἤδη is found not indeed at the beginning of a sentence, but at the beginning of a line with a supplementary participle: an instance is Od. ν 187—9

> ὁ δ' ἔγρετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
> εὕδων ἐν γαίῃ πατρωίῃ, οὐδέ μιν ἔγνω,
> ἤδη δὴν ἀπεών·

where the participial clause is really an independent statement containing an afterthought:

(7) in 12 cases ἤδη follows conjunctions introducing dependent sentences, viz. ὄφρα καί 3 times, ἐπεί twice, εἰ conditional 3 times, ἵνα once, ὡς 3 times (ὡς ἤτοι once).

In 6 cases, not counted here, ἦ ἤδη in an alternative follows εἰ 'whether':

(8) 5 cases are of a different nature. Here ἤδη follows noun and verb, coming in every case at the end of the line: viz. Od. α 303, κ 484, μ 393, τ 300, υ 53. In these cases ἤδη is placed last for the sake of emphasis, e.g. μ 391—3

> αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ' ἐπὶ νῆα κατήλυθον ἠδὲ θάλασσαν,
> νείκεον ἄλλοθεν ἄλλον ἐπισταδόν, οὐδέ τι μῆχος
> εὑρέμεναι δυνάμεσθα· βόες δ' ἀπετέθνασαν ἤδη.

where we must translate not 'the oxen were by now dead,' but 'the oxen were dead by now':

(9) the 11 remaining instances are of a miscellaneous nature and only slightly exceptional. Four are analogous to

group (4), differing only in this respect that the first word in the sentence is only loosely connected with the previous clause. These are Il. Ψ 20

πάντα γὰρ ἤδη τοι τελέω, τὰ πάροιθεν ὑπέστην.

and Il. Ψ 180, where the same line is repeated,

Od. β 410—1

δεῦτε, φίλοι, ἤϊα φερώμεθα· πάντα γὰρ ἤδη
ἀθρό' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ.

Od. ω 318—9

τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμός, ἀνὰ ῥῖνας δέ οἱ ἤδη
δριμὺ μένος προέτυψε φίλου πατέρ' εἰσορόωντι.

Od. τ 358—9

καί που Ὀδυσσεὺς
ἤδη τοιόσδ' ἐστὶ πόδας τοιόσδε τε χεῖρας·

would be quite regular if Ὀδυσσεὺς δέ που had been written in place of καί που Ὀδυσσεύς.

In one case ἤδη follows αἴθε in a wish. Od. υ 94 is a case with a participle not obviously supplementary.

In the remaining 4 cases ἤδη follows an auxiliary verb and qualifies an infinitive: these are

Il. Γ 98

φρονέω δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἤδη
Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας, ἐπεὶ κακὰ πολλὰ πέποσθε κ.τ.λ.

Od. ο 88

βούλομαι ἤδη νεῖσθαι ἐφ' ἡμέτερα·

following a vocative,

Od. υ 215—6

μεμάασι γὰρ ἤδη
κτήματα δάσσασθαι δὴν οἰχομένοιο ἄνακτος,

Od. φ 116—7

ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λιποίμην
οἷός τ' ἤδη πατρὸς ἀέθλια κάλ' ἀνελέσθαι.

Whether these instances are in any degree exceptional may be questioned on the ground that the adverb could scarcely precede the auxiliary verb. But this is by no means true. There are at least nine examples of ἤδη so preceding the auxiliary verb, and this is not only permissible, but is the rule with ἤδη and, as will be mentioned, with δή also. Naturally it is not every auxiliary verb that allows of this order, any more than in the parallel case with the negative. But instances occur with *κέλομαι, λέγω, μέλλω, οἴομαι, φημί*, and in the case of δή with *βούλομαι, ἔλπομαι, μέλλω, οἴω, φημί*. Hence in the above instances except perhaps the first we require an explanation of the order. It will be seen that in the first three the ἤδη is emphatic: the fourth is obviously due to the original sense of *οἷός τε*, which requires it to come first in its clause.

It thus appears that out of a total of 149 occurrences 46 have ἤδη absolutely first and 49 more virtually first, that is (*a*) preceded only by a vocative or exclamation, *ἀλλά, ἦ*, or ἦ, or (*b*) at the head of a supplementary participial clause. We may add to these the 12 cases in which it follows the introductory word of a dependent sentence. In 34 further cases ἤδη is absolutely or virtually second, that is preceded by only one substantive word with or without *ἀλλά δέ μέν γάρ* or enclitics. There are only eight cases—and these have been referred to in detail—in which the word is to be found otherwise placed.

The reason for this very remarkable gravitation to the commencement of the sentence is obvious. ἤδη is a combination of two particles which show the same tendency in even a slightly more marked degree[1]. To the case of δή we shall presently return. In the first part of ἤδη we have plainly nothing but the common circumflexed asseverative particle. This is indeed evident from the usage seeing that ἤδη, like ἦ,

[1] As a form of ἦ δή, it should come first in the sentence. But the compound once formed goes its own way. The case of ἦτοι is precisely similar: for, whereas ἦ very rarely follows any word but *ἐπεί*, we find ἦτοι constantly, like ἤδη, second to introductory words. ἤδη is peculiar only in that its meaning allows it to come in a few cases last for the sake of emphasis.

practically never occurs in Homer except in the speeches. ἤδη is in fact too emphatic for the impersonal narrative; whence five out of the six passages in the Iliad where it is found in the narrative refer to death, and ἤδη would seem to be used to add special seriousness or emphasis. The same explanation will perhaps apply to the remaining instance, the line concerning Nestor's age, A 250. The 14 occurrences in the Odyssey do not in general demand any special emphasis, and it may therefore be worth while to enumerate the small differences in the usage of ἤδη, which distinguish the two poems; viz. (1) εἰ ἤδη in dependent questions is found six times in the Odyssey, never in the Iliad, (2) excluding dependent questions and speeches εἰ δ' ἤδη X 52 and ὄφρα καὶ ἤδη Ω 635 are the only cases in the Iliad of ἤδη in dependent sentences; in the Odyssey there are nine instances with ὄφρα εἰ ἐπεί ὡς, (3) the cases quoted above no. (8) all come from the Odyssey, (4) of the 11 slightly exceptional cases eight come from the Odyssey, only three, of which two are duplicates in Ψ, from the Iliad. These facts seem to show a slight advance in usage in the Odyssey. For the most natural employment of ἤδη, being compounded with ἦ, is in main statements, and secondly in dependent speeches and thoughts, outside which limits it is used only twice in the Iliad.

ἤδη was excluded from the narrative not because its presence was not required, but because its place was supplied by δή, or ἤδη *minus* the asseverative ἦ. I will assume the correctness of the view maintained by Devarius, Hoogeveen, and Hartung, which regards δή as primarily a temporal particle. To what extent the particle retains this force in Homer remains to be considered. But first the question of order.

It is of course obvious that in point of order δή is governed by the same rule as ἤδη. It is placed either first in its clause—which is comparatively rare—or second, if we disregard conjunctions, enclitics, introductory vocatives and exclamations. So absolute is this rule that out of nearly 1000 occurrences only ten require even a passing reference: for three or four cases of the type σὺν δ' ὄγε δὴ αὖτε, νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν δὴ πάντες

require no explanation. Out of the ten more or less exceptional cases Il. Γ 150 and Od. ω 260 are instances of δή used like ἤδη with an explanatory or supplementary participle. In Il. Λ 319, 733, N 226, all of the type

ἐπεὶ νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς
Τρωσὶν δὴ βόλεται δοῦναι κράτος ἠέ περ ἡμῖν,

the δή, which ought to come after Ζεύς (since ἐπεί in the sense of 'for' is a mere joint and νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς is a single designation) is placed after Τρωσίν, because it can never begin a line unless it also begins a sentence[1]. Od. δ 485 and λ 348 are instances where the two first words are not so much part of the sentence as premised to it. The former reads

ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω δὴ τελέω, γέρον, ὡς σὺ κελεύεις.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ κ.τ.λ.

Parallel instances are likewise Il. Ω 243—4

ῥηΐτεροι γὰρ μᾶλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε
κείνου τεθνηῶτος ἐναιρέμεν.

and Od. ω 309—310

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσῆϊ τόδε δὴ πέμπτον ἔτος ἐστὶν
ἐξ οὗ κεῖθεν ἔβη.

Here δή means 'now' and is attracted towards the defining words: 'ye shall be &c....now that he is dead,' 'this is now the fifth year since he departed thence.' Il. M 322—4 reads as follows:—

ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε
ἔσσεσθ', οὔτε κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην κ.τ.λ.

Here δή is virtually second in its clause, since with αἰεί begins an apodosis to πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε. The last of the ten passages, which is more or less similar to the foregoing, is

[1] Compare Theognis 607—8

ἀρχῇ ἔπι ψεύδους μικρὴ χάρις· ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
αἰσχρὸν δὴ κέρδος καὶ κακόν, ἀμφότερον,
γίνεται·

and Bias

αὐθάδης δὲ τρόπος
πολλάκι δὴ βλαβερὰν ἐξέλαμψεν ἄταν.

Il. O 710—1

ἀλλ' οἵγ' ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
ὀξέσι δὴ πελέκεσσι καὶ ἀξίνῃσι μάχοντο κ.τ.λ.

and δή is to be taken very closely with πελέκεσσι or ὀξέσι πελέκεσσι 'no longer with arrows and javelins, but now with sharp axes.'

These are absolutely the only exceptions to the rule of order and nothing remains to be added on this head but (1) that δή never comes first in apodosis except in the phrase δὴ τότε, (2) that δή very rarely follows any part of the verb except the imperative or the infinitive imperatively used. There are 12 exceptions to the latter rule, five of them curiously enough with δὴ ἔπειτα. Three of these exceptions (Il. Υ 338, Od. α 290, μ 309) are participles, of which two are in imperative sentences. The nine cases with a principal verb are Il. I 309, N 226, Π 127, Φ 218. 472, Od. δ 138, θ 378, ο 423, ψ 230. In only two cases does there appear to be any reason for the exceptions, namely in Λ 733, N 226 as above: we have tmesis in Il. H 360, I 375.

Now this almost unbroken rule of order is even in itself fatal to a very prevalent doctrine. It is commonly held that δή except when placed first in the sentence follows the word or words which it influences. Thus, not to mention Liddell and Scott, the article in Ebelung's Lexicon Homericum is arranged entirely on this principle. But a simple inference is sufficient to demonstrate its falsity. The place of δή is fixed relatively to the sentence. The choice of the first word is governed by independent conditions. Hence we must necessarily conclude that it is only by a kind of accident that this first word is that to which δή is attached. Not only so, but the common opinion leads to numerous inconsistencies and often to a complete misunderstanding of the force of the particle. Thus, it is pointed out that δή is often found in conjunction with superlatives. In Homer there are a few sentences of the type

κάρτιστοι δὴ κεῖνοι ἐπιχθονίων τράφεν ἀνδρῶν (Il. A 266).

In these δή is taken with the superlative. But it is even more common to find a different order, e.g. in Od. λ 522

κεῖνον δὴ κάλλιστον ἴδον μετὰ Μέμνονα δῖον.

Is δή to be construed differently here? Again with words denoting number we have Od. ω 288

πόστον δὴ ἔτος ἐστὶν ὅτε ξείνισσας ἐκεῖνον;

Is δή differently used in Od. ω 309—310 *supra*? So again with πολύς: is there any difference in the usage of δή in Od. τ 379

πολλοὶ δὴ ξεῖνοι ταλαπείριοι ἐνθάδ' ἵκοντο.

and Il. Σ 103

οὐδέ τι Πατρόκλῳ γενόμην φάος οὐδ' ἑτάροισιν
τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἳ δὴ πολέες δάμεν Ἕκτορι δίῳ?

The last passage illustrates perhaps the worst feature of the common treatment of δή, the abuse of the so-called δή 'determinative.' Liddell and Scott give 'who plainly' as the sense of ὃς δή, and Bäumlein expresses a similar opinion. It is, however, clear that the δή has nothing to do with the relative, and the sense will vary with the passages. As for the determinations, they are always otiose, unless the preceding word is emphatic, and in general not determinations at all.

With a following noun δή occurs, Il. O 710—1 (quoted above) and H 273

καί νύ κε δὴ ξιφέεσσ' αὐτοσχεδὸν ὁρμηθήτην κ.τ.λ.

'now with swords.' πᾶς follows δή in many places, e.g. Od. χ 31—3

ἴσκεν ἕκαστος ἀνήρ, ἐπειὴ φάσαν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα
ἄνδρα κατακτεῖναι· τὸ δὲ νήπιοι οὐκ ἐνόησαν
ὡς δή σφιν καὶ πᾶσιν ὀλέθρου πείρατ' ἐφῆπτο.

where δὴ καὶ πᾶσιν = *iam omnibus* in contrast with the one already slain.

Forgoing further illustration we may now ask what is the proper sense of the particle, what changes this sense undergoes and when, under what circumstances it is affected by attachment to other words. Now the proper force of both ἤδη and

δή is, as Hartung defined it, a reference to the immediate present. This sense appears most vividly with δή standing at the commencement of the sentence, e.g. Od. π 280

δὴ γάρ σφι παρίσταται αἴσιμον ἦμαρ·
'for now their fated day confronts them,'

but it is confined neither to this position nor to Homer. Compare Soph. Tr. 1145

οἴμοι, φρονῶ δὴ ξυμφορᾶς ἵν' ἔσταμεν,

where Jebb translates 'Alas, now I see in what plight I stand.' But now L. and S., relying on an oft-quoted passage of Aristotle (Phys. Δ c. 13. 222 b 7—12), distinguish ἤδη and *iam* from νῦν and *nunc* as referring to either the immediate past or the immediate future, while νῦν and *nunc* refer to the present moment[1]. But Aristotle is pushing an erroneous distinction, and in fact ἤδη is constantly used of the immediate present and νῦν often of the immediate past and future, as instances in L. and S.'s Lexicon will show. The real difference is that

[1] The passage from Aristotle runs as follows:—τὸ δ' ἤδη τὸ ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ παρόντος νῦν ἀτόμου μέρος τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου. πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη, ὅτι ἐγγὺς ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μέλλει. καὶ τοῦ παρελη-λυθότος χρόνου τὸ μὴ πόρρω τοῦ νῦν. πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη βεβάδικα. τὸ δὲ Ἴλιον φάναι ἤδη ἐαλωκέναι οὐ λέγομεν, ὅτι πόρρω λίαν τοῦ νῦν. Aristotle is defining the *notion*—i.e. of necessity the simplest usage—of ἤδη: hence he uses the words οὐ λέγομεν. Plainly however he is mistaken, as he overlooks ἤδη with the present (his ἤδη βαδίζω is an idiomatic use of the present for a future), e.g. Rhet. A. 12. 1372 b 13—14 οἷς ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ. No one can deny that ἤδη ἔστι can be said in Greek, or, if Aristotle is to be supposed to question this, it is hard to see what he means by the above passage or by De Anima Γ 10. 433 b 8—10 φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον. The fact is that in every language particles meaning 'now' are idiomatically used of the immediately preceding and following instants: cf. in our present chapter what is said of νῦν, τὸ μὲν οὕτω λέγεται τῶν νῦν, ἄλλο δ' ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ὁ τούτου ἐγγὺς ᾖ. ἥξει νῦν, ὅτι τήμερον ἥξει· ἧκει νῦν, ὅτι ἦλθε τήμερον. Unfortunately, when he comes to ἤδη, Aristotle gives us the derived in place of the fundamental use. Heller (p. 259) attributes error to Aristotle on a different ground, namely that a Greek could say τὸ Ἴλιον ἤδη φημὶ ἑαλωκέναι πρὸ χιλίων ἐνιαυτῶν. This however is not to the point, since here ἤδη goes with the numeral (which is the predicate, v. *infr.*) and not with the verb.

ἤδη and δή always refer to some new or critical event just occurring. Hence in such a sentence as

ταῦτα ἦν πάλαι καὶ νῦν ἔστι

it would be impossible to substitute either δή, though in Homer καὶ δή is always temporal, or ἤδη, though ἤδη constantly means 'now.' Again in

ταῦτα ἦν πάλαι, νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι

we might substitute ἤδη, but the sense will be changed to 'but now and from this time forth it is not.' In fact, while ἤδη is a purely temporal particle referring to the points on the single line of time, νῦν is a particle as it were of two dimensions and implies a glance at the *circumstances* of the moment[1]. It is the equivalent of the English 'at present.' ἤδη on the other hand always implies a reference to the past, a fact which is in harmony with the etymology, seeing that δή is an instrumental case of an obsolete pronoun and means literally 'hereby' or 'herewith.'

It is a necessary consequence of this instantaneous sense that ἤδη and δή always imply motion or change. Hence the two particles are sometimes used of motion in space, a line in space being thought of in connection with the line of time. The most familiar instance with ἤδη is Thuc. 3. 95

καὶ Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν.

With δή we may quote Od. κ 513—4

ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσι
Κώκυτός θ', ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀποῤῥώξ.

In both passages the idea is that of proceeding from one point to another, and the notion of space is after all secondary to that of time. It need scarcely be said that νῦν is not used in this sense.

Another natural development is the sense of 'at length,' which is simply due to emphasis, an emphatic 'now' being

[1] This distinction is not, I think, that meant by Hartung p. 235, when he says that ἤδη denotes 'the present as a point, an instant, not as a line, a duration.' I do not ascribe *length* to νῦν, but—so to speak—breadth.

equivalent to 'now at last.' The Latin *demum denique* and *tandem*, which are to be similarly explained, are in point of etymology closely connected with δή[1].

'Already,' the stock translation of ἤδη, is a notion never inherent in the word, but wherever present, is imported from the idea of anticipation in the context. The imperfection of the rendering can be easily shown by illustration:—in Il. T 122

> ἤδη ἀνὴρ γέγον' ἐσθλός, ὃς Ἀργείοισιν ἀνάξει
> 'this moment has a man been born &c.'

Od. κ 381

> ἤδη γάρ τοι ἀπώμοσα καρτερὸν ὅρκον
> 'for I have even but now sworn'

Od. β 410

> πάντα γὰρ ἤδη ἀθρό' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ
> 'for all is by now collected in the hall'

if we substitute 'already' for 'even now' &c. we neglect the special force of ἤδη and at the same time introduce the foreign idea of contemporaneousness or anticipation[2]. Ἴλιον ἤδη ἑάλωκεν could be said only the instant after the taking of Troy. This I believe to be true of every period of Greek: but it is certainly noteworthy that there are a few exceptions in Homer. In Il. B 698—9 we read

> τῶν αὖ Πρωτεσίλαος ἀρήϊος ἡγεμόνευεν
> ζωὸς ἐών· τότε δ' ἤδη ἔχεν κάτα γαῖα μέλαινα.

though the narrative proceeds to state that Protesilaos died at the very outset of the war. Similarly we have said of the Dioskouroi τοὺς δ' ἤδη κάτεχεν φυσίζοος αἶα Γ 243. Most of the cases concern death and most commonly the ἤδη occurs in the second member of a disjunction, as Od. δ 832—4

[1] v. *infra* p. 113.

[2] I understand the English word 'already' always to contain a tacit reference to some other event, and to imply either 'sooner than some other event' or 'sooner than would have been expected.' These ideas are absent from ἤδη, which compares only with a certain *time*. Undoubtedly 'already' is often the most convenient translation.

κατάλεξον
ἥ που ἔτι ζώει καὶ ὁρᾷ φάος ἠελίοιο,
ἦ ἤδη τέθνηκε καὶ εἰν Ἀίδαο δόμοισιν.

The difficulty is obviously least in questions, and the force of the ἤδη may be expressed by 'by now.' It is however to be further suggested that the notion is in these cases not so much that of time as of *transition* from life to death &c. (v. *infra*). To δή the translation 'already' is suitable only with the same conditions as in the case of ἤδη.

A reference to the future is claimed by Bäumlein as one of the usages of ἤδη: similarly Aristotle, Hartung, L. and S. &c. So stated, this is impossible, if what has been said above is true. We may, however, dismiss the notion that there is any reference to the future in ἤδη = 'at once,' which is only an emphatic 'now.' The question concerns such cases as Od. ω 506

Τηλέμαχ', ἤδη μὲν τόδε γ' εἴσεαι αὐτὸς ἐπελθών,
ἀνδρῶν μαρναμένων, ἵνα τε κρίνονται ἄριστοι,
μήτε καταισχύνειν πατέρων γένος κ.τ.λ.

Ar. Eq. 209

τὸν οὖν δράκοντά φησι τὸν βυρσαίετον
ἤδη κρατήσειν, αἴ κε μὴ θαλφθῇ λόγοις.

Such cases are, however, easily explicable: the ἤδη in reality does refer to the past which is now set aside: the future is that which is partly a present and expresses 'a present intention, expectation or necessity' as in the famous αἶρε πλῆκτρον εἰ μαχεῖ (Goodwin 'Moods and Tenses' §§ 71—2). The action is future, but the necessity &c. have just (ἤδη) arisen. So ἤδη κρατήσειν = 'is now to conquer.' In Od. ε 160—1 we have a very clear case

Κάμμορε, μή μοι ἔτ' ἐνθάδ' ὀδύρεο, μηδέ τοι αἰὼν
φθινέτω· ἤδη γάρ σε μάλα πρόφρασσ' ἀποπέμψω.

Here ἤδη denotes that Calypso has changed her mind, and the future expresses purpose: 'for now I purpose to send you away.' The Greek future is known to have had originally subjunctive meanings, and in these cases the force of the subjunctive survives. Instances with δή will be quoted subsequently.

Starting from this inherent sense we may arrive, I think, at a classification rather more methodical than the usual one. To commence with the uncompounded δή; the usage divides itself into two groups, (A) including those cases where only the temporal sense appears, (B) including those where other ideas are present.

A. *The purely temporal use:—*

We must here exclude all cases where particles or other words are closely attached to δή. The first subdivision is into 'deictic' and 'anaphoric' employment, the deictic δή referring to the really present, the anaphoric to the ideally present, the time being defined by the tense or the course of the narrative; as in English we often employ 'now' when we really mean 'then' or 'next' or 'thereupon.' To quote instances of both usages:—

(1) the deictic 'now'

Il. A 161

καὶ δή μοι γέρας αὐτὸς ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς
'and now you threaten to take away my prize.'

Ω 398

ἀφνειὸς μὲν ὅγ' ἐστί, γέρων δὲ δή, ὡς σύ περ ὧδε
'rich is he, but an old man now, as you.'

Od. δ 551

τούτους μὲν δὴ οἶδα· σὺ δὲ τρίτον ἄνδρ' ὀνόμαζε
'these I now know: but name the third.'

Od. τ 72 sqq.

ἦ ὅτι δὴ ῥυπόω, κακὰ δὲ χροὶ εἵματα εἶμαι,
πτωχεύω δ' ἀνὰ δῆμον; ἀναγκαίη γὰρ ἐπείγει·
τοιοῦτοι πτωχοὶ καὶ ἀλήμονες ἄνδρες ἔασιν.
καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειὸν κ.τ.λ.
'is it that I am now foul and clad in mean robes? &c.
—Even I was once a wealthy man.'

(2) the anaphoric 'now'

Il. E 568

τὼ μὲν δὴ χεῖράς τε καὶ ἔγχεα ὀξυόεντα
ἄντιον ἀλλήλων ἐχέτην μεμαῶτε μάχεσθαι
'they were now opposed hand to hand and spear to spear.'

Ω 351

δὴ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἦλυθε γαῖαν
'for now darkness also came upon the earth.'

Od. γ 166

φεῦγον, ἐπεὶ γίγνωσκον ὃ δὴ κακὰ μήδετο δαίμων
'I fled, for I saw that god was now minded to do us evil.'

κ 114—5

ἡ δ' αἶψ' ἐξ ἀγορῆς ἐκάλει κλυτὸν Ἀντιφατῆα,
ὃν πόσιν, ὃς δὴ τοῖσιν ἐμήσατο λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον
'who straightway designed their death.'

With the future we have (1) the deictic use in

Il. B 339

πῇ δὴ συνθεσίαι τε καὶ ὅρκια βήσεται ἡμῖν;
'what now is to become of our compacts and oaths?'

(3) the anaphoric use in

Od. μ 55—7

αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τάσγε παρὲξ ἐλάσωσιν ἑταῖροι,
ἔνθα τοι οὐκέτ' ἔπειτα διηνεκέως ἀγορεύσω,
ὁππότερη δή τοι ὁδὸς ἔσσεται κ.τ.λ.
'which then shall be your road.'

The aorist with δή includes, beside the ordinary anaphoric sense in narration and the sense of 'ere now' which will be mentioned *infra*, also such cases with that aorist which refers to what has just happened, as

Od. ν 168

ὤμοι, τίς δὴ νῆα θοὴν ἐπέδησ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ;
'who hath now bound fast the ship upon the ocean?'

This usage is found with the aorist subjunctive, e.g. Od. *o* 400—1

μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
ὅστις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῇ
'who hath now suffered much and journeyed much.'

With the infinitive it is to be noticed, as in the case of ἤδη, that, where verbs of saying and certain others occur, the particle attaches not to these, but to the infinitive: so Od. *a* 194

δὴ γάρ μιν ἔφαντ' ἐπιδήμιον εἶναι
'for now, they said, he was at home.'

Il. N 776—7

ἄλλοτε δή ποτε μᾶλλον ἐρωῆσαι πολέμοιο
μέλλω
'it must have been at some other time rather that I have rested from warring.'

Od. ρ 460—1

νῦν δή σ' οὐκέτι καλὰ διὲκ μεγάροιό γ' ὀΐω
ἆψ ἀναχωρήσειν
'now shalt thou, methinks, get thee back again not in honour from the hall.'

This extremely natural construction is common also in such English sentences as Hamlet III. i. 157—8

'Now see that noble and most sovereign reason,
'Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh.'

where 'now' really goes not with 'see,' but with 'out of tune and harsh,' or perhaps rather with both.

So much for the simple temporal use of δή with the verb of the sentence. But there is a second temporal use of the word which in a scientific syntax must be kept apart as being of a different nature and leading to different derived usages. If we take such a sentence as Hamlet Act V. sc. ii. 259—262

'And let the kettle to the trumpet speak,
'The trumpet to the canoneer without,

'The cannons to the heavens, the heavens to earth,
'Now the king drinks to Hamlet.'

we see that 'now' is used not with the verb to contrast the king's present with his past action, but with the whole sentence to contrast the king's present action with the past in general. The same 'now' is used at the commencement of a conversation,

'Now say, Chatillon, what would France with us?'
(King John, I. i. 1)

'Now, mother, what's the matter?'
(Hamlet, III. iv. 9)

to mark transitions,

'But now, my cousin Hamlet and my son'—
(Hamlet, I. ii. 64)

interruptions,

'How now, what hath befallen?'
(Hamlet, IV. iii. 11)

and resumptions,

'For women's fear and love hold quantity;
'In neither aught or in extremity.
'Now, what my love is, proof hath made you know.'
(Hamlet, III. ii. 142—4)

In all these cases the particle has reference not to the sequence of the action, but to the sequence of the speaker's thoughts. Though it is strictly temporal, its object is to draw attention and thus soften the abruptness of a new beginning, answering the purpose of a context by naming the present instant. The same 'now' appears, though somewhat weakened, in conclusions, questions, and commands.

In how many of these senses is δή employed in Homer? The first of them obviously occurs in some cases where δή commences the sentence, e.g. Il. O 437

Τεῦκρε πέπον, δὴ νῶϊν ἀπέκτατο πιστὸς ἑταῖρος
'now is our loyal comrade slain.'

It is in these cases that δή comes nearest in effect to 'lo!'

The resumptive δή is seen by L. and S. in Il. Z 398

τοῦ περ δὴ θυγάτηρ ἔχεθ' Ἕκτορι χαλκοκορυστῇ.

Other instances are Λ 126, M 256, O 707, and a moderate number elsewhere. But it will be felt that in the narrative this resumptive 'now' is out of harmony with the Epic style, and the question arises what reason there exists for importing this sense into these passages. I believe that the sole reason is the habit of construing δή with the preceding word, which leaves no other interpretation possible. In reality, the temporal sense is always appropriate, and we may translate the quoted passage '*his* daughter was now married to Hector.' We may remark—what but for the extreme looseness of grammatical terms would be evident—that the term 'resumptive' is not really applicable to these sentences. The actual thought may be put thus: 'Hector was met by his wife, the daughter of Eetion; Eetion, who lived in woody Plakus, king of the Kilikes, his daughter was now wedded to Hector.' The last clause is in reality of the nature of an apodosis or conclusion. The δή serves to contrast Andromache's present position as wife to Hector with her original position as daughter of Eetion. The really resumptive 'now' on the other hand begins a new statement and is equivalent to 'I now go on to say,' referring to the sequence of the speaker's thoughts.

The transitional or continuative 'now' is likewise not found in Homer. Without repeating what has been said in connection with the 'resumptive' use, we may note the total impossibility of separating the continuative δή from the δή of apodosis, just as in the parallel case of δέ. Sentences of precisely the same form occur in the two cases, and sometimes the same sentence is found in one case as an apodosis and elsewhere as continuing the narrative. As a clear instance of the temporal δή we may quote Il. N 121—4

ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος
αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν· δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν.
Ἕκτωρ δὴ παρὰ νηυσὶ βοὴν ἀγαθὸς πολεμίζει
καρτερός, ἔῤῥηξεν δὲ πύλας καὶ μακρὸν ὀχῆα,

where both δή's are temporal, the second repeating the first

without emphasis. As concerns *μὲν δή*, which is held to be especially appropriate to transitions, we have only to observe that it most commonly occurs at the beginning of speeches in order to see that the collocation is purely accidental. So obviously in Od. ψ 49—50, Il. N 762—4, Γ 457—8.

Often the temporal force is required by the sense, e.g. in the repeated

> ὃς δὴ πολλάων πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα
> ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ λύσει,

where *δή* is certainly opposed to *ἔτι*[1], or Il. Ψ 522

> τόσσον δὴ Μενέλαος ἀμύμονος Ἀντιλόχοιο
> λείπετ'· ἀτὰρ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐς δίσκουρα λέλειπτο.

where it is opposed to *τὰ πρῶτα*. I am aware of only two places where the temporal sense is inapplicable, viz. Il. K 314—8

> ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δόλων Εὐμήδεος υἱός,
> κήρυκος θείοιο πολύχρυσος πολύχαλκος·
> ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης·
> αὐτὰρ ὁ μοῦνος ἔην μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτῃσιν.
> ὅς ῥα τότε Τρωσίν τε καὶ Ἕκτορι μῦθον ἔειπεν.

and Od. ο 361—2

> ὄφρα μὲν οὖν δὴ κείνη ἔην, ἀχέουσά περ ἔμπης,
> τόφρα τί μοι φίλον ἔσκε μεταλλῆσαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι.

In view of the frequent combination of *ἤτοι μέν* with a following *ἀλλά δέ αὐτάρ* I do not hesitate to read δ' *ἤτοι* in place of

[1] Heller (Philologus VIII pp. 291—2) denies that there is here any temporal antithesis between *δή* and *ἔτι*, claiming that *δή* both here and elsewhere is equivalent to 'ut scitis, ut notum est.' The antithesis (so common with *ἤδη*) will be found also Il. Ξ 234, &c.: a striking and unmistakable instance is Theogn. 53

> Κύρνε, πόλις μὲν ἔθ' ἥδε πόλις, λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι.

Heller urges that *δή* is found in the *same* sentence with *ἔτι*, Eur. El. 43 and 424. The sense of *δή* is, indeed, hard to define in these two passages: but we do not seek the most simple sense of particles in Euripides. The passages quoted with *οὐκέτι δή* are plainly beside the mark, since the negative makes all the difference: *οὐκέτι δή* = *iam non amplius*. The common *ἔτι δή*, *ἔτι δή γε* (= *porro*) present no difficulty.

δή τοι, an old suggestion which ought probably to be adopted in this and other cases: cf. Hartung, II. pp. 358—363, who rejects it. In the second passage the rhythm requires us to take δή with κείνη: the sense will be *illa demum* (v. *infr.*).

The conclusive δή is likewise unexampled: Il. Σ 364 for instance (πῶς δή) is simply a case of δή in questions, the inference being *implied*.

The δή of commands and questions is very familiar, but is equivalent not to *quaeso*, but to *nunc* in the same position. In commands we have such phrases as ἄγρει δή 'come now,' φράζεο δή 'bethink thee now': the complete parallelism of *agedum*—both in etymology and usage—was observed by Budaeus. Both in Greek and English the line which separates the idiomatic 'now' from the ordinary temporal sense is extremely narrow and fluctuating, and any temporal determination in the sentence serves to preserve the full temporal notion. Thus the δή is affected in Il. A 514

> νημερτὲς μὲν δή μοι ὑπόσχεο καὶ κατάνευσον
> 'now promise me truly and ratify it.'

but in Od. υ 18

> τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης,

the temporal sense is preserved by the ἄλλο ποτέ. So in Il. K 447

> μὴ δή μοι φύξιν γε, Δόλων, ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ,
> ἐσθλά περ ἀγγείλας, ἐπεὶ ἵκεο χεῖρας ἐς ἁμάς.

by the ἐπεί sentence 'now that thou hast come into our hands.' A good instance is Il. T 400—403

> Ξάνθε τε καὶ Βαλίε, τηλεκλυτὰ τέκνα Ποδάργης,
> ἄλλως δὴ φράζεσθε σαωσέμεν ἡνιοχῆα
> ἂψ Δαναῶν ἐς ὅμιλον, ἐπεί χ' ἑῶμεν πολέμοιο·
> μηδ' ὡς Πάτροκλον λίπετ' αὐτόθι τεθνηῶτα.

where ἄλλως δή 'differently now' contrasts with μηδ' ὡς of l. 403. In fine the force of δή in commands and questions is to apply them to the particular occasion, for which reason it is not found in such as are general or frequentative.

It therefore appears that while the adverbial δή is common, the use of δή as a conjunction connecting sentences, so frequent in Classical Greek, is scarcely to be found in Homer. It occurs only in commands and questions, and even here it is extremely difficult to say where the one usage begins and the other ends. The use as a conjunction is plainly derived from the use as a temporal particle introducing a new fact. The conclusive 'now' is equivalent to 'now we arrive at this result,' the transitional to 'now we pass to another matter,' the resumptive to 'it is now to be noted,' and so on. In general the temporal force decays with the emphasis. Every one will feel it, for instance, in the sentence 'now what follows?' if 'now' is emphatic: but in a much less degree if the emphasis is on 'follows.'

We now come to the cases, real or supposed, where δή is attached to some part of the sentence other than the verb. The rule for this connection may be very simply stated. When the particle attaches to any word in the sentence other than the verb that word contains the real or psychological predicate. The reason for this is easily seen. It is the nature of δή to introduce a new fact or occurrence. But as every (simple) sentence consists of two members, the given thing, ὑποκείμενον, or psychological subject, and the predicate or new fact concerning this, the particle will naturally attach to the latter. Hence when this is contained in some word other than the verb, δή attaches to this word, which is always emphatic (Paul, 'Principles of Speech,' trans. Strong, pp. 114 sqq.). In other words, δή attaches in general to the emphatic word of the sentence wherever placed. It is precisely the same with the English 'now': in the sentence 'The king now drinks to Hamlet' 'now' will go with 'The king,' 'drinks' or 'Hamlet' according as each bears the emphasis; and it would be easy to show that these three words will be successively the real predicate.

After so much explanation we may pass on to illustrate, excluding all cases where δή is connected with time words, conjunctions, particles, and the like:—

(1) *δή with superlatives and comparatives:*

In this usage the particle denotes 'that a point has been reached[1].' The occasion is expressed by the tense of the verb, a time word, or a demonstrative. The word qualified is always the real predicate and the position in relation to δή quite free.

(*a*) with δή following:—

καρτίστην δὴ τήν γε μάχην φάτο δύμεναι ἀνδρῶν.
Il. Z 185.

μείζων δὴ παρὰ νηυσὶ βοὴ θαλερῶν αἰζηῶν. Ξ 4.

(*b*) with δή preceding:—

τὸν δὴ μήκιστον καὶ κάρτιστον κτάνον ἄνδρα.
Il. H 155.

ἦ δὴ πλεῖστον ὅμιλον ὄρα καὶ τεύχε' ἄριστα.
Il. O 616.

Ἠοῦς δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπερμενέα Κρονίωνα
ὄψεαι. Θ 470.

ὃς δὴ ἀφνειότατος γένετο θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. Υ 220.

In Il. Ψ 785

Ἀντίλοχος δ' ἄρα δὴ λοισθήιον ἔκφερ' ἄεθλον

λοισθήιον has the force of a superlative.

(2) *δή with πολύς:*

(*a*) with δή following:—

πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ τλῆμεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
ἐξ ἀνδρῶν. Il. E 383.

πολλοὶ δὴ ξεῖνοι ταλαπείριοι ἐνθάδ' ἵκοντο. Od. τ 379.

(*b*) with δή preceding:—

τρώκτης, ὃς δὴ πολλὰ κάκ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐώργει.
Od. ξ 289.

In Il. Λ 558—561

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβιήσατο παῖδας
νωθής, ᾧ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη,

[1] I believe that in Classical Greek the superlative with δή always expresses the *highest*, and not merely a *very high*, degree: thus κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή Thuc. VIII. 1. 2 is not 'exceedingly great dismay,' but 'dismay greater than ever before.'

κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήιον· οἱ δέ τε παῖδες
τύπτουσιν ῥοπάλοισιν

the δὴ πολλὰ ῥόπαλα are opposed to the ῥοπάλοισιν of l. 561, as Leaf has seen.

(3) δή *with* πᾶς:

There is no instance of πᾶς preceding, a fact which is doubtless due to pure accident. With δή preceding we may quote

τέκνον ἐμόν, δὴ πάμπαν ἀποίχεαι ἀνδρὸς ἑοῖο. Il. T 342.

ἀλλ' Ἥφαιστος ἔρυτο, σάωσε δὲ νυκτὶ καλύψας,
ὡς δή οἱ μὴ πάγχυ γέρων ἀκαχήμενος εἴη. E 23—4.

(4) δή *with numerals:*

(*a*) the numeral precedes:—

ὀκτὼ δὴ προέηκα τανυγλώχινας ὀϊστούς. Il. Θ 297.

'Eight arrows have I now shot,' and not, as L. and S. 'no less than eight arrows have I shot.'

Similarly B 134—5

ἐννέα δὴ βεβάασι Διὸς μεγάλου ἐνιαυτοὶ
καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν κ.τ.λ.
'it is now nine years &c.'

(*b*) δή precedes:—

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσῆϊ τόδε δὴ πέμπτον ἔτος ἐστίν,
ἐξ οὗ κεῖθεν ἔβη. Od. ω 309.

So with τόσος

ἥτις δὴ τέτληκε τόσα φρεσίν, ὅσσα τ' ἐγώ περ. Od. τ 347.

(5) With words not in themselves implying progress or degree, but which assume this sense under the influence of δή.

(*a*) δή follows:—

κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων. Il. Ω 54.
'tis now dumb clay that his fury outrages.'

παῖδα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑῆος ἐνὶ μεγάροις ἀτιτάλλω,
κερδαλέον δὴ τοῖον, ἅμα τροχόωντα θύραζε. Od. ο 450—1.

κεῖται Πάτροκλος· νέκυος δὲ δὴ ἀμφιμάχονται
γυμνοῦ. Il. Σ 20—1.

The last instance is perhaps uncertain since we may translate either 'they are now fighting for the spoiled corse' or ''tis the spoiled corse they are now fighting for.'

A good instance is Od. υ 347—8

οἱ δ' ἤδη γναθμοῖσι γελώων ἀλλοτρίοισι,
αἱμοφόρυκτα δὲ δὴ κρέα ἤσθιον.

Here δή attaches to αἱμοφόρυκτα in precisely the same way as ἤδη to ἀλλοτρίοισι, the two words containing the predicates: 'their laughter was now forced and their meat defiled with blood.' For similar combinations of ἤδη and δή cf. Od. χ 248—9, Theogn. 961—2: with ἦ μὲν δή...καὶ δή, Il. I 348—9.

(*b*) δή precedes:—

Il. O 711, H 273 have been already quoted. A probable case is B 436

μηδ' ἔτι δηρὸν
ἀμβαλλώμεθα ἔργον, ὃ δὴ θεὸς ἐγγυαλίζει,

'which *now a god* furthers': cf. Philoxenus ap. Bergk I p. 605 ἂν δὴ φιλέοντι θεοί 'which the very gods love,' and with ἤδη Pindar Pyth. IX 119—120 ὠκεῖα δ' ἐπειγομένων ἤδη θεῶν πρᾶξις. In connection with καί the temporal sense sometimes becomes extremely weak, e.g. Od. ρ 307—9

καλὸς μὲν δέμας ἐστίν, ἀτὰρ τόδε γ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα
εἰ δὴ καὶ ταχὺς ἔσκε θέειν ἐπὶ εἴδεϊ τῷδε,
ἦ αὖτως κ.τ.λ.

'if he was further swift also.' The phrase καὶ δὴ καί—to be divided καὶ | δὴ καί—is only a special case of δὴ καί[1].

We may now add a few cases with pronouns. The order varies and the sense is as in the above:—

[1] A later classical variation of δὴ καί is καὶ.....δή. The earliest instance is Timocreon ap. Bergk I p. 538

ἀλλ' ἐντὶ κἄλλοι δὴ πονηροί.

Homer's καὶ τότε δή is different.

(*a*) the first person :—

ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ μεταδαίσομαι ἱρῶν. Il. Ψ 207.
'where I also now shall share in the sacrificial feast.'

τάχα δή με διαῤῥαίσουσι καὶ αὐτόν. Od. π 128.
'they are wasting my substance: soon they will tear myself also in pieces.'

(*b*) the second person :—

αὐτάρ τοι καὶ κείνῳ ἐγὼ παραμυθησαίμην
τῇ ἴμεν, ᾗ κεν δὴ σύ, κελαινεφές, ἡγεμονεύῃς.
Il. Ο 45—6.
'where *thou* should'st lead.'

οἷος δὴ σὺ δέμας καὶ εἶδος ἀγητός. Il. Ω 376.

In Il. Υ 115

φράζεσθον δὴ σφῶϊ, Ποσείδαον καὶ Ἀθήνη κ.τ.λ.

the δή would be the weakened 'now' of commands but for the temporal indication in *σφῶϊ* &c. 'it is now for you, Poseidon and Athene, to take thought.'

(*c*) the third person :—

οὗτος δή τοι, ξεῖνε πάτερ, δόμος ὅν με κελεύεις
πεφραδέμεν. Od. η 48.
'this now is the house.'

ξείνω δή τινε τώδε, διοτρεφὲς ὦ Μενέλαε. δ 26.
'here now are certain two strangers.'

οἷον δὴ καὶ ὅδ' ἦλθε φυγὼν ὕπο νηλεὲς ἦμαρ. Il. Φ 57.
'as this man now has come.'

The pronoun is naturally always emphatic, and it is therefore perfectly idle to quote instances of such pronouns with δή as if the collocation had any constant force or the particle here any special meaning. *σὺ δή* has just as many meanings as δή, which may be either adverb or conjunction and may go either with *σύ* (if emphatic) or with any other word in the sentence. With unemphatic pronouns δή could have no meaning at all.

With οὕτω there are two instances of displacement, namely Od. δ 485

> ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω δὴ τελέω, γέρον, ὡς σὺ κελεύεις·
> ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπέ, κ.τ.λ.

and λ 348—9

> τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω δὴ ἔπος ἔσσεται, αἴ κεν ἔγωγε
> ζωὸς Φαιήκεσσι φιληρέτμοισιν ἀνάσσω.

In five cases οὕτω δή commences a sentence, and there are two instances of δὴ οὕτως (Il. K 385, T 155). The displacement here is not due to any attraction of δή to οὕτω, since there is no similar case with κεῖνος ὅδε ὥδε, &c. ταῦτα μέν and τοῦτο μέν are prefatory to the sentence ('as for this, thus shall it now be done'), being so placed in order to connect with what precedes and contrast with what follows. Where it is not desired to connect with what precedes we have a different order, as Od. ε 23—4

> οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή, κ.τ.λ.

The chief time words which are found with δή are πάλαι δηθά δηρόν αὖτε ἔπειτα νῦν τότε. Of these πάλαι δηθά δηρόν αὖτε are from their nature always emphatic, and the δή always attaches to them. So too other expressions denoting duration or repetition, as Od. ν 376—7

> φράζευ, ὅπως μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσεις,
> οἳ δή τοι τρίετες μέγαρον κάτα κοιρανέουσιν,

where δὴ τρίετες = *iam triennium*. With a preceding or following νῦν or τότε, δή is or is not to be taken according to the emphasis. Neither particle is dependent upon the other except when νῦν or τότε is emphatic. Thus both in τὰ δὴ τετελεσμένα ἦεν and in τὰ νῦν δὴ πάντα τελεῖται, δή is used in the same sense, contrasting the fulfilment with the promise or expectation. So again in Il. O 437

> Τεῦκρε πέπον, δὴ νῶϊν ἀπέκτατο πιστὸς ἑταῖρος

and Π 538

> Ἕκτορ, νῦν δὴ πάγχυ λελασμένος εἶς ἐπικούρων,

we have only one use of δή, calling attention to the new fact: in the second however νῦν is prefaced as a protasis. This is especially clear in cases such as Il. Π 779—780

ἦμος δ' ἠέλιος μετενίσσετο βουλυτόνδε,
καὶ τότε δή ῥ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν Ἀχαιοὶ φέρτεροι ἦσαν

where τότε is a summary repetition of the protasis and δή the common δή of apodosis, 'then the Achaeans had at length the advantage.' The temporal words in no way prevent the close connection of the particle with other words, e.g. πάγχυ (Π 538) and ὑπὲρ αἶσαν (Π 780): cf. Il. K 173, Od. χ 195. In the common phrase ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε κ.τ.λ. there is no collocation ὀψὲ δή 'quite late' (L. and S.): the sense is rather 'but when it was late X now (or 'at length') replied.' So in the line

ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες,

and Od. γ 357

εὖ δὴ ταῦτά γ' ἔφησθα, γέρον φίλε,

δή goes not with ναί ('nay verily') and εὖ, but with ταῦτα, 'thus much now hast thou rightly said.'

We now come to ἐπειδή and εἰ δή. That ἐπειδή is equivalent to *quum iam* rather than to *quoniam* we might infer from the fact that it is subject to tmesis, so that we have ἐπεὶ ἄρ δή, ἐπὴν δή, and ἐπεὶ οὖν δή, but never ἐπειδάν. But it is still more evident from the usage. For not only does a review of the passages show that δή has here precisely the same force as elsewhere, but in fact ἐπειδή almost always refers to something that has just taken place. So, deictically, in such sentences as Od. ο 390

ξεῖν', ἐπεὶ ἄρ δὴ ταῦτά μ' ἀνείρεαι, κ.τ.λ.

and anaphorically in narratives such as Il. Δ 122 sqq.

ἕλκε δ' ὁμοῦ γλυφίδας τε λαβὼν καὶ νεῦρα βόεια·
νευρὴν μὲν μαζῷ πέλασεν, τόξῳ δὲ σίδηρον.
αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ κυκλοτερὲς μέγα τόξον ἔτεινεν, κ.τ.λ.

With εἰ the particle is used in a precisely similar manner.

The condition is always one existing or about to exist at the moment of speaking. So in Od. ν 237—8

νήπιός εἰς, ὦ ξεῖν', ἦ τηλόθεν εἰλήλουθας
εἰ δὴ τήνδε τε γαῖαν ἀνείρεαι, κ.τ.λ.

It is this fact which has led to the translation 'if really,' though δή does not mean 'really,' and could not be twisted into that meaning by any connection with εἰ. (Note that in L. and S.'s Lexicon εἰ δή has by the accident of a cross reference escaped treatment.)

There remains now only the question of δή in the sense of δήποτε 'ere now,' and, as here the use of ἤδη is more common, we may begin with the latter. In such a sentence as Il. Γ 184

ἤδη καὶ Φρυγίην εἰσήλυθον ἀμπελόεσσαν

it is often said (as in Pierron's note here) that ἤδη is equivalent to ποτε. Though this is clearly impossible, it is not quite obvious what is the real explanation. ἤδη ἐπήλυθον may in Homer mean either (1) 'I now (= next) visited,' as in Od. ρ 606

ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐπήλυθε δείελον ἦμαρ
'for now came also afternoon,'

or (2) 'I have now visited,' as in Il. Υ 306

ἤδη γὰρ Πριάμου γενεὴν ἤχθηρε Κρονίων·
νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει κ.τ.λ.
'for now the son of Kronos has come to hate the race of Priam, and Aeneas shall henceforth be king among the Trojans.'

But at the beginning of a speech only the second sense can stand, unless there is some time stated to which the preterite-aorist can refer. How then do we arrive at the sense of 'ere now'? I think that here as in the case of δὴ καί (*supra*) we have a decaying of the temporal sense[1]. It is to be observed that in cases with the present, such as Il. Ε 379—80

[1] Undoubtedly it would be easier to employ the idea of 'already' in explaining these cases. We should, however, be involved in the fallacy of using just that part of the meaning 'already' which does not belong to ἤδη.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν φύλοπις αἰνή,
ἀλλ' ἤδη Δαναοί γε καὶ ἀθανάτοισι μάχονται.

though the temporal sense is undoubtedly preserved (v. the contrast with ἔτι), yet the chief meaning of ἤδη καὶ ἀθανάτοισι is 'etiam immortalibus.' In Γ 184 the temporal sense has disappeared and only the force of 'etiam' remains. This is so without καί in Od. χ 186

δή τότε γ' ἤδη κεῖτο, ῥαφαὶ δ' ἐλέλυντο ἱμάντων

—the only instance of δή and ἤδη together—where ἤδη='quite[1].' In the Classical idiom this usage is common, as in Ar. Lys. 626

δεινὰ γάρ τοι τάσδε γ' ἤδη τοὺς πολίτας νουθετεῖν κ.τ.λ.

where ἤδη = 'now actually.'

The instances coming under this head are Il. A 260

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἀρείοσιν ἠέπερ ὑμῖν
ἀνδράσιν ὡμίλησα 'etiam fortioribus'

Γ 205 ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δεῦρό ποτ' ἦλυθε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς
'huc etiam'

A 590, Ξ 249, Υ 90, 187. In these cases with ποτε ἄλλοτε, &c., we have the preterite-aorist.

Where the sentences contain πολύς, the explanation is different and the ordinary sense 'by now' suffices:—so Od. δ 266—9

ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γύναι, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.
ἤδη μὲν πολέων ἐδάην βουλήν τε νόον τε
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων, πολλὴν δ' ἐπελήλυθα γαῖαν.
ἀλλ' οὔ πω τοιοῦτον ἐγὼν ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσι κ.τ.λ.
'I have by now known the mind and will of many heroes —but never yet, &c.'

and λ 416—8

ἤδη μὲν πολέων φόνῳ ἀνδρῶν ἀντεβόλησας,
μουνὰξ κτεινομένων καὶ ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ·

[1] I must confess that the reading in this passage seems to me most doubtful. I had thought of δὴ τότ' ἀκηδὲς ἔκειτο, which Ameis's Appendix ascribes to Herwerden. But a perhaps more likely suggestion would be ἤδη δὴν τό γε κεῖτο. The use of κεῖτο is not, I think, in itself suspicious.

ἀλλά κε κεῖνα μάλιστα ἰδὼν ὀλοφύραο θυμῷ κ.τ.λ.
'many by now are the slayings thou hast seen—but that scene chiefly would it have grieved thy heart to behold.'

There is a slight difference of emphasis even between these two passages: it will be seen from the context that πολέων is more emphatic in λ 416—8, and hence ἤδη goes more closely with it here. In the Classical language the usage requires no καί or πολύς ποτε ἄλλοτε, &c., and we have such cases as Ar. Av. 1669

ἤδη σ' ὁ πατὴρ εἰσήγαγ' εἰς τοὺς φράτερας;

But in Homer the only instance at all approximating to this is Il. Θ 236—7

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τιν' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλήων
τῇδ' ἄτῃ ἄασας, καί μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας;

but even here τινα implies ποτε.

The use of δή is rarer, but similar: with πολλοί we have Il. E 383—4 (*supra*): with που ποτε ἄλλος

ἦ μὲν δή ποτ' ἐμὸν ἔπος ἔκλυες[1], ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν
πείθευ 'iam olim' Ξ 234—5

ὡς δὴ ἴδον ἀνέρας ἄλλους
κάρτεΐ τε σθένεΐ τε πεποιθότας ἠνορέῃ τε P 328—9
'iam alios'

In Od. λ 261

ἦ δὴ καὶ Διὸς εὖχετ' ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσιν ἰαῦσαι

and ibid. 306

ἦ δὴ φάσκε Ποσειδάωνι μιγῆναι

δὴ καὶ Διός = 'etiam Iovis,' δὴ Ποσειδάωνι = 'etiam Neptuno.'

In the above we have incidentally quoted most of the usages of ἤδη, and it will therefore be sufficient—in view of the parallelism with δή—to add a number of references:—

(1) the ordinary deictic and anaphoric usage = 'now,' 'by now.'

[1] ἔκλυον is always an aorist in Homer.

(*a*) present and perfect

ἤδη γὰρ χαλεπὸν κατὰ γῆρας ἐπείγει
Il. Ψ 623 cf. Od. ζ 34 ρ 157 &c.

ἤδη γάρ μοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται ὄφρ' ἐπαμύνω
Il. Z 361 cf. H 402 and *passim.*

(*b*) future and subjunctive

εἰπέ...ἢ ἤδη φθίσονται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δουρὶ δαμέντες
Il. Λ 821 cf. Od. χ 101 and *supra.*

μερμηρίζει...ἢ ἤδη ἅμ' ἕπηται Ἀχαιῶν ὅστις ἄριστος μνᾶται Od. π 76 cf. τ 528 and Il. Π 648.

(*c*) imperfect and pluperfect

ἤδη γάρ οἱ ἐπώρνυε μόρσιμον ἦμαρ Παλλάς
Il. O 613 cf. Od. θ 470, κ 29, φ 393 &c.

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἤδη κῆρι δαμεὶς Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκειν
Od. γ 410 cf. θ 502, ο 268.

(*d*) aorist

Od. ω 318 &c. *supra.*

(2) ἤδη attached to predicates (= emphatic words) other than the verb.

(*a*) comparatives and superlatives

A 260 v. *supra.*

(*b*) to πολύς

v. *supra.*

(*c*) to πᾶς

ἦ ἤδη πάντες καταλείπετε Ἴλιον ἱρήν Il. Ω 383.

(*d*) to numerals

ἤδη γὰρ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἔτος Od. β 89.
Cf. Il. Ω 765, Od. τ 192, 222 &c.

(*e*) to pronouns

ἤδη καὶ κεῖνον Il. Π 648 cf. P 687, Od. χ 262.

(*f*) to temporal words

ἤδη γὰρ δηρὸν χρόνον ἀλλήλων ἀπέχονται
εὐνῆς καὶ φιλότητος Il. Ξ 206 cf. Od. ν 189.

If now it is asked what differences between the employment of δή and ἤδη are to be found in Homer, the answer has already been given: ἤδη is a more emphatic word and as containing ἦ is almost restricted to the speeches. It does not seem that there is any other difference. Indeed the question might be raised how far in Homer ἤδη is one word or two. That it is already one word is shown by the fact that it can follow ἤ—which ἦ cannot do—and that it in some cases comes late in the sentence. Even where it comes second it has already, like ἦτοι, outstepped the limitations of ἦ. On the other hand it constantly appears at the beginning of the sentence in just the places where we expect ἦ—namely where a speech commences or where there is a change of subject. A consideration of ἦ δή is instructive in this connection. ἦ δή is printed by the editors in 12 cases (A 518, 573 B 272, 337 Ξ 53 O 467 P 538 Φ 583 Ω 518 *a* 253 ε 182 π 337): but they do not always agree, and in π 337 Ameis prints ἤδη. It will be found impossible to draw any distinction of sense between ἦ δή and ἤδη greater than can be paralleled from other combinations printed as one word. But moreover in other cases the two are plainly complementary: we have ἤδη γάρ, but never ἦ γὰρ δή, ἦ μάλα δή, but never ἤδη μάλα, though ἤδη γὰρ μάλα occurs. We are dealing not with a difference of sense, but with a rule of order: and though both ἦ μὲν δή (B 798 Γ 430 H 97 I 348 Π 362 δ 33 ξ 216 σ 257) and ἤδη μέν (O 222 P 629, 687 β 402 δ 267 θ 98 σ 175 ω 87, 506) occur, the difference is only in the point of the μέν—δέ (ἀλλά) antithesis; indeed the reff. may point to a development of usage.

The above claims to be a methodical classification of the usage of ἤδη and δή within the prescribed limits as showing how the secondary meanings are related to the primary notion of time. It will be however not quite useless to refer to other treatments of the same particles by various grammarians. I find discussions in Devarius 'De Graecae Linguae Particulis,' Budaeus 'Commentarii Linguae Graecae,' Hoogeveen 'Doctrina Particularum Graecarum' as abbreviated by Schütz,

Hartung 'De Particulis δή et ἤδη' and 'Lehre von den Partikeln d. Griech. Sprache,' Klotz Notes to his edition of Devarius, Heller 'Epistola ad Max. Dunkerum de particulis ἤδη et δή' in Philologus VIII. 1853, Bäumlein 'Untersuchungen über Griech. Partikeln,' Thiemann 'Über d. Gebrauch d. Partikel δή und ihre Bedeutung bei Homer' in the Zeitschrift für d. Gymnasialwesen for 1881, Vogrinz 'Grammatik des homerischen Dialektes'; along with notes in Döderlein's 'Glossarium' and Nägelsbach's 'Anmerkungen zur Ilias.' It is not however a case of *quot homines tot sententiae.* The opinions upheld in these works are in reality two, that δή is a temporal particle equivalent to the Latin *iam*, and that it is equivalent to δῆλα δή, serving to call attention to some fact. Budaeus takes no definite line: but both Devarius and Hoogeveen regard *iam* as the primary denotation, while the same view was fully developed by Hartung in 1832, whose treatment I, as has been indicated above, in general follow. The temporal sense would seem at this time to have been established. But since then the other view has been general. Thus Klotz, whose edition of Devarius appeared in 1835, while adopting *iam* as an accurate translation, expressly denies an inherent temporal sense in δή, describing this opinion as an 'error multorum ac pene omnium grammaticorum.' He holds δή to be practically the same as ἤδη, which he derives from εἰδέναι, the force of both particles being to call attention to a *fact.* The same view as concerns the sense of the particle is elaborated by Heller, who makes δή apologise for mentioning something known, while ἤδη calls attention to a new fact. Similarly Bäumlein connects δή with *dies* (so also Curtius &c.) as denoting something clear and patent: ἤδη however he conceives to mark the present with reference to some other time. Even in 1881 Thiemann and in 1892 Prellwitz (Etymologisches Wörterbuch d. Griech. Spr.) give the primary sense of 'certainly' to δή. Vogrinz on the other hand makes it refer to the present situation and to be therefore naturally used of time; while Monro in the second edition of his grammar very aptly makes the particle denote the attainment of a result.

The view which equates δή to 'certainly' &c. &c. very

largely rests on the now exploded etymological connection with *dies*. The temporal sense has never really been attacked in detail. In the course of a long article Heller notes only one Homeric passage where the temporal sense is plainly inappropriate. The passage is Il. N 517

δὴ γάρ οἱ ἔχεν κότον ἐμμενὲς αἰεί

'for now he felt an everlasting resentment against him.' Heller, who thinks δή means 'ut ex antecedentibus bene meministis,' inquires what is the force of *now* if Deïphobus always felt this resentment against Idomeneus. The fact is, however, that the κότος does really date from this encounter, and Deïphobus is enraged to find himself no match for Idomeneus[1].

Against the view of Heller, Bäumlein &c., a great deal can be urged. First the etymology: it is now perfectly certain that δή is connected not with *dies*, but, as Hartung saw, with a host of temporal and place words in other languages. We may instance from Latin the *dē* or *dem* in *denique dem(um) tandem pridem*, and the *dō* or *dom* in *dum* (= *dōm*) *quando donec*. The preposition *de* is only a place usage of the same form, which was originally a case of a pronoun meaning 'this': so that δή means quite literally 'with this' or 'at this[2].'

Secondly, it is totally impossible to derive the various uses of the particle from the sense of 'plainly' or 'certainly.' Nothing could be less appropriate than such a sense in questions, commands, and wishes: yet δή is especially common in such sentences. To take the case of questions: here Bäumlein would explain such a sentence as

τίς δὴ ὅδε ξεῖνος νέον εἰλήλουθε;

as meaning 'who can we plainly declare that this stranger is that has recently come?' But apart from the extreme un-

[1] *αἰεί* goes, as usual, with *ἐμμενές*.

[2] These connections were for the most part pointed out first by Hartung, who, however, derived the forms from a wrong 'root.' The etymology now accepted may be seen ap. Prellwitz 'Etymolog. Wörterbuch,' s. v., Fick 'Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen[4],' I p. 65, Per Persson 'Indogermanische Forschungen,' II pp. 249—250.

naturalness of all this, it is obvious that the Greek gives only 'who plainly.' Feeling the difficulty, Bäumlein declares that δή often serves merely to give a character of greater decision and liveliness to the question; this is simply to abandon all explanation. Again in a command, as

ἄλλοισιν δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλεο

Heller makes δή equivalent to *opinor*, expressing indignation: in

νημερτὲς μὲν δή μοι ὑπόσχεο καὶ κατάνευσον

he would make it equivalent to 'quemadmodum secundum ea quae modo dixi faciendum esse puto.' Bäumlein would have δή here mark a demand or request as decisive, natural, and justifiable, so that ἄλλοισιν δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλεο = 'to others plainly you may give your command.' But these treatments are open to the same objections as before: they entirely strip commands, questions, and wishes of their peculiar character. And this is sufficient to condemn the method. The fact is that, while these writers speak of 'plainly,' 'certainly,' &c., they really operate with 'accordingly,' failing meanwhile to bridge the gulf between these two senses, to quote parallels from other sources, or to distinguish between adverbial and conjunctional usages.

Before leaving the subject it may be worth while to refer to the chief differences between the Homeric and Classical idiom. Without entering far into a subject which could satisfactorily be treated only at considerable length, it may be said in general that the Classical writers employ all the Homeric usages together with certain additional ones. Of these the most important are, (1) the conjunctional use = 'now' = 'then' = 'therefore' &c., (2) in resumptions and transitions, (3) in ironical sentences. These last contain nothing peculiar, and the particle will take different senses according as it attaches to different words. In Soph. O. C. 809

ὡς δὴ σὺ βραχέα ταῦτα δ' ἐν καιρῷ λέγεις

it goes with σύ in the sense of *denique* or *demum*: in English we say 'to begin with.' We have the same use in Ant. 441

σὲ δή, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα

where we should say 'you now.' Neither the irony in the former nor the sternness in the latter is expressed by the δή: rather are both expressed by the sentence. The very fact that irony is implied rather than expressed shows that there is nothing peculiarly ironical in the particle. In many passages sometimes regarded as ironical there is really no irony: thus in Herod IX. 59

ταῦτα εἴπας ἦγε τοὺς Πέρσας δρόμῳ—κατὰ στίβον Ἑλλήνων ὡς δὴ ἀποδιδρησκόντων

the sense is simply 'thinking they were at length in flight.'

In answers again δή retains its ordinary sense: καὶ δὴ βεβᾶσι (Soph. Tr. 345) is literally 'even now they are gone.' In hypothetical answers, e.g. Eum. 894 καὶ δὴ δέδεγμαι, the hypothetical nature of the assent is, of course, expressed by the context.

When δή is connected with individual words—in which case the sense of *denique* is generally appropriate,—these words usually, of course, precede: but the reverse order is by no means uncommon; so in Aesch. Prom. 922

ὃς δὴ κεραυνοῦ κρείσσον' εὑρήσει φλόγα, κ.τ.λ.

it goes with κεραυνοῦ κρείσσονα, and Eur. Hipp. 834

οὐ σοὶ τάδ', ὦναξ, ἦλθε δὴ μόνῳ κακά,

with μόνῳ.

In expressions of the type δή που δή τις δή ποτε, &c. the precise force of the δή can best be felt by comparison with πόθεν δή; (unde *tandem*) &c. πρὶν δή and πρίν γε δή = 'until finally.' The Platonic νῦν δή precisely corresponds to our 'just now.' We find the Latin *iam* employed in the same way and also the Greek νῦν, which here differs from νῦν δή only in emphasis, ἃ νῦν ἔλεγες being related to ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες as νῦν λέγεις to νῦν δὴ λέγεις.

F. W. THOMAS.

ON THE TEXT OF M. AUR. ANTONINUS Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν.

In the Seventeenth Century the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius received their full share of attention from English Scholars. In 1634 Meric Casaubon published the first English translation, and subsequently re-edited Xylander's text with notes and a new Latin version, contributing not a few useful suggestions and emendations of the text. Gataker's noble work, first issued in 1652, is a monument of learned industry, and ranges far and wide in illustrative annotation. Since his day English translations, of which the Foulis Press edition is the flower, have been multiplied, but comment and textual criticism have passed into the hands of continental scholars. Coraes, in his 1816 Paris Edition, did more than any other individual to purify the text of its corruptions, and too few of his corrections are incorporated in the familiar Tauchnitz Edition, laboriously rather than brilliantly elaborated by Schultz. This is in the main reproduced in Stich's (Teubner) edition, which contains little that is new except the valuable conspectus of readings and conjectures, and a tolerably complete Index of Words. Apart from valuable Adversaria by Nauck[1], hasty in matters of excision, no modern scholar of distinction has bestowed systematic attention upon the text. But close verbal study, for purposes of translation, convinces me that the *Meditations* are singularly susceptible of secure emendation. The features of style are just what might be expected from one who confessedly lacked intellectual spontaneity or vivacity, whose modes of study and speech were laboured and anxious,

[1] *Mélanges Gréco-Romains*, St Petersburg, 1884.

and who had left school days behind him[1] before he began the practice of Greek composition. There is often a certain choiceness and distinction of phrase, such as drops from the pen of a refined and careful foreigner, but there is no ease of motion, none of the flexible variety or flow that characterise a Lucian or a Plutarch. Terminology and fabric of thought are borrowed from the schools, but, while the writer is conformist and orthodox at heart, his inattention to metaphysics results in constant and often lax enlargement of the content of philosophic terms. As the work progresses, he visibly feels his way towards fit expression, and tends to crystallise his thought in recurrent formulas and similes, so that his range of idea and phrase and metaphor is closely limited and constantly returns upon itself. With each book diction and style grow simpler. In Book I. there is effort in almost every line, in the clumsiness of vocabulary, in the heavy successions of adjectives adverbs or participles, and in the formless monotony of structure and of turn of phrase (esp. I. vii, xiv—xvii); with each succeeding book there is perceptible increase of ease, and in XI. xviii it may be said that he has found the best expression that idiosyncrasy allowed for the truths on which he laid most stress: in that section scarcely a phrase is new, but clarity, precision, ease of statement and of sequence have been attained. Hence M. becomes continually his own interpreter and emender; and some later reference or repetition clears up a copyist's slip. Though this affects interpretation more vitally than emendation, its importance for the latter will, I think, appear in the following pages, in which I have limited myself to the consideration of those passages, in which I have something new to offer for the improvement of the text. To conjectures of my own I have thought it well to add conjectures from a Cambridge Scholar, in his day Craven Scholar and Fellow of King's, whose work has hitherto escaped the notice of those capable of turning it to good use. Capel Lofft's edition of M. Antoninus, published in 1863 under the pseudonym of C. L. Porcher[2], has stood on a few shelves of public or private libraries unread, and about as unreadable as per-

[1] Cp. Frontonis *Epp. Graec.* v.

[2] *i.e.* Capel Lofft, Stoic.

versity of bent could make it—but among the rubbish-shoots of alterations, various readings, Addenda, and Insuper Addenda, I have picked up chance gems of happier inspiration, which may thus at last secure deserved though tardy recognition. Except where I have expressly preferred Stich's reading, I have quoted the Tauchnitz text, and for convenience of reference have in the longer sections added (in Arabic numerals) the number of the line as printed in the Tauchnitz.

It will be well in the first instance to deal with glosses. Though some are acknowledged, and ought frankly to be bracketed by editors, others have hitherto escaped exposure. There can be little doubt that the perplexing *καὶ τὸ ἀθεώρητον τῶν οἰομένων* of I. ix belongs to this category. Stich follows A in omitting *τῶν*, but this does not mend the matter, nor has Gataker found followers in his conjecture *τῶν ἀθεωρήτως οἰομένων*. The words are simply a marginal explanation of the sense ascribed to *τῶν ἰδιωτῶν*, namely the simple, the unphilosophic, the plain thinkers, who are unversed in the *θεωρήματα* of the Schools. Sextus had carried out in life the injunction of Epictetus *μὴ λάλει τὸ πολὺ ἐν ἰδιώταις περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων*. That it is a gloss seems clear from the following considerations. As a marginal explanation it is apposite and well-expressed; intruded into the text it is intolerable, and the *τῶν* must be placed before *τό*. Secondly, Marcus never uses *οἴεσθαι* thus, with the accusative: even the word is not usual in his vocabulary, and I have only noted occurrences I. xv, IX. xxix, and—*in quotation*—VII. xxxv. Thirdly, the variations of text are significant: A omits *τῶν*, and Suidas (s.v. *ἀπαθέστατα*) omits both *τὸ* and *τῶν*: the brief original *ἀθεώρητον οἰομένων* has been variously adjusted for insertion into the text.

Another instructive instance occurs I. xvi. 41, at the words *φαρμάκων καὶ ἐπιθεμάτων ἐκτός*. Here Suidas quoting the passage *verbatim* closes with *ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκτός*. The draggling *ἐκτός*, which all editors continue to insert, is clearly a relic of the marginal note *ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκτός*, which drew attention to the distinction of *φάρμακα* taken as drugs, *ἐπιθέματα* for external application. M. Casaubon should have seen this,

instead of heavily rewriting *εἰς ὀλίγιστα ἰατρικῶν χρήζειν, ἤτε φαρμάκων ἐντὸς ἢ καὶ ἐπιθεμάτων ἐκτός*. This gloss taken in connexion with others shows that the MS. passed through the hands of some one medical or interested in medicine, and with this one is tempted to connect the association of extracts from Marcus with fragments from Aelian's *περὶ ζώων* in the lesser Vatican, Laurentian and other codices (by Stich designated X). This seems the most probable account of the double *διά* clause at the end of IV. xxi. Coraes would substitute *καί* for the second *διά*, but it is far simpler to regard *διὰ τὰς ἐξαιματώσεις*, or else the companion clause, as an explanatory gloss from the margin. In V. ix the case seems equally plain. The ophthalmia is clear and straightforward, and fits well into its place. But what could be more dull, and more interruptive to the sense, than the duplicated *ὡς* tacked on with the technical terms? *Πρὸς κατάπλασμα* is our expert's description of the egg lotion, *πρὸς καταιόνησιν* of the sponge-fomentation and syringing; both are foreign to the original and declare themselves disjointed intruders. The little parade of technical knowledge inclines me to select the *διὰ τὰς ἐξαιματώσεις* for ejection in IV. xxi.

The same thing is exemplified in II. ii, *λύθρος καὶ ὀστάρια καὶ κροκύφαντος ἐκ νεύρων φλεβίων ἀρτηριῶν πλεγμάτιον*. Here Schultz I. suggested omission of *πλεγμάτιον*, or of all words following *κροκύφαντος*. The adscript I believe to be *κροκύφαντος*: the rest of the language is characteristically Marcus's in usage of diminutives when dealing with physical organs; with *φλέβια* compare for instance *ἐντέριον* VI. xiii, *ὀργάνιον* X. xxxviii, *σαρκία* II. ii, *τριχία* VI. xiii, IX. xxxvi, and with *πλεγμάτιον* the parallel *αἱμάτιον*, *πνευμάτιον*, *σπερμάτιον*, *σωμάτιον*, all occurring more than once, and the closely analogous *κρεάδια*, *μελύδρια*, *μυξάριον*, *ὀστάριον*, *σαρκίδια*, and *ψυχάριον*. The *κροκύφαντος* 'tissue' is a surgeon's word, that survives in Galen only, and betrays the same technical interest as *κατάπλασμα*, *καταιόνησις*, *ἐξαιμάτωσις*, all of which occur and are best illustrated in Galen. One might almost think the manuscript of his imperial patient had passed under Galen's hand, and bore his passing annotations.

A good instance of a gloss narrowly failing to usurp a place in the text occurs I. xvi. 31, where P has incorporated the *οἰκογενής*, which the margin supplied as the Greek equivalent for *οὐερνάκλος*. Here as elsewhere the unrectified asyndeton betrays the adscript. The following cases hardly require argued exposure.

In III. vi omit *τὸ ἴδιον* [*καὶ*] *τὸ σόν*, notes elucidating *ἐκεῖνο*.

In IX. i. 37 *κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς γινομένοις* was a marginal explanation of *ἐπιγινομένοις*, and has been patched in with *καί*. PA stupidly inserted the detachable *κατὰ τὸ* before *συμβαίνειν*. Read simply *ἀντὶ τοῦ συμβαίνειν τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις*.

In IX. xxvii, the asyndeton *δι' ὀνείρων διὰ μαντειῶν* bewrays the gloss, a relevant reminiscence from the close of I. xvii.

In XI. xxiii, *παιδίων δείματα* is an unmasked gloss on *Λαμίας*.

In X. xv again the asyndeton convicts *ἰδέτωσαν*, with which the margin called attention to the *contemplari* sense of *ἱστορησάτωσαν*.

In V. xxxiv Reiske rightly suspected *εἴγε καὶ εὐοδεῖν*, the conjectural restoration accepted by editors. It is a gloss—drawn from VI. xvii, VII. liii, VIII. vii, and cf. *εὐοδία* V. viii.—on the less familiar *εὑροεῖν*, iterating the *εἴγε καὶ ὁδῷ* of the text.

In VIII. xxv, *δριμεῖς μὲν* is a marginal *δριμεῖς μὴν* pointing out that Charax and Demetrios are instances of the *οἱ δριμεῖς ἐκεῖνοι* category. For *μὴν* transcribed as *μέν*, cf. *οὐδὲ μὲν* (all MSS.) in IV. xxxix; and A's *μὲν* for *μὴ* at opening of VII. lxvi.

These instances may justify similar assumptions in other cases, where suspicious tags appear at the end of a phrase or section, but excision must be cautious and sane. In dealing with scraps of soliloquy the pursuit of adscripts is risky, but I shall point out probable instances in II. iv. xii, III. iii, V. xxxiv, VII. xxxi, VIII. xxv. li, IX. i.

Throughout the glosses are of the interpretative order, for edification or for explanation, the work of an intelligent reader, who probably supplied the headings, *Πλατωνικόν*, *Ἀντισθενικόν*, *τὸ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου*, *περὶ δόξης*, *περὶ θανάτου*, and such like,

prefixed to various sections. Nauck, out of the supposed adscript that closes IV. xxx, would attribute them to a needy schoolmaster, but taken together they suggest rather some scholar or monk, with interests in medicine and in ethics; and when the same critic proceeds to excise harmless iterations of phrase—such as *σμάραγδον εἶναι καὶ* VII. xv, or *τῶν ἀναισχύντων* IX. xlii,—he has failed to note how characteristic of the author such verbal repetitions are. Instances abound (e.g. III. iv, V. vi. xiii, VII. xv. xvi, X. i. iii. xi. xxv, XII. xxiii. xxx), and are indeed a feature of style.

I will now proceed with the books *seriatim*.

BOOK I.

I. xiv. In recounting his obligations to his brother Verus, Marcus includes, according to the consentient testimony of the MSS., *τὸ ἀμελὲς καὶ ὁμότονον ἐν τῇ τιμῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας*. There seems no good authority for assigning to *ἀμελές* the sense of 'absorbed, undeviating' interest in the object of pursuit, and there is nothing in M. to countenance such a use. Among the many corrections offered both Schultz and Stich have approved Cor.'s *ὁμαλές*, which has thus almost established itself. The conjecture is at first sight taking, but in VI. xxx, on which it is based, the reference is to *equability of temper*, the natural and appropriate use of the word, but not in point here; and the claims of *ἐμμελές*, the earlier correction of Menagius and Reiske, are in every respect better founded. The manuscript evidence favours it strongly, for the omission of one of the two *μμ* would inevitably lead to the depravation *ἀμελές*, while the corruption of *ὁμαλές* is not easy to account for; the word twice recurs in M., namely I. x and XI. ii, and the cognate *πλημμελεῖν* four times; and it is certainly more applicable than *ὁμαλές* to the temper and mind and life reverently attuned to philosophy (*τὸ ἐμμελὲς ἐν τῇ τιμῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας*). The companion *ὁμότονον* too strongly supports *ἐμμελές*, in spite of the accidental proximity of *εὔτονον* and *ὁμαλὲς* in VI. xxx; for *εὔτονον* there is of *well-braced* energy, while *ὁμότονον* carries out the musical reference,

introduced by τὸ ἐμμελές. Thus while it is possible to read ὁμαλές, and to render as 'sustained and resolute,' it is on all counts preferable to retain ἐμμελές and render 'harmonious well-attuned devotion to philosophy.'

We will next approach a baffling passage in I. xvi, where lines 11—15 we find ἀεὶ δ' ὅμοιον αὐτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ χρείας τινὰς ἀπολειφθέντων· καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις, καὶ ἐπίμονον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προαπέστη τῆς ἐρεύνης, ἀρκεσθεὶς ταῖς προχείροις φαντασίαις.

In the first clause ἀπολειφθέντων is the reading of all MSS. and editors, but surely ἀπολῃφθέντων is the more appropriate word, in the ordinary *intercipi* sense, so common in prose writers from Herodotus onwards. As for reading, the alteration, considering the state of the MSS., is almost too trivial to notice. καταλειφθῇ A for καταληφθῇ in XI. i is but one instance out of scores.

But it is the second clause that has been the stumbling-block to editors, and defied satisfactory emendation. To any one reading the long succession of adjectival and infinitival accusatives, of which the first two pages of the section are built up, it should be clear that προαπέστη did not belong to a main sentence, and that the feeble tinkerings ἀλλ' οὔ ποτε..., ἀλλ' οὗτοι, Schultz's naive ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ, Προαπέστη τῆς..., and also Gataker's καὶ ὅτι οὐ, are inadequate and on the wrong track. Clearly a relative or a conjunction is required, and I have little doubt the confusion has resulted from the displacement of ὧν following the ἐπίμονον. Nothing was easier than to omit one member of the triplet *-ονονων*, for *o* and *ω* are constantly interchanged in the MSS. To exemplify the same slip in the same word, we may in passing correct the ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν μόνον, which holds its place at l. 54 of this section in every text yet issued, though the μόνων of A is unquestionably correct. In Marcus adverbial μόνον is used with verbs, and in the usual adversative clauses (οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ καί, μονονουχί, κ.τ.λ.), but with substantives the word is habitually[1] treated

[1] Stich's Index (Teubner ed.), though far from complete, is a helpful guide. Important instances of μόνον in IV. xii., IX. ix, x. xiv. xxxii. are not indexed. In III. x. the correct μόνα is preserved by A.

adjectivally in agreement with its case, and this passage is clearly a miswriting, not an isolated exception. Text v shows the same corruption near the end of III. iv, where AD both give the correct *μόνων*, and similarly in VIII. vii.[1]

With *ὦν* restored, we may with tolerable confidence read *ἐπίμονον ὦν ἂν ἄλλος τις προαπέστη τῆς ἐρεύνης, ἀρκεσθείς...* With the loss of *ὦν* the *ἄν* (insecure enough between the recurrent -ον and αλλ-) naturally dropped away, and all fell into confusion. The relative clause reinforces *ἐπίμονον* with the object which this sense of 'persevering in' desiderates, and which the verb has in VI. xxi. *βλάπτεται ὁ ἐπιμένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπάτης καὶ ἀγνοίας.* Parallelisms of expression in dealing with the same subject are characteristic of Marcus, and in the characterisation of Antoninus in VI. xxx almost every phrase has its counterpart in the more diffuse panegyric of I. xvi. Thus it sensibly confirms our conjecture to find in VI. xxx the echo *καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἄν τι ὅλως παρῆκε, μὴ πρότερον εὖ μάλα κατιδὼν καὶ σαφῶς νοήσας.*

I. xvi. 57. For *ἀνθρώποις* C. L. hit on the clever, and perhaps correct, *ἀναλώμασι*: *δεδορκότος*—omitting *δὲ* with the MSS.—may then be made dependent on *τὸ ἔμφρον κ. μεμετρημένον.*

I. xvi. 59. *οὐκ ἐν ἀωρεὶ λούστης. ἀωρί* A. The *ἐν* is a gross solecism; Reiske's *ἐν ἀωρεῖ* (approved by Schultz!) modelled on *ἐν ἀκαρεῖ*, needs no comment. It is almost incredible that no editor has perceived that *ἐν* is for *ἦν*. At this point the section breaks away from its long chain of abstract accusatives, and adopts narrative statement: the finite verb is almost indispensable. Read *οὐκ ἦν ἀωρὶ λούστης.*

I. xvi. 73. *τὸ δὲ ἰσχύειν καὶ ἔτι καρτερεῖν καὶ ἐννήφειν ἑκατέρῳ.* The *ἐννήφειν* is a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*—unrecorded even in Steph.—that should have aroused more distrust. For what they are worth, *ἐναποθνήσκειν, ἐναποπνεῖν, ἐναρμόζειν, ἐναφανίζεσθαι, ἐνίστασθαι* and *ἐνυφίστασθαι* may be quoted in its favour from M., but no one of them is unparalleled, or indeed (the last excepted) specially uncommon. Surely with the *ἑκατέρῳ* an *ἐν* is required. We shall get rid of the *ἅπαξ*

[1] Cf. *χεῖρον* for *χείρων* in VIII. xlv.

λεγ., much improve the phrase, and provide a suitable companion to the very simple *ἰσχύειν* and *καρτερεῖν*, by assuming a scribe's transposition, and reading *νήφειν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ*. *νῆφον* occurs in this same section, and *νήφειν* in IV. xxvi.

I. xvii. 53. *καὶ τούτου ἐν Καιήτῃ ὥσπερ χρήσῃ* has quite baffled the editors and translators, and been made the butt of guesses more amusing than plausible. C. L.'s *τὸ τοῦ* for *τούτου* is one of the happiest hits among his random shafts, though, with the reference unknown, restoration must be uncertain. With barely the change of a letter, it gives the excellent result 'And the answer of the man at Caieta—"As you will use it,"' meaning "That depends on the use you put it to." It is quite easy to suppose that, after the manner of *sortes Vergilianae*, divine guidance was seen in some such simple oracular utterance, and provisionally nonsense is changed into sense with an ingeniously delicate touch. For the expression, compare VII. lviii *αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τὸ πῶς χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅλος γίνεσθαι; χρήσῃ γὰρ καλῶς*.

Book II.

II. ii. *μηκέτι τὸ εἱμαρμένον ἢ παρὸν δυσχεραίνειν ἢ μέλλον ὑποδύεσθαι*. For the traditional *ὑποδύεσθαι* Stich replaces the MSS. *ἀποδύεσθαι*. Neither is right, or justly defensible. Read *ἀποδύρεσθαι*, the credit for which rests with C. L.'s *ὑποδύρεσθαι*. It is conspicuously nearer to the MSS. than Gat.'s *ὑποδείσασθαι* or Cor.'s *ὑποδεῖσαι*, and explains the variants: the *-ρ-* once omitted, it was natural to substitute *ὑποδύεσθαι* for *ἀποδύεσθαι*, but there is no authority for *ὑποδύεσθαι* with the accusative in the sense 'to shrink from.' *ἀποδύρεσθαι* is a good counterpart to *δυσχεραίνειν*, and is used by contemporaries, such as Lucian and Galen: in Marcus himself the compound *ἀποδυσπετεῖν* of IV. xxxii, V. ix, is a good parallel. Hesychius' attribution of the sense *δειλιᾶν* to *ὑποδύεσθαι* has been referred to this passage, but of course without authority, and such rendering would be quite inappropriate.

II. iv. ὅρος ἐστί σοι περιγεγραμμένος τοῦ χρόνου, ᾧ ἐὰν εἰς τὸ ἀπαιθριάσαι μὴ χρήσῃ, οἰχήσεται, καὶ οἰχήσῃ, καὶ αὖθις οὐκ ἥξεται. Schultz and Stich concur in this strange text. The MSS. all read εἰς τὸ μὴ ἀπαιθριάσαι: Gataker transposed the μή, but should have read ἐὰν μὴ εἰς τὸ ἀπ., which gives the more natural order. No doubt the scribe, having omitted the μή, wrote it above, and the copyist then inserted it wrongly: there was nothing to tempt the scribe to forestall it. At the end to retain the barbarous ἥξεται, or to adopt Cor.'s old-world ἵξεται, is mere wantonness, when both surviving MSS. give ἔξεσται. ἔξεστι is a favourite turn with M., and in III. xiv, VIII. viii (and cf. X. xxxiii) similarly concludes a section. As for ἥξεται, the only instances are in Or. Sib., where ἵξεται must undoubtedly be substituted. The interposition of the second person οἰχήσῃ should have discredited ἥξεται or ἵξεται, but I must confess that I regard καὶ οἰχήσῃ as an adscript incorporated from the margin. AD agree in omitting the καὶ, and οἰχήσῃ was probably a mere note explaining the αὖθις οὐκ ἔξεσται. 'You will no more have the power—for you will have disappeared.' Thus the passage should read ὅρος ἐστί σοι περιγ. τοῦ χρ., ᾧ ἐὰν μὴ εἰς το ἀπαιθ. χρήσῃ, οἰχήσεται καὶ αὖθις οὐκ ἔξεσται.

II. vi. This section has suffered in various ways. The duplicated ὕβριζε, ὕβριζε stands self-condemned; if the taunting imperative were allowable, its iteration could not be tolerated; but Gataker justly observes that an ironical remonstrance of the kind is foreign to the style of Marcus. Nor could the word itself bear the ironical turn imputed to it. '*Do violence to yourself, my soul*' is nonsense. The change required is not great. The first ὑβρίζῃ is a question, possibly answered by ὑβρίζῃ, but I do not think such *middle* use of ὑβρίζομαι will stand. It is more likely that owing to the repeated η, as so often, a μη has dropped out. We shall then have the perfectly satisfactory ὑβρίζῃ; μὴ ὕβριζε σεαυτήν, ὦ ψυχή. '*Is violence done to you? Do not on that account do violence to yourself, my soul,*' sc. by indulging revenge; and perfect coherence is secured with the last clause of the section, which calls the soul to self-respect, and to a contentment that the souls of others

(the *ὑβρίζοντες*) cannot touch. The *ὑβρίζει ἑαυτὴν* is twice repeated in II. xvi, and *ὑβρίζειν* of the offender occurs IV. xi.

One other change, besides *σεαυτήν* for *αὑτήν*, is needed. After *ἔξεις*, we find *εὖ γὰρ ὁ βίος* V, *οὐ γὰρ ὁ βίος* A, *βραχὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος* D, while Gataker suggests *φεύγει* as the missing word. The word dropped out early, and was very probably defaced in the archetype. Almost to demonstration it was *εἷς*, lost owing to the preceding *ἕξεις*. In general sense the nearest parallel is II. xiv, *οὐδεὶς ἄλλον ἀποβάλλει βίον ἢ τοῦτον ὃν ζῇ*; but for parallel expression, compare VI. 30, *βραχὺς ὁ βίος· εἷς καρπὸς κ.τ.λ.*; the *εἷς* at beginning of a clause is indeed characteristic, as in V. iii *μία δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ὁδός*—VI. ii *μία γὰρ τῶν βιωτικῶν*—VI. vii *ἑνὶ τέρπου*—IX. xlii *εἷς γὰρ καὶ οὗτος*—X. xxxvi *ἓν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο*, and recurrently in XII. xxx. The use of *εἷς* is further corroborated by VII. ix, XI. xxi, &c., &c.

This section gives a natural opportunity for considering the use of *αὑτόν*, *αὑτήν*, &c., for the second person reflexive. Here at the first occurrence AD give *ἑαυτήν* and Xylander's text *αὑτήν*, while at the two later occurrences there is a consensus for *σεαυτήν*. Variations of this kind cannot record any genuine tradition, and there is no doubt *σεαυτήν* forms should be restored to the text throughout. The aberrations of Xylander's lost MS., and the *inertia* of editors in handling a printed text, have caused the trouble; for the evidence is conclusive. In many places where the edd. retain *ἑαυτόν*, a *σεαυτ-* variant appears in one or more MSS., and needs no further confirmation. Thus in IV. xxxi Stich rightly adopts the *δοῦλον σεαυτὸν καθιστάς* of A: in VI. xlii the *εἰς τίνα σεαυτόν* of A is no doubt right as against the *εἰς τίνας ἑαυτόν* of the received text: in VII. xxviii, besides the preceding *-ς*, D actually gives *εἰς σαυτὸν συνείλου*, and similarly in VI. xvi *περιποιήσεις σεαυτῷ*; at the end of VII. lxiv *λέγε σεαυτῷ* has the corroboration of Mo 2; in IX. xlii. 29, where once more *ἑαυτὸν* follows *εἰς*, AX preserve the correct *σεαυτόν*, and so too in XII. xiv *ἄξιον σαυτὸν ποίησον*. Instructive variants, falsely omitting the *σ-* or *σε-*, will be found in VIII. xlviii. xlix, X. viii. 1, XI. ix and elsewhere. The number of passages left to deal with is small; in a few a preceding *-ς* or *-σε* has caused the loss of the initial *σ-*:

so for instance with *ἐὰν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πολλάκις λέγῃς* and *οὔπω ὡς αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῶν* of VII. xiii, to whose proximity the third *ἑαυτόν* in the same short section, *ἐὰν μέρος εἶναι ἑαυτὸν λέγῃς*, may probably be attributed; so again with *ἐπάνιθι εἰς ἑαυτόν* [and possibly *εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπανέρχεσθαι*] VI. xi, in which the *σ-* must be restored; and so with cases noticed in IX. xlii and XI. ix. There remains for correction only *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα καθαρὸν ἑστῶτα τηρῇς* in III. xii, but the *ἑαυτοῦ* is perhaps part of the corruption which has overtaken the immediately preceding *μηδὲν παρεμπόρευμα ἀλλά.*

In this connexion it will not be superfluous, and will save hasty correction, to note that with the *infinitive* the third person reflexive is often, perhaps generally, retained. Thus in II. i *ἔωθεν προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ*, III. xi *λέγειν παρ' ἑαυτῷ*, and VIII. lxi *εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικόν* are unimpeachable; this confirms the retention of *κρῖναι* given by AD in V. iii, in preference to the *ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν κρῖνε* of the received text, and would suggest *εἰς ἑαυτὸν* as perhaps the true reading for *εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπανέρχεσθαι* of VI. xi. This I believe is the explanation and justification of *τὸ μὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ἀτοπωτάτοις νόμιζε* of XI. xix, in spite of its close association, both before and after, with the second person; the passage should be translated 'This does not come from your heart; and not to speak from one's heart is moral inconsistency.' Such changes of person are not infrequent in Marcus, and V. iii just cited gives a close parallel.

II. vii. *περισπᾷ τί σε τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα· καὶ σχολὴν πάρεχε κ.τ.λ.* Drastic reconstructions have been offered; but repunctuation, as the order of words suggests, and the addition of a single letter, meet every need. Read *περισπᾷ ἔτι σε τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα; σχολὴν πάρεχε*...The *καὶ* is absent from D, and was the natural result of missing the opening *question.*

II. xii. The final clause has fallen into confusion, out of which Sch. and Stich construct *πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ κατὰ τί ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακέηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον.* Almost every MS. and editor offers a different variant; I believe the original ran

καὶ πῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, διακέηται τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μόριον, though whether the ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ was part of the original, or is rather a marginal note, may be questioned.

II. xiv. τὸ γὰρ παρὸν πᾶσιν ἴσον, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον οὐκ ἴσον· καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλλόμενον οὕτως ἀκαριαῖον ἀναφαίνεται. There seems strong reason for regarding εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον οὐκ ἴσον as a marginal note. (1) The εἰ is missing from AD, though without it the text is meaningless. (2) The οὐκ condemns the εἰ. (3) The seeming antithesis gives no intelligible sense. What is τὸ ἀπολλύμενον (note the *present* particip.), if it be not the present? and what is the distinction between it, and τὸ ἀποβαλλόμενον? Gataker recognised the difficulty, and substituted the impossible καὶ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον οὖν ἴσον: no other editor appears to me to extract coherent sense, even when rendering τὸ ἀπολλύμενον (cf. Schultz *quod periit*) as τὸ ἀπολόμενον. I believe the clause was originally a pious reflection upon τὸ παρὸν ἴσον, to the effect that present probation means eternal loss or gain. As soon as it is expunged from the text, the passage flows naturally, in a familiar channel: compare end of section, and XII. xxvi τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἕκαστος ζῇ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποβάλλει.

II. xvi. τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἐν μέρει αἱ ἑκάστου τῶν λοιπῶν φύσεις περιέχονται. It is hard to believe that ἐν μέρει is sound, though it has escaped criticism. Commentators merely refer to such passages as II. ix τῇ φύσει ἧς μέρος εἶ, but how is the desired sense to be got from the above? It is not true to say that individual natures are comprehended *in a part of* universal nature; such language is rather a contradiction than an affirmation of their place as μέρη τοῦ ὅλου II. ix. I had thought of συνεχείᾳ, which occurs V. viii. 39 of the συνέχεια μορίων in a whole, while συνέχειν is specifically used of the unifying bond of nature. But it is to be observed that αἱ has no manuscript authority and rests solely on the conjecture of Coraes. This being so, ἑνώσει seems the more likely original, and would to some extent relieve the necessity for the conjectural αἱ. The word is familiar in M.'s vocabulary, the closest parallels to the use here being τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας VI. xxxviii, and τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἑνώσεως VIII. xxxiv. The simple dative

is the natural usage with *περιέχεσθαι*, as in III. vii, and the closely parallel *τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου, ὅσα φύσει περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου* X. vii, while for *ἐν μέρει περιέχεσθαι* there is no justification.

Book III.

III. ii. *ἡδέως πως δια-συνίστασθαι.* The compound, in itself barely tolerable, conveys no meaning here, *συνίστασθαι* being all that the sense requires; editors excusably retained it, as long as there was no better option than Reiske's *νὴ Δία*, or Cor.'s *καί*, or Stich's *διὰ τί*!! The true reading, as C. L. saw, is *ἡδέως πως ἰδίᾳ συνίστασθαι* 'forms some pleasing combination of its own,' the *ἰδίᾳ* appropriately repeating the *ἴδιόν τι κάλλος* and *κατ' ἰδίαν* of preceding lines. The word is used with extraordinary frequency in M., and the adverbial *ἰδίᾳ* is very common in Plutarch.

III. iv. 3. *ἤτοι γὰρ ἄλλου ἔργου στέρῃ τουτέστι φαντα-ζόμενος...ἤτοι*, very common in M., is invariably disjunctive and answered by *ἤ*; its use for *profecto*—so Morus, approved by Schultz—seems quite improbable. Boot.'s *ἤδη* might pass, but I much prefer to regard the *η-* as drawn from the final *-η* of preceding *ποιῇ*, and to read *τί γάρ...*; the *τουτέστι*, which others have felt unsatisfactory, I believe to stand for *οὕτως ἔτι*, resuming the *ταῖς περὶ ἑτέρων φαντασίαις* of preceding clause, or for *τοιοῦτον ἔτι* looking forward to the coming *τί* clauses; the *ἔτι* in either case, as so often in M., expresses persistent habit. We thus get the natural self-remonstrance *τί γὰρ ἄλλου ἔργου στέρῃ* $\begin{cases} \tau o \iota o \hat{\upsilon} \tau o \nu \\ o \hat{\upsilon} \tau \omega \varsigma \end{cases}$ *ἔτι φανταζόμενος...*, 'Why miss other opportunities for action, by thus fixing your regards upon what some other person is doing or saying or thinking...?' Of the two suggestions, there seems good reason for preferring *τοιοῦτον ἔτι*, upon the strength of the parallel corruption in IV. xxxix. There too Xylander appears, by his Latin rendering, to have found *τουτέστι*, which has established itself in the Tauchnitz and Teubner texts: but PA both show *τοιοῦτόν ἐστι*, which vindicates the original *τοιοῦτον ἔτι*. The case is instruc-

tively parallel, the ἔτι once again of persistent habit, and the τοιοῦτον looking forward to the coming relative clause ὃ ἐπίσης δύναται...In both cases the τοιοῦτον was probably represented by some compendium, which has misled the later copyist: at any rate τοιοῦτος forms seem curiously to induce variants and corruption. As one instance I may quote the last words of IV. xxxiii, where Coraes and (at some length) Skaphidiotes are right in adopting Menag.'s τῆς αὐτῆς. [C. L. riots in emendations of this 'scape-goat' word. 'Haec vox scribae pro hirco expiatorio fuit, super quem sibi exonerabat, si quid in texto eius simile, plus minusve, idemque difficile, autumabat'—he writes, and proceeds to supply the most caleidoscopic variants.]

III. v. The corrupt ἐν δὲ τὸ φαιδρὸν...has baffled restoration. I am inclined to think that both φαιδρόν of v., and φαινόμενον of AD formed part of the original, and that the iterated φαι- caused the loss of the neighbour word in either case. I would then read ἔχε δὴ τὸ φαινόμενον φαιδρὸν, supporting it by τὸ φαινόμενον δίκαιον X. xii, τὰ φαινόμενα καθήκοντα III. xvi, and τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα VI. xxvii.

III. vi. The arrangement of the three final clauses as a colloquy, adopted in all recent texts, is a misunderstanding. The sense runs continuously on.

For ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθερίως, fifth line from the end, certainly read ἐλευθέρως with AD; the identical combination recurs V. vii and X. viii. 27, while ἐλευθέριος nowhere appears, except on the single and mistaken authority of A in VIII. i.

III. ix—xi. A seems correct in combining these three sections into one. In section x the illative οὖν and the ταῦτα referring directly to the preceding reminders are conclusive. In xi the τοῖς δὲ εἰρημένοις is equally decisive; for in Marcus τὰ εἰρημένα, as in III. xvi, XI. xxi, XII. xxx, refers to immediately preceding words (not to former parts of the work), and δέ never opens a new section. This last observation will enforce three other corrections, which cover all the apparent exceptions that occur. In VIII. iii δὲ, excised by Cor., should perhaps be replaced by δή: in XI. xxxvii δεῖ for δὲ is necessary

to the sense, and ἔφη gives the citation in direct form, just as in the section following; the δεῖ and δὲ confusion may be illustrated from the variant δεῖ δὲ καὶ shown by D at the opening of VII. lx. The only other case is ὅμοιον δ' εἶναι XII. ix, where we may confidently read σ' or σε for δ'.

III. xii. καὶ τῇ ὧν λέγεις καὶ φθέγγῃ ἡρωϊκῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀρκούμενος εὐζωήσεις. It is true that Arist. *Eth.* vii. 1 uses the phrase ἡρωϊκὴ ἀρετή in its legitimate sense of 'superhuman' virtue, but the word never dropped out of its proper sense of 'like or belonging to a Hero' into a mere superlative. To talk of 'being content with heroic truth of word and speech' is sheer nonsense, and I offer εὐροικῇ as a certain correction, even though unknown to Greek Lexicons. εὔρους (II. v, V. ix, X. vi), εὔροια, and εὐροεῖν (V. xxxiv, X. vi) are recognised Stoic terms, familiar to Marcus, and εὐροϊκὴ is a more natural form than δυσροητική, with which Arr. *Epict.* 4. 1. 58 matches his δύσροια and δυσροεῖν. Compare δυσπνοϊκός, δυσνοϊκός, and the very common εὐνοϊκός, which would decide the form. In support of the recovered adjective it may be noticed that εὐζωήσεις is virtually an ἅπαξ λεγόμενον peculiar to this passage: Steph. quotes for it only Achmes *Onir.* 151.

III. xvi. καὶ τῶν ποιούντων, ἐπειδὰν κλείσωσι τὰς θύρας. Something is wanting, and the best and simplest supplement is τῶν πάντα ποιούντων, the loss due to the duplicated π. For the phrase compare Dem. *De Cor.* ἣν Ἔμπουσαν ἅπαντες ἴσασι καλουμένην, ἐκ τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.

Book IV.

IV. iii. 11. βραχέα δὲ ἔστω καὶ στοιχειώδη, ἃ εὐθὺς ἀπαντήσαντα ἀρκέσει εἰς τὸ πᾶσαν ἀϋτὴν ἀποκλεῖσαι, καὶ ἀποπέμψαι σε, μὴ δυσχεραίνοντα ἐκείνοις, ἐφ' ἃ ἐπανέρχῃ.

For the meaningless αὐτήν, which Schultz retains and refers to an unexpressed ψυχήν, Stich adopts Casaubon's fantastic ἀϋτήν. Other conjectures are ἀνίαν, λύπην, ἄτην, ἄσην, ἄλμην: it is strange that it should have been left to C. L. to divine that αὐτήν is for αὐλήν, which with the ἀποκλεῖσαι of AD gives perfect sense, and sums up those distasteful duties, from which

M. sought relief in inward communion giving him new strength for their resumption. Compare *ἐν αὐλῇ βιοῦντα* I. xvii. 14, and in exactly the same key as the present passage, V. xvi *ὅπου ζῆν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ εὖ ζῆν· ἐν αὐλῇ δὲ ζῆν ἐστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ εὖ ζῆν ἐν αὐλῇ.*

IV. iii. 24. *ἀλλὰ τὰ σωματικά σου ἄψεται ἔτι; ἐννοήσας ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.*....The punctuation requires alteration. The *ἔτι following ἄψεται* draggles, especially at the end of the clause, and is quite inappropriate with the future. It is the accustomed *ἔτι* of persistent habit (cf. note on III. iv) and belongs to *ἐννοήσας* clause.

IV. v. *σύγκρισις ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων...εἰς ταὐτά.* Gat. fills up the lacuna with *διάκρισις* or *διάλυσις*, but *λύσις* is quite sufficient, cf. XII. xxiv *ἐξ οἵων ἡ σύγκρισις καὶ εἰς οἷα ἡ λύσις.* The *λύσις* was lost owing to the εις immediately following cic. I suspect *τῶν αὐτῶν* of having replaced the frequent *τοιούτων* under the influence of the following *ταὐτά.* At the end of the section *παρασκευῆς* creates natural misgivings, for *παρασκευή* nowhere occurs in M., while *κατασκευή* in this sense is again and again reiterated.

IV. xvi. *ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν θεὸς αὐτοῖς δόξεις, οἷς νῦν θηρίον καὶ πίθηκος, ἐὰν ἀνακάμψῃς ἐπὶ τὰ δόγματα*...Gataker is justly puzzled; who are the *αὐτοῖς*? Following Xylander he interprets them to mean the fickle and unprincipled, whose reverence you will speedily command if only you pay steadfast heed to the principles of virtue and philosophy. But *ἀνακάμψῃς* must mean *return* (after some implied backsliding), and the rendering *reflectis mentem* is inadmissible; and the sentiment itself, however consonant with the cheerier mood of Epictetus (see Gat. *in loc.*), does not accord with Marcus' unvarying accent of patient unappreciated continuance in well-doing. Nor does it leave any force to the phrase *οἷς νῦν θηρίον καὶ πίθηκος*, more particularly to the *νῦν*, which M. Casaubon still more violently overrides. Thus we seem forced to interpret *αὐτοῖς* of the Wise, the Philosophers, as the earlier part of Gat.'s note would seem to suggest: but on that supposition the language is strained and unnatural, and the thought conveys little meaning or solace. As a solution I suggest *θεὸς θεοῖς αὐτοῖς*

δόξεις—'In a week you can become as a god among gods, instead of a mere beast and ape, if only you will return to the ways of consistency and reason.' The general thought is familiar in this book, e.g. xiii, xxxvii, and I think the fitness of θεοῖς will be clear to anyone considering the original allusion, which Plato gives thus in *Hipp. Mai.* 289 B. Ἡράκλειτος λέγει...ὅτι ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται.

IV. xviii. ὅσην ἀσχολίαν κερδαίνει ὁ μὴ βλέπων...is retained by all modern editors, in spite of Gat.'s proposed εὐσχολίαν. The general sentiment is clearly parallel to that with which III. iv opens, with close verbal correspondence. With ἀσχολίαν we must render 'How much expenditure of time is gained,' in the sense of 'is saved,' and I cannot find any authority for such use of κερδαίνειν: as referring to 'time,' the usage of the verb is well established in the sense of *apponere lucro*, e.g. Dem. *Phil.* III. 29 τὸν χρόνον κερδᾶναι τοῦτον, ὃν ἄλλος ἀπόλλυται, *Lys.* 137. 41 χρόνον κερδαίνομεν ὃν ἔζη, and in (?) Eur. *Fr.* 1131

εἰ δέ τις πράσσει κακῶς
κακὸς πεφυκὼς, τὸν χρόνον κερδαινέτω.

And to this usage M. conforms, as in IV. xxvi κερδαντέον τὸ παρόν. There are indeed rare cases, for which see Schultz *Adnotationes Criticae* and Lexx., in which κερδαίνειν is used of some unwelcome gain, the best known being διπλᾶ δάκρυα κερδαίνειν Eur. *Hec.* 518, but in all these instances the object is something gotten, not something that we are saved from getting. M. uses both εὔσχολος and εὐσχολεῖν, the former in a neighbouring passage, which virtually repeats that under consideration—cf. IV. xxiv τὰ πλεῖστα ὧν λέγομεν καὶ πράσσομεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ὄντα, ἐάν τις περιέλῃ, εὐσχολώτερος καὶ ἀταρακτότερος ἔσται: and these fully justify εὐσχολία.

At the end of XII. ii the same correction is necessary. The texts contentedly read ὁ γὰρ μὴ τὰ περικείμενα κρεάδια ὁρῶν, ἤπου γε ἐσθῆτα καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην περιβολὴν καὶ σκηνὴν θεώμενος, ἀσχολήσεται. This is nonsense, though the Latin versions successfully veil it by their *multo minus* rendering of ἤπου γε, and εὐσχολήσεται must be restored.

IV. xix. *ὑπόθου δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀθάνατοι μὲν οἱ μεμνησόμενοι, ἀθάνατος δ' ἡ μνήμη· τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς σέ; οὐδὲν λέγω, ὅτι πρὸς τὸν τεθνηκότα· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ζῶντα τί ὁ ἔπαινος, πλὴν ἄρα δι' οἰκονομίαν τινά; πάρες γὰρ νῦν ἀκαίρως τὴν φυσικὴν δόσιν· ἄλλου τινὸς ἐχόμενον λόγου λοιπόν.* Editors have tried emendation and repunctuation without much success. In the first half, against Stich, I have retained v., but—which does not seem to have occurred to any editor or translator—take *ὅτι* after *λέγω* for 'because,' not 'that' or 'what.' In the last clause, I accept Gataker's easy *παρίης* for *πάρες*, and think that the *ἐχόμενον* v. and *ἐχομένην* AD are mistaken substitutions for original *ἐχόμενος*. The whole will then give this connected sense—'But assume that those who remember you are immortal, and memory immortal, what is that to you? Nothing, I say, because it applies to you dead. Indeed to you living what good is praise, except for some secondary end? In courting it you are missing your opportunities and neglecting nature's gifts, while you idly cling to what this or that man may say of you hereafter.' This use of *λόγον* for 'mere talk' occurs, e.g., in v. iii. The rendering *ratio* gives no sense, and Stich honestly asterisks the clause.

IV. xx. *οὔτε γοῦν χεῖρον ἢ κρεῖττον γίνεται τὸ ἐπαινούμενον.* There is no such *οὔτε...ἤ...* in M., nor is there any need or excuse for it here. [The *μήτε...ἤ* in VIII. li is apparent only.] Nauck heals the blot, which other edd. endure, by reading *οὔτε* for *ἤ*. But both here and in v. viii. 21 I note that *γὰρ οὖν*—a slighter change—would supply a better connexion than *γοῦν*, and *οὐ γὰρ οὖν χεῖρον ἢ* would meet the need.

IV. xxi. *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐνθάδε ἡ τούτων πρὸς ἥντινα ἐπιδιαμονὴν μεταβολὴ καὶ διάλυσις χώραν ἄλλοις νεκροῖς ποιεῖ.* The *πρὸς ἥντινα ἐπιδιαμονήν* is in every respect unsatisfactory; *πρὸς* cannot possibly be twisted into 'after,' as all the versions require; *ὅστις* (unsupported by *οὖν* or *δή*) is nowhere I think thus used by M. for *quidam*, and certainly is unsuitable in this clause (perhaps the *δι' ὅτου δὴ* of XI. xiii comes nearest); the *ἐπιδιαμονήν* is a rare combination, found only in Christian fathers, for 'after-continuance' or survival of the Soul, and scarcely appropriate here. The error lies in a corrective in-

version from the original *ἐπὶ πόσην τινα διαμονήν*. The temporal *ἐπί* 'extending over' recurs in the very same *ἐπὶ ποσὸν* combination in this section, and again X. ix; so also in *ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλασσον* III. vii, *ἐπ' ὀλίγον* I. viii, VIII. xxv, *ἐπὶ μακρόν* V. xxxiii, &c., &c.: it is thoroughly in place of the gradual change and dissolution. The attachment of *τις* to *πόσος, ποῖος, ὁποῖος, τοσόσδε* is quite a habit with M., and *διαμονήν* falls into its proper place as resuming the initial *διαμένουσι*.

IV. xxiv. *Ὀλίγα πρῆσσε, φησὶν, εἰ μέλλεις εὐθυμήσειν· μήποτε ἄμεινον τἀναγκαῖα πράσσειν*. There have been various conjectures to amend the last words, but what is really wanted to give them their due force is *μόνον*, which was lost in the preceding *-μεινον*. Read *μήποτε ἄμεινόν μόνον τἀναγκαῖα πράσσειν*, which the rest of the section, especially *δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον πράξεις τὰς μὴ ἀναγκαίας περιαιρεῖν*, helps to confirm. For the position of *μόνον*, compare III. x.

IV. xxvii. *ἤτοι κόσμος διατεταγμένος, ἢ κυκεών, συμπεφορημένος μέν, ἀλλὰ κόσμος*. Apart from the vicious balance of clauses, this makes nonsense: a *κυκεών* cannot under any circumstances be a *κόσμος*, for the two terms are habitually antithetical. *κυκεών* in M. is moreover always used with some supporting synonym or epithet. No doubt *κυκεὼν συμπεφ.* is the alternative to *κόσμος διατεταγμένος*. The *ἀλλά*, as so often in M., introduces his own answer to the dilemma. *μέν* may be variously accounted for, but the simplest explanation is that it represents *μήν*. A copyist's transposition caused the misunderstanding, or *vice versa*. Read *ἤτοι κόσμος διατεταγμένος ἢ κυκεὼν συμπεφορημένος. ἀλλὰ μὴν κόσμος. ἢ ἐν σοί κ.τ.λ.*

IV. xxviii. Editors have failed to see that the opening *μέλαν ἦθος* is a quotation, of which the remainder of the section is an exposition or paraphrase. This expansion or comment upon an initial quotation is quite in M.'s manner: compare IV. xxiv, VII. xlvii. lii, IX. xxx, XI. xii, and probably IV. xxxi, IX. xxvi and other sections. Recognition of this confirms Xyl.'s *κατὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα* in IV. xviii.

IV. xxx. *ὁ μὲν χωρὶς χιτῶνος φιλοσοφεῖ, ὁ δὲ χωρὶς βιβλίου· ἄλλος οὕτως ἡμίγυμνος. Ἄρτους οὐκ ἔχω, φησί, καὶ ἐμμένω*

τῷ λόγῳ.—Ἐγὼ δὲ τροφὰς τὰς ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων οὐκ ἔχω, καὶ ἐμμένω.

None of the interpreters has made coherent sense of this section, and Nauck in despair thinks the last clause was the marginal sigh of some needy scholiast. We must get rid of ἄλλος and the '*iste tertius seminudus*' by reading ἄλλως and attaching it to the βιβλίου clause. Then we get a single coherent comparison, between the shirtless, but content, philosopher, and the emphatic ἐγώ—Marcus bereft of his intellectual aliment, the books and memoranda which he so often deplores (cf. II. ii. iii, III. xiv, VIII. viii). With Stich I retain the οὕτως of PA for οὗτος, and translate, "Without a shirt the philosopher is a philosopher still, without a book, not so. Says our half-clad friend 'Bread I have none, yet I hold fast to reason.' And so say I 'Provender of learning I have none, yet I hold fast'." The true philosopher must rise superior to intellectual, as well as material, privations.

IV. xl. μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον. All editors appear to regard ἐπέχον in sense *obtinentem* or *praeditum* with unquestioning equanimity. My own scruples are perhaps due to ignorance, but I should be glad to have them relieved; it is easy to suggest ἀπέχον (cf. IV. xlix, IX. xlii, XI. i), or even, having regard to the preceding μίαν, ἀμπέχον. But a more suitable word, and one more liable to depravation, would be ἐφέπον, which in point of usage perfectly matches διέπον of V. 21.

IV. xlvi. I print the section in full (following Stich's text), as there are various nice points for discussion.

Ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνῆσθαι· ὅτι γῆς θάνατος, ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος, ἀέρα γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ ἔμπαλιν. μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου, ᾗ ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει· καὶ ὅτι, ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι, λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτῳ διαφέρονται· καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται. καί, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε δοκοῦμεν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν· καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ παῖδας τοκέων, ὧν τοῦτ' ἔστι· κατὰ ψιλόν, καθότι παρειλήφαμεν.

The first sentence makes it clear that Marcus reproduces

only the general sense and leading catch-words of the original. *γενέσθαι* is a weak representation of the *ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον* form of this favoured and even hackneyed epigram. (See Frag. 25 and 68 in Bywater.) The second citation retains still less of the *ipsissima verba* of the fragment, elsewhere given as *ἄγεται....., οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκη βαίνει.* Thus in approaching the third citation, I have little faith in *διηνεκέως ὁμιλέουσι*, as Bywater prints in Fr. 93, faithfully preserving the *words* of Herakleitos. *διηνεκῶς* is not elsewhere ascribed to Herakleitos, while M. uses the adverb a dozen times as part of his ordinary vocabulary. Again *διαφέρονται*, so familiar to historic and philosophic prose and used thus in M. XI. xxxix, has not the ring of Herakleitos, and I believe *ἐγκυροῦσι* (for *ἐγκυρέουσι*) is the only Herakleitean fossil embedded in the text, which is content with loose paraphrase and interpretation of the fragment reported by Clem. Alex. (see Fr. 5 in Bywater). It is quite the manner of M. to quote one or two words only. Commentators have strangely imagined that M. ascribed VII. xlviii to Plato. The citation, as IX. xxx shows, is confined to the fragmentary words *ἐπισκοπεῖν* (prob. for *ἐπιθεωρεῖν*)... *ἄνωθεν κατὰ ἀγέλας.*

The *ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας* reminiscence cannot be separated from the reference in VI. xlii (in Bywater, Frag. 90 and 94), and the recurrence of phrase suggests verbal citation. In the last line editors have made queer work, failing to unravel the consentient testimony of PAD. In *παῖδας τοκέων ὦν* the *ὦν* is possessive, or else for *ὥς*, and the citation—with hexameter cadence it may be noted—is prosed in the *τουτέστι* clause. Read therefore *καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ παῖδας τοκέων ὥς, τουτέστι κατὰ ψιλόν, καθότι προειλήφαμεν.* The reference must I think be quite distinct from that of Bywater's Frag. 97. The omission of *οὐ* might bring them into harmony, and it is curious that in the preceding *ὅτι οὐ δεῖ* also the excision of *οὐ* would similarly facilitate reconciliation with VI. xlii; but there seems to be no divergence in the MSS. tradition.

IV. xlviii. *τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατιδεῖν ἀεὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελῆ.* *ὅλον* is Casaubon's conjecture adopted in all editions. C. L. does well to return to the MSS. *ὅλα* and read

τοιγάρ. Very probably here as elsewhere ἀεὶ has taken the place of δεῖ, which would relieve the abrupt infinitive. 'Therefore we must look at things human in their entirety, fleeting and sorry.'

IV. li. καὶ στρατείας can hardly be sound. εὐσταθείας, τερθρείας, and (better) τερατείας have been the conjectures. I had thought of στραγγείας 'hesitation' as preferable to any of these, and find it actually ascribed to this passage by L. and Sc., copying from Stephanus.

BOOK V.

V. i. ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι—[Φημὶ κἀγώ·] ἔδωκε μέντοι καὶ τούτου μέτρα ἡ φύσις· [ἔδωκε μέντοι καὶ τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν·] καὶ ὅμως σὺ ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα, [ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀρκοῦντα] προχωρεῖς. Looking at the variants on these lines, it seems clear that marginal adscripts have been incorporated. The personal φημὶ κἀγώ, reverting to first person, with which AD replace δεῖ of v.—the duplicated ἔδωκε μέντοι with its feeble accompaniment—and the superfluous ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀρκοῦντα *asyndeton*, all point the same way. Which phrases to omit is questionable, but consideration of the whole case relegates those bracketed above to the margin.

In the following sentence, if with Stich the ἄλλοι δὲ...of AD is retained, C. L.'s insertion ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς τέχνας ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον φιλοῦντες has much in its favour; but I prefer the scholarly ἀλλ' οἵ γε... of Schultz and Coraes, for a parallel to which see XI. xviii. 21.

V. v. τὸ ἀπέρισσον, τὸ ἀφλύαρον, τὸ μεγαλεῖον. The run of the sentence suggests a negative word to complete the list, and the suggestion is quite borne out by the sense of μεγαλεῖον. It must imply some *good* quality of the Stoic and restrained order of virtues. Casaubon gives *altitudine praeditum*, which Gataker and others improve into *sublimem* 'high-minded, dignified.' This does not fall happily into line with the companion words, and strains μεγαλεῖος, which signifies 'magnificent,'

or in unfavourable sense 'high and mighty,' ἡ μεγαλειότης in the Byzantine Court becoming the official style for 'His Magnificence.' Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 1. 4 μεγαλείους καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας. Read ἀμεγαλεῖον, which suitably follows ἀπέρισσον, ἀφλύαρον in sense of 'absence of ostentation.' Dübner, apparently by mere slip, renders '*nugis et magnificentia alienum.*' The word is not in Lexicons, but M. abounds in these privative adjectives, as a glance at Stich's Index will show. From this very sentence we may add ἀκίβδηλον, ἀφιλήδονον, and ἀμεμψίμοιρον—itself a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον. The form is not in itself more unnatural than ἀμεγέθης, and the loss of A before M is easy.

v. v. At the close of the section the books read ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν πάλαι ἀπηλλάχθαι ἐδύνασο· μόνον δέ, εἰ ἄρα, ὡς βραδύτερος, καὶ δυσπαρακολουθητότερος καταγινώσκεσθαι· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀσκητέον, μὴ παρενθυμουμένῳ, μηδὲ ἐμφιληδοῦντι τῇ νωθείᾳ.

To begin with, μόνον δὲ, as Reiske saw, is objectionable; μόνον is used as connective particle or conjunction in M., but not with δέ. Secondly, nothing has availed to bolster up the hanging εἰ ἄρα: to *understand* ἐδύνασο is absurd, and there is nothing in M. like it: nor has any one accepted the εἰ ἄρῃς hazarded by Casaubon. Thirdly, the καταγινώσκεσθαι is as helplessly pendent as εἰ ἄρα, and Gat.'s insertion of μέλλῃς has no warrant and is a mere botch. Is not μόνον δέῃ ἄρα the true reading? "After all you need only to be found fault with (or, to note your own fault) as more slow and unreceptive than you should be; and that fault you can discipline, if only you do not shut your eyes to it, or indulge, make a foible of, your own stupidity." μόνον δεῖ ἄρα would be more satisfactory, but involves change of the nominatives to accusatives.

v. vi. ἐν τούτοις οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, τοῖς τρόπον τινὰ ἀπαρακολουθήτως αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι;—Ναί.—Ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεῖ παρακολουθεῖν· ἴδιον γὰρ (φησὶ) τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι κοινωνικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ νὴ Δία, βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸν κοινωνὸν αἰσθέσθαι.—Ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν, ὃ λέγεις· κ.τ.λ.

The colloquy seems to need rearrangement. In the first place, I have no doubt φύσει should be read for φησί. I doubt

whether the absolute *φησί* is ever sound in M., except to mark quotation (as in IV. xxiv, VII. lxiii, IX. xli (*bis*), X. xxiii), of which there is here no question. The *φύσει* corruption, in one form or another, has MS. attestation in V. xxviii, where read *φύσει* with AD, in IX. xli, in X. vii. 1. 3, and recurs I suspect in VIII. xxxviii. In place of the bald *Ναί.* response, I take *Ναί· ἀλλὰ* to introduce the counterplea, just as in the parallel *Ναί· ἀλλὰ τούτοις περισπούδαστα* of V. xxxvi. The rejoinder is given by *Καὶ νὴ Δία.* I will not here discuss the interpretation of *παρακολουθεῖν*, or the substitution of *αὐτῷ τούτῳ* for *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* (cf. *αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ παρακολουθεῖν πειρῶ* VII. xxiv), but provisionally translate. *Objector.* 'What, are we to class ourselves with things that act unconsciously, without intelligence?'—*M.* 'Yes indeed; but to do so is to assert intelligence; for it is a characteristic of the social being to perceive consciously that his action is social.'—*Obj.* 'Yes in truth, and to wish the recipient too to perceive the same.'—*M.* 'What you say is true, &c.'

V. viii. 26. Recent editors have combined to read *ἐκεῖσε*, but the form seems unknown to Marcus; on three occasions at least—*ἐκεῖ δὲ μεταβαλεῖν* VI. xlvii, *αἴρειν ἔνθεν καὶ ἐκεῖ φέρειν* VIII. vi, and (less conclusive) *ἀποδοῦναι ἐκεῖ* VI. xv—*ἐκεῖ* is used for *ἐκεῖσε*, and doubtless *ἐκεῖ* V., or *ἐκεῖ σε* (AX) *ἄγειν*, is the true reading.

V. ix. *τί γὰρ τούτων προσηνέστερον ;*—*Ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτο σφάλλει ;* The *οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτο* is a mixture of the *οὐχὶ διὰ τοὺς* of V., and the *διὰ τοῦτο* of AD. The genitive rather than the accusative seems required, and I suspect the original was *ἡδονὴ διὰ τοῦδε*, with punctuation modified. "'Why what is more agreeable than these?' so says the beguiling voice of pleasure."

V. xxvi. *ὅταν δὲ [αἱ πείσεις] ἀναδιδῶνται κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν συμπάθειαν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐν σώματι ἡνωμένῳ....* *ἑτέραν* seems nowhere to have aroused a suspicion, but I am unable to attach any rational meaning to it. It is a copyist's blunder for *μερῶν*, and we thus recover a well-known formula of Stoic teaching, specially associated with the phrase *ἡνωμένον σῶμα.* Thus Sextus *Ad Phys.* IX. 80—a passage replete with

striking correspondences of expression to language found in Marcus—argues that 'sympathy of parts' implies organic unity, in these terms; *ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις·...ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν*, and V. 44 *οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτως ἥνωται τὸ περιέχον ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, ἵνα ὃν τρόπον τῇ κεφαλῇ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μέρη συμπάσχει καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ κεφαλή, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις τὰ ἐπίγεια.* The 'sympathy of parts' between the *ψυχή* or *ἡγεμονικόν* and the *πείσεις* is restated in almost identical terms in the *τοῖς τοῦ σαρκιδίου πάθεσιν ἐμπαρέχων συμπαθῆ τὸν νοῦν* of VII. lxvi, and is part of the cosmic *ἕνωσις* and *συμπάθεια* set forth in IX. ix. 21 *ἐκ διεστηκότων τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις ὑπέστη, οἵα ἐπὶ τῶν ἄστρων. οὕτως ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπανάβασις συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐν διεστῶσιν ἐργάσασθαι δύναται.* These passages alone sufficiently justify the change, but the *μέρος ἄτρεπτον* and *ἐν τοῖς μορίοις* of the clause make it more certain and inevitable.

It is worth noting that the *ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπανάβασις* above illustrates the uncommon use of *ἀναδιδῶνται εἰς*, which recurs in IV. xl, and I cannot suppress a suspicion that *ἐπανάδοσις* is there the true reading. *ἐπανάβασις* is quoted from Synesius only, and there means 'return.' *ἐπανάδοσις* occurs, though in a different sense of legal reclaim or restitution, but is quite possible of 'assimilation.' *ἀνάδοσις* and *ἀναδίδοσθαι* belong to medical terminology, and are used of assimilative or digestive processes, the distribution of food through the veins, sap through trees, &c. As a good illustration, take *ἡ ξανθὴ χολὴ εἰς ὅλον ἀνεδόθη τὸ σῶμα.* Alex. Aphrod. *Probl.* 1.

V. xxviii. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος λόγον ἔχει (φησί), καὶ....* With the *φύσει* of AD before them (cf. note on V. vi), it is astonishing that every modern editor should retain *φησί* and quotation type. To suppose it quotation is wanton; every word and form is redolent of Marcus.

Book VI.

VI. xiii. *καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν, ἐφ' ᾗ σεμνύνεται, περιαιρεῖν.* No one produces any justification for translating *ἱστορίαν* 'consideration,' in the sense of 'importance, dignity, pretentiousness' (*narrationis pompam* Gat., *externam speciem* Schultz), nor is there the least trace of any such implication in M.'s uses of the word. Schultz I. rewrote *εὐτέλειαν*, and Nauck approves Reiske's hardy conjecture *τερθρείαν*. I suggest as much closer in *ductus litterarum*, and yielding a perfectly satisfactory sense, *ὑψηγορίαν*, and the *ὑφ' ᾗ* of PA may perhaps reflect the defaced word. *ὑψηγορία* is customarily used of mood or claim, seldom in the rhetorical sense of 'magniloquence,' and is paraphrased by Hesychius as *ὑπερηφανία*. Cf. e.g. Longinus xiv. 1 *ἡνίκ' ἂν διαπονῶμεν ὑψηγορίας τι καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης δεόμενον, καλὸν ἀναπλάττεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς κ.τ.λ.* Thus here it is most appropriate with *ἐφ' ᾗ σεμνύνεται* in the sense of 'lofty pretensions.'

VI. xiv. In printing *ἢ κατὰ ψιλὸν, τὸ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων κεκτῆσθαι* the editors have mistaken construction and meaning. *κατὰ ψιλόν* can be used for 'in prose,' as in IV. xlvi (if sound); but here, as usual, it is an adjective agreeing with *τὸ κεκτῆσθαι*, and the comma should be deleted. The same construction with substantival infinitive reappears in *τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλόν* X. xxviii 'bare following,' just as here 'bare possession of troops of slaves.' Such is the habitual usage of Marcus, e.g. IV. xlv, VII. xiii, VIII. xxxvi, XI. iii.

VI. xxxiii. *εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ κακόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ.* There is no reason for supposing that M. would have written *εἰ.....οὐκ ἔστιν* either here or at XI. xi. The sentence is falsely stopped and the meaning misunderstood. The *εἰ παρὰ φύσιν* is clearly the converse of the *οὐδὲ...παρὰ φύσιν ἐστιν ὁ πόνος* of the preceding clause, and here as so often M. has in mind the aphorism of Epicurus given at VII. xxxiii *περὶ πόνου· τὸ μὲν ἀφόρητον ἐξάγει· τὸ δὲ χρονίζον, φορητόν*, repeated VII. lxiv, VIII. xlvi, X. iii. Place the comma

after *φύσιν*, and remove it after *ἔστιν*, and translate, 'While if it (the *πόνος*) is contrary to nature, for him it no longer exists and is not an evil to him.' The thought is identical with *εἰ δὲ, ὡς μὴ πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε· φθαρήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν*, X. iii.

VI. xlv has hitherto baffled the editors. The final clause *κοινότερον δὲ νῦν τὸ συμφέρον ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων λαμβανέσθω* is rendered '*Vocabulum "utilis" nunc vulgari sensu de rebus mediis accipias.*' This ignores the *comparative κοινότερον*, and attaches to it an untenable meaning. It makes *τὰ μέσα* the measure of *τὸ σύμφερον*, in defiance of all Stoic teaching regarding *ἀδιάφορα*, and it leaves the section nonsense. It is strange that no one before C. L. divined that *ἤ* has been lost before *ἐπί*: the emendation is most felicitous, and the like slip occurred in the *ἐπιτελέσαι, ἢ ἐὰν* of VII. v. Translate, 'But "good" or "interest" must be regarded as wider in range than things indifferent.' This completes the argument perfectly, and is a familiar thought with M. The individual's good is identical with the world's good, if you sufficiently enlarge your thought of 'good,' and make it transcend the accidents of the bounded individual life. *ἐπί*, as so often, means 'in the case of,' 'extending over.'

In the last line of VI. l., C. L. once more offers a happy suggestion, in reading *τούτου δ' εἰ τυγχάνεις, ἐφ' οἷς κ.τ.λ.* for the traditional *τούτου δὲ τυγχάνεις· ἐφ' οἷς κ.τ.λ.* The change hardly affects the sense, but much improves the *nexus* of expression.

Book VII.

VII. ii. *Τὰ δόγματα πῶς ἄλλως δύναται νεκρωθῆναι, ἐὰν μὴ κ.τ.λ.* The text is certainly faulty; it is not in M.'s manner to place *τὰ δόγματα* before the *πῶς*, and there is no special emphasis apparent. Moreover A (the sole MS. authority here besides v.) reads *ἢ τὰ δόγματα πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως...*, out of which Stich in the *Rhein. Mus.* conjectured *ζῇ τὰ δόγματα. πῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The strong point in the conjecture is the *νεκρω-*

θῆναι antithesis, but I cannot bring myself to believe in the abrupt and unlikely ζῇ. I believe the true reading to be ἴδε τὰ δόγματα· πῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The previous section concludes with ὀλιγοχρόνια: the division into sections was unmarked in the archetype, and the ιΔ was merged in the -ονια leaving the isolated and unintelligible ᾗ. With initial ἴδε τὰ πράγματα, the ἴδε πάλιν τὰ πράγματα later in the section falls at once into natural place. And this ἴδε is very common; e.g. IV. xi. XXVI, VII. XXXIV, VIII. v. XIX, IX. XXVII. XXXVII.

As to the continuity of sections, it is of frequent occurrence in A, and there are other instances where the letters or word concluding a section have affected the opening of the next. So in VII. lxvii, XI. xi. xxiv, XII. x. xviii, and perhaps xv.

VII. xvi. τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν...οὐ φοβεῖ ἑαυτὸ * * * εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν. As best filling of the lacuna I propose οὐ τρέπει ἑαυτό. Later in the section the οὐ γὰρ ἔξεις of PA (for which Stich adopts οὐ γὰρ ἄξεις) represents, I have no doubt, οὐ παρέλξεις αὐτὸ εἰς κρίσιν τοιαύτην. The various emendations have just missed the right combination, which fits into place perfectly.

VII. xxvii. μὴ τὰ ἀπόντα ἐννοεῖν ὡς ἤδη ὄντα· ἀλλὰ τῶν παρόντων τὰ δεξιώτατα ἐκλογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. The ὡς ἡδέα ὄντα suggested by Schultz II. is unconvincing. Yet it is hard to believe that ἤδη ὄντα is correct. What is meant by τὰ ἀπόντα? The adjoining words and the τῶν παρόντων τὰ δεξιώτατα make it clear that Cas. is not right in interpreting it by *futura*, as though parallel in sentiment to τὰ μέλλοντα μὴ ταρασσέτω. But there remain two alternatives—to take τὰ ἀπόντα of (1) *troubles*, from which you are free, or (2) gifts or advantages, which you covet. In the first case ὡς ἤδη ὄντα, or possibly ὡσεὶ δὴ ὄντα, must stand, though the phrase is not happy. In the second case, read ἡδίω ὄντα (or, with C. L., ἡδίονα): ω and ο are so frequently confused (cf. on μόνον at I. xvi) that the loss of -ω was easy and the corruption of ἡδί- to ἤδη then became inevitable. As regards form ἡδίονα is possible, for M. writes χείρονα, XI. xviii. 6, in place of the much commoner χείρω, but ἡδίω ὄντα is preferable and better explains the corruption. Thus the monition is an expansion of the familiar τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι, an injunction—as I think the δεξιώτατα

suggests—to make the best of the faculties and opportunities you possess, and not sigh over deficiencies and limitations. Cf. v. v, vii. lxvii and the like.

vii. xxxi. *ἐκεῖνος μέν φησιν, ὅτι Πάντα νομιστί. ἔτι εἰ δαίμονα τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἀρκεῖ δὲ μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι τὰ πάντα νομιστὶ ἔχει· ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα.* Except that A reads *ἔτι ἢ δαίμονα*, the manuscripts give no assistance towards the recovery of the original, and none of the conjectures cited in Schultz I. gives coherent sense. Whether we read *δαίμονες* or *δαιμόνια* for *δαίμονα*, it must in some form or another be *contrasted with στοιχεῖα*, as in the repeated antithesis *ταῖς ἀτόμοις ἢ τοῖς θεοῖς* viii. xvii (cf. ix. xxviii, x. vi, &c.), *στοιχεῖα* here, as in vii. l, being equivalent to *ἄτομοι*. To secure the contrast, two ways seem possible—first, to read *ἔτι εἰ δαίμονες μόνα τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀρκεῖ δὴ μεμνῆσθαι*, translating 'Even if the elemental atoms alone are gods (i.e. even though no gods exist beside the elemental atoms), it is yet enough to remember that *All things are by law*,' but the turn of phrase does not read like Marcus. The second, and I think better, expedient is to read *εἴτε δαιμόνια, εἴτε στοιχεῖα*, which may be connected with the foregoing, or (better) with the succeeding words, reading *ἀρκεῖ δή*. M. is fond of such opening, loosely apposed nominatives, with *εἴτε... εἴτε....* Compare such close parallels as *εἴτε ἄτομοι, εἴτε φύσις, πρῶτον κείσθω, ὅτι μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου* x. vi, and *εἴτε θεός, εὖ ἔχει πάντα· εἴτε τὸ εἰκῇ, μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῇ* ix. xxviii.

I mistrust the attachment of *ἔχει* to the *πάντα νομιστί dictum*, and think it must belong to the *ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα* phrase, which Stich is very likely right in regarding as a gloss. It must mean, that all lies in a nutshell. Perhaps *ἔχεις ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα*.

vii. xxxix. Is it too censorious to restore the quotation to its correct form *ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι καὶ ἡμῖν χάρματα δοίης*?

The readings of next section and of vii. l show what havoc the scribes made of M.'s verse quotations.

vii. l. *ἢ τοῦτο διάλυσις κ.τ.λ.* The *ἢ τοῦτο* is untranslatable, and induced Gat. and Cor. to change the following *καί* into *ἤ*. Read *ἤγουν*.

vii. lv. *μὴ περιβλέπου ἀλλότρια ἡγεμονικά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ*

βλέπε κατ' εὐθύ, ἐπὶ τί σε ἡ φύσις ὁδηγεῖ. The ἐκεῖ is an awkward and even questionable piece of Greek, and some strengthened form of βλέπε is needed to balance περιβλέπου. Read ἐπίβλεπε, which leads naturally to the ἐπὶ τί, and has its proper sense of looking attentively. [ἔκβλεπε is possible, but less likely.]

VII. lvi. ὡς ἀποτεθνηκότα δεῖ καὶ μέχρι νῦν βεβιωκότα.... The words as they stand seem meaningless, and will not bear Long's rendering 'Consider thyself to be dead and to *have completed thy life* up to the present time.' Other translators insert 'only' without any justification. Schultz gives hesitating approval to Reiske's suggestion μέχρι νῦν οὐ, but the true reading is clearly καὶ μὴ μέχρι νῦν. It accounts for the error, and after δεῖ M. would use μή, as in the ensuing section VII. lx. It is the familiar thought of II. iv, and the ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος repeats the sentiment of προθεσμίας λαβών in that section.

VII. lxvii. ἡ φύσις οὐχ οὕτως συνεκέρασέ [σε] τῷ συγκρίματι, ὡς μὴ ἐφεῖσθαι περιορίζειν ἑαυτόν. Plausible as the insertion of σε at first sight appears, it will not do. It is not sense to talk of 'you' being commingled with the compound (the said compound being yourself): and it is discredited by the ἑαυτόν following. I accept Sch.'s suggestion that τὸν νοῦν began this section, as well as ending the last, and count this among the evidences of sections running on without break shown in the archetype. See note on VII. ii.

Book VIII.

VIII. iii. ἐκεῖ δὲ ὅσων πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων; the variation from ὅσων to πόσων seems arbitrary and unpleasing, for the difference cannot discriminate exclamation from question, the final πόσων certainly being exclamatory. Also the *objective* genitive after δουλεία is harsh, and is not comparable with the δουλεία στενόντων of IX. xxix. The easy change πρὸς ὅσων for πόσων (cf. πρὸς ἥντινα for πόσην τινα IV. xxi) would remedy both defects. At the same time it must not be adopted hurriedly, in face of such parallel variations as πρὸ ὀλίγου δὲ

καὶ ἐδούλευον πόσοις καὶ δι' οἷα X. xix, and *καὶ πόσων μὲν ἡδονῶν ὑπερεῖδες· πόσα δὲ ἔνδοξα παρεῖδες· εἰς ὅσους δὲ εὐγνώμων ἐγένου* V. xxxi.

VIII. vii. *τὰς ὀρέξεις δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνων πεποιημένη.* The perfect participle, as Cor. felt, is quite out of place in the line of present participles, and gives no good sense. The true reading is *περιποιουμένη*, and a like misunderstanding of some cursive abbreviation has led to *πεποιημένοις* AD, *περιπεποιημένοις* v., near the end of IX. iii, prob. for an original *περιποιουμένοις*. With the usage in the latter passage, cf. the Epictetean *δόγμα ἐλευθεροποιὸν περιποιήσασθαι* Arr. IV. i. 176.

VIII. xvi. Read *ἡ σὴ γὰρ ἐνέργεια*—the initial *ἡ* having been lost by itacism, owing to preceding *ἐστι*. The article is *invariably* prefixed to the possessive: so twice in this section, and in 21 other instances—except of course when used predicatively as V. xxxiii, VIII. xviii, XII. iii. The usage with *ἐμός* and *ἡμέτερος* is equally constant.

VIII. xxi. The closing *πορνεῦσαν* is obviously corrupt; Cor.'s *καὶ πυρέξαν*, though impossible as a correction, rightly divines the need, viz. some word connected with disease and meaning 'decay,' 'mortification' or the like. Such an one, by no means far removed from the MS. tradition (cf. Gat.'s *ἀποπνεῦσαν*), exists in *ἀποπυῆσαν*, which Hippok. 1012 C uses intransitively in this same tense. Read *νοσῆσαν δ' ἢ ἀποπυῆσαν*, and compare *πυῶδες οὐδὲ μεμολυσμένον οὐδὲ ὕπουλον* III. viii.; it is noteworthy that Hipp. *l. c.* associates *ἀπεπύησεν* with *κατεμωλύνθη*, and there can be no reasonable doubt that *μεμολυσμένον*, considering its context, should be corrected to *μεμωλυσμένον*, a recognised term of the discharge of abscesses. Bekker introduced the same correction in Ar. *Meteor.* 4. 3. 18.

VIII. xxxi. For *μὴ καθ' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου θάνατον*, C. L.'s *μηκέθ'* has much to commend it. For elision and position, cf. *μηκέθ' ὅλως* X. xvi.

VIII. xxxii. *οὐδὲν εἴς γε τὸ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ εὐλογίστως.* The ellipse, in our author, does not seem excessively harsh, but *διακεῖσθαι* might from similarity of lettering have dropped out without much difficulty before *δικαίως*.

VIII. XXXV. *ὥσπερ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις....* Translation is in any case difficult and uncertain, but *ὡς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυν.* seems to render it possible. *ὡς..., οὕτως...* (as well as the commoner *οὕτως..., ὡς*) is familiar to M., for instance in V. XXIX, VII. XXXIV, IX. iii &c.

VIII. XXXVII. For *οὐ καὶ τούτους*...I suspect *οὐχὶ τούτους...*, common in pressing an added question. For a parallel case, following *τί δέ ;* see VI. XLIII, and pressing a *τί οὖν ;* in VII. LVIII.

VIII. XXXVIII. *εἰ δύνασαι ὀξὺ βλέπειν, βλέπε, κρίνων, φησί, σοφωτάτοις.* Strangely perverse and unscholarly corrections have been offered. *βλέπε κρίνων φύσει σοφωτάτους* gives an easy and fairly satisfactory restoration—'If you have sharp eyes, see and discern the inly wise.' For *φησί* corrupted from *φύσει,* see on V. VI.

VIII. XLI. The section, as read by the editors, closes with the somewhat fatuous *ὅταν γένηται σφαῖρος, κυκλοτερὴς μένει,* 'When it becomes a sphere, it remains round'! The figure recurs XI. XII, and the quotation from Empedokles is given at XII. iii as

σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς, κονῇ περιήθεϊ γαίων.

In *both* passages—(in the latter A reads *μονῇ*)—the true reading is assuredly *μονίῃ,* for which the Stoics used *μονή,* e.g. Zeno ap. Stob. *Ecl.* I. XIX. 4. The verse is quoted Stobæus, *Ecl.* I. 15, 2 b. In XII. iii the *περιήθεϊ* of V., with the confused *γεαίων* of A, bears out the *περιηγέϊ* of Simplic., adopted by Cor., rather than the alternative *περιγήθεϊ* espoused by Peyron.

In our present section, the words are to be connected with the preceding clause, and the comma removed; 'fire cannot touch it, nor steel, nor tyrant, nor contumely, nor any other thing, when once it becomes "poised as a sphere self-orbed."' The exact parallel is in VIII. XLVIII *ἀκαταμάχητον γίνεται τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὅταν εἰς ἑαυτὸ συστραφὲν ἀρκεσθῇ ἑαυτῷ.*

VIII. LI. *πῶς οὖν πηγὴν ἀένναον ἔξεις καὶ μὴ φρέαρ ; φύου σεαυτὸν πάσης ὥρας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν.* So Schultz, following the tradition of V. *καὶ μὴ φρέαρ,* which AD omit, may safely be discarded as a gloss on *πηγὴν ἀένναον,* suggested, one cannot help suspecting, by the *πηγὴ ὕδατος ἁλλομένου* of John

iv. 14 contrasted with the *φρέαρ* of *v.* 11, 12. The omission will help us to the true restoration of *φύου*, for which *φυσίου* Cor., *ῥύου* Sch. I., *ἀφελοῦ* Sch. II., are sorry makeshifts. Read *εἰσδύου*, which was suggested not unnaturally by the neighbouring metaphor. The *εἰσδύεσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ποιοῦντα* of VII. xxx furnishes a close parallel in form of expression, and *εἰσδύεσθαι εἰς* recurs VIII. lvii. The initial *εἰς-* was lost in *ἕξεις*. The *ἂν φυλάσσῃς σεαυτὸν* of AD is at first a puzzling variant, but it presumably formed part of the gloss, which ran *καὶ μὴ φρέαρ, ἂν φυλάσσῃς*. Thus difficulties of expression and of MS. tradition are all satisfactorily cleared up.

Book IX.

IX. iii. *κατὰ ἄνθρωπόν ἐστι λελογισμένον μὴ ὁλοσχερῶς μηδὲ ὠστικῶς...πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἔχειν*. Gataker had good ground for his scruples about the meaning of *ὁλοσχερῶς*, which the translators render *temerarie* or *negligenter*, Cas. hazarding *non omnino*. If sound, it can only mean 'absorbed in,' 'resolutely bent on,' death. But the phrase is inappropriate, as well as queer, and I think *δυσχερῶς* may with confidence be restored. It is exactly the word required by the passage, and by the general sentiment of M.; the adverb is used VIII. xii, and is parallel to the repeated *μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τοῖς ἀπονεμομένοις*. For general context compare *εἰ συμβαίνει σοι, ὡς πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε· εἰ δὲ, ὡς μὴ πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε* X. iii. (I find the same emendation occurred to C. L.)

IX. iii. *περιμένεις πότε ἔμβρυον...ἐξέλθῃ*. The syntax 'wait till when the offspring is to emerge' seems intolerably rough. Read *περιμένεις, ἕως ποτε...*, or possibly *μέχρι*, lost owing to *με-* iteration; compare *μέχρι ἀποσβῇ* IV. xix, *μένε μέχρι ἐξοικειώσῃς* X. xxxi, *μέχρι σβεσθῇ* XII. xv.

IX. xxii. *τὸ μὲν σεαυτοῦ, ἵνα νοῦν δικαϊκὸν αὐτὸ ποιήσῃς*. For *δικαϊκόν* AD read *δικανικόν*, but the text is expressly certified by Suidas s.v. *δικαϊκός*, and the usage of *δικαϊκὴ διάθεσις* in V. xxxiv is a good parallel. The *αὐτῷ* of AD suggests to Skaphidiotes the reading *νοῦν δικ. αὐτῷ ἐμποιήσῃς*, but neither to imbue the *ἡγεμονικόν* with a *νοῦς δικαϊκός*, nor to make it a

νοῦν δικαϊκόν, nor (reading *ποιήσῃ*) for it to produce a *νοῦν δικαϊκόν*, seems consonant with ordinary usage: and I find no trace of any common Stoic formula *νοῦς δικαϊκός*, which might justify the text. I believe *νοῦν* is a mere misreading for *νῦν*, of which M. is so fond (e.g. XI. xiii).

IX. xxviii. *Καὶ ἤτοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ ἡ τοῦ ὅλου διάνοια· ὅπερ εἰ ἔστιν, ἀποδέχου τὸ ἐκείνης ὁρμητόν· ἢ ἅπαξ ὥρμησε, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ τὶ ἐν τινί· τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄτομοι, ἢ ἀμερῆ· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, εἴτε θεός, εὖ ἔχει πάντα· εἴτε τὸ εἰκῆ, μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῆ.* The exact seat and extent of the corruption is most difficult to determine, and the MS. variant *ἐν* and *ἓν* suggests no remedy. Schultz II. propounds *καὶ ἕν τι γίνεται τρόπον τινα. ἢ ἄτομοι καὶ ἀμερῆ*: but this leaves the text unaccounted for, while the use of *ἕν*, the position of *τρόπον τινα*, and the detachment of the last clause are all indefensible. Coraes, on very different lines, alters *καὶ τὶ ἐν τινί* to *καὶ τί ἐντείνῃ;* and this finds strong corroboration from his *τί οὖν ἐντείνῃ* for the *τί οὖν ἐν τίνι* of X. xxxi, and from the *τί ἀντιτείνεις* rejoinder in the closely parallel XII. xiv. But the correction, as Stich felt, is not unexceptionable: the *τὰ λοιπὰ* is left unsupported; the *καὶ τί* is hardly in place; and the nexus of sense is scarcely satisfactory. The claims of C. L.'s suggestion *κατεκτείνει* are worth considering. The word does not indeed occur elsewhere, but small stress can be laid on this, seeing that *κατεντείνεσθαι* also occurs only in the pages of Marcus (IV. iii. xxxii, VI. xxvi, XII. xxvii). It would admirably express the extended chain or series of consequential results, derived from the initial *ὁρμή*, and neatly rounds the sentence, taking *τὰ λοιπὰ* for *object.* (Intransitive uses of *ἐκτείνειν* are unexpectedly rare.)

The following words *τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄτομοι ἢ ἀμερῆ* (without MS. variation) are strangely baffling. A careful comparison of the strictly parallel XII. xiv shows that three alternatives are contemplated—*first*, an active *πρόνοια* constantly overruling all; *second*, an initial act of creative force, realised in unalterable sequences of a *τάξις ἀπαράβατος*, both of these implying a theistic interpretation of the Kosmos; *thirdly*, a random concourse of atoms, which is a denial of the Kosmos.

The two theistic hypotheses require, as always, to be placed in sharp contrast with the latter. Feeling this, the Latin translators write *vel atomi et corpora indivisibilia pro rerum principiis habenda erunt* (Gataker), or something equivalent. But this is mere jumping at the sense, ignoring *τρόπον τινα*, and overriding *ἤ*. I believe the source of error lies in *ἀμερῆ*, which is indeed quite foreign to the needs of Marcus, and worse than superfluous as an addition to *ἄτομοι*. It is not the least likely to represent a gloss, for such glosses as have crept into the text are illustrations or explanations, not scraps of superfluous pedantry. *ἤ* points to a contrast with *ἄτομοι*, and we have the missing word in the *ἀνάγκη εἱμαρμένη* of XII. xiv. Itacism would assist the loss of *εἱ-* after *-οι ἢ*, and *-μαρμενη* in the neighbourhood of *ἄτομοι* would quickly drop into *ἀμερῆ*. Thus I would read *τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄτομοι ἢ [ἡ] εἱμαρμένη*, and refer *τρόπον τινα* to the double alternative already set forth; our translation of the whole will be, 'Either the World-mind imparts each individual impulse—in which case, accept the impulse it imparts; or, it gave the initial impulse, to which all else is consequential. It comes to this—a concourse of atoms, or an appointment of destiny. In fine, either God works, and all is well; or, if all is random, be not you too a part of the random.'

IX. xxix. Line 1 should be given to preceding section, and A is probably right in further subdivisions of the section. If so, in line 2 *δή* must be substituted for *δέ* (see remarks on III. xi), unless C. L.'s plausible *δοκεῖ* be substituted for *δὲ καί*.

Two lines later the Edd. read *ἄνθρωπε, τί ποτε; ποίησον ὃ νῦν ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ*, for which (comparing XI. XV. *τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε*)—*ἄνθρωπε, τί ποτε ποιῇς;* seems preferable, the *-ον* arising from duplication. For the following *ὅρμησον, ἐὰν διδῶται*—for which Cor. proposes *ὅρμησον οὖν, ἕως ἂν διδῶται*—*ὅρμησον ὃ ἂν* (or *ὃ ἐὰν*, cf. XII. iii) *διδῶται* will suffice.

Book X.

X. vii. *τοῦτο οὖν, ὃ ἔλαβε, μεταβάλλει, οὐχ ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν. ὑπόθου δ', ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σε λίαν προσπλέκει τῷ ἰδίως*

ποιῷ, οὐδὲν ὄντι οἶμαι πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. The old text read *ἐκεῖνο*, in place of A's *ἐκείνῳ*, and possibly correctly. Gataker frankly gives up the meaning, and the translators at large are not more helpful than Long (to whom the credit of honesty is always due). 'This then which has received [the accretion] changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But suppose that this (which thy mother brought forth) implicates thee very much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality (of change), this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.' Long is unquestionably right in taking *λίαν* as equivalent to *πάνυ* (*not* to *nimis*), for the usage of M. is uniform in this respect (cf. IV. xxxvi, VI. xiii, VII. xxiv. xxxi. lxvii, X. viii. 16, XI. xviii. 28, XII. xxvii &c.). The passage closes a section, in which Marcus has been discussing the significance of death. Change, he says, is a law of nature, and for the well-being of the universe: death is a form of change, which means either dispersion of the elements for new combinations, or their resolution into other elemental forms, through which they pass back to the primal universal Reason (*τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον*). But behind these elements, which it continually accretes, assimilates, transmutes, and eventually discharges or resolves, lies the individual Ego, that *σπερματικὸς λόγος* or germ of Reason, which constitutes the personal and individual life. This was received, or became immanent, according to Stoic teaching, at the moment of birth, the embryo being until then in the category of *φυτά*. Hence the careful introduction of the words *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως*, and *οὐχ ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν*, with which compare *μέχρι ψυχώσεως* XII. xxiv.

At this point follow the words under discussion. The editors generally, as Long, make *ἐκείνῳ* agree with *τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ*, and seem to confuse the very distinction on which M. is trying to insist, namely that between the permanent unchanging Ego, and the ever-changing phenomenal elements through which its life is realised and expressed. Now (1) the order of words makes the identification of *ἐκείνῳ* with *τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ* most unnatural. (2) *τὸ ἰδίως ποιὸν* in Stoic language cannot mean that which has the peculiar quality of *change;* it is that which has or gives specific quality or differentiation,

the *distinctive individuality* of a thing. (3) What is the 'it,' the subject to προσπλέκει, which is neither the σε, nor yet the phenomenal surrounding or expression of the σε? Further, the active usage of προσπλέκει may well give us pause. The word is uncommon, and is almost always used in the passive, except indeed by Galen[1], who makes free use of the word, of chemical or other intermixture. And I am at a loss to think of anything that could appropriately be said to implicate or infuse the σε with the changeable ἐκείνῳ. I believe that προσπλέκει has replaced the passive προσπλέκῃ, and that—following or causing the change—σε has taken the place of σύ. Dissociating ἐκείνῳ from τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ, I propose to render as follows. 'Thus that which it receives changes[2], not the original offspring which the mother bore. But even admitting that you are intimately bound up with that (sc. the changeable assimilated περικείμενον) in (or by) your individuality, that does not affect the present question.'

The passage is one of the most perplexing in our author, and the words can be taken in so many ways, that some better explanation (without change of text) may be forthcoming, but no one yet seems to have grappled with the difficulties fairly and satisfactorily.

X. ix. ὁπόσα ὁ φυσιολογητὸς φαντάζῃ καὶ παραπέμπεις. φαντάζῃ is of course middle, and ὁ φυσ. is not thus used with the second person; nor do the words give sense, for it is the *absence* of φυσιολογία that effaces true verities. Gataker's intelligence grasped the sense requirement in his suggested ἀφυσιολογητῶς, but the true reading (which strengthens the point and contrast) is οὐ φυσιολογητῶς. The same miswriting recurs at X. xxv, where the MSS. agree in ὃ βούλεται for the οὐ βούλεται of Nauck, which no future editor will question.

[1] It is one among many suggestive correspondences of vocabulary between Galen and his imperial patient: unfortunately Galen is one of the most difficult authors to consult for points of lexical usage, or even reference. Greek *Indices* to Galen, or even clear notation for reference, would be of immense service to a student of Marcus.

[2] Possibly τοῦτο, and οὐχ ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν, are object not subject to μεταβάλλει. But this hardly affects the sense, and either construction is quite common in M.

X. xii. *ἄριστον γὰρ κατατυγχάνειν τούτου· ἐπεί τοι ἥ γε ἀπόπτωσις ἀπὸ τούτου ἔστω.* The *ἔστω* condemns itself, and *ἔσται* or *ἐστίν* is generally substituted. Coraes writes *ἐστὶν αἰσχρόν* to save the sense. Skaphidiotes' *κάκιστον* is at first sight more taking and clever, but involves an untrue antithesis. Read *ἀπότευγμ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.* This gives a pretty verbal antithesis to the somewhat unusual *κατατυγχάνειν*, and the *τοι* points to some proverbial assonance of the form *ἀπόπτωσις οὐκ ἀπότευγμα*, 'defect no defeat.' Marcus himself uses the word, and antithetically to *ἀτύχημα*, in IV. xlix *ἀτύχημα ἀνθρώπου...οὐκ ἀπότευγμα τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, a welcome corroboration of a conjecture that might otherwise seem more ingenious than sound.

X. xiii. *μήτι διοίσει σοι, ἐὰν ὑπὸ ἄλλου γένηται τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντα ;* C. L.'s *ψέγηται* for *γένηται*, if not absolutely convincing, is well worth recording. The passive *ψεγόμενον* occurs IV. xx, and the sentiment is at once brought into striking accord with *ἔωθεν προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ· συντεύξομαι περιέργῳ, ἀχαρίστῳ, ὑβριστῇ* of II. i. The *γένηται* implies jealousy of well-doers, and fear of supersession, forms of temptation quite unfamiliar to the writer.

X. xvii. *τοῦ ὅλου αἰῶνος καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας συνεχῶς φαντασία, καὶ ὅτι πάντα, κ.τ.λ.* The elliptical form of the text cannot stand, neither will C. L.'s hardy *φάντασαι* mend the fault. It is more easy to suppose that *φαντασία καὶ* represents original *φαντασίαν ἔχε* than anything else which will meet the need; but perhaps *καί*—a frequent usurper—represents the final compendium of *φαντάσασθαι.* At X. vii. 12, Cor.'s *καὶ ὡς* will not do, though I have no improvement to offer; *οὐχί* (from *-ο καί*) is the best suggestion I can give, but does not satisfy me.

X. xviii. *εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐφιστάντα, ἐπινοεῖν αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ.* *ἐφιστάναι εἰς* troubles me, and is not the least borne out by such usages as *ὁρᾶν εἰς* (on which see XII. xviii). If sound *εἰς* must mean 'with reference to'—but *ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου* would have been more natural—and the comma after *ἐφιστάντα* be removed. *Δεῖ σ᾽* for *εἰς* is another expedient.

X. xix. *εἶτα οἷοι ἀνδρονομούμενοι.*—This is a *vox nihili*,

which no one—(not even L. and Sc.)—has ever heard of. It is extraordinary that the conjectures offered should be *ἀγορανομούμενοι*, *αὐρονομούμενοι* (!), *ἀβρυνόμενοι*, and *ἀνδριζόμενοι*, when a slighter change will give us *ἀνδρογυνούμενοι*. This fits the context excellently, is well borne out by *ἀνδρογύνων* III. xvi, and adds a new verb to Lexicons.

X. xxxiii. 23. In *ὁ πάσχων αὐτό*, the *αὐτό* is not happy, though no doubt it might refer to any assumed *ἔγκομμα*. *αὐτός* would be a clear improvement, and the following *αὐτὸ τὸ πάσχον*, in an author who so constantly repeats his own phrase, makes me think it is the true reading.

Book XI.

XI. iii. *τὸ δὲ ἕτοιμον τοῦτο, ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως ἔρχηται*. Both in usage and construction—with the *ἀπό*, with the following *κατά*, and still more with the adverbs—*ἄρχηται* would be a clear improvement upon *ἔρχηται*. The subj. *ἔρχωμαι* necessarily rouses distrust, and does not occur elsewhere in M.

The *τοῦτο ἵνα* may be noted, in connexion with the next section, XI. iv, which runs:—*πεποίηκά τι κοινωνικῶς; οὐκοῦν ὠφέλημαι· τοῦτο ἵνα ἀεὶ πρόχειρον ἀπαντᾷ· καὶ μηδαμοῦ παύου*. The tendency to insertion of *τοῦτο* before *ἵνα* in Hellenistic writers is well known (Winer III. xxiii. 5), and illustrated by the last section: but there is nothing in M. to support so curt and peremptory a use as this *τοῦτο ἵνα* for *fac ut*. M. has *ποιεῖν* and *ἵνα* more than once (IV. xviii, VIII. xxxiv), and joins *ἵνα* to verbs or phrases of preventing or empowering; e.g. *κωλύειν ἵνα* VIII. xxxii, *ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν ἵνα* VIII. xxviii, *ἐν τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν ἵνα* III. ix: in consonance with these, I incline to excise *καί*, and leave *τοῦτο ἵνα* clause dependent on *μηδαμοῦ παύου*.

XI. vi. *αἱ τραγῳδίαι παρήχθησαν...καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτω πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι, οἷς ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ψυχαγωγεῖσθε, τούτοις μὴ ἄχθεσθε*. Reiske conjectured *καὶ ὅπως...μὴ ἄχθησθε*. Though this correction is hardly satisfactory, I am

surprised that the text satisfies editors. Later Greek does indeed allow ὅτι μὴ 'because not' with the indicative, but there is nothing to bear out such usage in M., and it makes nonsense of the passage. A (here the only corrective of v.) reads ἄχθεσθαι, and I cannot doubt that ὅτι, under the influence of preceding καὶ ὅτι, has replaced ὥστε. Tragedy was introduced (1) as a representation of life, (2) *so as to* fortify the hearers against the corresponding vicissitudes of experience.

The whole of this section is surprising, a fragment from the 'philosophy of literature' quite unlike anything else in the Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν. Curiosities of diction or idiom may be explained or extenuated, but any reader of M. must be staggered at the recurrent and isolated use of the *second person plural* in ψυχαγωγεῖσθε &c. It is a fragment from a lecture, and how comes it in this setting?

Διογένης ταυτὶ παρελάμβανε. I have nowhere noted use of ταυτὶ, and it has no appropriateness here. Read ταὐτὸ (unless ταυτὶ betrays a strange hand). In the following sentence, ἡ νέα πρὸς τί ποτε παρείληπται, ἢ κατ' ὀλίγον, editors are certainly justified in accepting Gataker's ἢ as an improvement, but I suspect the original to have been παρείληπται, καὶ ᾗ, which restores easy run to the whole.

XI. xii. σφαῖρα ψυχῆς αὐτοειδής, ὅταν μήτε ἐκτείνηται ἐπί τι, μήτε ἔσω συντρέχῃ, μήτε σπείρηται, μήτε συνιζάνῃ, ἀλλὰ φωτὶ λάμπηται, ᾧ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁρᾷ τὴν πάντων, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὑτῇ.

Stephanus argues at length for replacing αὐτοειδής here, as in the few other cases of occurrence, by αὐγοειδής, and Philo (who is fond of the word) speaks in simile of τῆς αὐγοειδεστάτης ἀρετῆς. But in Galen and Plutarch (as elsewhere) the word has a physical sense not far removed from 'luminiferous,' associated with Stoic views of πνεῦμα, and not appropriate to the metaphorical σφαῖρα ψυχῆς or to the gist of the present passage. The word has been usually interpreted 'self-orbed,' of a self-complete and perfect circle, equivalent in effect to the κυκλοτερὴς μονίη (discussed on VIII. xli) which is present to the writer in using the term σφαῖρα ψυχῆς. But, looking to the end of the section and to the near neighbourhood of ἡ

ψυχὴ ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ XI. i, I am disposed to think that M. really intended '*self-seeing*,' on the *αὐτοποιός* model. For this *αὐτοϊδὴς* would be more strictly correct, but the familiar *-ειδης* compounds would instinctively prevail.

In the second line editors retain *σπείρηται* and gravely render it *dilatatur, effertur* and the like. Cor. pointed the way with *σπειρᾶται*, but he should have written *συσπειρᾶται*, for while the simple verb (used esp. of serpents' coils) can hardly be upheld, *συσπειρᾶσθαι*—familiar as a military term in Xenophon—is of common occurrence in Lucian, Galen, Plutarch, etc. Plutarch's use is an apposite parallel: *δέον εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ χρήσιμα συσταλέντας καὶ συσπειραθέντας, ἐκ τῶν ἀχρήστων... ἐλευθερίας ἱερὸν ἱδρύσασθαι Mor.* 828 C, and he elsewhere combines it with *συστρέφεσθαι*. In our passage the sense is identical with the *ἡγεμονικὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸ συστραφέν* VIII. xlviii.

XI. xv. *αὐτοῦ* (leg. *αὐτὸ*) *φανήσεται· ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου γεγράφθαι ὀφείλει εὐθὺς ἡ φωνή· τοιοῦτον ἔχει, εὐθὺς ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἐξέχει, ὡς....* The passage has been subjected to various false punctuations, and emendations not worth reciting. It is the sentiment, not the *φωνή*, that ought to be written on the forehead; the *εὐθύς* in each case opens its own clause, and *ἔχει* has supplanted *ἠχεῖ*. Read *ἐπὶ τοῦ μετ. γεγ. ὀφείλει· εὐθὺς ἡ φωνὴ τοιοῦτον ἠχεῖ, εὐθὺς ἐν κ.τ.λ.*, and all becomes vivid and natural. For the later prose use of *ἠχεῖν* of the ring of the voice, cf. Epicurus *Ep.* I. 52. *ἀπηχεῖν* and congeners are common in M.

XI. xvi. *τί μέντοι δύσκολον ἄλλως ἔχει ταῦτα;* P gives *καλῶς ἔχειν*, A *ἄλλως ἔχειν* (which Stich adopts). Coraes was rightly discontent with both, though his own *ὅλως ἔχει* can carry no conviction. The true original, as the *ἄλλως καλῶς* variation shows, was *τί μέντοι δύσκολον οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν ταῦτα* 'Why protest at things not being otherwise?' Plutarch uses *δυσκολαίνειν* in just the same way, *δυσκολαίνουσι τοῦτ' εἶναι De Comm. Not.* 39. 1076 C. Here the *οὐ* was absorbed in the *-ον* of *δύσκολον*, but in XI. v, where the same doubt occurs, the confusion seems due to an early variant *πῶς ἄλλως*, beside the orig. *οὐκ ἄλλως*.

XI. xviii. *καὶ πρῶτον* is an absurd opening to this long

section, by far the most elaborate and systematic summary of ethical principles found in Marcus. What does the *καὶ* represent? *πείσεται* ends the preceding section, and it would not have been difficult for *-αι* to absorb *αρ-*, or for *-σεται* to have absorbed *στοι-*. But there is nothing to suggest that either *ἀρχαί* or *στοιχεῖα* would have been the term used by M. for his summary of first principles. In fact he does use another word, and with some insistence, *τούτων τῶν ἐννέα κεφαλαίων μέμνησο* l. 57, and at l. 70 *εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ δέκατον.* Is it too ingenious to suppose that *κα ι'* really represents *κεφάλαια ι'*, *Ten heads of philosophy*, affixed as heading by Marcus or by his redactor, and ranging with the *Πλατωνικόν*, *Ἀντισθενικόν*, *Περὶ πόνου*, *Περὶ δόξης* of VII. xxxiii—xxxvi, and the like? The term *κεφάλαια* was familiar as used in a special connexion; compare the title of Philo's treatise *Περὶ τῶν δέκα λόγων, ἃ κεφάλαια νόμων εἰσί*: and it can hardly be an accidental coincidence that leads Marcus to formulate his *δόγματα* in *ten* 'heads.' The gifts of the nine Muses, with the tenth from Apollo leader of the choir, range side by side with the decalogue of the Jewish moral code.

l. 55. *ἀλλ' ἤτοι πρὸς μόνον, καὶ ἐὰν ἄλλοι τινὲς περιεστήκωσι.* The *καί* is at fault, for *ἤτοι*, as always, demands answering *ἤ*. I am disposed to agree with the editors that the balancing words have been lost after *περιεστήκωσι*: but *ἢ ἐᾶν, ἐὰν ἄλλοι τιν. περιεστήκωσι* (suggested by C. L.) deserves consideration.

XI. xxiv. The *οἱ* may with probability be restored before *Λακεδαιμόνιοι*. *Παιδίων δείματα* ending the last section is an adscript, and *οἱ* was easily lost in the final *-ει* of *ἐκάλει*.

BOOK XII.

XII. i. *ἐὰν οὖν, ὁτεδήποτε πρὸς ἐξόδῳ γένῃ, πάντα....* Both sense and syntax require the present indicative *γίνῃ* for the aorist subj. A similarly shows *ἐπεὶ γένῃ* for *ἐπεὶ γίνῃ* V. xxxvi, and analogous confusions are habitual; e.g. X. vii. xiii. xxvi. xxxiii, &c.

XII. v. *παραζητῶν.* The compound is extremely rare, and indeed not quoted again, except from Marc. Erem. The *παρα-* is credited with the connotation 'to inquire *amiss* or *fruitlessly*,' but is an inappropriate prefix to *ζητεῖν* with which it cannot (as with *παραπαίειν*, or again derivatively with *παρορᾶν* or *παραγιγνώσκειν*) have a sense of 'glinting aside' or 'past the mark.' *περιζητεῖν* 'to inquire curiously' is more appropriate, and a recognised compound, and there need be little hesitation in making the change considering the behaviour of the MSS. Παρα- appears for or beside *περι-* in *παρακρατεῖται* XI. xx, *παρατρεχέτω* VI. iii, *παρακειμένου* X. i, *παραφέρῃ* XII. xiv, and cf. *παρειπάτω* V. iii, *παρεμπόρευμα* III. xii, &c. &c. for like variations.

XII. xv. The initial *ἤ* is meaningless. Either it is a mere dittography from the *-ει* of preceding *παροίσει* (AX do not separate the sections at all), or else Cor.'s *ἦ* must be adopted, introducing the disjunctive question. But in this case the *ἀποσβήσεται* makes it natural, and almost necessary, to read also *φανεῖ* and *ἀποβαλεῖ*. The change of *βαλλ-* and *βαλ-* is not worth considering; the MSS. diverge almost at random, e.g. II. i. iv, VI. iv, VII. xviii, VIII. vi. xxv, IX. xxviii, X. xxxi, XII. xxv, and sometimes, as in XI. xvii, agree in obvious error. I prefer the excision of *ἤ*.

XII. xxiv. *ἐπὶ μὲν ὧν ποιεῖς, εἰ μήτε εἰκῇ κ.τ.λ.* The reading of the text (taking into account the following *ὅτι* clause) is untranslateable, and not to be bettered by excision of *εἰ* (with Morus). After *ποιεῖς*, as C. L. has rightly seen, a clause *ὅτι εὖ ποιεῖς* or its equivalent has dropped out.

εἰ...τὴν πολυτροπίαν ὅση κατανοήσαις. Stich adopts *ὅτι καταφρονήσεις* (which Schultz cites as *κατανοήσεις*) of A, but it is hard to make it construe, the sense 'despise' is not in place, and A has transcribed the clause very carelessly. At the same time the *ὅση* so placed is intolerably curt. I think the *ὅτι* arose out of *ἐστι*, the *ε-* being dropped after preceding *-η*, and that *ὅση ἐστι κατανοήσαις* should be restored.

For the closing *ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ τῦφος*, read *ἐπὶ τούτοις τίς ὁ τῦφος;*

XII. xxx. *καίτοι κἀκεῖνα τὸ νοοῦν συνέχει καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ*

αὐτὰ βρῖθον. All the manuscripts agree in τὸν νοῦν, but Gataker's τὸ νοοῦν has been almost universally accepted (τὸ συννοοῦν Cas.). The pretender should have been exposed before now; it is no part of Stoic terminology, and certainly could not be said συνέχειν τὰ ἀναίσθητα. Beside τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον, τὸ ἑνοῦν needs no defence. ἑνοῦν, both active (VIII. xxxiv) and passive, and ἕνωσις are frequent in M., and this passage helps to confirm my restoration ἧς ἑνώσει...περιέχονται in II. xvi.

XII. xxxi. τί ἐπιζητεῖς; τὸ διαγίνεσθαι; ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; τὸ ὁρμᾶν; τὸ αὔξεσθαι; τὸ λήγειν αὖθις; τὸ φωνῇ χρῆσθαι; τὸ διανοεῖσθαι; τί τούτων πόθου σοι ἄξιον δοκεῖ; Commentators, from Casaubon, have felt natural distrust of τὸ λήγειν αὖθις, enumerated among objects of natural desire. And Cor.'s τὸ μὴ λήγειν αὖθις does not better the sense. No one has suggested the correction λέγειν, which at first sight seems tame. But Marcus is here recapitulating the successive functions of ψυχή, according to Stoic classification, the δύναμις αἰσθητική, ὁρμητική, αὐξητική, φωνητική, and διανοητική in ascending order. And in such a recapitulation τὸ λέγειν is an appropriate term, when we recall the familiar Stoic discussions upon τὸ λεκτόν as a special function or 'part' of the soul. Herewith the αὖθις gains a just force; for the enumeration at this point passes from the functions of ψυχή, immanent in the lower 'animal' stage, to those distinctive of the higher human ψυχή endowed with speech and reason (διάνοια). [*All* the customary δυνάμεις of Soul are mentioned, except the σπερματικόν, and the only question is whether the αὖθις points to λήγειν concealing some term equivalent to σπείρειν and denoting reproduction. But I think of none such, nor is this δύναμις dwelt on by Marcus.]

GERALD H. RENDALL.

THE LATER PLATONISM.

I. *The Parmenides.*

PERHAPS no other single dialogue of Plato has given rise to so much discussion as the *Parmenides*. In the teeming brains of commentators from the days of the Neo-Platonists to those of the Neo-Hegelians, it has generated countless varieties of interpretation and of criticism. Syrianus and Proclus, Bessarion, Conti, Tiedemann and Tennemann, Stallbaum and Zeller, and a host of other more or less well known names, bear witness at once to the attractiveness of the problem of the Parmenides and to the difficulty of solving it.

The opinions held by these numberless exegetes may first be roughly classed under two heads, according as their authors admit or disallow the genuineness of the Parmenides.

Amongst those who deny the Platonic authorship of the dialogue are Socher, Ueberweg and Schaarschmidt (and probably Horn), on grounds of philosophical matter, and C. Ritter, on grounds of linguistic style.

I do not think this view has anything to commend it. It appears to me a crude way of cutting the knot which has to be untied, and of offering an explanation which really explains nothing. And Stallbaum, I take it, hits the mark when he observes (Introd. p. 340) that the dialogue's 'auctoritas' and 'integritas' are only suspected "quia universae scriptionis argumentum non satis intellectum est"; for such a suspicion is, in fact, simply a confession of weakness on the part of its publisher, a confession of his own inability to solve the problem and satisfactorily explain the 'argumentum' of the dialogue. We get no further in any way by adopting a hypothesis of unknown authorship: no further, but rather back; for instead

of escaping the old difficulties, which attach to the orthodox view, we create for ourselves fresh and still more insoluble problems—*μᾶλλον ἀδύνατα*, as Aristotle phrases it Hibernicé.

I do not think this hypothesis need detain us long; and I will here dismiss it with a quotation from the vigorous pen of the late Dr Maguire, who held strong views on this point. "The authenticity of the Parmenides has been denied by eminent modern Platonists, but this is a case of the fallacy of objections, and the question is, Is a master-piece more likely to come from a known or an unknown genius, the latter too numbering amongst his accomplishments that of consummate skill in forgery without any object to himself and *nulla posteritatis cura*, especially when the existence of the Academy under Plato's nephew Speusippus, and then Xenocrates *γνησιώτατος τῶν μαθητῶν*, would ensure a rigid scrutiny into the genuineness of the greatest monument of dialectic?" (*Hermathena* II. p. 447).

Admitting, then, the authenticity of the dialogue, we are faced by a number of questions concerning both its relations to the rest of the dialogues in the Platonic canon, and the interrelations of its own parts.

As to the general significance of the dialogue as a whole, the conflicting opinions that have been urged may be roughly classed under three heads:

(*a*) The Parmenides is void of all real content, and serves merely as an exercise in logical method; so Schleiermacher, Ast, Herbart, Hegel (*Vorrede z. Logik* I. xxii), and others.

(*b*) It is a *direct* developing of the Platonic metaphysics; so Stallbaum, Hegel (*Gesch. d. Phil.*), and others.

(*c*) It aims at *indirectly* establishing the Ideal Theory; so Hermann, Brandis, Zeller, and others.

Though, as the names appended show, all these views have found important advocates in modern times, the views themselves are in their main features sufficiently antique; the first being, as Proclus tells us, that which his own *καθηγεμών*, Syrianus, specially opposed.

Whichever view be adopted, we are bound to explain all

the difficulties which led to the mistaken adoption of the counter-views; we are bound to determine the motive of the dialogue, the peculiarities of its form, the 'Einkleidung' or dramatic setting, the relation of the 1st to the 2nd Part, the precise significance of each of the antinomies in the 2nd Part, the total result of the dialogue. We have, moreover, to explain exactly the relative position in which this dialogue stands to the rest, to observe all the links of connection and to weigh their value, and so to fix approximately by both linguistic and philosophical indications the precise place of the Parmenides in the canon.

The majority of the interpreters named above appear to make two important assumptions, namely, that Plato's Ideal Theory remained essentially one and the same throughout his philosophic career from the date of its first promulgation; and secondly, that the Parmenides as we have it is a single complete work written all at a fixed point in Plato's life.

But when we come to the expositions of Platonism which have appeared within the last decade or two, we find more than one authority venturing to call in question the correctness of these assumptions. One of these revolutionaries hails from Italy, another from Germany, a third from England.

The scholars to whom I refer are (need it be said?) Dr Henry Jackson, Dr Otto Apelt, and M. Felici Tocco; and it is their speculations that it is at present most interesting to examine.

Dr Jackson's papers on "Plato's Later Theory of Ideas" (published in the Journal of Philology, vols. x—xv), are sufficiently well known, by name at least, to English students. Apelt's papers on the Parmenides and the Sophist were published (or rather re-published) in his "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie" (Teubner, 1891), and are entirely independent of Jackson's work, taking account mainly of the views of Zeller and Stallbaum: while, finally, Tocco's tract, entitled "Del Parmenide, del Sofista e del Filebo" (Bencini, 1893), contains a re-statement of the views previously put forward by him in his "Ricerche Platoniche" (Catanzaro, 1876), and adds to this a critique of the theories of Jackson and of Apelt and a further defence of his own.

The most convenient plan to adopt therefore, in examining the three theories in question, will be to follow Tocco in his criticisms on the views of Jackson and of Apelt. But before doing this, it will conduce to clearness if I briefly set down the main points which characterise the views of all three.

Dr Jackson distinguishes an earlier and a later Theory of Ideas, the former being that contained in such dialogues as the Phaedrus, Phaedo and Republic, and the latter being developed in the Philebus, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus—in this order.

The earlier theory of Ideas, intended to serve as the basis of a theory of knowledge, may be stated in three main propositions:—

(*a*) "besides sensibles there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas":

(*b*) "every plurality of things called by a common name has an idea corresponding to it":

(*c*) "things are what they are by reason of the immanence of the idea."

The changes introduced in the later Theory were due to Plato's self-criticism, which showed him the untenability of the last two propositions; these changes took two forms, viz. (1) a revision of the list of Ideas, whereby relations, negations, and artificial products ceased to be regarded as Ideas proper (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*); and (2) a modification of the conception of the relation subsisting between the Idea and its particulars, whereby for 'participation' (*μέθεξις*) of the latter in the former was substituted 'imitation' (*μίμησις*). Hence, in the later theory there are Ideas only of natural kinds, these, as *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, being distinguished from artificial classes, and being non-predicable (*μὴ κοινωνῶντα*) of one another as opposed to those *γένη* which are so predicable. And, as a final result of the later metaphysics, the Idea is the type to which the particulars approximate, which type is "only hypothetically existent," yet eternal and immutable as "the perfect realization of an eternal mode or potentiality of thought"; the relation between particulars and Idea being constituted, not by the immanence of the latter, but by the identity of the elements, Sameness and Otherness, in both.

We pass next to the theses propounded by M. Tocco.

He attempts to prove—

(1) that the dialogues of the Sophist, Parmenides and Philebus, which are indubitably authentic, do not belong (as was held by Zeller and others) to a 'Megaric period,' but are posterior to the constructive dialogues:

(2) that in them Plato propounds a new doctrine, whereby multiplicity is introduced into the Ideal sphere from which it had at first been excluded:

(3) that this doctrine, developed analytically in the Sophist by means of an examination of the five most general Ideas, and indirectly demonstrated in the Parmenides by a *reductio ad absurdum* of the two contrary positions of the One without the Many and of the Many without the One, is finally applied in the Philebus to the ethical question:

(4) that this partial modification of his doctrine was due to Plato's desire to obviate the objections raised against his system by contemporary critics, and especially by Aristotle; which objections he frankly mentions himself in all three dialogues:

(5) that this modification explains the attribution of a theory of Ideal-Numbers to Plato by Aristotle, as a later form of his doctrine:

(6) and so, that the Pythagorizing tendencies of his successors are thus explicable.

The above brief summaries of the respective positions of these two exponents of Platonism will enable us to judge of the points of view from which both approach the study of the Parmenides, and also of the nature of the criticisms which Tocco passes upon Jackson's interpretation.

The peculiarities of this interpretation are (amongst others):

(1) that it makes eight hypotheses in place of nine;

(2) that it combines hypp. ii and iii (142 B—153 E—157 B) so that they result in containing the later theory of natural kinds;

(3) that it finds in hypp. i and iv (137 C—142 B, 159 B—160 A) the theory of the earlier 'immanent' idea, as taught in the Phaedo and Rep.

(4) that hypp. i and vi (137 C—142 A, 163 B—164 A) are referred to the Eleatic doctrine; hyp. vii (164 B—165 E) to the Socratic theory of Universals; hyp. viii (165 E ff.) to the denial of non-identical predication by Cynicism.

In virtue, then, of the third of these features, the view of Jackson may be classed with those theories that maintain the Parmenides to be a *direct* demonstration of Idealism, though it differs in most respects from all others of this class.

The first objection that occurs upon a survey of the above points is the difficulty of supposing that Plato thus mixed up in inextricable confusion the positive with the negative side of his doctrine. Is it not a strange proceeding, to say the least, on the part of so artistic a philosopher to introduce in this way such important changes in his doctrine as Jackson's theory presupposes? Why should the new theory be thus hidden away in a bushel of logical antinomies, so that to drag it to the light is impossible unless by the *tour de force* of linking together the second and third hypotheses which appear to the unprejudiced eye totally distinct?

Such à priori objections appear to me of considerable weight.

I do not, however, think that Jackson's position is much affected by the point brought forward by Tocco regarding the use of μέθεξις in these two hypotheses (142 B, 143 A, 144 A, 151 E, 155 D, 156 A), as a quotation from Jackson (*J. of Ph.* XIV. p. 228, no. 1) will show: "in the earlier system the relation of the particular to any εἶδος is μέθεξις, the term μίμησις being possibly available as an equivalent for μέθεξις, but in the later system, while the relation of the particular to its αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος is μίμησις, the particular's relation to the εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ is μέθεξις, and the relation of such εἴδη to the particular is κοινωνία." Consequently, on Jackson's view, it is quite appropriate to speak of a thing as μετέχον οὐσίας or the like.

That the fourth hypothesis is simply the contraposition of the third, and that it is fanciful to find in a combination of it and of the first a criticism of earlier Platonism, or in the seventh a reference to the Socratic theory, appears a well-founded objection. Socrates' conceptualism, surely, was based on no opposi-

tion to Eleaticism, and on no fundamental assumption in the form ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

However much is to be said in general for the broad theory of a later modification in Plato's doctrine, I cannot but think that both here and in his explanation of the Philebus Dr Jackson has overstepped the mark and run his theory to death.

Apelt's view next demands consideration. To appreciate its bearing, a word or two is necessary explaining his general view of Platonism.

The point he insists on most in his preface is "die Wichtigkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen Weltansicht und Dialektik" in Plato's philosophy. Plato's dualism lies, he explains, not in his halting between two theories of the Universe, an ontological and a dynamical or aetiological, as Zeller and others hold, but in the inconsistency between his dialectic and his theology. For the dialectical objects, the Ideas, are never treated as efficient causes, or forces, but only as final causes; and the only efficient cause is found in the Idea of the Good or in God, God being the Author of the world and the principle to which the Ideas owe their *Sein*. And so the dialectical sphere—the offspring of Socratic conceptualism—stands over against the real world which it fails to explain. For how are Ideas such as αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, or αὐτοάνθρωπος, to be conceived as spiritual realities?

Thus, all Plato's Dialectic is philosophically a mistake. And consequently the Parmenides, "the greatest monument of dialectic," is, in Apelt's opinion, a tissue of sophisms and logical blunders: "es ist wahres Arsenal von Erschleichungen und Sophismen, teils versteckter, teils mehr handgreiflicher, wenn auch nirgends so grober Art, wie etwa die im Euthydem mit so unvergleichlichem Humor behandelten." The law of contradiction is violated; the ambiguity of the term ἐστὶ is the basis of fallacious reasoning, and sophisms are based also on the ambiguity of such phrases as πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτῶν γίγνεσθαι, p. 140, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, 145 B; the law of contraposition is ignored, 148 A. And as Plato elsewhere shows himself capable of keeping right on these points of logic, the second part of the Parmenides cannot be meant as a serious dialectical effort.

Consequently, concludes Apelt, the aim of this second part cannot be to remove the difficulties raised against Idealism in the first part of the dialogue, as the web of sophisms of which it is made up is incapable of doing anything of the kind, and can have no serious doctrinal meaning.

At the same time, he allows both the Platonic authorship and the unity of the two parts of the dialogue. The difficulties raised in the first part he attributes mainly to the Megarics, and so, like Stallbaum, takes the dialogue as a whole to be directed against the attacks of that school. But in this he does not, of course, follow Stallbaum in regarding the second part as a serious argument intended directly to establish the Ideal Theory, but considers it to be no more than an *argumentum ad hominem*—the retort courteous "if I talk nonsense, you talk worse nonsense." Yet as a reply, though not a serious but a merely eristical reply, to the Megaric objections, the second part has direct reference to the first. Thus the first *aporia* as to how the Idea can be ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν is answered by the contradictions discovered as existing in ἓν in 144 C; the difficulty regarding μέθεξις in 131 C is answered by showing a like difficulty in the Eleatic view in 149 E—150 C; the *regressus ad infinitum* of the Idea is answered by a similar infinite regress of the One, in 142 B; and lastly, the difficulties of the relation of the Idea to the sensibles are shown to apply no less to that between τὸ ἓν and τἆλλα.

The above view of the dialogue as a whole naturally leads Apelt to an agreement with Schleiermacher as to the necessity of placing it among the earlier Platonic writings. "Charakter und Tendenz des Ganzen sprechen entschieden für eine verhältnismässig frühzeitige Abfassung."

There are however serious objections to this view of Apelt as to the date of the Parmenides, as Tocco points out. For as the German critic allows that the two parts of the dialogue form a unity, and holds also that its object is to combat the Megaric objections against the Ideal Theory, it must surely follow that this dialogue is a later work than those in which that Theory is first expounded, such as the Phaedrus, Phaedo and Symposium; and considerably later, too, if we are to judge

by the matured and detailed form in which these various objections are set forth. Besides which, as is noticed by Apelt himself (p. 60), the theory would appear to have passed through various stages, or at least to have caused a long period of mental doubt to its author, before such a passage as 130 C could have been written. But Apelt has an ingenious suggestion which partly removes this difficulty. He thinks it possible that the account given by Zeno of his document may be intended to apply to the dialogue itself, so that while really an early composition it was not published by Plato till comparatively late. But if, as Apelt tries to make out, the second part has direct reference to the *ἀπορίαι* in the first part this suggestion helps us little, as every word in the first part seems clearly to point to a comparatively late date. If, however, we cut asunder the dialogue, allowing with Apelt the early origin of the later part, whether with or without polemical bearing, this suggestion appears valuable. For without such esoteric explanation the conversation between Zeno and Socrates and in fact the whole rôle played by Zeno seem to lack point. Whereas if we take Zeno's words (128 D) *διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο, εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή*, as applying really to the dialectical discussion of the second part we find in them a peculiar appropriateness. Further, it might be suggested that the ages of the two philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno, whose doctrine is identical, though the one affirms it directly, the other indirectly, may be supposed to indicate the age of Plato at the two periods when he composed the second part and when he completed and published the whole dialogue. So that if he was 40, the age given to Zeno (127 B), when he wrote the second part, its date would fall about 387 B.C.; and if at its publishing he was 65, the age ascribed to Parmenides, the date of the dialogue as a whole would be approximately 362 B.C. This hypothesis would also agree fairly well with the supposition that Aristotle is indicated in the person of the young Socrates if we put the age of the latter at about 20 at the time of the visit of the Eleates (cp. Burnet, *Early Gk. Phil.* p. 180). It fits

in also quite well with the allusions made to Parmenides' discussion in Theaet. 183 E, and Soph. 287 C, though neither of these passages proves anything definite as to the priority or posteriority of the Parmenides as finally published. I am however strongly inclined to think that the Sophist is posterior and the Theaetetus prior to the completion of the Parmenides, the *δι' ἐρωτήσεων* method of the latter being rather taken as known in the Sophist, while in the Theaetetus the account of Parmenides' discussion seems to be purposely postponed.

And here it is just worth while to notice one or two similarities of phrase between the Theaetetus and the first part of the Parmenides, which have not yet, as I think, been observed. Theaetetus himself is spoken of in much the same way as the young Socrates in the Parmenides. Thus cp. Theaet. 164 D *νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑκακούεις καὶ πείθει*, with Parmen. 130 E *νέος γὰρ ἔτι εἶ...νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.*

There can, then, be little doubt that these three dialogues, the Theaetetus, the Parmenides and the Sophist, are closely connected. But what is the true interconnection of the two divisions of the Parmenides and what the object of the whole, must be further considered.

One of the most important points is to determine if possible with whom originated the *aporiae* urged by Parmenides against the Ideal Theory. Apelt, after Stallbaum and others, attributes them to critics of the Megaric school. If this view is right, then we surely cannot also attribute to the Megarics, as do nearly all the commentators since the days of Schleiermacher, a theory of *εἴδη*; since such keen critics were bound to have seen that their own doctrine was equally open to these objections.

This ascription of some form of Idealism to the Megaric school is so widely spread and generally adopted, having behind it the weight of two such authorities as Zeller and Bonitz—*παμπάλαιοί τε καὶ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες*—and being held as certain by Apelt, that, at the risk of digression, I must reiterate a few of the arguments by which Jackson and Tocco, with perfect success, seek to discredit it.

The only basis on which this hypothesis of a Megaric theory of εἴδη appears really to rest is the passage in the Sophist 246 where the view of certain εἰδῶν φίλοι is criticised, and this basis is no more than pure assumption. Besides this, however, Zeller and Apelt cite a reference to Stilpo's doctrine in Diog. L. II. 119 (see R. and P. 233) to prove "dass er den Begriffen ein von den Einzeldingen gesondertes Dasein beimass." But surely the argument about that most literal *ever*-green, 'everlasting lettuce,' is meant to prove just the opposite, namely the absurdity of a theory of Ideas, and is an attack, in the *reductio ad absurdum* method, on Platonism. As Diogenes himself puts it in the very same passage, Stilpo ἀνῄρει καὶ τὰ εἴδη, which can only mean 'he tried to upset Platonism,' and can certainly *not* mean "he tried to upset Megaricism"; for however much δεινὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς Stilpo may have been, he cannot have tried thus to cut his own throat. I grant that this passage may not *prove* a negative as regards Stilpo's Idealism, but it does prove at least that *Diogenes* was wholly innocent of ascribing to him any such doctrine.

The second passage which Apelt adduces is a fragment of Eudemus ap. Simplic. Phys. 98, 1: Πλάτων τε γὰρ εἰσάγων τὸ δισσὸν πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔλυσε πραγμάτων ὧν νῦν οἱ σοφισταὶ καταφεύγοντες ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τοὔνομα τῶν λόγων ἀφώρισε. Whether we think the text as it stands defensible, as does Tocco, or whether we change ὧν νῦν to ὃ ἠγνόουν with Diels or to ὃ ἀνένευον with Apelt, the 'sophists who took refuge in εἴδη' must be explained of the contemporaries of Eudemus, such as Stilpo and Menedemus, and people such as οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι who denied the possibility of all save identical predication. And as Tocco well puts it "le parole dunque ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη sono *un apprezzamento di Eudemo*, e non vogliono niente affatto dire che Stilpone o altro Megarico prima di lui sia arrivato alla teorica delle idee." Eudemus is merely interpreting the position of these 'Sophists'—Megarics and Cynics—in his own language; and how different a thing that may be from stating with historical precision the views of these thinkers, all who know Aristotle's

survey of the philosophy of his predecessors will hardly need to be reminded.

These two passages then prove nothing for the identification of the εἰδῶν φίλοι with the Megarics, and the other texts (D. L. II. 1, Met. N. 4. 1091^{b} 13, Θ 3. 1046^{b} 29 etc.) merely go to show a close historical connection between the Eleatic and Megaric schools.

The à priori difficulty of attributing to the Megarics any such pluralistic doctrine was long ago pointed out by Ueberweg, writing to this effect: "The supposition that Euclid without detracting from the Unity of the Good, or the truly existent, also assumed a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable" (Vol. I. p. 89 Eng. Tr.). And so, too, Chaignet (*Hist. de la Psych. d. G.* I. p. 196), though following the multitude in ascribing ideas to the Megarics, remarks: "Il est difficile, néanmoins, de concevoir comment cette pluralité d'idées se comporte avec l'unité absolue de l'être, et quel peut être leur rapport mutuel." We may conclude, then, that on this point Jackson and Tocco have done well to follow in the footsteps of Ritter and Dittenberger. There is no real ground for ascribing any kind of Idealism to the Megarics, and the reference to εἰδῶν φίλοι in the Sophist cannot indicate that school. The question who really are indicated by it, we must here defer, so as to return without further delay to the immediate problems of the Parmenides.

We have noted that it appeared inconsistent of Apelt to attribute a form of Idealism to the Megarics, and at the same time to hold that the objections against the theory of Ideas in Parmenides, Pt I., were raised by that school. If, however, he is wrong as to the first of these points, he may be right on the second. And if right in the second, again, he can scarcely be right in thinking the Parmenides as a whole to be a juvenile production. That is to say, to formulate it more precisely, we observe two separate inconsistencies in Apelt's view, if it be reduced to the following four propositions:—

(1) The Parmenides is an early production of Plato's.

(2) The Parmenides is a unity, the second part having

direct reference (as retorts rather than replies) to the objections against the Ideal Theory in the First Part.

(3) These objections originated with the Megarics, against whom, accordingly, the whole dialogue is expressly directed.

(4) These same Megarics held a "Lehre von der Mehrheit unkörperlicher Formen," a "Begriffsphilosophie."

Thus nakedly stated it will easily appear, as Tocco rightly contends, that propp. 1 and 2 are incompatible, and likewise propp. 3 and 4. That there is no good ground for maintaining prop. 4 has just been shown; and it has also been shown that the inconsistency between propp. 1 and 2 may be partly escaped by adopting the hypothesis of a second redaction of the dialogue, so that the period of time which elapsed between the composition of the early second part and the late introductory first part would sufficiently account for the accumulation of criticism against the Ideal Theory.

But if we adopt this hypothesis we must give up the view that the Second Part is meant as a retort in detail to the objections of the First Part. So that we are again brought face to face with these questions, which Apelt's theory fails to answer satisfactorily, viz.:—

(1) Who were the people that raised the *aporiae*?

(2) Is the Second Part meant as a solution, or a retort, to those *aporiae*, or is it quite without immediate reference to them?

To answer these questions completely it would be necessary to examine in full the indications as to the motive and scope of the dialogue contained in Part I., which would involve also an enquiry into the attitude of Aristotle and into the relation of the Philebus to our dialogue; and further it would be necessary to consider how far Apelt's severe verdict on the Second Part enforces the corollary of an early origin: but only a few points can here be dealt with.

To begin with, we have four acting *dramatis personae*—Parmenides and Zeno, Socrates and Aristotle. Who, then, are the persons actually indicated under these names? If by Parmenides is meant Plato himself, Zeno can hardly be intended for an antagonist of Platonism, nor can Socrates be

intended for a Megaric or a type of any other rival school. All these are represented as in fundamental agreement, only that the young Socrates is labouring with an imperfect and fractional Idealism owing to his lack of acquaintance with logical method and the insufficiency of his philosophic training, so that he himself is unable to perceive the fuller Idealism which underlies both the positive and the negative side of Eleatic doctrine.

The objections which Parmenides raises are valid only as against the philosophic immaturity of Socrates' position.

Granted, then, that by Parmenides is symbolized the mature Plato himself, are we to suppose that it was Plato himself who originated the *aporiae* here put forward? This is the view taken by Dr Jackson, who sees in the young Socrates here, as in the εἰδῶν φίλοι of the Sophist, no other than the Plato of the Phaedo-Republic period; and in both of these points he can, to some extent, count M. Tocco as an independent ally. But in spite of the learning and ingenuity with which these two authorities maintain this opinion, I am unable to agree with it. To begin with, there is a strong à priori improbability in conceiving that any theorist who had publicly preached a definite doctrine should then proceed with equal publicity to controvert his own doctrine. When such a theorist finds himself compelled to change his views he is usually tempted to make out that in reality his later position is identical with that formerly occupied, or if he allows the change to be real he at least does not go out of the way to publish abroad his inconsistency. And if this is so when the change is due to external pressure, and as a concession to outside criticism, we should expect it to hold good à fortiori when the change is due wholly to self-criticism and to the internal dissatisfaction of the theorist with his earlier view. It is hardly possible to conceive that Plato in his position as the head of a School and surrounded by hostile critics of other Schools could have first preached an "earlier Idealism," next proceeded to make a public onslaught on that doctrine, and finally ended by erecting on the ruins of his earlier philosophic edifice an

entirely remodelled Temple of Truth[1]. Yet this is practically the procedure ascribed to Plato by the partisans of the 'later theory,' whatever form that theory is supposed to have taken. This view of Platonic development I find it impossible to accept, and consequently I cannot follow Tocco and Jackson in identifying the doctrine attributed to the young Socrates of the Parmenides, or to the εἰδῶν φίλοι of the Sophist, with that expounded by Plato himself in the Phaedo and Republic.

But if these *aporiae* brought forward by Parmenides cannot be regarded as a serious attack by Plato upon his own earlier theory, in what light are we to regard them?

Two other views have been held. Apelt, as we have seen, follows Stallbaum and others in ascribing their origin to the Megaric school; while Susemihl ascribes them to Plato, as a criticism (not, of course, of his own theory, but) of the Megaric doctrine of εἴδη.

The latter view we may at once dismiss, as we have seen no sufficient reason for attributing to the Megarics any kind of ideal theory.

But the former view has a good deal in its favour.

In the first place, the close connection between the Megarics and Eleatics and the fact that the objections are put in the mouth of the Eleatic Parmenides appear *prima facie* evidence in support of a Megaric origin of the *aporiae*. Besides this, as has been noticed, the Megaric Stilpo ἀνῄρει τὰ εἴδη; and Bäumker has shown (*Rhein. Mus.* XXXIV. 82) good grounds for ascribing the argument known as τρίτος ἄνθρωπος to the Sophist Polyxenus, a pupil of the Megaric Bryson. Tocco points out that this does not prove anything as to the origin of the rest of the *aporiae*, which may be granted; but it adds at least to the probability of the view, as it is natural to ascribe all the objections put in the mouth of the same person to the same school.

[1] It is but fair to note here that Dr Jackson's view does not thus separate the 2nd and 3rd of these steps, i.e. it makes both criticism and reconstruction simultaneous processes. But though they find simultaneous *expression*, criticism must surely precede reconstruction in mental *origin*: hence I retain the above threefold distinction.

M. Tocco's objection at this point to Apelt's view leads us to consider the alternative which he himself prefers. With Jackson he holds the *aporiae* raised to be valid against the theory attacked, which theory he identifies with the earlier Platonism of the Phaedo, etc., but he does not go with Jackson in making Plato himself the author of the *aporiae*, but ascribes them all to Aristotle, "il quale se più tardi fondò una scuola propria, è probabile che anche prima fosse poco persuaso degl' insegnamenti del maestro, e non mancasse di muovergli forti opposizioni" (p. 427).

In this view he is not without a weighty ally in Teichmüller (to whom however he makes no reference), who writes (Neue Stud. III. 370): "Die Vertheidigung Plato's ist so grossmüthig und so pädagogisch gehalten, dass sie möglicher *gegen Einwürfe des Aristoteles in der Schule* und gegen die von Plato bei diesem erkannte Tendenz gerichtet ist, die erst später zum entschiedenen Durchbruch kam." Contrariwise Apelt (p. 53): "Denn so wahrscheinlich es ist dass Aristoteles schon im persönlichen Verkehr mit seinem Lehrer manchem Bedenken gegen dessen Lehre Ausdruck gab, so wenig glaublich ist es, dass er schon frühzeitig eine so erschöpfende Kritik an dessen Lehre geübt habe, wie sie uns in seinen Schriften entgegentritt; vielmehr gewannen ihm wohl die Einwürfe gegen die Ideenlehre erst Hand in Hand mit der Ausbildung des eigenen Systems ihre volle Bedeutung."

But the apparent contradiction of Apelt's view disappears when he suggests, on the next page, that Aristotle merely converted *in suum usum* Megaric, or other, objections against the Platonic Idealism which lay ready to hand.

Here, then, I think we have the true solution of the problem: some, at least, of the *aporiae*, most probably all, were first evolved by the Megarics or kindred theorists, and then accepted by Aristotle as valid against Platonism, and by him urged as such against his master in the Academy.

I have no doubt about accepting Teichmüller's view that the discussion as a whole is confined to the Platonic school itself. This is indicated by Zeno's words, 136 D: *εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα*

πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ κ.τ.λ.; and by the phrase of Parmenides which follows, 137 A: δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν.

On this hypothesis there is a characteristic touch of fine sarcasm in making Aristotle the 'answerer' on the ground that, as youngest, ἥκιστα ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστ' ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο—the submissiveness proper to the youngest scholar contrasted with the actual mental character of 'him that troubled Israel'!

The whole tone of the introductory portion, the *ex cathedra* style adopted by Parmenides, together with his insistence on the youth of Socrates and of Aristotle and on their need for γυμνασία, 'mental discipline,' all support this view of the circumstances of the production of the dialogue. Plato means to warn his over-hasty and short-sighted pupils emphatically that they cannot expect to understand the full import of Idealism before they have undergone the needful preliminary training, and that it is presumptuous in them to criticise their master's doctrine whilst still mere undergraduates. So far, then, I agree at once with both Apelt and Teichmüller.

But when Teichmüller proceeds further (op. cit. 360 ff.) to make out that the whole dialogue is aimed at Aristotle's *Weltansicht*, at his dualistic separation of God from the World, and intended also as a vindication of the dialectic method as against Aristotle's contemptuous rejection of it, he certainly appears to outstep far the bounds of historical probability. Such a view is chronologically impossible, and turns the world upside down. We cannot make the dignified Philosopher guilty of such a thing as a "Streitschrift gegen die Richtung des Aristoteles": this would be too much of a 'cart before the horse.' Teichmüller, like Tocco and Apelt, is partly right in his view of the Parmenides, but partly wrong also: we must steer the middle course between all three.

Accepting, then, the above as the most probable account to be given of the first Part of the dialogue, and the *aporiae* put forward in it, we have next to consider in what relation it stands to the second Part.

As a primary à priori objection to Apelt's view of the

second Part, we may argue that it is most unlikely that Plato would have produced a work which had no serious purpose and was a mere piece of eristic—in Stallbaum's words "Platonis ingenio plane indignum fuerit, integrum librum composuisse meris nugis sophisticis tanquam aranearum telis refertum." But if we ask what the purpose of the second Part exactly is, we meet with a variety of answers. It is argued by some that it ought to contain a fulfilment of Socrates' desideratum, expressed in 129 B, C: *εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἓν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.* Others think it ought to provide a refutation, direct or indirect, of the *aporiae* of the first Part. Others again insist on such phrases as *τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τῆς γυμνασίας*; (135 D), *δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν* (137 B), from which they argue that the second Part is only meant as a dialectical exercise with no positive content. As the first step to a verdict on the comparative merit of these diverse views, it will be well to look more closely at the strictures passed by Apelt on the logical validity of the argument.

A large proportion of the sophisms alleged by Apelt are due, as he points out, to a confusion between qualitative and modal judgments, between *Sein* and *Dasein*, between *Anschauung* and *Begriff*, between *Begriffsvergleichung* and *Urteil*. Such confusions may be variously attributed to design, or to carelessness, or to ignorance on the part of the author; we find them occurring not infrequently in other Platonic dialogues, as Apelt himself indicates, and their occurrence may be largely attributed to the natural ambiguity of language, especially of a language but newly made to serve as a logical instrument. But at the same time, it is difficult to believe that if Plato was conducting a serious positive argument in favour of his own doctrine, he would allow himself to fall into these blunders, at least at the period of his philosophical maturity.

The first Hypothesis is *εἰ ἕν ἐστιν ἕν* (137 C—142 B), which results in the conclusion that if the One is unconditioned it admits of no predicate whatsoever. From 137 C—139 B, in which all Plurality and Spatial determination of the One is

negated, the argument proceeds correctly, Apelt admits. But in 139 B ff. where, as the eighth deduction, Identity and Diversity, Similarity and Dissimilarity, are denied to the One, Apelt points out a sophism based on the ambiguity of *ταὐτόν* which has the two senses of 'ein und derselbe Gegenstand' and 'einerlei' (cp. 139 B and D), and another based on the confusion between a judgment and a mere conjunction of notions, where it is argued that because *ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ* is a different notion from *ἓν ἑαυτῷ* therefore a thing which is *ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ* cannot be *ἓν ἑαυτῷ*.

From 139 E to 140 E he allows the argument to pass unchallenged, but at the latter point he signalises another sophism based on the ambiguity of the Greek idiomatic use of the comparative in the time-phrases, *πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ*, etc. (cp. Rep. 430 E).

With regard to the "Antithesis" (*ἓν εἰ ἔστι = εἰ ἕν ἐστιν ὄν*), 142 B ff., Apelt allows the correctness of the first four conclusions, but in regard to the fifth, that the One must exhibit both Rest and Motion, he points out that the argument which leads to the conclusion *τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ* (145 E) rests on a play on the double sense of *ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι* (for which cp. Ar. Phys. 210[a] 25 ff. with Simplic. ad loc.). Further in the transition from this conclusion to the affirmation of Rest and Motion, Apelt notes that a similar sophistic use is made of the ambiguous *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, a confusion of the mathematical with the physical sense—*space* in which, with *thing* in which. (Apelt rightly refers here to Theaet. 181 C to show that Plato himself was quite clear on the subject of spatial motion, and the other kinds of *κίνησις*.)

No less sophistical is the next argument, intended to prove Similarity and Dissimilarity (148), where from the fact that *τὸ ἕτερον* makes similar *ἕν* and *τἆλλα* is inferred the conclusion that *ταὐτόν* makes them dissimilar: a case of neglect of the law of contraposition, as if we were to deduce from the premiss that 'All roses are flowers' the conclusion 'what is not a rose is not a flower.' That Plato, however, was not ignorant of the right method sufficiently appears, as Apelt notes, from Meno 89 D E, Rep. 454 A etc. (cp. Ar. Soph. El. c. 5).

Again in 149 D ff. a confusion is observable between notion and object—between 'greatness' and a 'great thing.'

In 151 E ff. the ambiguity regarding comparisons of time reappears; and in 153 A—D numbers are compared with numbered objects, *τἆλλα* being used of both the numbers other than the One and objects other than the One; and again the term *πρός τι* is used to mean at once 'in relation to' and 'than,' in temporal comparison, the substitution of the genitive in the latter case veiling the sophism.

As to the third Hypothesis, 155 E—157 B, so far from esteeming it as a 'Synthese' or solution of any kind, Apelt maintains that its result is purely negative, being an application of the Zenonian arguments against the possibility of motion and change, based on the indivisibility of Time and Space, to the case in point—the self-contradictory *ἕν*.

Finally, in addition to this "bewusste dialektische Spielerei," Apelt cites Ueberweg (Jahn. Jahrb. 89, 111 ff.) for the unplatonic character of the dialectical method here adopted; and the lack of a positive conclusion he regards as a further indication of the purely eristical character of the dialogue.

On the other hand, granting the justice of the particular charges made against the arguments by Apelt, we may argue with Tocco that the general conclusions are just. Thus, in the first Hypothesis, though some of the inferences are undoubtedly illegitimate, the conclusion with regard to the absolute unconditional Unity, *ἓν ἕν*, that its position is a negation of the possibility of all knowledge of it (142 A *οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται*), is perfectly just. And we can scarcely help seeing in this also an intended rejection of the absolute monism of the Eleatic and Megaric schools.

The second hypothesis is, as Tocco rightly insists, quite distinct from the first, the position being *ἓν ὄν*, which results in a synthesis of contradictory results. The third position, *ἓν μὴ-ὄν*, results in a similar complex of contradictions, if *μὴ-ὄν* be a relative notion, and in pure negation and nihilism if it be an absolute notion. And the total result of the whole series of antinomies is thus put: *ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως*

ἐστί τε καὶ οὔκ ἐστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται I.e. whether we posit the Being or Not-being of the One, we involve ourselves necessarily in apparent contradictions of thought. If we are to save Thought we must synthesise, and not sever, Being and Not-being, Unity and Otherness. The fundamental conception, then, which determines the whole course of this second part is quite correctly expressed by Tocco in the following terms (p. 429): "l' uno come lo intendono gli Eleatici, vale a dire sequestrato da qualunque altro concetto, non si può neanche pensare; ma d' altra parte non possiamo fare a meno di questo concetto, se non si vuole sovvertire il fondamento stesso del pensiero. E la consequenza non esplicita ma chiaramente sottintesa è quest' altra: che al concetto Eleatico dell' Uno bisogna sostituire un altro che lo renda pensabile, come a dire che l' uno non sia chiuso in sè stesso, anzi accenni ai molti coi quali è in necessaria relazione, nè quello senza questi si possa pensare, nè questi senza quello. La κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν, esplicitamente insegnata nel Sofista, è qui la conclusione implicita del dialogo." In these remarks I thoroughly agree, but it must at the same time be remembered (1) that the result is in form paradoxical and purely negative; (2) that both method, and in some details content also, are rather Megarico-Sophistical than Platonic; (3) that the second part is expressly propaedeutic merely (γυμνασία, παιδιά). These considerations induce me to regard, with Apelt, the second part as a comparatively early composition (possibly enlarged in some details later) which owes its style and method to Megaric influence, it being primarily intended as a polemic against the monism of that school. It is put into the mouth of Parmenides in order to lend force to it as an *argumentum ad hominem*, while indicating that the true core of Parmenidean doctrine is inconsistent with any form of absolute monism or individualism.

But while going thus far with Apelt, I must also maintain (agreeing in various degrees with Tocco, Jackson and Teichmüller) that the first part of the dialogue is quite late, meant to immediately precede the Sophist, in which dialogue, and not in the Parmenides itself, the positive solution of the *aporiae*

and the *σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις* of the Ideas which the young Socrates regards as a desideratum is, in part at least, accomplished; the completion of the task being contained in the Politicus, Philebus and Timaeus.

At the same time I cannot subscribe either to such a theory of alteration in the Platonic doctrine as is maintained by Jackson, nor yet to such another as Tocco seeks to prove. The fundamental Idealism of Plato remains unaltered throughout, though in expression and aspect it varies with the form and subject of the various dialogues.

The Idea throughout is *ἓν-καὶ-πολλά*, and though it is not until we arrive at the comparatively late dialogues just mentioned that we find a detailed development of the aspect of plurality and relativity, this is due merely to an historical accident—to the fact that certain members of his Academy absurdly charged Plato with pseudo-Megaricism and pseudo-Atomism, being themselves led astray by the sophistical *aporiae* of the Megarics which, through lack of depth, they were unable to rebut. And it is to these disciples of little faith that Plato addresses his Parmenides, as if he had said "this kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting."

Such being the general view of the dialogue which an impartial consideration of the discussions of Apelt and Tocco appears to confirm, I revert now to the views propounded in Dr Jackson's paper, some of which call for more particular remark. As already stated, I am entirely at variance with him as to his main argument. Consequently, I cannot admit the legitimacy of attempting by sleight-of-hand to extract from the series of hypotheses an earlier ideal theory which is rejected, and a later theory of natural kinds which is to be approved. Nor can I see in the eighth hypothesis (seventh in Jackson's numbering) a critique of Socraticism.

But this point deserves a word more of special remark. The hypothesis in question is (164 B ff.) *ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι* and deals with the effect of the (relative) non-being of the One on *τἆλλα*. *τἆλλα* are shown to be *ἄλλα*: *ἕτερα*: *ἀλλήλων ἕτερα*: *κατὰ πλήθη ἀλλήλων ἄλλα*: *πολλοὶ ὄγκοι, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὔ*: whence it results that number and its modes have

merely an apparent existence (*φάντασμα ἰσότητος: φαίνεται πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα*), and that *ἄπειρα τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ τἆλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι*, whence the general result is that true knowledge is impossible. In all this there seems nothing to indicate an allusion to Socraticism, but I would suggest—if it has not before been suggested—that the phraseology is specially appropriate to a critique of *Pythagoreanism*. The Pythagorean view was that everything is a number, i.e. a sum of points, or materially-conceived monads, a *πλῆθος* or *ὄγκος*. So Simpl. Phys. 140, 34 D gives us one of the arguments of Zeno against the reality of the point, in other words against the hypothesis *εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν*, which concludes thus: *οὕτως εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα, μικρὰ μέν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δέ, ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι*. Again, Zeno's fourth argument against the Pythagorean view of space, showing that with it absolute motion is indistinguishable from relative, is thus stated in Ar. Phys. VI. 9. 239^{b} 33 ff. *τέταρτος δ' ὁ περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ κινουμένων ἐξ ἐναντίας ἴσων ὄγκων παρ' ἴσους, τῶν μὲν ἀπὸ τέλους τοῦ σταδίου, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ μέσου, ἴσῳ τάχει, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνειν οἴεται ἴσον εἶναι χρόνον τῷ διπλασίῳ τὸν ἥμισυν, κτλ.*

Here *ὄγκος* appears as a term *used by Zeno* to denote a row or aggregation of spatial, discrete, units such as those of which the Pythagoreans held the real world to be built up (cp. Tannery, *Science hellène*, p. 257).

Consequently it would seem that in this passage Plato is following on the lines of Zeno in criticising Pythagoreanism.

If this, then, be so; and if also—which seems beyond a doubt—the first two hypotheses are aimed at Eleaticism, we are brought to the conclusion that Jackson is at least partly right in his view that a definite reference to particular theories is to be found throughout the second part of the dialogue, and consequently right also when he says that it is 'hardly safe to take for granted that the One here investigated is "die Idee im Allgemeinen, in abstracto, d. h. ihrer logischen Form nach, aufgefasst,"' which is Zeller's view.

And here, regarding the scope of the sophisms and false

reasonings pointed out by Apelt in the second Part, it is to be noticed that they affect only the first three hypotheses, the logical validity of the last six (157 B ff.) remaining unchallenged.

Consequently it would be possible to suppose that these last—which deal with the effects of the existence of *ἕν* on *τἆλλα*, and with the effects of the non-existence of *ἕν* both in relation to itself and in relation to *τἆλλα*—are additions to the original eristical treatise, if we adopt the hypothesis of a double redaction. In this case the negative argument—which seems in method more serious and exact—would constitute a suitable preparation for the discussion of *μὴ ὄν* which follows in the Sophist; while the Zenonic retorts (149 E ff., 142 B ff.) to the objections of the Megarics all appear in the discussion of the first two hypotheses which belong to the original composition. We might even conjecture further that the words: *εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων ἡνίκα...ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη...τὸν Παρμενίδην...καὶ σμίκρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων* (127 C) convey a hint of a break in the sequence of the dialectical discussion to follow, the shorter final portion of Zeno's tract alone being approved by the presence of the Master.

But however this may be, it seems more than probable that while the arguments of Part II. are not *all* to be taken as serious Idealistic doctrine, neither are they *all* to be set down as pure eristic, all as anti-Megaric. In other words we should distinguish between the historical import of the various hypotheses.

And it is herein I think that Jackson's most valuable contribution to the study of the Parmenides will be found to lie,—in the suggestion, namely, that "the hypothetical investigation is what it professes to be, an inquiry into the relations of *ἕν* and *τἄλλα*, as they have been or may be conceived, so that several distinct theories come successively under examination." For such a procedure as this we may find a parallel in Aristotle's treatment of the theories regarding substantial numbers (Met. M 6), where all possible as well as all actually-held views are set forth.

Closely connected with this, there is another suggestion

made by Jackson, the value of which Tocco has equally failed to appreciate.

It is this, that "the first element of the *συμβαίνοντα* is in each case a statement of the doctrine which is at the moment under investigation." For example, in the first Hypothesis, the theses that the One is not a whole, has not parts, is *ἄπειρον* (without beginning, middle, or end), is without figure, is neither in space nor in time—all these are to be regarded on Jackson's view as 'no more than an amplification of the hypothesis investigated.'

The importance of this view is that it enables us, in part at least, to save Plato's credit with regard to the fallacies which occur in the arguments, since these fallacies will be found to lie in the fundamental conception (in no case Plato's own) which is under examination. Consequently we ought to regard the fallacies unearthed by Grote, Apelt and others,—the confusion between a thought and a thing, between the absolute and the relative, between the ambiguous senses of *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*, of *ἕν* and *τἆλλα* and *ἐν* and *πρός*,—as all *intentionally* introduced to show the logical inaccuracy or dishonesty of the sophistic method of reasoning, and the consequent need on the part of tiros in philosophy of a cathartic process which should guard them from being misled by the dangerous arts of the eristic. *Τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.* Soph. 231 B.

Here, then, we have the motive for the republication of the second part of the Parmenides—an *argumentum ad hominem* against the Megarics and Cynics and the like false theorists reproduced by Plato in order to purge the minds of some of his own errant disciples from the *δοξοσοφία* with which these pseudo-philosophers had imbued them. The teaching of the 'sophist' is only a false art of *mimicry* which substitutes *μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα* for *ὄντα*, a delusive *παιδιά* which deceives *τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν παίδων, τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας*, a form of juggling by intellectual mountebanks (*γοητεύειν*). Soph. 234 A—D.

The reference in all this denunciation of sophistry to the

matter and manner of the second Part of the Parmenides is sufficiently clear, as is also the similarity of tone and phrase to certain passages in the first Part of that dialogue already noticed.

Another allusion may also be noticed in Soph. 259 C:—*τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων.* 259 D *καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω ταναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὗ τέ τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.* (With which cp. Phileb. 13 D, 14 D, 15 D, E.)

Again, we find the practice of *χωρισμός* thus severely criticised in the same passage (259 D): *τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.* This is supposed to be a cut at Antisthenes, and plausibly so (*νεογενής*) (*ὀψιμαθής*). But it is difficult not to see in it also a reference to the view of the young Socrates in Parm. 129 ff., concerning *χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα* —a most 'unphilosophic' view, when interpreted by the untrained mind of youth.

If this reference be allowed, it will be another point against the correctness of admitting any 'later' theory of Ideas, whereby the 'earlier' theory becomes identified with that here criticised so contemptuously.

There are numerous other points in the papers of Jackson and Apelt on this dialogue which well merit attention. But I must here limit myself to the above consideration of some of the main questions.

And so I pass on now to the interpretation given of the companion dialogue, the *Sophist*, by the three critics with whom I am primarily here concerned.

II. *The Sophist.*

In my observations on the Parmenides I confined myself mainly to an estimation of the views propounded by Dr Apelt and Dr Jackson, and by their critic M. Tocco.

I shall adopt the same course in the following paper, comparing the opinions of these three scholars, and trying to deduce from their arguments and counter-arguments such conclusions regarding the Platonic theory in the *Sophist* as may appear most probable.

Apelt's essay, as is indicated by the title "Ideenlehre im Sophistes," is mainly restricted to the philosophic kernel of the dialogue—to the examination of *οὐσία*, of *δύναμις*, of *κοινωνία*, and of their value for the Ideal theory. In addition to this, however, he attempts at considerable length to justify the identification of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, mentioned in 246 B, with the Megaric school.

As already pointed out, I am at one with Jackson and Tocco in their rejection of this view, holding it to be at once improbable in itself and supported by no external evidence.

It is interesting to notice, however, the way in which Apelt diverges from Zeller in his account of the historical origin of this supposed Megaric Idealism. Both agree in finding in the Megaric philosophy a double element, Eleaticism and Socraticism. The question then is, which of these two is the original and determining element: were the Megarics Socratics first, and only secondarily Eleatics, or is the reverse the case?

Zeller holds that the Socratic is the primary and original feature in Megaricism, and that their doctrine of Unity in its strict sense was a later development, and he bases this view on his other theory of the priority of the Sophist to the Parmenides —the Megarics figuring as pluralists in the former dialogue, and in the latter as monists.

Apelt on the contrary dates the Parmenides later than the Sophist, and accordingly maintains against Zeller that the primary element in Megaricism is not the Socratic but the Eleatic. In his critique of Zeller here he has some good remarks (Beiträge, p. 96). It is, as he says, "von den sokratischen Begriffen zur Wesenheit der Begriffe noch ein weiter Schritt, von dem es gar nicht wahrscheinlich ist, dass sie ihn noch unter der unmittelbaren Wirkung des Verkehrs mit Sokrates oder auch unter der unmittelbaren Nachwirkung desselben thaten. Denn dem Sokrates lag so etwas fern. So dann be-

zeugen die übrigen sokratischen Schulen zur Genüge, dass man Sokratiker sein konnte, ohne die Begriffe geradezu zur Hauptsache zu machen. Auch dem Sokrates waren die Begriffe schliesslich bloss Mittel zum Zweck," u. s. w.

And, again, he argues justly that the Megarics cannot have had a theory of εἴδη at the time the Parmenides was written: "Die Megariker weisen grosse Widersprüche oder Undenkbarkeiten in der Ideenlehre nach, aber so, als hätten sie ihrerseits nie an εἴδη geglaubt."

But the more I agree with these remarks of Apelt the more convinced am I of the incorrectness of his own view: nor can I see how it comes about that he persists in spite of himself in saddling the Megarics with any εἴδη-theory at all.

Still, his view is more moderate than Zeller's, since he regards the Megarics' Idealism as due to the influence of Plato. Their primitive Eleaticism was, he imagines, modified into a pluralism by the effect of "die freundschaftliche Polemik des Plato gegen ihre starre Einslehre." So that some, at least, of the School converted their ἓν into ἀσώματα εἴδη; for it is conceivable that *both* views existed in the School alongside of each other (p. 95 N. 1).

When Apelt grants thus much, it will be seen that practically his view comes very near to that of Campbell and others, which he begins by expressly rejecting: for it comes to much the same thing, in point of fact, whether we regard the εἰδῶν φίλοι as pseudo-Megarics influenced by Platonism or as pseudo-Platonists influenced by Megaricism. The latter is the view I prefer; as in fact I have seen no explanation of the matter which seems to me to approach so nearly to the truth as that contained in Campbell's note on 247 E: "Plato, while developing his own theory of knowledge with greater clearness, administers a gentle reproof to *some of his own followers*, who held tenaciously to a conception of the εἴδη, based on immature statements of his own, and mixed with Eleatic and Pythagorean elements."

The view here expressed by Campbell is so far similar to that of Grote, and Ueberweg, and Jackson, and Tocco, in that all of them confine the reference to Platonism and the Platonic

School; the point in dispute being as to how far an *actual* and *self-conscious* modification of the original Idealism of Plato *himself* is here implied. But without now entering upon this discussion, I pass on to the next point in Apelt's paper, with the remark that his investigation of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* problem merely seems to confirm the conclusion already arrived at as to the impossibility of identifying them with the Megarics.

The next point to be mentioned is Apelt's identification of the opponents of the "Friends of the Ideas," i.e. of the extreme materialists. As the passage, 247 C, tends to express "eine Zusammenfassung aller materialistischen Ansichten," we must hold it to refer to the Atomists as well as to the Cynics. For, as Apelt rightly observes, the way in which these materialists are described in 246 A (*διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα*) by no means excludes the followers of Democritus, since though their atoms are not, as single, tangible and sensible, yet as aggregates they compose the objects of sense.

The most important thesis, however, in Apelt's paper is his attack upon the view that in the Sophist is to be found a new development or modification of the theory of Ideas. The two chief supporters of this view with whom he concerns himself are Bonitz and Zeller. Both these are agreed in thinking that the Sophist introduces a new conception of the Ideas as 'living forces.' So Bonitz regarded the dialogue as a turning-point in Plato's philosophic theory, a "Weiterbildung": while Zeller holds that the two points of view run through the Ideal theory from the commencement. In either case an inconsistency with what is regarded as the original or fundamental doctrine is assumed to exist in the Sophist. As against this construction of the dialogue Apelt maintains the following propositions:—

(1) Aristotle, though citing the Sophist, appears ignorant of any peculiarity of doctrine in it.

(2) The definition of *ὄν* in 248 E really "nur die Bedeutung eines dialektischen Kunstgriffes hat": and it is not even original with Plato.

(3) The *δύναμις* of action, passion, motion, ascribed to the Ideas imply no active relation to the sensible world as efficient causes; since

(4) The Ideas in the Sophist, as in the rest of the dialogues, are spiritual essences, which are related to sensibles only as *final* and never as *moving* cause: i.e. the activity ascribed to the Platonic Ideas is the same as that ascribed to the Divine νοῦς of Aristotle, as also is their passivity: the efficient cause is not the Ideas but the Godhead, the Demiurgus of the Timaeus.

(5) The κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν does not imply other motive activity than the δύναμις τοῦ γιγνώσκειν καὶ γιγνώσκεσθαι: it is merely an expression for "die ewige giltige Ordnung, in welcher die Ideen zu einander stehen": and, as such,—

(6) The 'communion of kinds' is no new doctrine in the Sophist: the real novelty lies in the deduction from it of "die Giltigkeit des μὴ ὄν für die Ideenwelt."

It will be seen that the point of view from which Apelt approaches the study of the Sophist is contained in prop. 4.

In it we have his view of Plato's Idealism summarised, and accordingly, his efforts are directed to interpreting the Sophist in conformity with the hypotheses therein involved. For if we are to sever God,— = δημιουργὸς of Timaeus = αἰτία τῆς ξυμμίξεως of Philebus = ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ of Republic,—from the Ideas, as efficient from final cause, it is clear that we must either allow some inconsistency and lack of unity in the Platonic doctrine or else explain away the δύναμις theory in the Sophist. The latter alternative is that adopted by Apelt. But his critic Tocco is far from allowing this "interpretazione teistica del Platonismo, la quale risale ai Padri della Chiesa." If the question were thus simple, he argues, how could Aristotle have failed to understand his master's doctrine; how could he have accused him of neglecting the ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως, if the Demiurge is literally to be understood as such? Besides which, the independence of the Ideas is guaranteed by such passages as Parm. 132 B, Symp. 211 A, which shew us that they cannot be viewed as concepts of the divine mind.

These objections, and others, brought forward by Tocco, suffice at least to shew that Apelt's main position must be regarded at the best as very doubtful. Consequently, he is not justified in using it as a basis for the interpretation of the Sophist; and so it remains for us to enquire how far his other propositions are sound. His citation of Aristotle's attitude can

scarcely be made to prove much. Aristotle's whole treatment of Platonism is an astonishment to succeeding ages, and his authority has been adduced by every one to prove everything. The value which his evidence has for us in this matter must depend on our general estimation of his intelligence and impartiality; and holding, as I do, that he neither understood completely nor cared to understand Plato's doctrine, I do not ascribe over-much weight to his words regarding Idealism. At the same time, if the view I have taken of the Parmenides is correct, and if it is meant as a reassertion of the Ideal Theory in the face of criticisms raised or adopted by Aristotle and others, we should certainly expect Aristotle to notice a divergence from the earlier doctrine if such is to be found in the Sophist. And, thus, I am rather inclined to agree with Apelt's inference from Aristotle's silence, that no novelty of doctrine is to be discovered in the dialogue: though it is a step further, which I refuse to take, when he infers also that the theory of Ideal Forces is consequently absent. For, granted that there is no novel doctrine in the Sophist, it does not follow *ipso facto* that we must therefore exclude that theory: it is equally possible to hold that the theory was throughout an essential tenet of Platonism.

To prove, however, that this is not the case is, as we have seen, the main thesis of Apelt's essay. Accordingly we proceed to the arguments adduced in support of his second proposition.

What does Plato mean by his definition of *οὐσία*: is he in earnest with it or is he not? A review of the whole passage proves, replies Apelt, "dass die obige Definition des *ὄν* im Verlaufe der Verhandlung nur die Bedeutung eines dialektischen Kunstgriffes hat." It is a 'Hilfswort' which brings both Materialists and Ideo-philes "unter einem Hut und nötigt jeden, von dem andern etwas anzunehmen."

Further, the notion of *δύναμις* as applied to *πάσχειν* = *γιγνώσκεσθαι* is a reduction of it from 'Kraft' to 'Möglichkeit,' and only in this latter Aristotelian sense has it place in the Ideal world. So the *πάσχειν* of the Ideas is only "ein Schatten des eigentlichen *πάσχειν*"—*καθόσον γιγνώσκεται κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖται διὰ τὸ πάσχειν* 248 E. If the definition

were seriously and literally intended to apply to the Ideal world, then the genuine ὄντως ὄν were not the Ideas but ὕλη, μὴ ὄν, and the Ideas would come under the head of οὐσία 'mehr als Contrebande eingeschmuggelt, denn als ehrliche Ware eingebracht.' For the definition of οὐσία by δύναμις is no better than that of ἔρως by ἐπιθυμία συνουσίας, criticised in Ar. Top. 146ª 7 ff.—οὐχ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεται.

Further the words in 247 E, ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰσύστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη, indicate clearly that the def. is only meant "als einen blossen interimistischen Notbehelf," the words referring to the limitation ποιεῖν = γιγνώσκειν, πάσχειν = γιγνώσκεσθαι which shortly follows.

This last point of Apelt's is, naturally, not new: Campbell, for instance, holds, as against Grote, that these words indicate that the definition of οὐσία as δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν "is only a step, though an important step, in the dialectical progress of the argument" (p. 124).

But I do not think this sufficiently expresses Plato's true meaning.

His object throughout is to show the comprehensiveness of the notion οὐσία, and thereby to reconcile the partial and one-sided views of the antagonists in the γιγαντομαχία. The Eleate poses as 'not God and not the beast,' as neither Titan nor Celestial, but as the Mediator between the two. And so on the one hand he compels the corporealists to admit ἀσώματα as ὄντα, and on the other hand he induces the Idealists to attribute πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν to νοητὰ and νοοῦντα. And thus he succeeds in subordinating both the opposed notions of Being under a higher notion—that of δύναμις. Both κίνησις and γνῶσις are forms of πάσχειν, and so a δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν may involve either of these forms of affection. As the Sophist is dialectical, primarily concerned only with the sphere of thought, with the determinations of the categories of logic, the application of this definition is confined to the interrelations of the logical genera and species. Κινεῖσθαι, ἀπο-, παρα-γίγνεσθαι, κοινωνεῖν, μετέχειν, μίγνυσθαι, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν—all these terms are applied to the relation of subject to predicate or of predicate to subject, of subordinate to super-ordinate notion. Now,

although these categories (*γένη* or *εἴδη*), which *ἐθέλει συμμίγνυσθαι*, are thus represented as personal activities which have living force (*δύναμις*, *κίνησις*), it does not follow that Plato actually regarded them as spatially moved, nor does it follow that he regarded them alone as *ὄντα* or as *δυνάμεις* to the exclusion of physical objects.

Instead of saying 'the Ideal alone is the Real,' may not Plato have said rather 'all the Real is Ideal'? In other words, have the Ideas no other aspect than the logical: are they not also essences, the core of reality which underlies the world of sense? If so, the *γνῶσις* which they produce in the intelligent mind, as produced through the means of sensation, will be a literal *κίνησις*, not merely 'a shadow of the genuine *πάσχειν*.' The thing-in-itself will be literally *κινοῦν*, the percipient subject *κινούμενον*. And so, as an explanation of the outside phenomenal world, as a reduction to the lowest terms of its independence and self-substantiality, there seems no ground to deny that Plato was quite in earnest with the definition he puts in the mouth of the less *σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες* of the Materialists, those more easy of conversion (*τοὺς βελτίονας γεγονότας*, 246 E).

Plato's Ideal World is *both* the Real and the Intelligible, consequently *both* sides of the definition (*κίνησις* and *γνῶσις*) must be included—the *ὂν* being at once *ὂν-νοητόν*, *κινοῦν-κινούμενον*, *νοοῦν-νοούμενον*. And so, though the definition here extracted from the physical enquirers is not further followed up in its physical aspect in the present dialogue, we shall find that it is so in the Philebus and Timaeus. For we must insist that these four dialogues—Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus—hang closely together, and are complementary the one to the other; while all four are to be regarded as providing the solution, as completely as Plato cared to provide it, of the *aporiae* raised in the 1st Part of the Parmenides.

Thus the proviso contained in the words *ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰσύστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη* is by no means to be construed as implying that the definition is false, but merely that it is to be understood *comprehensively*, i.e. not merely on the objective side but on the subjective side equally. And so,

as its *complement*, not as overriding the former definition and destroying its validity, there is introduced the further aspect of *κίνησις* as intellectual process, which further aspect it is that occupies the main share of attention throughout the Sophist. But in the *later* dialogues the objective side, the Idea as *οὐσία*, is again resumed: the logical discussions of the Eleate have for their complement the physical exposition of Timaeus and the ethical exposition of Socrates. And in this way the difficulties raised as to the sphere of the Ideas and their interrelations in the 1st Part of the Parmenides are resolved: for in 130 B—D three separate classes of *εἴδη* are distinguished—relations of quality and quantity (*ὁμοιότης, ἕν, πολλά*), ethical qualities (*δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν*), physical substances (*ἄνθρωπος, πῦρ, ὕδωρ—θρίξ, πηλός, ῥύπος*); so that the interrelations of these various kinds of *εἴδη* and *γένη* naturally need a *series* of dialogues for their discussion. And so, not till the close of the series will the desire of Socrates be fully satisfied—*εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν.* And be it noted, that the answer given throughout implies the confusion of thought involved in the question—for the answer shows that the Ideas are always conditioned, as well as unconditioned, and that the One and the Many are not *ἐναντία* but *ἕτερα*, not absolute but relative.

Consequently, Apelt's attempt to prove an *alibi* for the Ideas when charged with dynamism must be regarded as a mistake, due to his confining his attention solely to the present dialogue and disregarding the doctrine of its *ξυγγενῶν*.

The next point he raises concerns the origin of the definition in question. It is quoted, he notes, in Ar. Top. 146ª 23: *τὸ ὂν τὸ δυνατὸν παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι*: without mention of Plato's name; and if it is truly Platonic we should expect it to be adduced as an example in Top. 148ª 15 ff., when the relation of the Definition to the Idea is discussed: *ἁπλῶς δ' οἷς πρόσκειται τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ τὸ παθητικόν, ἀνάγκη διαφωνεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδέας τὸν ὅρον· ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀκίνητοι δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἰδέαι τοῖς λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι.* "Wenn er nur hier jene nach Top. 146ª 23 ihm wohlbekannte Definition nicht zur Erläuterung

anführt, so zwingt dies geradezu zu der Annahme, dass er sie nicht für platonisch hielt."

Further, the definition was adopted by the Stoic school, but rejected by the Academics, as by Diadumenos ap. Plutarch Comm. Nat. 30, p. 1073, which goes to show its materialistic character. It appears also in Epicurus (ad Herod. p. 22, 3 Usener): *τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματάζουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη.*

But we must not conclude from the adoption of it by the Stoics that this definition originated with their precursors, the Cynics, as Dümmler supposes (*Antisth.* 52 ff.): for such a supposition would be inconsistent with Antisthenes' fundamental denial of predication, as well as with the mode in which Plato here introduces the definition. In fact, it was probably in existence before the rise of Cynicism; and the citation from Epicurus suggests that it originated with Democritus. We have however the authority of Phaedr. 270 c (with which cp. Galen, Comm. in Hippocr. de nat. hominis xv. p. 102, Kühn) for referring it to Hippocrates—a thinker of the same kind as the *γηγενεῖς*.

All this is extremely interesting, and the attribution of the theory in question may well be due to the Atomists. And this implies, it is true, in one sense that it is 'unplatonisch,' but not in another; for Plato did not go quite so far as to hold that every theory not originated by himself must needs be therefore a damnable heresy.

As to the citation from Aristotle, I cannot attach much value to it, on the grounds mentioned already; yet so far as it shows anything, Apelt's inference from it seems the correct one. The definition is both Platonic and unplatonic, the Ideas are both moved and unmoved, the *ὂν* is *μὴ ὂν* and the *μὴ ὂν* is *ὄν*.

In enumerating the chief heads of Apelt's argument, I divided it summarily into six propositions. My opinion as to the value of the first four of these has now been briefly indicated, so it remains only to add a word on the last two.

As to his statement that the *κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν* implies no further degree or kind of action or passion than *δύναμις τοῦ γιγνώσκειν καὶ γιγνώσκεσθαι*, this I am quite willing to admit. The 'intercommunion of kinds' is but an expression for the laws of thought: i.e., as Apelt puts it, for "die ewige giltige Ordnung, in welcher die Ideen zu einander stehen"—only here I would use in place of the comprehensive term 'Ideas' the more precise expression 'logical Ideas': for *εἴδη, γένη, ὄντα, ὄντως ὄντα* are not quite synonyms.

I agree also in the main with his last proposition, that the "communion of kinds" is no novelty to Plato's thought, and, as believing this, I must hold also that the doctrine of *μὴ ὂν* as *ὂν* and its "Giltigkeit für die Ideenwelt" is equally fundamental for Platonism from first to last. For the *κοινωνία* theory in early dialogues Apelt points to Phaedr. 265 D ff., Theaet. 186 A, Rep. 476 A (cf. 531 D); while Phaedo 102 D, Parm. 129 C by no means prove Plato's ignorance on the matter, as the difficulties there suggested concern not *ἕτερα* but *ἐναντία* (e.g. *μέγα καὶ σμικρόν*). Apelt, however, seeks to infer from Rep. 476 ff. that Plato had not then developed the notion of *μὴ ὂν* as we find it in the Sophist: "wäre dies der Fall," he argues, "so würde er nicht schlechthin und ohne jede Einschränkung dem *μὴ ὂν* die *ἀγνωσία* zugewiesen haben 477 A B, 478 C. Denn das *μὴ ὂν* des Sophistes ist nichts weniger als *ἄγνωστον*." I do not believe this to be the truth, though there is difficulty in proving a direct negative; at least we may fairly say that a distinction between the absolute and relative at that stage of the argument would have served but to confuse the hearer and was rightly avoided by the speaker, and we may claim that silence does not prove ignorance.

At the same time, I am willing to admit development of expression, both in breadth and clearness, and I quite agree with Apelt and the others who rank the Sophist and its fellows amongst the latest of Plato's compositions. As to the point last raised, the novelty of the Sophist doctrine of *μὴ ὄν*, Jackson and Tocco are, naturally, both to be found in agreement with Apelt, and accordingly both make much of Rep. 477 A ff.: but does not the very addition of such adverbs as *παντελῶς* and *εἰλικρι-*

νῶς to ὄν, and of μηδαμῇ and πάντως to μὴ ὄν, in that passage indicate the consciousness of a distinction between the absolute and relative notions?

But while agreeing as to their view of the Republic on this point, these two scholars presently diverge. For whereas Tocco holds that the doctrine of the relative μὴ ὂν is not to be found in the Timaeus any more than in the Republic, Jackson on the contrary maintains that in the Timaeus is to be found the fullest, latest, and most matured exposition of Platonism.

Thus, à propos of Rep. l. c., Tocco writes: "L' opposizione non è men cruda nel Timeo, dove l' ὂν è l' intelligibile, il μὴ ὂν il sensibile (27 D): διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε": which he contrasts with Soph. 258 D E: ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ μὴ ὄν. Holding, however, with Jackson, and indeed the majority of Platonists, that the Timaeus is one of the very latest dialogues, I cannot admit Tocco's inference that Plato was ignorant of the Sophist doctrine of μὴ ὂν when he wrote these words; but I readily cite them as weakening the force of the argument drawn from Rep. 477 A ff.

I proceed next to consider some points in Jackson's view of the dialogue and the criticisms passed upon it by Tocco.

The view so admirably set forth in the first dozen pages of Jackson's paper (*Journ. of Phil.* XIV. pp. 174 ff.), shewing that the seven definitions given of the Sophist represent the various forms assumed by that type of person in the course of his historical evolution, wins ready consent from the Italian scholar. He agrees also with the suggestion that the sophistic character (the Sixth Definition) sketched in 226 A ff. is meant for the historical Socrates: and, as we have already seen, he approves the identification of the εἰδῶν φίλοι with Plato himself in the earlier phases of his Idealism.

The positive arguments in favour of this last point are based on a comparison of Soph. 246 B, 248 A, 248 C with Phaedo 78 D ff., 65 D, 79 C, etc., which is said to prove that in three main respects the theory of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is identical with that taught in the Phaedo, viz. (1) antithesis of οὐσία and γένεσις, (2) διάθραυσις σωμάτων, (3) ἀκοινωνησία τῶν εἰδῶν. We have

already seen, however, that the κοινωνία theory appears in the Republic, which Jackson rightly classes alongside of the Phaedo; and the antithesis between οὐσία and γένεσις is found emphasised in the Timaeus (38 A, 52 A ff.), which again Jackson rightly holds to be posterior to the Sophist; while the physical speculation, implied in the words τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα...κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες 246 B, finds perhaps its analogy, as Tocco suggests, rather in the resolution of matter into elements and triangles in Tim. 53 C than in the division of γιγνόμενα into εἴδη which Jackson attributes to the Phaedo. Consequently it were rash to argue from these premisses that an earlier Ideal theory *as opposed to* a later is alluded to in this passage of the Sophist. At first sight, then, it would seem as if Plato (if the author of the Sophist) must either be slashing at his own theory from first to last, or else not alluding to it at all: but the true view, as appears to me, is that he is doing neither, but rather correcting misinterpretations of his own teaching; and only on this view, I imagine, is it possible to explain the inconsistencies above noted.

For, granted that the Timaeus is of later date than the Sophist, and granted that it repeats the phraseology of the Phaedo and Republic, we can only assume that the criticism of the Sophist is directed against a misunderstanding of that phraseology (as by Aristotle), *not* at the doctrine it was really meant to convey.

On this point, however, I am speaking solely for myself, since Tocco expresses himself as in entire agreement with Jackson on the matter.

Where the two first part company is over the interpretation of the κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν theory (250 E ff.). Jackson explains the γένη which admit of inter-communion to be οὐ καθ' αὑτὰ as opposed to the αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη which do not communicate with one another; and to the latter alone, as 'types of natural kinds,' he would apply the name *Idea*. On this view the Ideas are the specific types (Man, Horse, Dog, etc.) which are not merely separate from the particulars but separate also from one another, since none of them is predicable of any other (we cannot, e.g., call Dog Cat). The relation of

the particular visible and audible cats and dogs to Self-Cat and Self-Dog is not *μέθεξις* but *μίμησις*, in other words the Ideal Cat is not immanent in (*παρουσία*) the particular cat but is rather the model or archetype (*παράδειγμα*) of the particular. On the other hand the *οὐ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* or *γένη* are *τὰ κοινωνοῦντα*, such as those *μέγιστα γένη—ὄν, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, στάσις, κίνησις*—specially treated of in the Sophist. They express *relations*, and are categories rather than Ideas proper, logical genera and species; and to their interrelations the term *μέθεξις* is, in the 'later' theory, properly restricted. "The subject is said to 'participate' (*μετέχειν*) in the attribute, the attribute is said to 'communicate' (*κοινωνεῖν*) with the subject. Hence the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα* (that is, the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*), though they do not 'communicate' (*οὐ κοινωνεῖ*), either with one another or with the *κοινωνοῦντα*, nevertheless 'participate' (*μετέχει*) in the *κοινωνοῦντα*: while the *κοινωνοῦντα* (that is, the *εἴδη* which are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*), 'communicate' with the *μὴ κοινωνοῦντα*, and both 'communicate' with, and 'participate' in, one another."

In criticising this distinction between *εἴδη* which are *καθ' αὑτὰ* and *εἴδη* which are *οὐ καθ' αὑτά*, Tocco objects that it is nowhere expressly stated by Plato. Parmen. 129 C, D, to which Jackson appeals in support of his view, according to Tocco, "dice proprio l' opposto di quel che vuole lui...Or bene in questo programma della nuova teoria le idee di simiglianza e dissimiglianza, di uno e di molti, sono dette *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*. Che cosa se ne deve inferire? Che l' espressione sia sbagliata, e che invece doveva dirsi *οὐκ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*? Cosi conclude il Jackson, ma chi legge senza preconcetti il passo, dovrebbe inferirne tutto il contrario, che cioè anche nella nuova teoria come nell' antica le idee tutte si possono per un verso dire *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, e per un altro *δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι*."

Thus while Jackson holds that Socrates' desideratum is fulfilled by a *distinction* between two separate kinds of *εἴδη* (logical and natural kinds), Tocco holds, on the contrary, that its fulfilment lies in the attribution of plurality to all sorts of Ideas without distinction. For the latter maintains that Plato

never distinguished between the three kinds or aspects of the Ideas, viz. (1) "i criteri supremi di valutazione"; (2) "le categorie"; (3) "gli archetipi della realtà." I am far from agreeing with Tocco in attributing to Plato such confusion of thought as this; but at the same time I am at one with him when he interprets the passage in the Parmen. as of comprehensive application to the whole field of the Ideas, in all their aspects. Under whatever form we consider the Idea it is at once One and Many—logically in the Sophist, physically in the Timaeus, ethically in the Philebus.

For if Jackson's restriction of the *κοινωνία* and One-Many theory is to hold, how, for instance, are we to explain the fact that in Phileb. 15 A both natural types (*ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς*) and moral Ideas, or criteria (*καλόν, ἀγαθόν*), are regarded as on the same level, as alike *ἑνάδες* whose possible *διαίρεσις* is matter of dispute? A further objection raised by Tocco is that the example adduced by Jackson of a non-attributable kind, viz. Dog, is arbitrarily selected: if, e.g. we were to take Bird or Fish, the result would be different, for Bird may be predicated of Duck or Dove, and Fish of Sole or Shark; and even Dog perhaps = tame Wolf, or Wolf = wild Dog. I do not imagine that this will be regarded by Jackson as a serious blow to his theory, since the Idea proper is, by hypothesis, the type of the '*infima* species'; and he would merely have to reply that if Bird turns out not to be such a species, then it has no Idea proper; possibly Dog is not such either, but that is a matter which concerns not the philosopher but the zoologist.

But when Tocco goes on to argue that relations themselves *are* types, his view becomes of more importance. He cites Tim. 32 A, where is taught the intercalation of two means in the case of solid numbers, as in the proportion $a^3 : a^2b = ab^2 : b^3$, and where this *proportion* is taken as the *model* for the relations between the elements, Fire : Air = Water : Earth. And he also remarks that the relation of equality (e.g. $4 = 2 \times 2$) is used as a type, towards which particular equalisations among things strive to approach. Here he is right: the type is a formal or mathematical *relation*. The Idea is never an absolute Unity, viewed in whatever aspect; if not external it must

admit at least of internal relations, being always approachable analytically as well as synthetically.

Here we may conclude our discussion of these rival theories so far as they apply to the present dialogue. They do not convince us that anything essentially new to Platonic doctrine is to be found in it, nor do they show grounds for deserting the view deduced from a consideration of the Parmenides. We have found all three theorists—Jackson, Apelt and Tocco—useful rather as pointing out each other's deficiencies, and so leading to a more true and comprehensive view of Platonism, than as severally propounding acceptable explanations.

All three alike, however, have done good service to the cause, if only by stirring up the waters and preventing stagnation in Platonic study—the stagnation of a Zellerian orthodoxy. *ἐν κινήσει βίος*: 'the worst enemy of the better is the good.' Apelt wakes us up with the contention that Plato's 'Dialektik' is at war with his 'Weltansicht,' and with the warning that "man thut nicht wohl daran, in der sokratischen Forderung des begrifflichen Wissens schlechtweg den Anfangspunkt der Ideenlehre zu suchen." Jackson and Tocco arouse us yet more forcibly by proclaiming the creed of a double Plato, a self-criticising 'Dipsychus,' whose old age is at war with his youth.

The lethargic conservative may be content to dub all three as *οἱ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦντες*, but others will tender thanks to them all for the learning, acuteness and originality with which they impugn received opinions.

Of myself, as conscious of a weakkneed eclecticism which would fain agree in part with all sides, I fear it will be said: *δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία.* But was not this the fate dreaded by the Platonic Socrates himself?

R. G. BURY.

A SUPPLEMENT TO THE APPARATUS CRITICUS OF CLAUDIAN.

BIRT's edition of Claudian contains a collation of a manuscript in the Gale collection of Trinity College O 3, 22 by Mr F. J. H. Jenkinson, the University Librarian, for the *Carmina Minora*. For an unexplained reason it is deficient in XXV *epithalamium Palladii* and XXX *Laus Serenae*. This deficiency I here supply. The collation is made by Birt's text. Abbreviations are noted, by means of italics, in a few cases where the reading of the manuscript is made clearer thereby.

I may add that I am inclined to set a somewhat higher value than Birt upon this manuscript J.

Incipit Epitalamus dictus prefacio *litteris minusculis rubris* (fo. 88ª)

[Praefatio] 1 CARMINA *littera initiali picta* perthalamū (*et similia saepe*) 3 nriq ;

[Epithalamium] 1 FORTE *littera initiali picta* sōpnū 2 intexti 3 sideros 5 uitē—uuis 7 Estus (*et similia semper*) tranlucet 9 requiesci 10 Pinnatī 11 artus propinquant 15 ueneris secuntur 16 pinnis ulmas 17 driaclasq; *ut uidetur* 19 Siluestrisq; 23 Audite prura lire 26 iocunda 27 sōpnū 28 intecta comas turbata capillos 29 interque suorum *om.* 36 Manadiosq; libris 38 Dissimili tenuē 40 lapsu 41 agni 44 relinquas 48 citare 49 ruppibus 51 Leticie. que thoro 55 libantur 60 urbi 62 Quis 63 Successit regio quae 65 *om.* 66 cunctas 68 uire (?) senectū 70 Danubius Tomi] thonu 74 domitos partica culmina carros 75 īponere 77 incestū 78 tum] non

81 delecta 83 pallatī 84 milicie quo illustror 85 Alter stabulas assignat 86 numeros cuneosque recenset 87 uiris constrinxit in unū *uersuum finibus inter se transpositis* 88 Depositāq; 90 scotū quantū 91 Occeanū peccatur renus 93 stilico nichil 94 Iuditio ue 95 due 98 mihi 99 coris imeneus 103 currū 105 fremtē 106 athesim quos audis 107 uenacus anne 108 querelis 109 Euridani 112 se] s *esse* 113 conflingunt 114 *post* 115 115 Consequar lapsu 116 tumuere 120 Syrius 124 uirū cupido 127 ciuibus 130 Viuite et cordes 131 sonent 132 paterna 135 cithicas 137 tingis 139 aligeros 140 Praestanti de 141 pyroes 144 nothos 145 medulis

Incipit laus Serenae *litteris minusculis rubris* (fo. 94[a])

[Laus Serenae] 1 Dic *littera initiali picta* cur tantum ī 2 redimere coronā *marg.* serenā 3 solitum 4 Et 8 aganipea per mesidos 10 eliconia 14 abneget 17 Cloclya thibrinas 18 cybelem 19 mollitur 20 caribdis 21 scilla 22 Antifate 23 sinenū 24 cliclops et tēpta calipso 25 Penolope decus atq; uni 26 puditicie 27 totidem seui 31 Penope el *supra scr. al. man.* *tra*hat *ra et* at *ex corr.* 32 laercia 39 *om.* 41 occeano getuli 45 calidoniis 46 excubiis 48 Adderat 52 Idia ex acta 53 tuos—fluctus 54 equus preciosa 56 elia 58 quos 60 farie 62 illiricis 63 laciis hiberia 64 erraria 67 contēpta fuit nec 69 Facillam pulcramq; 71 Diui//ciis celletya 72 durya 73 passum 74 occeanus littore 75 auster 76 Montibus n *in ras.* t *supra scr.* 77 pyrreneisq; 78 fulmineis nīphe 79 relegentes 80 annes 81 dominam] *genera* 82 talamis axse 83 stilico 87 redolentibus aulem 88 Terraq; innectent Gratia] *genera* 89 Affluxit perhennū 90 candencia 91 mūdo 93 thorū 94 Oīa genitrix 95 archani 97 quociens 98 Theodosius 99 atq; 100 querelis 101 Quis 102 luxerat 103 infācia 104 sullimis ad optat 105 solatia 106 *proprius* 107 sobolem 108 deuixit 111 sumas elatus 112 Suspiceret

īpendit 113 quam te] quante 114 Littus 115 rippa zefirisq; 116 inurbis 118 therematia 119 thalamis cithereia 120 himeneus 121 pulcras 124 spumancia 126 galathea 127 trichon 128 proth'eus 130 septriferi 131 rogale 133 inter 137 flacilla 139 fideli 140 reuerencia 142 uestis 145 ulixem 148 dampnas 149 annos 150 Laodonia redeuntem 151 Philacidē 154 tiranni 155 inbella (b *repetitum*) 159 S; 161 thori 163 dira 167 tela 168 mircholus 170 sceneida 172 Menibus exaltis calidon 173 hanelo 174 Aalcides 175 funera nīphe 176 Sautia funera cornu 177 anne sub acto 178 s; 179 stilico 182 honor 183 Nexit 184 Solus miritie 185 stilico 187 S; facta 188 suis 191 phrigie 192 capadocū 193 nex inde germina 196 s; 200 etatisq; q; *postea add. a m. 1 in spatio angustiore* 205 pauore 207 Aut Stilico//tracia 209 doctor 210 uinctus 214 littus 215 Optars d (*eras*) reducere 216 *om.* 218 undas 223 uitisq; uagas 229 Nequit 230 femur 233 nephas 234 Inducis *sed corr.* 235 letentes *corr. al. man.* 236 mouebas; *ita*

J. P. POSTGATE.

DUALS IN HOMER.

It is or should be well known that the dual of the historic tenses is not as a rule augmented by Homer. But I am not aware that the exact facts with regard to this have ever been set forth or any conclusions drawn from them.

There are in the Odyssey 44 duals of historic tenses, or, knocking off the spurious conclusion, 40. Of these 40, 36 are certainly not augmented, 3 are doubtful, *ῥιέσθην* (*γ* 344), *ἥσθην* (*η* 232), *ἡγείσθην* (*ξ* 470), but may be fairly claimed as unaugmented considering the poet's invariable usage, and for *ὠρχείσθην* (*θ* 378) La Roche long ago pointed out[1] that we should write *ὀρχείσθην* with one MS. The poet of the *Odyssey* then *never* augments a dual. But no sooner are we across the boundary line drawn by the Alexandrine critics between the true and the false *Odyssey* than we stumble over an augmented dual on the very threshold of the later poet's addition: *τὼ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν φιλότητος ἑταρπήτην ἐρατεινῆς* (*ψ* 300). Even he has three unaugmented (*ψ* 301, *ω* 101, 361) to this one lapse from correctness.

When one looks forth from this firm ground on to the "dark untrodden infinite abyss" of the *Iliad* and marks it "up from the bottom turned by furious" commentators and surging theories, one may well pause before entering upon it, and consider the best way of approaching the question. Are we to consider every augmented dual as evidence in favour of a post-Odyssean date? Surely this would be unjustifiable; the Odyssean poet may have very well observed greater strictness in this respect than some of his predecessors. He certainly did so with respect to the molossus before the bucolic diaeresis.

[1] Ad P 530.

The marvellous purity and limpidity of his style, and the unmatchable neatness of his conduct of the plot, accord well with the idea that he may have been somewhat strict in his use of forms. On the other hand he shews greater freedom in, for instance, use of the bucolic hiatus. One thing at any rate is certain; the augmented dual is far commoner in the *Iliad*, though still very rare, if we compare it with the unaugmented. But though it is found most often or altogether in regions of the poem already suspected of being later additions to the primitive *Achilleid*, I should like to insist at the outset that I do not consider an augmented dual as a witness of any cogency against the passage in which it occurs being of the most ancient date. Taken along with other grammatical considerations it may be allowed some weight, and it certainly reaches a higher proportion in the late K than in any other book.

There are in the *Iliad* 151 duals of historic tenses, including *μιάνθην* of Δ 146[1]. Of these 15 prove nothing: *ἡγησάσθην* (B 620, 678, 864, 870), *ἡγείσθην* (B 731), *ἥσθην* (Δ 21, Θ 445, 458), *ἐξέσθην* (H 59, Θ 74), *ἐφιζάνετον* (K 578), *ἰθυνθήτην* (Π 475), *ἰσχανέτην* (P 747), *ϝιέσθην* (Σ 501, Ψ 718). There are 118 not augmented, including K 354, P 530, Ψ 418, of which three more anon, and *μιάνθην*. There are 18 augmented, of which several are to be easily corrected, and with these I will begin.

E 10. *δύω δέ ϝοι νιέες ἦστην*. Qu. *ἔστην*? which would be the same in the old alphabet as *ἦστην*. But is *ἦστην* an augmented form?

H 301. *ἠμὲν ἐμαρνάσθην*. Read *μαρνάσθην*.

O 544. *τὼ μὲν ἐεισάσθην*. Read *τὼ μὲν ϝεισάσθην*, which was bound to be corrupted into our text.

P 382. *ἠμὲν ἐμαρνάσθην*. "*μαρνάσθην*? conf. Θ 127. Ξ 406. γ 140. Ω 281. sed etiam H 303 *ἠμὲν ἐμαρνάσθην* librorum consensus tuetur". La Roche.

Φ 298. *ἀπεβήτην*. Read *ἀποβήτην*. It is in compounds above all other verbs that the augment has intruded.

If these emendations be accepted there remain thirteen, distributed as follows.

[1] Monro § 40.

Γ 239. *ἦ οὐχ ἑσπέσθην.* This does not admit of correction, for *οὐχὶ* is not found in Homer at all and *οὐκὶ* only in certain formulas (Monro § 355). So we must be content with *οὐκ ἑσπέσθην.*

Ε 555. *ἐτραφέτην.* This is in a simile; it happens to be the only dual of a historic tense found in a simile anywhere in Homer, and so far as one instance will carry us it shews that the desire to augment a gnomic aorist was stronger than the feeling that a dual should not be augmented.

Ζ 19. *γαῖαν ἐδύτην.*

Ζ 40. *αὐτὼ μὲν ἐβήτην.*

Κ 228. *ἠθελέτην.*

Κ 254. *δρεινοῖσιν ἐδύτην.*

Κ 272. *δρεινοῖσιν ἐδύτην.*

Λ 782. *ἠθέλετον.*

Μ 461. *ἐσχεθέτην.*

Ν 346. *ἀνδράσιν ἠρώεσσιν ἐτεύχετον.* So editors, but on what authority? Schol. Κ 364 and "*ἐν ἄλλῳ ἠρώεσσιν ἐτεύχετον*" Α. A itself has *ἠρώεσσι τετεύχετον*, so has L; others again *τετεύχατον* or *τετεύχατο.* "*τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων διὰ τοῦ ᾱ τετεύχατον*" quotes La Roche from Cramer. Though the commentators preserve a strange silence about the augment, they find other difficulties; Leaf seems to regard the imperfect as out of place; Leeuwen and Costa declare *all* the variants corrupt. The termination in *-τον* is dubious or at least very rare. Considering all this we cannot quote this passage for an augmented dual, but must regard the augment as additional evidence that there is something wrong.

Ξ 283. *Ἴδην δ' ἱκέσθην. ἵκανον* one MS and Strabo, which may be right.

Ξ 295. *πρῶτόν περ ἐμισγέσθην. μίσγω* is a word which gives itself strange airs about augments; compare the horrible *ἐμισγέσκοντο* of *υ* 7.

Ρ 433. *ἠθελέτην.*

Thus even of the thirteen three (Κ 228, Λ 782, Ρ 433) may be palliated on metrical grounds, for *θελέτην* is a dubious form for Homer and *ἐθελέτην* would not go into a verse, in one the reading is almost certainly wrong and in another slightly

suspicious, and one is gnomic. Thus we have seven crucial instances, but perhaps it will be better to reckon in *ἠθελέτην* and *ἱκέσθην*, which make up eleven.

If we place these in the scheme of disintegration given by Dr Leaf (vol. ii, p. 11), we find one (*ἠθελέτην* Λ 782) in his first stratum, none in the second, one (*ἐσπέσθην* Γ 239) in the third, Z 19 and 40 and P 433 in the fourth, M 461, Ξ 283, 295 in the fifth, none in the sixth, the three from K in the seventh. Thus there is a distinctly perceptible growth in the augment as we advance; in the two oldest strata are none at all except the excusable *ἠθελέτην* of Λ 782 and the gnomic *ἐτραφέτην* of E 555.

I have arranged my figures in accordance with my best judgment, but any other decision with regard to these duals would lead to much the same result. If my emendations are not accepted, the argument in favour of Dr Leaf's scheme will be a little weakened; if more palliatives are allowed, it will be a little strengthened. So far as it goes, though that is little way enough, this enquiry tends to confirm his hypothesis. And that small grammatical points such as this are by far the most satisfactory evidence to be adduced on the Homeric question is a view to which I incline ever more decidedly. The form *its* is the only clear evidence against the genuineness of the epitaph ascribed by some to Milton, but that evidence is conclusive; so it will have to be in the end with Homer. The parts of the *Iliad* which are on grammatical evidence adjudged by Mr Monro to be later additions are KΨΩ; of these K may be presumed to be latest, and it is K which gives us more augmented duals than any other book in Homer. Ψ and Ω however have none, but the only part of them that can be regarded as clearly post-Odyssean is the funeral games, in which the use of the article has made such progress.

I will next dispose of the three reserved cases, K 354, P 530, Ψ 418. In the first of these Aristarchus read *ἐπεδραμέτην*: so also C and Eustathius twice; the best MSS *ἐπιδραμέτην*. In the second *ὁρμηθήτην* is only found in A and one other MS, the rest have *ὥρμηθήτην* (*ὥρμήθησαν* H). In the third *ἐπεδραμέτην* Aristarchus and D, *ἐπιδραμέτην* other MSS

and the British Museum papyrus 128. These three instances are all words peculiarly subject to corruption, for no class of words is more regularly augmented by the MSS than those beginning with *o* and compounds. Thus *ὀρχείσθην* is the only dual in which the Odyssean MSS have yielded to temptation, and it is the rarest thing in the world to find a compound escape, except with these very duals. But Aristarchus must have had strong evidence to go upon when he read *ἐπεδραμέτην* in two places, particularly as we know that he was of opinion that the unaugmented forms were more Homeric in every number. It seems also that Aristarchus did not know of this peculiarity of duals, for to judge from our MSS he must have had evidence enough to warrant his writing *ἐπιδραμέτην*, even if the majority of his MSS gave the other form. Therefore we may be sure that *no one* knew this in the Alexandrine period, and we may take it for granted no one did afterwards until modern criticism began. Therefore our MSS have been handed down in this respect correctly by the mere accuracy of copyists, and the errors of this kind which have crept into the text are pre-Alexandrine. Yet such errors are almost microscopic: how astonishing then is the fidelity with which the text has been preserved from so early a period all through the Roman and Byzantine age!

The same will hold good for mistakes of other dimensions. The monstrous corruptions with which the text is disfigured, *συνοχωκότε*, *ἀργύρεοι δὲ σταθμοί*, and all their kith and kin, date probably from the time at which the poems were first collected and written down, whenever, howsoever and by whomsoever it was all done. That the editions "of the cities" and all the vast diplomatic material at the command of the Alexandrine critics could not help them to cure all that multitude of wounded, is decisive evidence on this point. The only instances that can be urged on the other side are mere trifles compared with the shoal of such blunders as I have referred to, which are to be swept in by the loosest net of the most careless critic.

On the other side I am bound to admit that after a good deal of ransacking of Apollonius I have failed to find an augmented dual in him. But then I only succeeded in finding

three duals at all, for he hardly ever uses them, and their being unaugmented may be ascribed to their being modelled on Homeric phrases; I do not think that Apollonius can have consciously abstained from augmenting them. Theocritus certainly did not, for he writes ἐστιχέτην (xxv 154).

There are only three duals of historic tenses in the *Hymns*, one augmented (*Hermes* 504), two not (v 379, vi 12).

ARTHUR PLATT.

A 18. *ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες.*

That *θεοὶ* was not in the original, as suspected by Fick, seems almost proved by comparison of the *Hymn to Demeter*, 135:

ἀλλ' ὑμῖν μὲν πάντες Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
δοῖεν κουριδίους ἄνδρας.

The author of the Hymn knew his Iliad pretty well. He appears to have been acquainted also with B 558, a line omitted by the best MSS, and said to have been added by Solon. At least the 384th line of the Hymn, *στῆσε δ' ἄγων ὅθι μίμνεν ἐϋστέφανος Δημήτηρ*, can hardly fail to remind one of *στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες*. But both may be modelled on some antique pattern now lost.

A 271, 2. *κείνοισι δ' ἂν οὔ τις*
τῶν οἳ νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν ἐπιχθόνιοι μαχέοιτο.

As the Lapiths and Centaurs were all dead, the sense required is: "No man now living *would have fought* with them." Read then *μαχέσαιτο*, for the *aorist* optative is almost invariably used by Homer in this construction, when in Attic a past tense of the indicative would have been used with *ἄν*. Indeed I very gravely doubt whether the *present* optative was ever used by Homer in this sense, though our texts have one or two apparent instances. (*μαχέοιτο* is given up by every one.)

A 505. *τίμησόν μοι υἱόν.*

The lengthening of *μοι* appears incredible. Read *τίμησόν δή μ' υἱόν*, for *δὴ* is regularly used with the imperative in solemn prayers of this kind. Thus *ῥᾶξον δὴ ἔγχος* in Z 306,

where one may perhaps suspect the original to have been *ϝᾶξον δή μ' ἔγχος*, the difficulty of the elided *μοι* causing the *μοι* to disappear here as the *δὴ* disappeared in A 505. Again in Π 242 perhaps *θάρσυνον δέ ϝοι ἦτορ* represents an original *θάρσυνον δή ϝ' ἦτορ*.

Z 436. *ἀμφ' Αἴαντε δύω καὶ ἀγακλυτὸν Ἰδομενῆα,*
ἠδ' ἀμφ' Ἀτρεΐδας καὶ Τυδέος ἄλκιμον υἱόν.

It is very strange that Andromache should not mention Achilles among the chiefs who led the Achaeans to storm the wall where it was most *ἐπίδρομον*. It seems indisputable that the attacks she mentions were made *before* the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles; where then was the latter? Gone on an expedition? Hardly, for then they would have awaited his return before attacking the city. Apparently the poet is so used to representing to himself the state of things when Achilles was away that he has here repeated it without reflexion by a kind of anachronism. It is like the more celebrated crux about the twenty years absence of Helen from Greece in the last book.

The whole poetical significance of the scene between Hector and Andromache depends upon its being their *last* meeting. Yet in Θ 55 we hear: *Τρῶες δ' αὖθ' ἑτέρωθεν ἀνὰ πτόλιν ὡπλίζοντο*. Hector then had passed the night after the last meeting in Troy. So it is also stated in H 477. It would be absurd to say that Hector was too busy to see his wife; the management of an army in Homeric times and in a poem would be too simple an affair for that. Hence it may be argued that H and Θ (or parts of them) are later than Z, or at any rate that Z was not composed with an eye to its being in its present place. Θ at any rate seems necessarily to go with I, which is shewn by linguistic evidence to be one of the latest books.

M 63.

ἡ δὲ (τάφρος) μάλ' ἀργαλέη περάειν· σκόλοπες γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ
ὀξέες ἑστᾶσι· προτὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεῖχος Ἀχαιῶν.

Who would ever speak of the wall as being next the stakes in the trench? Surely we should read *προτὶ δ' αὐτήν*. Compare H 436, 440.

N 561. *Ἀσιάδην, ὅς οἱ οὗτα μέσον σάκος ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ.*

ὅ ϝοι editors generally. Qu. *ὅς ϝ' οὗτα?*

N 777. *μέλλω ἐπεὶ οὐδέ με πάμπαν ἀνάλκιδα γείνατο μήτηρ.*

So La Roche with best MSS. But the position of the enclitic is un-Homeric. This indeed may be remedied by reading *οὐδ' ἐμὲ* with inferior MSS, but the elision of *ἐπεὶ* still remains. Read *ἐπεί μ' οὐ πάμπαν.*

O 716. For *οὐχὶ μεθίει* Zenodotus is accused of having read *οὐκ ἐμεθίει.*

More probably he read *οὔ ἑ μεθίει.* I have previously suggested that the original was *οὔ ϝε.*

P 121.

σπεύσομεν, αἴ κε νέκυν περ Ἀχιλλῆι προφέρωμεν
γυμνόν· ἀτὰρ τά γε τεύχε' ἔχει κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ.

I think that the second line is interpolated from P 693, Σ 21. It is certainly not wanted here, for *νέκυν περ* is quite good sense by itself—"dead at any rate, if not alive." Hector had not yet seized the armour when Menelaus left the fight over the body, as appears from 91, though he does so apparently while Menelaus is away; see 125.

Φ 190. *τῷ κρείσσων μὲν Ζεὺς ποταμῶν ἁλιμυρηέντων,*
κρείσσων αὖτε Διὸς γενεὴ ποταμοῖο τέτυκται.

"*τῷ*, 'suspectum' Nauck. We cannot write *τῶ*, for this would imply a deduction from what precedes, contrary to the sense of the passage." Leaf. I venture to think that there *is* a deduction, and that we must write *τῶ*. "You," says Achilles, "are the son of a river, but I am descended from Zeus. Therefore (I am stronger than you, for) as Zeus is stronger than rivers, the children of Zeus are stronger than the children of rivers." The syllogism is somewhat cut down, and difficulty is caused to us by the paratactic method of expression where we should use a subordinate clause. If this explanation be deemed unsatisfactory, it only shares the fate of all others proposed.

X 271. *ἔγχε᾽ ἐμῷ δαμάει· νῦν δ᾽ ἀθρόα πάντ᾽ ἀποτίσεις.*

νῦν is read by some inferior MSS, omitting δ᾽. Is not this right? It strikes me as much more in the Homeric style.

X 295. *ἦτεέ μιν δόρυ μακρόν· ὁ δ᾽ οὔ τί ϝοι ἐγγύθεν ἦεν.*

Did not Homer say *ὁ δ᾽ οὐκέτι ᾽ϝ᾽ ἐγγύθεν ἦεν*?

Ψ 320. *ἀφραδέως ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἑλίσσεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.*

Bentley's *πολλὰ* is not satisfactory, for the plural is not wanted. If we are to be particular about the digamma in the *ἆθλα*, we may read *πουλύ*.

Ω 14. *ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἐπεὶ ζεύξειεν ὑφ᾽ ἅρμασιν ὠκέας ἵππους.*

It is commonly said that this is the only example of *ἐπεὶ* with an iterative optative in Homer, except the late *ω* 254. But does the poet really mean "*whenever* he yoked his horses he dragged Hector"? Surely such an expression is a little absurd. Compare now *β* 105: *νύκτας δ᾽ ἀλλύεσκεν ἐπεὶ δαΐδας παραθεῖτο*. Does this mean "*whenever* she had lights brought"? δ 222: *ὃς τὸ καταβρόξειεν, ἐπεὶ κρητῆρι μιγείη*. Here to say "whoever drank it *whenever* it was mixt" is little short of nonsense. Finally take a parallel instance with *ὅτε* instead of *ἐπεί*, *υ* 138:

ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ κοίτοιο καὶ ὕπνοο μιμνήσκοιτο,
ἡ μὲν δέμνι᾽ ἄνωγεν ὑποστορέσαι δμῳῇσιν.

This cannot mean "*whenever* he got sleepy," for it refers to a single occasion, the evening before; it is only "*when* he got sleepy."

Looking at all these passages together, may we not say that *ὅτε* or *ἐπεὶ* with optative is like *cum* with pluperfect subjunctive in Latin, and has no significance beyond "when he had yoked," "when she had lights brought," "when it had been mixt"? How or why such a use should have grown up in Homer I do not pretend to say. At any rate Ω 14 by no means stands alone, for it is perfectly certain that *ἐπεὶ* is the genuine reading in *β* 105 and wherever else the line is repeated, and δ 222.

ἀσπίδα πάντοσε ϝίσην.

Common sense and, I believe, archaeology protest against this meaning "round." Comparing the phrase used of horses, *σταφυλῇ ἐπὶ νῶτον ἐϝίσας*, we may conjecture that *πάντοσε ϝίσην* meant *flat*, literally "level in every direction." Such a meaning seems to me at least easy and natural, and a flat shield is spoken of by Schuchardt (English translation, p. 267) as found at Mycenae. "A large wooden object, which has been pieced together out of many fragments, is of great importance. It is almost certainly a part of a shield. Its flat face is curved to meet the rim, which is formed by a projecting narrow horizontal border of neat workmanship." Compare also *καὶ ἐπὶ στάθμην ἴθυνεν.*

κάρη κομάοντες Ἀχαιοί.

It is amusing to see how history repeats itself. Listen to this from Gordon's *History of the Greek Revolution* (vol. i. p. 303). "So much alike are the Christians and Moslems in speech and semblance, that in action they find it difficult to discriminate friends from enemies, and the Greeks adopted a practice of fighting bare-headed, in order that their own party might recognize them by their flowing locks." The quaintest touch in Gordon is the statement, apparently quite unconsciously humorous, that at one stage of the proceedings "Odysseus took refuge in Ithaca."

δ 165. *ἐν μεγάροισ', ᾧ μὴ ἄλλοι ἀοσσητῆρες ἔωσιν.*

Read *ᾧ μὴ πάρ' ἀοσσητῆρες.* Cf. ε 489: *ᾧ μὴ πάρα γείτονες ἄλλοι.*

δ 650. *ὁππότ' ἀνὴρ τοιοῦτος ἔχων μελεδήματα θυμῷ.*

Qu. *τοιαῦτα*?

δ 665. *ἐκ τόσσων δ' ἀϝέκητι νέος πάϊς οἴχεται αὖτως.*

If we take *ἐκ τόσσων* together there is no construction for *ἀϝέκητι*: if we take *ἐξοίχεται* together we get no sense, for the meaning is certainly simply "he has gone," not "gone out." Indeed what does "out of so many" mean? Perhaps we should read *εἷς τόσσων* or *τοσσῶνδ' ἀϝέκητι.* In uncials *εἷς* and *ἐκ*

are the same thing, and we get a good contrast between *εἷς* and *τόσσων*, and a satisfactory construction for *ἀρέκητι*. The δ' must of course go if we adopt this, for the poet would have said *εἷς δὲ τόσων*, not *εἷς τόσσων δ'*. But no connecting particle is required, and indeed La Roche and Ludwich read *ἐκ τοσσῶνδ'* without one.

ο 386. *ἦ σέ γε μουνωθέντα παρ' οἴεσιν ἢ παρὰ βουσίν.*

"*οἴεσιν* corruptum" Leeuwen and Costa. Read *μουνωθέντ' ἐπ' οἰέσιν ἢ ἐπὶ βουσίν*. Cf. e.g. υ 209, Λ 106. Is not *παρὰ* in this connexion as dubious as the contracted *οἴεσιν*?

Hymn Apollo Pyth. 26.

οἱ ἐπιτέρπονται θυμὸν μέγαν εἰσοράοντες.

Read *μέγα* from one MS. For bucolic hiatus cp. 12.

130. *εὖτ' ἄρα δὴ Κρονίδης ἐρικυδέα γείνατ' Ἀθήνην*
ἐν κορυφῇ.

κορυφῇ three MSS. Read *ἐκ κορυφῆς*.

162. *ὣς ἄρα φωνήσασ' ἵμασε χθόνα χειρὶ παχείῃ.*

ἵμασε is ridiculous; read *ἔλασε*, comparing 155.

175. *τόνδε.*

Read *τόν γε*. The same corruption is found several times in Homer.

184. *φοινὸν ἀποπνείουσα.*

ῥοῖζον Stadtmüller. I take *φοινὸν* to be a correction of *φόνον*, and *φόνον* to have been a gloss on some word meaning "gore," perhaps *θρόμβον*.

309. *ἱστία μὲν πρῶτον κάθετον λύσαντε βοείας.*

This dual amid a wilderness of plurals, and addressed to more than two persons, cannot be right. In 325 we have: *ἱστία μὲν πρῶτον κάθεσαν λῦσαν δὲ βοείας*. In 309 moreover one MS reads *λύσατε*. The same corruption *λύσατε* is found in several MSS at A 20, for either *λύσαιτε* or *λῦσαί τε*. The original then of our present line was *κάθετε λῦσαί τε βοείας*: the poet of the *Hymn* knew the version *λῦσαί τε* rather than *λύσαιτε* in the *Iliad*, and has echoed it here, as he is always

echoing Homer. Then λῦσαί τε was corrupted in the archetype of our MSS either to λύσατε afterwards patched up into λύσαντε, or to λύσαντε straight. The result of this was the further corruption of *κάθετε* to *κάθετον*.

If however we are to read λῦσαί τε here, why λῦσαν δὲ in 325? I think that originally it was λῦσάν τε in 325, for three MSS accentuate λύσαν δὲ, which is a sign that this comes from a reading λύσαντε in 325, as in 309. The right reading of 309 then is *κάθετε* λῦσαί τε *βοείας*, and of 325 *κάθεσαν* λῦσάν τε *βοείας*.

Hymn to Hermes 106.

καὶ τὰς μὲν συνέλασσεν ἐς αὔλιον ἀθρόας οὔσας.

ἀρδευθείσας Stadtmüller, one of those corrections which are calculated rather with a view to displaying the vocabulary of the critic than to hitting the truth. It does not suit the context and does not account for the MS reading, which is simply an adscript to *ἀθροισθείσας*.

258. *ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ γαίῃ*
ἐρρήσεις ὀλοοῖσι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ἡγεμονεύων.

ὀλοοῖσι Bothe, *ὀλίγοισι* (*σιν*) MSS. But *ὀλοοῖσι* will hardly do. Desperate measures are often required in the Hymns, and perhaps the original may have been *σκοτίοισι*.

282. *ἦ σε μάλ᾽ οἴω*
πολλάκις ἀντιτοροῦντα δόμους ἐὺ ναιετάοντας
ἔννυχον οὐχ ἕνα μοῦνον ἐπ᾽ οὔδεϊ φῶτα καθίσσαι.

As the accusative and infinitive clause refers to future time, read *καθίσσειν*. Possibly also *σέ γ᾽ οἴω*.

429. *Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῇ,*
μητέρα Μουσάων· ἡ γὰρ λάχε Μαιάδος υἱόν.

Read *ἡ γὰρ ϝάδε Μαιάδος υἱι.*

546. *ὃς δέ κε μαψιλόγοισι πιθήσας οἰωνοῖσι*
μαντείην ἐθέλῃσι παρὲκ νόον ἐξερεείνειν
ἡμετέρην, νοέειν δὲ θεῶν πλέον αἰὲν ἐόντων.

Read *ἡμέτερον*.

Hymn IV 38. *Ζηνὸς...ὅς τε μέγιστός τ' ἐστί.*

Perhaps this phrase may suffice to defend Grashof's *Ζῆν' ὅς τ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ὕπατος καὶ ἄριστος*, Ψ 43, where see Leaf.

48. *ϝείπῃ.*

Read *ϝείποι.*

Hymn V 53. *καί ῥά 'ϝοι ἀγγελέουσα ϝέπος φάτο.*

Read *ἀγγέλλουσα*, as T 120.

99. *Παρθενίῳ φρέατι.*

φρείατι Παρθενίῳ? *φρείατι* being written in the Attic form as *φρέατι*, the transposition would be naturally made.

351. *ἐπεὶ μέγα μήδεται ἔργον.*

Read *μήσατο ϝέργον.* Compare γ 261.

Hymn XIX 27.

ὑμνεῦσιν δὲ θεοὺς μάκαρας καὶ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον·
οἷόν θ' Ἑρμείαν...ἔννεπον,

οἷον, the reading of one MS, is clearly right; they sing of gods in general, and give Hermes a song all to himself. But read δ' for θ'.

33. *λάθε γὰρ πόθος ὑγρὸς ἐπελθών.*

λάθε Ruhnken, *θάλε* MSS. But though, as the German poet says, "Love comes and he is there" without our knowing much about it, yet *λάθε* will never do here. We must go a step further and read *λάβε*. Possibly even *βάλε* might do, and it is nearer the MSS. But indeed *λάβε* and *βάλε* are the same thing in an indifferent MS, and those of the Hymns are shameful.

Hymn XXVI 7. *τόνδε.*

Read *τόν γε.*

Hymn XXXIV 21. *σὺν μητρὶ Σεμέλῃ.*

Read *μητέρι σὺν Σεμέλῃ.*

Batrachomyomachia 103 (119).

τοῦτον ἀπέκτεινεν βάτραχος κακός, ἔξοχος ἄλλων.

Read *ἔξοχον.* The lament of Troxartes over his son is parodied from those of Priam over Hector, and the pathos in

both cases depends on the dead son being *ἔξοχος ἄλλων*. But there is no point in saying that the frog who killed him was *ἔξοχος ἄλλων*.

140 (156). *ἔλθοι*.

Read *ἕλθῃ*.

164 (180). *στέμματα βλάπτοντες*.

Neither in Epic nor in Attic verse could *α* be shortened before *βλάπτοντες*. Read *δάπτοντες*, which would easily be corrupted to *λάπτοντες* and hence to the text.

194 (211). *ἤριπε δὲ πρηνής, ψυχὴ δὲ μελέων ἐξέπτη*.

μελέων δ' ἐξέπτη Ludwich, which rather makes matters worse. Probably the poet said *ψυχὴ δ' ἐξέπτατο γυίων*. If *μελέων* were substituted for *γυίων* (and that this is possible enough may be seen from the reading of the best MSS two lines further down, *δι' αὐχένος τρῶσεν ἐπιφθάς*!) the transposition and change to *ἐξέπτη* would be made by some one to help the scansion (just as *τρῶσεν ἐπιφθὰς* is changed to *εὐθὺς ἔτρωσεν* in inferior MSS).

228 (250). *ἐς πόδα ἄκρον*.

Read *ποδός*.

230 (252). *φύγῃ*.

Read *φύγοι*.

256 (287). *αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα κεραυνόν, δειμαλέον Διὸς ὅπλον*.

ἀεὶ μαλερὸν M. Schmidt for *δειμαλέον*. But this *ἀεὶ* is out of the question. More likely *ἀμαλμάκετον* (in sense of "invincible").

ARTHUR PLATT.

NEW DETAILS FROM SUETONIUS'S LIFE OF LUCRETIUS.

THERE is perhaps no poet of whose life we should more gladly know a little than Lucretius. Even a glimmer of reliable tradition regarding his personal history and his relations to the human beings of his time is welcome and is worth following up.

Before Munro published his last edition of Lucretius, he travelled to Munich in order to examine the MS. readings of Pontanus which are preserved there, and he frequently refers to them in his notes. He does not seem to have been aware, and we question if it is yet known, that the British Museum contains a very complete copy in MS. of Pontanus's emendations. These are carefully transcribed on the margin of the Venice edition of 1495 by the hand of Hieronymus Borgius (Girolamo Borgia), a kinsman of Caesar Borgia and a Latin poet of note in his day, who, towards the end of his life, was made Bishop of Massa di Sorrento. He was the pupil and intimate friend of Pontanus, alumnus suus he calls himself, and it was to his hands that Pontanus, before his death, entrusted the epitaph he had composed for himself[1]. Borgia too was an enthusiastic student of Lucretius, and Pontanus allowed him to transcribe his emendations. From a note appended at the end of the preface, it appears that the copy was made under Pontanus's supervision. As the transcriber completed his task

[1] Paullo post Alexandri [the Pope] obitum, medio autumno magnus Pontanus ad immortalem vitam migravit, et antequam decederet, Hieronymo Borgio, suo alumno,...hoc epitaphium dedit. (From Borgia's history of his own times, *De Bellis Italis*, Book IV, fol. 66, quoted from the MS. by Chauffepié in 1753.) Roberto de Sarno in his *Vita Pontani*, p. 63, uses the words, Hieronymo Borgio quem in quavis arte bona instituerat Pontanus.

in 1502, and as Pontanus died in 1503, the volume contains Pontanus's latest views of the text.

Borgia contemplated an edition of the poem, containing Pontanus's revision of the text: for ten pages inserted at the beginning of the volume contain a MS. preface and dedication. Probably it was only the death of Pontanus which hindered its immediate publication. Girolamo Borgia was a man of unquestionable ability and of qualities which won him the intimate friendship of some of the leading men of his time: but when we think of this edition of Lucretius, completed with so much labour and care, and made ready for the printer, as well as of the history of his own time, written in 20 books (quoted from the MS. under two titles, *Historia suorum temporum* and *De Bellis Italis*), both works left unpublished at his death in 1549, it would seem that he lacked some of the energy and all the ambition of the stirring race from which he was sprung. From the preface to his Lucretius, written in vigorous and graceful Latin, we quote a few passages containing some entirely novel information as to the life of the poet. This result might naturally be expected from the research of Pontanus, who, during his "over 20 years' study of the poet," had opportunities of examining many MSS. now lost to us. It is well known that Pontanus was a diligent student of MSS. The Munich MS. of Lucretius contains many emendations in his hand: we owe to him the discovery of the MS. of Donatus's commentary on Virgil, and of another Latin grammatical work[1]. In these notes on the text of Lucretius he makes constant reference to the Latin grammarians.

At this date, we must remember, many MSS. existed which have since perished. The description of Boccaccio's visit to the library of Monte Cassino, where he found so many valuable volumes mangled and mutilated for the sake of the parchment, shews what wholesale destruction could go on[2]. In the 15th century the value of MSS. was better known; yet even then

[1] The short *Ars grammatica* bearing the name of Remmius Palemon, whose work on synonyms Suetonius incorporated in great part in his *Prata* (Keil, *Gramm. Lat.* v. pp. 533—547).

[2] Symonds's *Renaissance in Italy*, Vol. II. p. 135.

Poggio found the famous MS. of Quinctilian at St Gall plenum situ...pulvere squalentem...in teterrimo quodam et obscuro carcere, fundo scilicet unius turris quo ne capitalis quidem rei damnati retruderentur[1]. Even during the life-time of Pontanus how many a MS. must have succumbed to damp and ill-usage.

The preface begins thus:—

Hieronimus Borgius lucanus Elisio poo[2], iuveni erudito patricio Neopolitano. S. et voluptatem.

After praising his friend's love of study and the eagerness with which even in youth he enquired into and discussed questions of natural science and theology as well as the profoundest problems of philosophy—de rebus naturalibus et diuinis ac denique de contemplationibus ex intimo philosophiae sacrario expromptis,—he goes on to quote a saying of his

Saepenumero enim te dicere solitum memini: Turpe esse homini non inuestigare ac se decipi sinere, Vulgique sectari errores. Praeclara equidem et uere homine digna exercitatio.

These words remind us how men viewed Lucretius's poem in that day, as a great and daring but godless work, containing truths which might be disturbing to theology, but which must be enquired into.

He goes on to say that the favourite studies of Elisius and himself attracted both of them specially to Lucretius:

Quom ad hanc nostram exercitationem T. Lucretium uterque pariter desideraverimus, mea consuetudo apud Pontanum, nostri saeculi oraculum, tantum ualuit ut ab eo facile impetrare optatum potuerim; quapropter quamuis tot seculis lacer, corruptissimus ac pene nulli intellectus delituerit, eius tamen diuino ingenio magna ex parte emendatus in lucem restituitur. Ego uero in transcribendis emendationibus multum laboraui, tametsi tu quoque non parum insudasti: quamobrem uisum est e re non parvi referre colligere aliqua ad huius poematis principium non parum necessaria. [We have to omit the brief but acute analysis of the poem.] Quae pertinent ad totius operis cognitionem, ea sunt huiusmodi.

T. Lucretius Carus nascitur Licinio Crasso oratore et Q.

[1] Peterson's Quinctilian, p. lxx.

[2] Po is a "frazione" of the province of Massa and Carrara.

Mutio Scevola, pont. conss., quo anno Q. Hortensius orator in foro quom diceret[1] non parvam eloquentiae gloriam est auspicatus[2]. Vixit ann. iiii et XL et noxio tandem improbae feminae poculo in furias[3] actus sibi necem conscivit reste gulam frangens, uel, ut alii opinantur, gladio incubuit[4]: matre natus diutius sterili.

Cum T. Pom. Attico, Cicerone, M. Bruto et C. Cassio coniunctissime uixit[5]. Ciceroni uero recentia ostendebat carmina, eius limam sequutus a quo inter legendum aliquando admonitus ut in translationibus servaret uerecundiam[6], ex

[1] In 95 B.C. Hortensius, at the early age of 19, made his first speech in the forum, which gained the applause of the consuls Crassus and Scaevola, who were respectively the chief orator and the chief jurist of the day.

[2] Cf. Suetonius, *Life of Virgil*, 17. Poeticam puer adhuc auspicatus in Ballistam...distichon fecit. It is of course difficult to distinguish where the writer from whom Borgius draws gives the exact words of his original authority and where he is merely condensing from him. I follow exactly Borgius's rather wavering orthography.

[3] Poet. for furor. See note on p. 229. If Suetonius dwelt at length on the story of the philtre (and it is just such stories which Suetonius loves to enlarge upon,) he may have used both phrases.

[4] Jerome merely says, propria se manu interfecit. It is in the manner of Suetonius to quote the two-fold tradition without deciding for either. Thus Jerome says of the death of Terence merely, in Arcadia moritur, while Suetonius gives the various traditions in full.

Jerome's entire reference to Lucretius is as follows: T. Lucretius poeta nascitur, qui postea amatorio poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset, quos postea Cicero emendavit, propria se manu interfecit anno aetatis quadragesimo quarto [a. 656. Donatus].

[5] Cf. Suetonius, *Life of Terence.* Hic cum multis nobilibus familiariter vixit, sed maxime cum Scipione Africano et C. Laelio. Cf. Cicero, *Lael.* I. quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat.

[6] Cf. Suetonius, *de Grammaticis*, 10, cum sibi sciat nihil aliud suadere nisi ut...vitet obscuritatem Sallustii et audaciam in translationibus. The criticism above attributed to Cicero is entirely in harmony with the rules of taste as laid down by him in the *De Oratore*, iii. cc. 40—41. A metaphor must, like a person in a strange place, be introduced with modesty not with violence: etenim verecunda debet esse translatio ut deducta esse in alienum locum, non inrupisse, atque ut precario non vi venisse videatur. Again in his *Orator*, c. 24, he says: Ergo ille tenuis (orator) modo sit elegans, nec in faciendis verbis erit audax et in transferendis verecundus et parcus in priscis. This principle leads him, at *De Or.* iii. 40, to criticise and blame the expression of Ennius,

caeli ingentes fornices,

"the mighty arches of heaven," because there can be no similarity between a globe and an arch.

quibus duo potissimum loci referuntur[1], neptunni lacunas[2] et coeli cauernas.

C. Memmio epicureo dicavit opus. Romani autem Epicurei hi memorantur praecipui: C. Memmius, C. Cassius, Fabius Gallus, C. Amafinius, M. Catius, L. Calphurnius Piso frugi qui Polidemum audiuit, C. Velleius Gallus Senator, Vergilius Maro Scyronis[3] auditor, Pollius parthenopeus, L. Torquatus, L. Papirius Paetus, Caius Triarius in primis grauis et doctus adolescens, ut inquit Ci°. de fi: T. Pomponius Atticus et hic T. Lucretius Carus.

Two of these names of Roman epicureans, contemporary with Lucretius, are unknown to us: Pollius parthenopeus, and Polidemus[4], for which name Professor Ellis and Mr J. D. Duff make the certain emendation "Philodemum" (see Cicero, in Pison. § 68). Many of the names in this list are those of Epicurean spokesmen in Cicero's dialogues or else of correspondents of his. It is curious to find Virgil expressly ranked as an Epicurean. Probus in his short life of Virgil, which Nettleship thinks is "compiled independently from the same materials as Suetonius used," says of Virgil—secutus Epicuri sectam.

... Sunt qui putent unum et viginti libros composuisse[5] et poematis principium hoc esse, Aetheris et terrae genitabile quaerere tempus, et usque ad eum locum Concelebras quindecim carmina intercidisse[6], quorum ego opinionem nequaquam probaverim: nam quo pacto tempus quaerere proponit; quom nullum tempus per se esse dicat? ut in primo libro:

[1] For the use of refero, compare *De Rhetor.* i. ex quibus non alienum fuerit unam et alteram exempli causa ad verbum referre.

[2] This phrase must come from one of the lost pages. Salsae lacunae occurs at III. 1031 and v. 794. Lucretius uses this word in a very characteristic way, giving it a vaguer and vaster meaning. Coeli cavernas occurs IV. 171.

[3] According to Haupt (*Hermes* I. 40) both the forms Sciron (found in some MSS. of Cicero) and Seyron are entirely without authority.

[4] *Polidemum* is the mistake of a literal but quite unlearned scribe.

[5] A qua bipartita divisione Lucretius suorum quinque et viginti librorum initium fecit hoc: Aetheris et &c. Varro *de ling. lat.* v. 17. Thus Lucian Müller reads, after Lachmann. K. O. Müller has unius et viginti. For the *Lucretius* of the MSS. Scaliger substituted *Lucilius*. "But I can't imagine Lucilius writing that verse Aetheris—tempus. Besides, Lucilius wrote not 21 but 30 books," writes Prof. Ellis.

[6] Pliny, *N. H.* 35. 8. 34, sive (opera) extant sive intercidere. Cf. Livy 2. 4.

tempus item per se non est &c. Praeterea de tam ardua materia vix hos qui extant sex absoluere foeliciter potuisse reor: itaque ipse opinor nec plures senis composuisse et id quod extat principium esse, sane praeclarum et tanto poeta dignum.

He goes on to speak of the corrupt state of the poem,—Mendis scatet frequentibus ut uel Apolline, P. [poeta] Lucretio auctore si modo reminisci posset uel Cicerone correctore uel Memmio auditore sit opus: Quod nisi Pontani nostri labor diligentissimus hunc e tenebris extulisset, uix ullus sensus elici posset: Attamen ipse suo ingenio uigilantique studio (nam supra uiginti annos cum Lucretio consuetudinem habuit) effecit uti magna ex parte intelligi possit...Hoc autem feci, non uti commentaria digererem, sed tuorum in me meritorum causa; quis enim hoc audeat in Luc° tam praesertim lacero? quod quidem siquis tam improbus tentauerit, nihilo plus agat quam si humanum corpus per anathomiam dissipatum uelit in integrum restituere.

The date is here added and, a few lines below, a second date:

vale: Idibus Aug. anno dni. M°.D.ii. Neapoli.

Non ego cuncta meis amplecti uersibus opto,
non mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum,
aenea uox[1]:

hos uersus, quos uergilius sibi uendicavit, Servius ait esse Lucretii: unde credibile est multa carmina intercidisse quae non extant.

Nonis Julii. M°.D.ii. sub pontano cursim legente et emendante[2].

[1] Servius (on Georgic II. 42—4) says "Lucretii versus, sed ille 'aerea' vox ait, non 'ferrea.'" In his note on VI. 840 Munro says "Clearly something is wanting to connect this verse with what precedes. Lachmann has proved that a new leaf, the 142nd, of the archetype began here: in all probability then one leaf has dropped out in this place." Lachmann inserts in the gap four fragments, the first being Non mihi si linguae centum sint oraque centum, Aerea vox. But why not insert the first line also?

[2] In the course of the notes Pontanus is twice named: at v. 1193 *grando* mg. "glando in Pontani libro" and at v. 602—3, *nonne vides—redundet*, mg. "hi duo uersus et alii duo sequentes in Pontani libro desunt."

Professor Robinson Ellis, who has kindly read these notes, says, "One would be glad to know whence the life was drawn... The statement about the two expressions criticised by Cicero is odd enough and has the look of being authentic. In cent. XV. it would have been *possible* to put together a fictitious biography, for which you would do well to read the first article in Madvig's Opuscula on the supposed grammatical treatise of L. Cæcilius Apuleius."

Are we then to regard the information above quoted as fictitious, or as probably derived from some ancient and reliable source?

It is of course necessary to be on one's guard against the possibility of invention, by a writer of the date 1502. But in other matters, not concerning the life of Lucretius, Borgia shews that he is making use of information derived from sources entirely new to us. He gives the name of an Epicurean contemporary of Lucretius, hitherto unknown to us. The legend of lost books is familiar, though, as Borgia gives it, it seems drawn from a fresh authority, as he presents it in a form different from Varro's. The curious notion of a great gap in the poem just before Bk. I. l. 4 is hitherto unheard of. Borgia gives excellent reasons for rejecting it: he shews himself a man of not uncritical temper, apparently one not likely to accept information at random.

If Pontanus had access to MSS. now lost, it is not necessary to assume that these new facts are invented, especially if they are consistent with what we know regarding the poet. It is unfortunate that Borgia does not name his sources, yet this fact is by no means against his veracity: the very first thing which a literary counterfeiter does is to tell us where and how he got his information. For instance, the false Apuleius found his names of lost poems *in monumentis vetustisque lapidibus Romanorum.* It is not necessary to go back to the 15th century to find a fictitious biography: there could hardly be a better instance than the life of Lucretius which Mason Good prefixes to his translation.

If Cicero really edited the poem why does he not say so? why does he not quote from it? Probably for the same reason

that Virgil and Horace, while often referring to Lucretius, yet never name him: we mean, because Cicero did not choose to own himself as in any way responsible for a work looked on as dangerous: it might well have been called "un-Roman." (Yet Cicero never mentions his contemporary Catullus who addressed to him the graceful little poem beginning "Disertissime Romuli nepotum.") Cicero's letter to Quintus "proves," says Munro, "that four months after Lucretius's death he and his brother Quintus had read the poem which, as we saw, could not have been published in the author's life-time." But there are other indications which prove that, in one way or other, Cicero was a well-known figure to Lucretius. "The many imitations we find in Lucretius," says Munro, "of the few hundred extant lines of Cicero's *Aratea* prove, little as it might be expected, that he looked upon this translation as one of his poetical models." A student and thinker is indeed apt to render hero-worship to a great statesman and man of action, but it looks as if such a feeling required to be enhanced by personal and friendly intercourse in order to explain Lucretius's quite disproportionate admiration for Cicero's verses. Munro says with reason that four months "seems too short a time for the Ciceros to have read and be writing about the work if neither of them had had anything to do" with editing it. Does not Cicero's brief reference to the poem,—Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt[1],—sound as if the author were some one *personally* known to both him and his brother? If our new data be trustworthy, the earlier books of the poem, at all events, may have been familiar to the Ciceros long before Lucretius's death.

Borgius's data fix the birth of Lucretius in B.C. 95. According to Munro, two of the best MSS. of Jerome assign it to this year: the rest to B.C. 94. Jerome says he lived into his 44th year: we are told in the life of Virgil that Lucretius died on the Ides of October, B.C. 55, on the same day that Virgil

[1] The words following are evidently corrupt: Sed cum veneris, virum te putabo: si Sallustii Empedoclea legeris, hominem non putabo. Bergk's emendation Sed si ad umbilicum veneris gives the meaning needed. The difficulty of reading such a poem *right through* seems to be the thought which suits the context. Might I suggest, as involving less change, Si ad finem veneris, virum te putabo?

assumed the toga virilis. There is a discrepancy between the two dates assigned, and scholars have thought it necessary to give up either one date or the other. Suetonius (for Professor Nettleship[1] has conclusively proved that the life of Virgil, long attributed to Donatus, is entirely or in very great part the work of Suetonius) fixes the date of the poet's death so circumstantially that many scholars, following Munro, decide that Lucretius must have been born a few years earlier than Jerome says. "It appears to me as certain as such a point can well be," says Munro, "that Lucretius was born in the latter part of B.C. 99 or else in the early months of 98: since in either case he would be in his 44th year on the Ides of October, B.C. 55." I should prefer to retain both dates, but to assume that Lucretius did not live so long as Jerome, doubtless following Suetonius, asserts. A curiously similar discrepancy occurs in Suetonius's life of Horace. He says that Horace "died in B.C. 8 (V Kal. Dec.) at the age of over 59, whereas he himself fixes his birth in B.C. 65 (VI Idus Dec.) which would make him 57 in B.C. 8.[2]" Again, Suetonius states that Virgil wrote his Eclogues in three years, whereas it appears clear that their composition must have spread over five or six years[3]. Careless as Jerome is, it is not fair to hold him responsible for all the inaccurate dates which he gives.

Inventors almost always invent too much and use too much colour. Starting from the legend of the philtre and the poet's suicide, would not an inventor have been likely to give us something much more sensational than these details? There is a certain reasonableness in all of them. Some peculiarity of parentage and inherited temperament is probable enough in Lucretius's case. Again, Lucretius, if Sellar be right, addresses Memmius in the tone of one accustomed to meet on equal footing with the great men of his time[4]. It is admitted that Lucretius was known to Cicero: if he were a friend of Cicero's,

[1] *Ancient Lives of Virgil*, 1879.

[2] Wickham's Horace, Vol. I. p. xxx.

[3] Nettleship, p. 49. It is Suetonius who is probably responsible for Jerome's precisely similar self-contradiction as to Catullus dying at the age of 30. (Ellis, *Proleg.* p. LXIV.)

[4] Note the ease and fearless sincerity with which he addresses Memmius, especially at I. 102.

he could hardly fail to be more or less intimate with one so devoted to literature and so thorough an Epicurean as Atticus[1]. The name of Brutus rather surprises us: an imaginary biographer would not have been likely to select him as a friend of Lucretius. But, in virtue of likeness of temperament, might not Lucretius and Brutus well have been drawn to each other? There was in both the same high uncompromising spirit. The two metaphors criticised remind us of Browning or of Victor Hugo: and Cicero, we feel, would not have approved of *them*. The criticism attributed to him coincides remarkably, not merely in expression but in spirit, with the rules of style laid down by him, which are quoted above[2].

Regarding any new data of this kind two points mainly have to be considered. First, are they consistent with what we know already of Lucretius and his poem? Secondly, are they of a kind likely to be invented? I believe that Borgius's information comes down to us entirely independent of Jerome. Munro believes that Jerome's details regarding Lucretius are drawn from Suetonius's lost work *De Viris Illustribus*, which, from his own time downwards, was regarded as the chief authority on the literary history of Rome. It appears to me most probable that Pontanus found these data in the preface appended to a MS. of Lucretius's poem by some grammarian, who had Suetonius's life of Lucretius before him and made a rather fuller abstract of it than Jerome did[3]. Suetonius's biographies were especially liable to be abbreviated in this

[1] The Lucretius referred to in Cicero's letter to Atticus (VII. 24) as a friend of Cassius is not the poet: the letter dates from several years after Lucretius's death.

[2] See note 6, page 223. It has been pointed out to me that "Cicero is condemning an expression (cavernae coeli) which he uses himself at Aratea, 252." The expression does, it is true, occur in Cicero's juvenile translation from Aratus, and Cicero may have borrowed it from a poem of Varro's (see Munro on IV. 171). So voluminous a writer and so busy a man as Cicero may be allowed to have forgotten some of his own verses.

[3] In one case Jerome may, possibly, have retained the phrase of his original more literally than the compiler whom we have above assumed. Compare Borgius's noxio tandem improbae feminae poculo in furias actus with Jerome's amatorio poculo in furorem versus, and Suetonius, *Caligula* c. 50 Creditur potionatus a Caesonia uxore amatorio quidem medicamento, sed quod in furorem verterit.

way. Thus of the MSS. containing Suetonius's life of Horace, four cut it down from 69 to 30 lines[1]. When we compare the line or two given by Jerome to Virgil or Terence or Horace with Suetonius's lives of those poets which are preserved by Donatus and a scholiast (probably Acro), we see that Jerome's single sentence about Lucretius must represent a pretty long biography in Suetonius.

The authority anonymously quoted (e quibus duo potissimum loci referuntur) is probably Varro's *De Poetis Latinis* on which Suetonius's life of Lucretius was, almost certainly, based[2]. Ritschl thinks that most of the details of literary criticism in Suetonius are derived from Varro, though it is noticeable that Suetonius only once names him in the lives we have[3].

The notion of an immense gap in the poem before I. 4 has neither rhyme nor reason in it. It could enter no one's head to imagine but could only grow up out of misinterpreted tradition. A legend like this may even, like certain ancient corruptions in MSS., be a sign of antiquity and independent tradition. Dr J. S. Reid writes me: "I see no reason for surprise that Lucilius should have written the line

Aetheris et terrae genitabile quaerere tempus:

He is saturated with references to philosophy—even to a greater degree than has been supposed, as I hope to shew in a forthcoming article. The names of Lucretius and Lucilius have been again and again interchanged in MSS. Lucilius certainly imitated the *Epicharmus* and *Euhemerus* of Ennius. The suggestion of Baehrens that the first 21 books of Lucilius are mentioned together because they were written in hexameters and the remaining books in other metres, is a good one." When we read the reference in VI. 937 (quod in primo quoque carmine claret) to the argument in the first book (I. 329—369) for the presence of void in things and in VI. 91

[1] Roth, p. LXXXIII.

[2] For the unusual phrase limam sequutus, cf. auctoritatem et consilium alicuius sequi Cic. *ad Fam.* IV. 3: Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi, Caesar *De B. Civ.* I. 35: sententiam Calidii sequebatur ib. I. 2.

[3] Life of Terence, p. 30. See Ritschl's commentary (Reifferscheid, p. 518).

> tu mihi supremae praescripta ad candida calcis
> currenti spatium praemonstra,

we feel certain that our own 1st and 6th books form the first and last books of the poem which Lucretius composed.

Pontanus, who was a keen MS. hunter, was on the track of the "De Viris Illustribus." Enoch of Ascoli, sent by Pope Nicolas V. to search for MSS., brought back from a German monastery about the year 1458, a MS. containing three works hitherto unknown, the *Germania* and *De Oratoribus* of Tacitus and the part of Suetonius's lost work containing the chapters *De Grammaticis* and *De Rhetoribus*[1]. Pontanus copied out with his own hand in 1460 all three treatises, and the best MS. of these which we possess (the Leyden one) is a direct transcript of Pontanus's copy[2]. He prefixes to the Suetonius portion a note which shews that he had himself made search for a complete MS. The section of the book treating "Of the Orators and the Poets" had been discovered, he says, by a certain Paduan, but, when Pontanus made search for it in that city, he at last discovered that the finder had had the incredible folly to burn it[3]. During his researches among MSS. Pontanus

[1] Recently Principal Peterson (*De Orator.* pp. LXXIII and LXXIX) has shewn it to be very probable that the MS. which Enoch brought with him was not a copy but the original which he found at Hersfeld.

[2] Reifferscheid (Suetonius, Addenda, p. XV) holds that the Leyden MS. is not the actual copy made by Pontanus, though copied directly from this.

[3] Cui [Asculano] sic habenda est gratia ut male imprecandum est Sicconio Polentono Patavino, qui cum eam partem quae est de oratoribus ac poetis invenisset, ita suppressit ut ne unquam in lucem venire posset. Quam ego cum Patavii perquirerem, tandem reperi eam ab illo fuisse combustam ipsumque arrogantia ac temeritate impulsum de vitis illustrium scriptorum loquacissime pariter et ineptissime scripsisse" [anno 1433]. From Pontanus's note prefixed to the Leyden codex, quoted in Roth's Suetonius (p. 288). At the end of the MS. Pontanus adds "Amplius repertum non est adhuc. desunt rhetores XI."

The whole insinuation against Polentonus appears improbable. Compliments of this kind passed among scholars in saec. XV. Even Pontanus was charged with having discovered some dialogues by Cicero and published them as his own. The hopes cherished of finding the substance of Suetonius's lost work embodied in Polentonus's treatise were utterly disappointed by the discovery of the chapter on Plautus and Terence in MS. at Florence in 1843. This was published by Ritschl, according to whom it contains no new facts which could be drawn from any ancient writer. Ritschl's judgment of

must have kept his eyes open for any fragments bearing upon his favorite poet.

We quote one or two of Pontanus's emendations, hastily selected out of many which are not mentioned by Munro. In the Venice edition II. 40—43 stands as follows:

> si non forte tuas legiones per loca campi
> fervere cum videas belli simulacra cientis
> subsidiis magnis epicuri constabilitas
> ornatasque armis ita statuas stantesque animatas,
> his tibi tum rebus timefactae religiones
> effugiunt animo pavide.

In l. 43 the MSS. have ornatas armis itastuas tariterque animatas.

The brilliant emendation et ecum vi had not then been made: the passage must have seemed well-nigh hopeless. Pontanus has the following note:

Epicurus . constabilio . dicit armis Italis propterea quod Lucretius praecepta epicuri graece scripta convertit in latinum et armavit exercitum epicuri armis Italis—i—latino sermone.

Of course we can now see that the conjecture is mistaken: it may be fanciful but is it not still a notable one?

I. 853.

> ignis an umor an aura? quid horum? sanguen an ossa?

Pontanus reads

> an viscus, sanguen an ossa?

(See H. T. Karsten's discussion of the passage in *Mnemosyne*, 1890.)

VI. 954.

> denique qua circum colli lorica coercet.

Pontanus reads coheret and adds "al. coeli."

Polentonus as an author is vigorously worded:

"Diese Vitae sind das allerelendeste, abgeschmackteste, von Thatsachen entblössteste, nur aus den auch uns zugänglichen Quellen geschöpfte, diese aber auf das Verkehrteste gebrauchende Gewäsch, was man sich denken kann." (*Parerga Plautina*, Vol. I. p. 632.)

Those who know the Venice edition of 1495, published "per theodorum de ragazonibus," "monstrously corrupt" as Munro calls it, with passages out of their context everywhere, will not wonder that Borgia seems to despair of the text and compares the poem to a dismembered body. Thanks to the brilliant scholarship of his editors, even without "Lucretius himself for expounder, Cicero for corrector and Memmius for listener," the poet, difficult as his subject-matter is, can now be pretty easily understood. Lucretius has indeed been fortunate in this way. Marullus, Lambinus, Lachmann, Munro, were all men of *genius* in the way of scholarship. Pontanus may not have accomplished so much for the text as they, but he remains one of the great names associated with the poem. Like Auratus and his own friend, Marullus, Pontanus was one of those robust mediaeval scholars who could handle sword as well as pen: he was a vigorous thinker and a vigorous writer, who knew men as well as books, and whose Latin poetry is full of passion. To those older scholars Sophocles or Virgil were not merely elegant authors or texts to be experimented upon, but rather oracles to be studied daily for guidance: so Marullus, we are told, never retired to rest without first reading and pondering some verses of Lucretius[1]. This gave them that grip of the subject-matter of a great poet and that reverent entrance into his spirit which are so essential for restoring the text. To one of those older scholars it would have appeared a kind of profanity to offer us the choice of a dozen emendations of the same passage.

A strong piece of evidence for referring the fragments above quoted to Suetonius lies in the list of contemporary Epicurean philosophers, a list composed almost exclusively of spokesmen in Cicero's dialogues or of correspondents of his, one or two other names of note being omitted. The evident reference to the well-known passage about Piso and Philodemus, the evident remembrance of another notable passage referring to Hortensius's marvellous first speech in the forum[2] as well as the quotation

[1] Candidus says in his preface "Lucretianae adeo veneris per omnem aetatem studiosus fuit ut nuspiam fere, non eo comite, itaret, nunquam cubitum nisi perlectis aliquot exploratisque Cari carminibus sese reciperet."

[2] Nam Q. Hortensii admodum adolescentis ingenium, ut Phidiae signum,

from the *De Finibus* at once remind us how the works of Suetonius are simply filled with quotations from Cicero, and references to his life and writings[1], several sayings of his being also put on record. When first I read this list, it seemed to me one that might well be drawn up by some early scholar, learned in Cicero: but whence then come *Polidemum* (a corruption found in no MS. of Cicero and an error moreover which no learned man could have made) and the unknown Pollius? and why should a 15th century scholar single out for praise Triarius?

The gain from these fragments which come, I believe, from the long sought for volume of Suetonius may be scanty; yet why is it that we crave to know even a little of the lives of great writers? Is it not because a great poet is essentially more human than other men that any light regarding his personal history and relations to the human beings of his time is so welcome to us?

Postscript.

[Some weeks after the above article was in print, Dr Carl Radinger quoted the extracts from Borgius, as printed by me in the *Academy* for June 23[2], and examined them in an able and searching article in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* for September 22. He too arrives at the same conclusion as that expressed above, namely that the extracts are derived through the medium of some grammarian from Suetonius's *De Viris Illustribus*. Dr Radinger calls attention to one

simul adspectum et probatum est. Is, L. Crasso, Q. Scaevola Consulibus, primum in foro dixit et apud hos ipsos quidem consules et quum eorum, qui affuerunt, tum ipsorum consulum, qui omnes intelligentia anteibant, iudicio discessit probatus. Undeviginti annos natus erat eo tempore. *Brutus* c. LXIV. The language quoted by Borgius surely conveys an echo both of Cicero's words and of the impression they carry.

[1] Is there just a shadow of evidence from Cicero's language Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, &c., that Lucretius's poem was published in separate books? Had the whole work been published, or had it come into Cicero's hands as a whole early in 54 when this letter was written, would he not probably have used the word *poema* or *carmen*?

[2] "Traces of a fresh source of tradition regarding the life of Lucretius," pp. 519—520. See also *Academy* for Sept. 29.

important fact, namely that Pollius parthenopeus is mentioned in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, though in an inscription of somewhat uncertain origin. (VI. 3360.) He says "The man appears to have been a Campanian Greek and probably a freedman: see the Index to *C. I. L.* X." Dr Radinger also remarks regarding the name "C. Velleius Gallus senator:" "The cognomen Gallus, hitherto unknown, (if not taken from the 'Fadius Gallus' of the previous line[1],) points again to an authentic source."

Dr J. S. Reid, who kindly read this article in proof, wrote me (Sept. 24) with some valuable suggestions. "The reference to I. 4 *concelebras* is puzzling. The natural meaning of the passage would be that Borgius supposed the surviving part of the whole poem to begin with the word *concelebras*, but this is hardly possible. Even a lapse of memory is hardly to be thought of." [Yet Suetonius is uncritical and is fond of the marvellous and sensational. It is characteristic of him to chronicle probabilities and absurdities alike, without one word of comment.]..." *Sed cum veneris* in Cicero may well be elliptic and stand by itself: 'but more of this when I see you.' Cicero often in his letters breaks off from a subject in this elliptical way...There is really no difficulty about the connection between Lucretius and M. Brutus. No one could very well know Atticus without knowing Brutus. See Nepos *Att.* 8. 1. Nepos indeed speaks of the time after Caesar's death, but there is no reason to suppose that the acquaintance began only then. Indeed, the word *adulescens* seems to shew that Nepos confused his authorities, for Brutus was *certainly* over 40 at the time of Caesar's murder...I thought at once of Varro's *De Poetis Latinis*, as the source of the criticism quoted, and am glad to see that it has occurred to you also....With regard to Pollius, no doubt the friend of Statius, Pollius Felix, is meant. Cf. *Silvae* II. 2. 112, Seu volvit monitus quos dat Gargettius auctor. This accounts for the epithet Parthenopaeus: for, although Pollius was a native of Puteoli, he was connected with Naples: see *Silvae* III. 1. 923: and ascite meis, II. 2. 135. But a question might be raised whether the actual source from

[1] Borgius writes 'Fabius (not Fadius) Gallus.'

which the information was drawn did not mention Pompilius Andronicus, an Epicurean philosopher who lived at Cumae (Sueton. *Grammat.* 8). If the original source mentioned Pollius, it is curious that he alone should be picked out from the period of the Empire when the purpose of the writer obviously is to mention Epicureans who lived near the time of Lucretius. I cannot help thinking that the person who put Borgius's information into its present shape had in his mind Pollius Felix. If the information goes back to Suetonius, as I am inclined to think, the excerptor must have made a mistake, either due to MSS. corruption or to the combination of his own knowledge with what he found in Suetonius or possibly to both causes." It seems rash to differ with a scholar whose opinion is so weighty as Dr Reid's, but it still seems to me unlikely that Suetonius could have placed Pollius Felix, Statius's friend (A.D. 45—96), among so many Epicureans, contemporary with Cicero, nor is the name of Pollius Felix or his connection with Epicureanism conspicuous enough to induce a grammarian to insert him in this list of names whose associations are so different. Moreover, the designation Pollius parthenopæus is one which suits a freedman.—I agree with Dr Radinger in thinking that the list of Roman philosophers is derived from Suetonius's section *De Philosophis*. I do not think it formed the index of names prefixed, according to Suetonius's fashion, to that section, but that it is extracted from the general survey of Roman philosophy with which Suetonius introduced that part of his work, judging from the analogy of the introductory sketches prefixed to the *De Grammaticis* and *De Rhetoribus*.

It is curious that the phrase Neptuniae lacunae is blamed in a work (*Rhetorica ad Herennium*) which was probably used as a text-book by Cicero when a student and which he esteemed so highly that he incorporated many parts of it in his earliest work, *De Inventione*. The passage runs, Gravis oratio saepe imperitis videtur ea quae turget et inflata est, quum aut novis aut priscis verbis, aut duriter aliunde translatis, aut gravioribus quam res postulat, aliquid dicitur, hoc modo: Nam qui perduellionibus venditat patriam, non satis supplicii dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depulsus erit lacunas. (IV. 10. 15.) A comparison

of this passage and its context with that from the *De Oratore* (note 6, page 223) will show how largely this treatise helped to form Cicero's notions of style. It is indeed strange that the two phrases criticised by Cicero (both of which strike us as characteristic of Lucretius) should have been used by previous writers: but how often have such phrases been adopted from some lesser writer by a great poet and acquired from his lips an entirely new range and depth of meaning.

Quite a number of persons with the cognomen Parthenopaeus are mentioned, especially in Campanian inscriptions, in Vols. X. and XIV. of the *C. I. L.*: others in Vols. II. III. IX. and XII. "The name Parthenopaeus no doubt means merely 'Neapolitan' and belongs naturally to freedmen," says Professor Percy Gardner. The inscription referred to by Dr Radinger (VI. 3360) (said to have been found at St Angelo in Pescaria) is as follows:

d · m · | cn · pollius | parthenopeus | atticillae | delicatae | suae benemer | ti · f ·

This is one of the inscriptions recorded by the Benedictine, Galletti, in the years 1741–2, a large number of which are believed to have been fabricated by him. Such fabrications have sometimes been made on a basis of fact. If the inscription were fabricated, how did Galletti get hold of the name Cn. Pollius Parthenopeus? I may call attention to the fact that a name which may be the same occurs in an inscription from Morrone, in the same district as Pescaria (Vol. IX. 6078. 132),

cn · pollius · fec ·

No inference can be drawn from Cicero's use of the plural Lucreti poemata, which is perfectly natural. The ancients regarded the *De Rerum Natura* as a didactic poem and therefore lacking the unity of an epos or poem of action: see Suetonius (*De Poetis* p. 5 Reiff.) who also has Lucreti carmina.—Regarding several points I have profited by valuable suggestions from Principal Peterson.]

JOHN MASSON.

ON THE DATE OF THE 'Αποτελεσματικὰ OF MANETHO.

It is needless to dwell on the uncertainty which has hitherto existed respecting the date of the curious Greek astrological poem entitled 'Αποτελεσματικὰ, bearing the name of Manetho as author, which was first published by Gronovius in 1698 from a MS. in the Laurentian Library, the only one extant. The name of the author affords no clue to the period of the composition, being undoubtedly assumed to make the poem pass for the work of the celebrated Egyptian historian. Consistently with this misrepresentation, it is professedly dedicated to one of the Ptolemies: but Gronovius remarked that its diction and versification rendered this alleged antiquity exceedingly suspicious, and no subsequent editor has hesitated to assign it to the Roman period. Koechly, who edited it in 1851 for the volume of the "Poetae Bucolici et Didactici" in Didot's series of the Greek classics, and who has rendered great service by divesting it of its innumerable interpolations, has investigated the question of its period at considerable length. He decides that it is not earlier than the Antonines, or later than Alexander Severus, and inclines to the latter date, chiefly on account of an allusion which he thinks he discovers to Caracalla's incestuous connection with his stepmother.

It seems to have escaped the attention of the learned that the approximate date of the poem is indicated by the author himself, only that an astronomer is needed to interpret him. At the conclusion of his work (Book VI according to the ordinary editions, Book III according to Koechly's arrangement) he gives us his own nativity. Supposing this to be genuine, and there is not the slightest reason to deem it otherwise, it

is only necessary to find the period to which the planetary positions correspond, and we have the date of the author's birth; and consequently, within a few years, that of the poem also.

The passage is as follows:

Ἥλιος μὲν ἔην Διδύμοις, τῷ δ' αὖθ' ἅμα καλὴ
Κύπρις καὶ Φαέθων ἐρατὸς καὶ χρύσεος Ἑρμῆς,
Ὑδροχόῳ δὲ Σεληναίη Φαίνων τε καὶ ὥρη.
πουλυπόδῃ δ' Ἄρης ἐν Καρκίνῳ, ἀμφὶ δὲ μέσσον
οὐρανὸν ἐστρωφᾶτο βέλος Κένταυρος ἀνέλκων·
τὼς μὲν ἐμὴν γενέθλην Μοῖραι διετεκμήραντο.

"The Sun indeed was in Gemini, and with him fair Venus and lovely Jupiter and golden Mercury; but the Moon and Saturn and the degree ascending[1] were in Aquarius, and Mars in the many-footed Crab; and the Centaur drawing back his arrow (Sagittarius) was wound around the mid-heaven. Thus did the Fates ordain my geniture."

Evidently, then, nothing more is requisite for determining the date of the author's birth than to ascertain the period to which these celestial positions correspond. It is several years since I made this observation, but I was long deterred from bringing the subject forward by the fear that the necessary calculations might be too intricate and tedious to be fairly requested from an astronomer. Nothing might ever have been done had I not happened to mention the matter to the Earl of Crawford, a nobleman equally eminent as astronomer and as scholar. He assured me that the calculation would be by no means so difficult as I apprehended: and that, even if it were, Dr Downing, the Director of the Nautical Almanac, would most readily cause it to be executed. Thus encouraged, I ventured to apply to Dr Downing. My inquiry met with a most courteous reception; and, in what appeared to me an amazingly short space of time, a decisive and satisfactory solution. "I find," writes Dr Downing, "that A.D. 80 is the only year in the first five centuries of our era that accurately satisfies the

[1] Koechly, not understanding this astrological sense of ὥρη, unnecessarily alters καὶ ὥρη into καθ' ὥρης.

conditions of the problem. The longitudes for June 1 of that year[1] are Venus 76°, Mars 104°, Jupiter 73°" [that is, Venus in about 17 Gemini, Mars in 13 Cancer, Jupiter in 14 Gemini, Saturn in 28 Aquarius].

Assuming, then, that the so-called Manetho was between forty and fifty when he composed his poem, he wrote under Hadrian, a century before the date conjectured by Koechly. He was thus born one year later than the inscription of the steward's accounts on the recto of that papyrus in the British Museum the verso of which was to transmit Aristotle's work on the Constitution of Athens to the modern world; and one year before the date of the earliest horoscope (April 1, A.D. 81) published by the Trustees of the British Museum in their recent edition of the Graeco-Egyptian papyri in their collections—with which, it may be added, Manetho's nativity corresponds so well as to justify Dr Downing's calculation, could such corroboration be for a moment thought requisite. It is still more interesting to remark that Manetho was a contemporary of Ptolemy, although there is little affinity, save in subject, between his poem and Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos. The latter is a work of independent research, standing widely aloof from other ancient treatises on astrology, except those which have adopted it as a text-book; while Manetho's is a versification of precepts which had apparently come down to him from a remote antiquity.

R. GARNETT.

[1] For the information of readers entirely unacquainted with astronomy it may be mentioned that if the Sun was, as Manetho says, in Gemini, the birth must have occurred within the last ten days of May or the first twenty of June.

ON THE CODEX PAMPHILI AND DATE OF EUTHALIUS.

Summary.

1. The British Museum Armenian codex of Apocalypse, Acts and Epistles, Add. 19,730: (α) its age, (β) peculiar order in it of books of N. T., (γ) colophon attached to Paulines declares the text to be a copy of the codex of Pamphilus.

2. The same colophon found in uncial codex H of Paul and in other MSS. of Armenian Version.

3. Description of codex H of Paul.

4. Peculiar order of books in B. M. Add. 19,730 shared by older Armenian codices, also by codices Sinaiticus and Leicestrensis.

5. The common colophon of Armenian version and H of Paul probably due to Euthalius.

6. This is proved by a comparison of it with the Euthalian *argumenta*.

7. Recapitulation of evidence and conclusions proved.

8. Can codex H be from the pen of Euthalius? Does the Armenian version preserve the text of Pamphilus?

9. Date of Euthalius' stichometrical work and prologues, to Paulines and Acts, etc., *not* A.D. 458, but A.D. 396.

10. Scholars have been misled as to the date of Euthalius by an interpolation in his writings.

11. Possible reasons for this interpolation.

12. Further evidence from old Armenian sources of the earlier date being the right one. Euthalius really addressed his work on the Paulines to Theophilus of Alexandria.

13. The Armenian Version and H not absolutely the same text. List of differences in the Athos fragments of H.

14. Restitution by means of the Armenian Version of the true text in Gal. v. 1.

15. Which text is the more faithful to the codex Pamphili, H or the Armenian?

16. $\aleph^c$ and codex Porphyrianus rescriptus (= Euthal.^{cod}) supply independent evidence of what was in the codex Pamphili. Wilhelm Bousset's work.

17. Examination of Armenian Version in passages in which H $- \aleph^c$:

18. in passages where H is opposed to $\aleph^c$:

19. in passages where H departs from the older majuscules:

20. in passages where H agrees with the older majuscules against the younger ones:

21. in passages where H agrees with the younger majuscules against the older ones.

22. Summary of results so gained.

23. Conclusion. The Armenian is our best and surest representative of the codex Pamphili.

1. In the British Museum there is a codex of the Armenian Acts and Epistles, Add. 19,730, of value and interest for several reasons.

i. For its age. It is written by the scribe Thorus, as we learn from a subscription at the end of the Apocalypse. This is probably the same Thorus who helped to write a codex 149 of the Bible in the library of Edschmiadzin. In that case the British Museum codex must belong to about the year 1270. Thirteenth century codices of the four Gospels in Armenian are common enough, but of the Acts, Epistles and Apocalypse they are very rare. In the Paris Library there is but one of the same age, written in parallel columns Greek and Armenian, by Nerses Lampronatzi. The same Thoros wrote two of the San Lazaro codices of the Gospels, dated A.D. 1262 and 1274 respectively.

ii. The order of the books of the New Testament in the B. M. codex is peculiar. The codex itself is clearly the last half of a volume which began with the four gospels. They have been separated, and the present codex presents the rest of the N. T. in this order:

1. Apocalypse. 2. The Rest of St John the Apostle

3. The Epistles of Paul as far as the Thessalonians inclusive. 4. To the Hebrews. 5. Epistles of Paul to Timothy and Philemon. 6. The Acts. 7. The Catholic Epistles.

The Acts are preceded by the fragment entitled the "Voyage of Paul" and a list of the Apostles, with a brief notification of the sphere of work of each.

iii. In addition to the prologues of Euthalius, which are printed in every Armenian Bible, we have in the British Museum codex appended to the Epistle of Paul to Philemon a note, which also occurs in the same place in a codex of the entire Bible dated A.D. 1220 at San Lazaro in Venice, and also in a codex of the Armenian Bible belonging to Lord Zouche. It is written in the same large hand as the text and not in the smaller hand in which Thoros writes out the Prologues and Summaries of Euthalius:

"I wrote out and arranged as far as possible verse by verse (= *κατὰ δύναμιν στιχηρὸν*) the writings of Paul the Apostle, disposing (them) also in easily understood (or "grasped") readings (*ἀναγνώσεις*) for (or *of*) our brethren. Of all of whom I crave indulgence for my boldness; in order that by means of the prayers, to be offered in our behalf, I may receive your condescension towards me. This book was copied according to (or "from") an exemplar of Caesarea, which lies there in the chest of books, and which was written with his own hand by the holy Pamphilus."

There follows in red the heading: "Advice" (*aviso*), and then in the same large writing this: "I am master and teacher of the divine religion. If thou lend me to anyone, thou shalt take a goodly copy in my stead, for those who (? + have to) restore (i.e. books) are evil."

The advice here given means, it would seem, that we should guard against the dishonesty of borrowers, by exacting from them, as a pledge for the restoration of a volume, another copy; whether of the same book or not is not clear.

After this *aviso* follows this paragraph, still in the large hand with the heading in red letters: "Reply": "I keep thee a treasure of spiritual blessings, adorned with embellishments (or "arrangements") desired of all men and with all sorts of

ornaments. Yea, I speak truly. I will not vainly lend thee to anyone. Nor another time will I be jealous of (or? *for*) the weal of anyone. But when I shall lend thee to my friends, I will take a goodly copy (or *exemplar*) in exchange for thee."

These two quaint notices clearly refer to the Greek copy of the Pauline Epistles, which was transcribed from Pamphilus' own copy. As they occur in the Zouche Bible which is copied from one of the XIIIth century, and in the Venice Bible of A.D. 1220, they can hardly be peculiar to any one Armenian copy; but must have stood in the Greek copy, from which the Armenian Version was made.

2. I find the Greek original of the subscription which I have rendered from the Armenian in the 6th century uncial codex H of Paul, as follows: *ἔγραψα καὶ ἐξεθέμην κατὰ δύναμιν στειχηρὸν· τόδε τὸ τεύχος* Παύλου *τοῦ ἀποστόλου πρὸς ἐγγραμμὸν καὶ εὐκατάλημπτον ἀνάγνωσιν. τῶν καθ' ἡμας ἀδελφῶν. παρῶν ἁπάντων τολμης συγγνώμην αἰτῶ. εὐχὴ τῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμῶν. τὴν συμπεριφορὰν κομιζόμενος· ἀντεβλήθη δὲ ἡ βιβλος· πρὸς τὸ ἐν Καισαρία ἀντίγραφον τῆς βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ ἁγίου παμφίλου χειρὶ γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ*[1].

Scrivener remarks: "From this subscription we may conclude, with Dr Field, that the noble library at Caesarea was still safe in the sixth century, though it may have perished A.D. 638, when that city was taken by the Saracens."

3. Codex H is but a collection of fragments rescued from the bindings of more recent codices. The original codex was in a convent on Mount Athos until A.D. 1218, when a monk named Macarius, who, as C. R. Gregory remarks, should rather be named Schetlios, tore it up to make covers for other books. Fragments of it rescued from bindings exist in the libraries of Paris, Petersburgh, Moscow, Athos, Turin, and elsewhere.

This codex H, so far as it has been recovered, contains nothing but fragments of the Pauline letters. Consequently the affinity revealed between it and the Armenian Version by the possession of the same colophon only enables us to make some deductions as to the order in which the Epistles of Paul

[1] I print this as it stands in Tischendorf's copy in his edition of the N.T. of 1849.

must have followed one another in it. They no doubt followed the same order in which they come in the Armenian Version, with Hebrews following Thessalonians.

4. We have noticed the peculiar order of the N. T. books in the Brit. Mus. Add. 19,730. There is some reason to regard this as the primitive order followed in the Armenian Version. In the San Lazaro codex dated 1220 of the whole Bible already mentioned we have the traces of a similar arrangement. For in it their order is as follows: 1. The four Gospels. 2. The Acts. 3. The Catholic epistles. 4. The Apocalypse preceded by the prayer of Euthalius. 5. The Pauline Epistles (at the end of which are found the notices above referred to). 6. The voyage of Paul to Rome[1]. 7. The letter of the Corinthians to Paul.

This codex then agrees with B. M. Add. 19,730 in setting the Apocalypse before the Pauline Epistles. For the rest its order is adjusted to prevalent usage.

Other ancient codices shew a similar order. For example in codex Sinaiticus "St Paul's Epistles precede the Acts, and, amongst them, that to the Hebrews follows 2 Thess." (Scrivener, Introd.). The same order is observable as regards Acts and Paulines in many other codices, notably in the Leicestrensis. The Epistle to the Hebrews comes after 2 Thess. in all the four great codices Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, Alexandrinus and Ephraemi. The same order is observed in printed Armenian Bibles that have any pretensions to be correct.

Scrivener mentions (Introd. vol. I. p. 73) but a single codex in which the Apocalypse precedes all the Epistles, viz. Scholz's Evan. 268. This particular arrangement may be an idiosyncrasy of the British Museum codex.

5. The question arises: Is the colophon found both in codex H of the Paulines and in the Armenian Version of the Epistles of Paul to be attributed to Euthalius? We should probably answer in the affirmative; for in codex H, as in the Armenian Version, we have added the prefaces etc. of Euthalius. On the other hand it may be urged that, since in B. M. Add.

[1] This is the work of Euthalius, and is to be found in Greek at the end of his work on the Catholic Epistles. See Migne, Patrol. Graeca, Vol. 85, col. 692.

19,730 this colophon, along with the quaint notices about lending the volume which follow it, is in the same large hand as the text, whereas the prefaces etc. of Euthalius are added in a smaller hand; therefore Euthalius was not the author of the colophon, nor the transcriber of Pamphilus' text. The probability that the 50 great codices which Eusebius prepared for Constantine were copied or at least corrected from codices in the library of Pamphilus, and the fact that the codex Sinaiticus, which agrees in the matter of the order of the N. T. books with the B. M. Add. 19,730, was itself so corrected,—these facts taken together make for the view that the colophon in question was penned by Euthalius.

6. On this point however we are not left to conjecture. The following comparison of the colophon of codex H of St Paul with the undisputed works of Euthalius, published by Zacagni and reprinted in vol. 85 of Migne's Patrologia Graeca, establishes beyond a doubt that the said colophon is due to Euthalius; every word of it can be paralleled in those works.

Colophon of H: *ἔγραψα καὶ ἐξεθέμην κατὰ δύναμιν στειχηρὸν· τόδε τὸ τεῦχος Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου πρὸς ἔγγραμμον καὶ εὐκατάληπτον ἀνάγνωσιν.*

Cp. (Migne, Patr. Gr. 85, p. 633) Euthal. Elenchus Capitum Libri Actuum, *ἔναγχος ἐμοί γε τήν τε τῶν πράξεων βίβλον ἅμα καὶ καθολικῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἀναγνῶναί τε κατὰ προσῳδίαν, καί πως ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι, καὶ διελεῖν τούτων ἑκάστης τὸν νοῦν λεπτομερῶς, προσέταξας, ἀδελφὲ Ἀθανάσιε προσφιλέστατε, καὶ τοῦτο ἀόκνως ἐγὼ, καὶ προθύμως πεποιηκὼς, στοιχηδόν τε συνθεὶς τούτων τὸ ὕφος, κατὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ συμμετρίαν, πρὸς εὔσημον ἀνάγνωσιν, διεπεμψάμην ἐν βραχεῖ τὰ ἕκαστά σοι καὶ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἐκθέμενος ὀλιγοστὴν ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν, κ.τ.λ.*

Again in prologue to Epistles of Paul (Migne 85, col. 708): *καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ συντόμως ἐπιστολὴν ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς προτάξομεν τὴν τῶν κεφαλαίων ἔκθεσιν, ἐνὶ τῶν σοφωτάτων τινὶ καὶ φιλοχρίστῳ πατέρων ἡμῶν πεπονημένην· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀναγνώσεων ἀκριβεστάτην τομὴν κ.τ.λ.*

Again in the list of the number of lections, chapters, testimonia (i.e. citations of other parts of the Scriptures) and verses

which each Pauline epistle contains, we read (Migne, 85, col. 720) *διεῖλον τὰς ἀναγνώσεις καὶ ἐστίχισα πᾶσαν τὴν ἀποστολικὴν βίβλον ἀκριβῶς κατὰ πεντήκοντα στίχους· καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια ἑκάστης ἀναγνώσεως παρέθηκα καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ φερομένας μαρτυρίας· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅσων στίχων ἡ ἀνάγνωσις τυγχάνει· στίχοι ξ'.*

Colophon of H: *τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδελφῶν παρ' ὧν ἁπάντων τόλμης συγγνώμην αἰτῶ. εὐχῇ τῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμῶν. τὴν συμπεριφορὰν κομιζόμενος.* Compare the following from (Migne, Patr. Gr. 85, p. 630) the Elenchus Capitum Libri Actuum. *συγγνώμην γε πλείστην αἰτῶν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, τόλμης ὁμοῦ καὶ προπετείας τῆς ἐμῆς, ἅπαντάς τε εἰκότως κοινῇ καθικετεύων ἀδελφούς τε καὶ πατέρας, μετ' ἀγάπης αὐταῖς ἐντυγχάνειν, τῶν τε ἐμῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τε καὶ σφαλμάτων, τῶν ἐξ ἀπειρίας, ἀμνημονεύειν, διορθοῦσθαι δέ μοι μᾶλλον ἀδελφικῶς κατὰ συμπεριφορὰν τούτων τὰ ἕκαστα*

Again (Migne, 85, p. 652) later on, but still about the division of the Acts into chapters: *ἐκ πατέρων ἡμεῖς καὶ διδασκάλων τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸν τύπον ὠφελημένοι, ἐγχειροῦμεν μετρίως τῇδε τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐκθέσει, αἰτοῦντες συγγνώμην προπετείας ἡμεῖς, οἱ νέοι χρόνων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παρ' ὑμῶν ἑκάστου τῶν ἀναγιγνωσκόντων, εὐχῇ τῇ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὴν συμπεριφορὰν κομιζόμενοι. ἐκτιθέμεθα γοῦν κ.τ.λ.*

Again (Migne, 85, p. 665) from the Elenchus Capitum VII. Epp. Cath.: *ἐφ' οἷς οὖν ἔγωγε τολμῶ συγγνώμην αἰτῶ νέμειν ...ἀδελφὲ Ἀθανάσιε τιμιώτατε...ἐγὼ δέ τοι στιχηδὸν τὰς καθολικὰς καθ' ἑξῆς ἐπιστολὰς ἀναγνώσομαι, τὴν τῶν κεφαλαίων ἔκθεσιν ἅμα καὶ θείων μαρτυρίων μετρίως ἐνθένδε ποιούμενος.*

Colophon of H: *ἀντεβλήθη δὲ ἡ βίβλος πρὸς τὸ ἐν Καισαρεία ἀντίγραφον τῆς βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ ἁγίου Παμφίλου χειρὶ γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ.* Cp. Euthalius' own colophon at the end of his Argumenta etc. on the Catholic Epistles (Migne, vol. 85, col. 692): *ἀντεβλήθη δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ καθολικῶν ἐπιστολῶν τὸ βιβλίον πρὸς τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα τῆς ἐν Καισαρείᾳ βιβλιοθήκης Εὐσεβίου τοῦ Παμφίλου.* This notice does not occur in Armenian Bibles. It is curious that the Armenian Version in conjunction with H preserves the notice at the end

of the Pauline Epistles, where the manuscripts of Euthalius omit it; while these preserve the similar notice in connection with the Catholic Epistles, where the Armenian omits it.

7. Let us at this point recapitulate what we have proved in regard to the colophon of H of St Paul.

i. This colophon is identical in style and contents with Euthalius' prefaces, especially with the colophon which he appended to his edition of the Catholic Epistles.

ii. It occurs in Armenian codices of the Pauline Epistles as part and parcel of the Euthalian apparatus.

iii. The colophon of H is therefore from the hand of Euthalius.

iv. The codex H of Paul is written στιχηρῶς. As Scrivener (Introduction I. p. 53) says, it is one of the few documents so written which survive. The στίχοι of codex H are those of Euthalius himself.

8. Three more conclusions suggest themselves as very probable, namely:

v. The codex H of Paul was written out by Euthalius, who elsewhere than in this colophon attests his activity as a scribe.

vi. The Armenian Version of the Pauline Epistles was made from codex H itself or from a near relative of it, say from its parent or sister codex.

vii. The Armenian Version—at least of the Paulines—contains the text of Pamphilus.

9. These three tentative conclusions v. vi. and vii. I now proceed to test. But as a preliminary thereto we must try to date the activity of Euthalius.

The passage hitherto appealed to as deciding his date occurs (on p. 714 of vol. 85 of Migne's Patrologia Graeca) at the end of the Prologue to the 14 epistles of Paul. In Zacagni's Latin version it runs thus (words omitted in the Arm. are bracketed):

MARTYRIUM PAULI APOSTOLI.

Sub Nerone Romanorum imperatore Paulus Apostolus, pulcrum certamen certans in urbe Roma, martyrium ibidem passus est, capite videlicet ense reciso, anno a salutari Christi

passione tricesimo sexto, quinta die mensis Panemi [secundum Syro-Macedones, quae apud Aegyptios dicitur quinta mensis Epiphi,] apud Romanos vero tertio Kal. Julii, qua die suum divinus Apostolus martyrium complevit, anno sexagesimo nono salutaris adventus Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Summa itaque totius temporis ex quo martyrium sustinuit, trecentorum et triginta annorum est, usque ad praesentem hunc consulatum, quartum quidem Arcadii, tertium vero Honorii, fratrum imperatorum Augustorum, indictione nona Periodi quindecennalis, vicesimo nono die mensis Iulii. [Versus narrationis sunt XVI.]

Praecisius designavi tempus martyrii Pauli Apostoli. [Et a consulatu quarto quidem Arcadii, tertio vero Honorii usque ad praesentem hunc consulatum primum Leonis Augusti indictione XII, Epiphi mensis die V, Diocletiani vero annum CLXXIV, sunt anni LXIII; ita ut omnes anni a salvatoris nostri adventu usque ad modo memoratum annum sint anni CCCCLXII.]

10. Now here are given two dates, one answering to A.D. 396, the other to A.D. 459. Whose is the former, if the latter, as generally assumed, be that of Euthalius? Zacagni, the editor of the Greek Euthalius, answers that the former date is that of the ancient father, who divided Paul's Epistles into chapters. There is however nothing in the text to shew that it is meant as the date of the ancient father. On the contrary, it is clearly that of the writer himself. As the Greek text stands, the additional words giving the second date conflict with what precedes in a very enigmatical manner[1].

If however we turn to the Armenian Version of this passage, we find that it ends with the words "praecisius designavi tempus martyrii Pauli." The words "et a consulatu quarto quidem" to "sint anni CCCCLXII" are omitted, and we pass straight on to the enumeration of the lessons or *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἀναγνώσεων καὶ ὧν ἔχουσι κεφαλαίων* and of the *θείων μαρ-*

[1] The Armenian also omits the other words bracketed in the first of the two paragraphs and reads vicesimo nono die mensis *Iunii*. I have compared the printed text of these passages of the Armenian Euthalius with an Armenian Codex of the Bible belonging to Lord Zouche, and with a very ancient uncial fragment containing them which I found in the binding of a New Testament Codex in the Edschmiadzin library.

τυρίων which we have in Migne, Patrol. Gr. vol. 86, p. 716—748.

The old Armenian Version demonstrates that the later date along with the paragraph in which it occurs is an interpolation of an early scribe, and the earlier date becomes assignable to Euthalius. The whole of this father's activity must therefore be put some seventy years earlier than has been supposed, and must belong to the end of the fourth century instead of to the last half of the fifth.

11. The question arises: why was the paragraph containing the later date A.D. 458 inserted in the Greek Text of Euthalius? It has been pointed out by Prof. Jas. Rendel Harris, that Euthalius in his introductions puns upon the word μελέτη in a way that is pointless and unintelligible, unless his work had been really dedicated to a person named Meletius. Now Meletius was an heretical name, so it was erased and that of Athanasius substituted. Already when the Armenian version of Euthalius' introductions was made the text had been thus changed. This Athanasius is usually identified with an Alexandrian presbyter of the name, of the middle of the fifth century. Is it possible that the later date A.D. 459 was interpolated in the Greek text by some one, who saw that Euthalius could not in A.D. 396 have addressed his work to the great Athanasius, who died in A.D. 376? This is of course to assume that the substitution in the text of Athanasius, a safe man, for Meletius which was an heretical name, had already been effected during the first half or so of the fourth century. But this is likely enough, especially as the substitution is already found in the old Armenian version, which we have reason to believe was made early in the fifth century.

The exact nature of this tampering with the text of Euthalius is after all uncertain. It is even conceivable that Euthalius in the year A.D. 458 added the paragraph which contains that date and which the Armenian omits. He assures us that he was still a stripling and a deacon when he finished the introductions to the Paulines, and proceeded *at once* to his work on the Acts. Assume that he was twenty years old in A.D. 396; he may in that case have lived to A.D. 459, and at

the advanced age of 82 may have gone over his own work and have added the paragraph. We are however here in the sphere of mere conjecture.

12. But for the true date of Euthalius we are not dependent on his introductions alone, but possess in old Armenian literature what may possibly be independent testimony on the point. In what is called the book of the Caesars we have in old Armenian a sort of record of different reigns. Father Carekin in his Catalogue des anciennes traductions arméniennes, p. 174, gives this extract from it, which I translate:

i. "Arcadius and Honorius, sons of Theodosius the Great, ruled 24 years. In his (sic) third year there was Euthalius a blessed (father), an Alexandrine, who in admirable copies arranged (or "drew up," *lit.* "ordered") the preface and the particulars (or sections), and the lections of the holy Apostles and of the seven Catholic Epistles, on account of the heresies then existing, of Kalabros and Karpokrates, of Katharos and Eklaros (sic), who said that Christ was a mere man, and rejected the Old Testament and despised its testimony concerning Christ."

ii. Elsewhere in the same book we read thus: "Euthalius writes to a certain monk Athanasius, who asked him for a summary of the Apostles (?=of Acts), against those who corrupt the sacred scriptures. He is not the person who asked for the summary of the Acts, but a certain other person of royal rank."

iii. Another notice is the following: "In the days of Arcadius and Honorius the holy Euthalius of Alexandria made a summary of the Apostle (sic) at the request of the great father Theophilus; also of the Acts and Catholic Epistles, at the request of the royal ecclesiastic Athanasius his contemporary, because of the heresies of Kleobos and Karpokrates, who rejected and destroyed in new testaments the testimonies of the prophets about Christ."

iv. Another manuscript informs us that "This is one person and he who asked for the Acts another person."

These notices, which I translate as they stand, are somewhat obscure, but they add four facts to our knowledge of Euthalius'

work: 1. that he undertook his work on Acts and Catholic Epistles for one person, and upon the Paulines for another. Particular stress is laid on this: 2. that he undertook his work on the Paulines for a Theophilos. This is important, for in Greek and Armenian MSS. alike this work, like the other which came later, is addressed to Athanasius: 3. that the Athanasius who asked him for the work on Acts and Catholic Epistles was a *royal* ecclesiastic, whatever that means: 4. that the motive of Euthalius in adding the testimonia was to controvert those who rejected the Old Testament.

It is significant that in these notices of Euthalius, Theophilus is mentioned instead of Athanasius as the person to whom the work on the Paulines is dedicated. He must be the Theophilus who became twenty-second bishop of Alexandria in July 385 and died Oct. 412. He was a strong opponent of Origenism during the last twelve years of his episcopate; and, if Pamphilus be the ancient father from whom Euthalius derived his chaptering, this may explain the suppression of Pamphilus' name in the prologue. It may be that Theophilus' name, like that of Athanasius, was foisted into some texts instead of the name Meletius. Even if that be so, it affords evidence that Euthalius' work on the Paulines was done before A.D. 412 and not in 458. However, Theophilus is a very likely person to have suggested the task to the Deacon Euthalius. What may be the meaning of the epithet "royal" attached to Athanasius in these notices I cannot tell.

13. Having ascertained the date of Euthalius let us turn to examine the tentative conclusions v. vi. and vii., of which vi. is the most important; for unless the text of H of Paul be the same as that of the Armenian version, serious doubts arise as to v. and vii. A comparison of the two reveals the paradoxical fact that two texts, each claiming to be transcribed from the copy made by Pamphilus which lay in Caesarea, are quite different texts, so that, if one is the text of Pamphilus, then the other cannot be.

In the Archives des Missions Scientifiques, Paris, 1876, third series, third volume, page 420 foll., the Abbé L. Duchesne prints the text of the Paris leaves of H of Paul which contain

2 Cor. x. 8—12, 2 Cor. x. 18—xi. 6, 2 Cor. xii. 2; Gal. i. 1—4; Gal. ii. 14—17; Gal. iv. 30—v. 5. In two columns, I print the Armenian reading to the left, that of H of Paul to right, in cases where there can be no doubt about what the Armenian translator had before him.

Armenian Version. 2 Cor.	Codex H of Paul.
x. 8. ἧς ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Κύριος or ἧς ἔδ. ὁ Κ. ἡμῖν, with D^{c}EFGKL Thdrt Dam.	ἧς ἔδωκεν ὁ Κύριος with ℵ*BCD* and Euthal^{cod}.
x. 9. ἵνα μὴ δόξω with Tischendorf's text and all the great uncials.	ἵνα δὲ μὴ δόξω with 6. 10. 37 and many other cursives.
x. 10. "Will ye say the letters are burthensome and violent?" (N.B. This may be a paraphrase of the translators).	ὅτι αἱ ἐπιστολαὶ μέν, φησίν, βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχυραί with Tisch. and most codd.
xi. 1. ἀνέχεσθε.	ἀνέχεσθέ μου with Tisch. and all Greek sources.
xi. 2. ζηλῶ ὑμᾶς (perhaps due to the translator).	ζηλῶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς with Tisch. and other sources.
xi. 20. Arm. adds (de suo) after ἀνέχεσθε γὰρ the words εἴ τις ἐξαπατᾷ ὑμᾶς.	H has no such addition.
xi. 20. ὑμᾶς εἰς πρόσωπον with D^{b}KLM.	εἰς πρόσωπον ὑμᾶς with ℵBD* et EFGP Euthal^{cod}.
xi. 23. διάκονοι Χριστοῦ εἰσιν with Tisch. and other sources.	διάκονοι Χριστοῦ εἰσὶν κἀγώ (de suo).
xi. 23. παραφρονῶν λέγω with DEFG.	παραφρονῶν λαλῶ with ℵBKLMP.
xi. 23. ἐν κόποις περισσοτέρως, ἐν πληγαῖς περισσοτέρως, ἐν φυλακαῖς ὑπερβαλλόντως with Tisch. and Or.$^{3\,190}$ and P. (N.B. The Arm. uses the same expression in clauses 1 and 2 and alters it after φυλακαῖς, thus: in laboribus maxime, in plagis quam maxime, in	ἐν κόποις περισσοτέρως, ἐν πληγαῖς ὑπερβαλλόντως, ἐν φυλακαῖς περισσοτέρως with ℵ^{c}D^{b}KLM.

Armenian Version. 2 Cor.	Codex H of Paul.
carcere magis quam illi. Here magis quam illi must = ὑπερβαλλόντως.)	
xi. 30. τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ οἶδεν. DEMP Euthal[cod] and others add ἡμῶν.	τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ οἶδεν and after Ἰησοῦ is added over line in small hand Χριστοῦ. ℵBF[Gr]G KL omit ἡμῶν.
xi. 32. πιάσαι με with BD*.	πιάσαι με θέλων with ℵD[c]EKL MP Euthal[cod].
xii. 1 = Igitur gloriari quid oportet? sed expedit nihil.	εἰ καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ οὐ συμφέρει μοι "Euthal[cod] (corrupte) Ambrst al praem εἰ."
Gal. ii. 16. εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν.	εἰς Ἰη. Χρ.

14. Lastly, in Gal. v. 1 the Armenian both agrees with and differs from H in an interesting way. Tischendorf, with all other sources except the Armenian, ends ch. 4. v. 31 with the words διό, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἐσμὲν παιδίσκης τέκνα ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐλευθέρας, and begins the next chapter with the words τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν. Στήκετε οὖν κ. τ. λ. So H reads except that it transposes Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς and reads στῆτε. The Armenian is the only text which has preserved the true reading and sense of the passage. It = διό...τῆς ἐλευθέρας τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ᾗ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς (or? Χρ. ἡμ.) ἠλευθέρωσεν. Στήκετε οὖν. No editor has seen that the words τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ...ἠλευθέρωσεν go with ἐλευθέρας, and that a new subject begins with Στήκετε οὖν. In D[b] et[c] EKL and a few fathers we find η added before or after ἡμᾶς, but all the great uncials have gone wrong, including C[c]KL, which wrongly add οὖν after ἐλευθερίᾳ. The bungle must have arisen through the omission in some very early text of ᾗ before ἡμᾶς. The Armenian alone has kept the true text.

15. The few differences so far pointed out between H and the Armenian prove that both cannot be faithful copies of the codex of Pamphilus. For if they were, they would be the same all through. So the problem left us to solve, is to determine whether the Armenian and H have a common basis, whether

that basis was the codex Pamphili, and, if so, which best preserves to us this common basis.

16. I owe to Wilhelm Bousset, Textkritische Studien, Leipzig 1894, many of the data necessary to a solution. He points out that the corrections of the Sinaitic codex by the 3rd hand, ℵ^{c}, are from the same hand which wrote the colophon at the end of Esther to this effect: *ἀντεβλήθη πρὸς παλαιώτατον λίαν ἀντίγραφον δεδιορθωμένον χειρὶ τοῦ ἁγίου μάρτυρος Παμφίλου.* This copy of the O. T. corrected by Pamphilus, the same colophon tells us, professed to be copied from the Hexapla of Origen. Bousset proceeds to shew (*α*) that corrections by ℵ^{c} in the text of the N. T. were derived from a codex of Pamphilus, the pupil of Origen: (*β*) that ℵ^{c} agrees with H of Paul: (*γ*) that both ℵ^{c} and H agree with the codex Euthalii (the codex rescriptus Porfirianus Chiovensis P); for the colophon of H closely resembles the colophon on Acts and Catholic Epistles found in the Argumenta of Euthalius. Bousset does not see that the colophon of H is from the pen of Euthalius himself, though he comes very near to doing so. Scrivener (Introd. ed. G. Miller, vol. I. p. 183) had already acutely remarked that the subscriptions in H "appear due to Euthalius of Sulci." It only needed the Armenian manuscripts to substantiate Scrivener's conjecture. On pages 53—66 of his Studien zum Neuen Testament Bousset analyses in tables the exact relation in which H stands to ℵ^{c} and to the older and younger uncial codices. I gratefully avail myself of his work in order to test the value of the Armenian text and to ascertain whether, as its colophon implies, it is really the text of Pamphilus.

17. In Textkritische Studien (Leipzig 1894), W. Bousset gives on pp. 53—55 a table of 33 passages (two not quite certain) in which H and ℵ^{c} agree together. Of these agreements 14 are not of such a character that we can identify them in the Armenian Version. There remain 19 in which we can test the Version. In 12 of these the Arm. = Hℵ^{c}, viz.: 1 Cor. 10. 23 *πάντα* + *μοι*: 2 Cor. 4. 6 *λάμψαι*: 2 Cor. 10. 18 to *ἐστι δόκιμος*: 2 Cor. 11. 3 om. *καὶ τῆς ἁγνότητος*: 2 Cor. 11. 27 + *ἐν'' κόπῳ*: Col. 1. 28 Χριστῷ + Ἰησοῦ: Col. 3. 5 *τὰ μέλη* + *ὑμῶν*: 1 Tim. 1. 12 *ἐνδυναμώσαντι*: 1 Tim. 2. 3 *τοῦτο* + *γὰρ*: 1 Tim. 6. 13

παραγγέλλω + σοι: Heb. 10. 34 μένουσαν + ἐν οὐρανοῖς. It also in a twelfth case, Col. 2. 7, agrees with H and ℵ^{c} in reading ἐν αὐτῷ (or αὐτῇ) ἐν εὐχαριστίᾳ. Thus we have 12 cases of well marked and highly characteristic readings in which the Arm. = Hℵ^{c}. In most of these cases the oldest fathers, Clement and Origen, also agree with the Arm., as also does the Euthalian codex.

There remain seven cases of conflict between the Arm. Version on the one hand and Hℵ^{c} on the other, viz.:

i. 2 Cor. 11. 23 where the Arm. has ἐν πληγαῖς περισσοτέρως ἐν φυλακαῖς ὑπερβαλλόντως, a reading testified to by Origen, though not "in einem freien Citat", as Bousset thinks.

ii. Tit. 2. 5 Arm. has οἰκουργούς with ℵ*ACD*EFG and Clem. rom. H: but Hℵ read οἰκουρούς with Clem. Chr. Th. Euth.

iii. Tit. 3. 15 Arm. omits ἀμήν with ℵ*ACD* against Hℵ^{c} Euth.

iv. Heb. 12. 11 Arm. has πᾶσα μὲν or πᾶσα with ℵP and Orig^{int}.

v. Heb. 13. 25 Arm. omits ἀμήν with ℵ* against Hℵ^{c} Euth.

vi. 1 Tim. 1. 17 Arm. omits σοφῷ after μόνῳ with ℵ*AD*FG against Hℵ^{c} (non Euthal.).

vii. 1 Tim. 2. 8 Arm. has διαλογισμοῦ with ℵ*ADKLP Orig. Chr. Euthal.^{cod} Thdrt. Dam. διαλογισμῶν in Hℵ^{c}.

Where then the Arm. differs from the combination it differs in excellent company, e.g. in i. iv. and vii. it has Origen on its side. In ii. it has Clement of Rome to support it. In vi. and vii. it also carries with it the Euthal^{cod}.

18. On p. 56 Bousset gives 15 cases where H is opposed to ℵ^{c}. Of these 6 cannot be tested by the Armenian. In three more it agrees with H, viz. Col. 2. 2 συμβιβασθέντες. So BℵACDP and Clem.: Col. 2. 20 εἰ ἀπεθάνετε. So Euth. B(ℵ)ACDGKLP: 1 Tim. 2. 7 add ἐν Χριστῷ. So Euth. ℵD^{c}KL. Thus where the Arm. and H agree in opposition to ℵ^{c}, they are supported by Clement and Euthal.^{cod}, though opposed in Col. 2. 20 to Origen^{int} 4. 665.

In 5 more cases the Arm. is opposed to H, viz.:

i. Col. 2. 4 Arm. has *τοῦτο δὲ* with ℵ^{c}A^{corr}CDEKLP Clem. Thdrt. Dam.

ii. 1 Tim. 2. 9 Arm. has *ὡσαύτως καὶ* with ℵ^{c}DFGKL Orig.^{1,198} against HℵAP Clem.^{247} and Or.^{1,211}.

iii. 1 Tim. 6. 10 Arm. has *πολλαῖς* with ℵ^{c} and all sources except ℵH which read *ποικίλαις*.

iv. Tit 2. 4 Arm. has *σωφρονίζωσι* with ℵ^{c} Orig.^{cat} and all sources except H Euth. ℵAGP.

v. 2 Cor. 4. 4 Arm. has *τοῦ ἀοράτου θεοῦ*. So *ἀοράτου* is added by ℵ^{c}LP. H has a lacuna where *τοῦ ἀοράτου* could hardly have stood.

In all these five test cases the Arm. adheres to the Pamphilian hand of ℵ, whereas H forsakes it. In but one case (ii) has H support from Origen, and even then this father is neutral.

The one passage remains, Col. 2. 2, where H reads *τοῦ θεοῦ* with D^{b}P, while *τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is in ℵ^{c} and *τοῦ θεοῦ Χριστοῦ* in B. Here the Armenian has *τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* (or *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν*), which comes nearest to the reading of Clement *τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ* and is clearly the unsophisticated and primitive reading. These cases are most eloquent. If the third hand of the Cod. Sinaiticus ℵ^{c} is that which corrected the codex from the copy of Pamphilus—then the Armenian adheres to the Pamphilian reading where H departs from it.

19. On pages 59, 60 Bousset gives a table of 26 passages where H finds support from no majuscules or from one or two only. It would be long, though instructive, to go through them in detail. Let it suffice to say that in 17 of them, in which the Armenian admits of being tested, we find but a single case of agreement with H. This one case is the reading *ὃ νῦν* for *νῦν δὲ* in Col. 1. 26. And here *ὁ νῦν* is expressly attested by Clem.^{182} and Euthal.^{cod}. It is clear that wherever H departs from the great majuscules to agree with a few minuscules, the Armenian remains faithful to the former.

20. On pages 62—65 Bousset gives a table of 56 cases in which H conflicts with the younger majuscules, but agrees with the older ones and with a certain group of minuscules. In but 10 of these, out of 36 where the Armenian can be tested, is

there any conflict between Arm. and H. In these ten cases the following are the Arm. readings: (1) 2 Cor. 10. 8 ἡμῖν ὁ Κύριος: (2) 2 Cor. 11. 20 ὑμᾶς εἰς πρόσωπον: (3) 2 Cor. 11. 31 τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν: (4) Gal. 2. 16 οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐξ ἔργων νόμου: (5) 1 Thess. 2. 9 νυκτὸς γὰρ: (6) 1 Tim. 1. 13 τὸν for τὸ: (7) 1 Tim. 1. 16 Ἰησ. Χρ.: (8) 1 Tim. 3. 7 δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν: (9) 1 Tim. 6. 13 ζωοποιοῦντος: (10) 2 Cor. 4. 4 add ἐν αὐτοῖς. In all these cases the opposition of the Version is of no random sort, but is backed steadily by the following sources, KL Chris. Thdrt. Dam. In 8 of these, D or one of the secondary hands of D also agrees with the Version. In Nos. 7 and 9, ℵ supports the Version. In cases 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 the Euthal.^{cod} also agrees with the Armenian, a proof that in this codex we often have the true hand of Euthalius, where it has vanished from H. This much then is clear, that the Armenian is more faithful to the Euthalian codex than is H; for H often forsakes it, but the Armenian hardly ever.

21. Lastly, on p. 66 Bousset gives a table of 12 cases in which H goes with the later majuscules only, eight of which cases can be tested in the Armenian. Here we find that in two cases only does the Armenian follow H, namely in the readings: (i) 2 Cor. 11. 1 τῇ ἀφροσύνῃ. Here again Euthal.^{cod} KLP Chr. Thdrt. Dam. all go with the Armenian: (ii) 1 Th. 2. 13 omit καὶ before διὰ τοῦτο. Here καὶ is omitted in DEFGHKL Chr. In the other six cases the Arm. adheres to the older uncials. In two of these cases the reading of H is very characteristic, viz.: (i) 2 Cor. 12. 1 οὐ συμφέρει μοι, and (ii) 2 Tim. 2. 3 σὺ οὖν κακοπάθησον. Both these readings are rejected by the Armenian, yet figure in D^{c}KL Chr. Thdrt. Dam., with which group of authorities the Armenian usually agrees. In (i) the Euthal.^{cod} has οὐ συμφέρει without μοι. The Armenian may have had either οὐ συμφέρον μὲν or οὐ συμφέρει. It is only clear that it omits μοι. The other reading σὺ οὖν κακοπ. is found in the Euthal.^{cod}.

22. These results may be summed up as follows.

1. The Armenian Version on the whole adheres more closely to ℵ^{c} than does H. Bousset on p. 70 sums up his results by saying that ℵ^{c}H Euthal.^{cod} are closely allied. This

affinity, he says, is to be explained from the fact that "all three rest on the codex Pamphili as a common basis." Our analysis of the Armenian text shews that it has still more of ℵ^{c}, than either H or the Euthal.^{cod}. Now ℵ^{c} is the Pamphilian corrector of ℵ. Therefore the Armenian embodies more of the Pamphilian common basis than H or Euthal.^{cod}.

2. In determining what was the text of the codex Pamphili the Armenian is of prime importance, especially where it agrees with one or more of the following sources: ℵ^{c}, H, Euthal.^{cod}, the minuscules[1] (17), (23), 31, 37, 39, (46), 47, (67...), 71, 73, 80, 93, 115, 116, 118, (131), (137), (179), (252), or with citations in Clement or Origen.

Thus the common colophon of the Armenian Version and H is fully justified.

23. The results arrived at in the above paper come to this. In the year 396 Euthalius took the codex Pamphili of Paul, which lay in the Eusebian library of Caesarea, and made a copy of it στειχηρῶς, adding prologues, testimonia, summaries of chapters, etc. The chaptering of his new copy was not his own, but borrowed probably from the codex Pamphili.

The Armenian fathers translated the Epistles of Paul early in the fifth century along with the rest of the Bible. They selected for translation what we may call the new edition by Euthalius, which comprised the text of Pamphilus with new "adornments (or arrangements) desired of all men." The supplementary colophon which I here quote was in the Greek copy which they translated. Some owner of an Euthalian edition had added it. That the Armenians went to Origen's library for their copy of the Scriptures we already knew for certain; for we find in their Bibles the obeliski etc. of Origen, also marginal readings of Aquila and Symmachus derived from Origen's copies. Other copies of the Euthalian edition survive in the Euthalian codex and in the codex H of Paul. This codex, though of the VIth century, is not so true to the original edition as the Armenian Version taken from it very early in the fifth century.

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

[1] This list of minuscules I copy from Bousset, who has examined their readings.

VARIOUS CONJECTURES III.

Philostratus.

Vit. Apoll. ii. 7. 4 *ὅτι δ' οἶνον ἠγῇ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πόμα, δηλοῖς τῷ σπένδειν τ'* [*ἀπ'*] *αὐτοῦ τῷ Διί.* See below on Aesch. *Ag.* 1394.—iv. 20 *παρέτυχε μὲν τῷ λόγῳ μειράκιον τῶν ἁβρῶν οὕτως ἀσελγὲς νομιζόμενον ὡς γενέσθαι ποτὲ καὶ τῶν ἁμαξῶν ᾄσμα...ὁ δ' ἀναβλέψας ἐς αὐτό, Οὐ σὺ, ἔφη, ταῦθ' ὑβρίζεις ἀλλ' ὁ δαίμων ὃς ἐλαύνει σε οὐκ εἰδότα.* And the youth was in fact secretly possessed by a devil, for he would laugh when no one else did, and change to crying without cause; he used to talk to himself and sing. The general opinion attributed these ebullitions to the exuberance of youth, *ὁ δ' ὑπεκρίνετο ἄρα τῷ δαίμονι,* but the truth was that he responded to the devil, *καὶ ἐδόκει παροινεῖν ἃ ἐπαρῴνει τότε.* '*sicque ea patrare observabatur quae tum quoque proterve committebat*' Olearius, '*quaeque tunc agebat, solita sua protervitate agere videbatur*' Westermann, neither of which could be expressed by the Greek, or would have any point: indeed in the text as it stands there can be none. Write *καὶ ἐδόκει παροινεῖν ἃ ἐπαρῳνεῖτο,* 'he appeared to play mad freaks that were really played upon him.' *παροινεῖσθαι* is so used by Demosth. 403. 8, 1258. 6, *Epist. Phalar.* 8, and Eusebius *πρὸς τὰ Ἱεροκλ.* p. 73 has *καὶ τοῦ ἀσελγοῦς δὲ μειρακίου σαφῶς ἔνοικον δαίμονα, καὶ πάλιν ἣν ἔφησεν* [*Vit. Ap.* iv. 25] *ἔμπουσάν τε καὶ λάμιαν ἐμπεπαρῳνηκέναι τῷ Μενίππῳ.* Cf. Heliod. *Aeth.* v. 4 *ἔπαιζε δ' ἄρα τι τὸν Κνήμωνα δαιμόνιον....* By a similar error in Lucian i. 324 *ἐμεγαλαύχει τότε* for *ἐμεγαλαυχεῖτο* (cod. F), Cobet *V. L.* 232.—v. 35 *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο* for *οὔτε.*—vi. 5 *τοῦτον ἀκουσίου φόνου μέν, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δ' εἰργασμένου, μὴ καθῆραι. φόνου* is misplaced; we need *ἀκουσίου μέν.*—43 *Μοῖραι δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ βουλ<εύ>ον-*

ται. Cf. Hom. δ 822, Aesch. *Cho.* 989, 624, Soph. *Phil.* 1137, Apoll. Rhod. iii. 743, Aelian *N. A.* v. 54, xiii. 17.—vii. 42 *δέρη τε <πρὸς>* or *<ἐπὶ> τούτοις ἐλευθέρα.*—viii. 7. 39 *τούτῳ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν, τί λέγω χρήματα; πηγαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσι πλούτου.* I cannot think the reading sound. According to the examples known to me of this rhetorical construction, if he is to say *τί λέγω χ.;* he should have mentioned *χρήματα* before: cf. i. 46 *πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐγγὺς ἐσποιεῖ αὐτῇ—τί λέγω τὸ ἐγγύς; . .* viii. 26 *τήμερον—τί λέγω τήμερον; ἄρτι . .* (vi. 19 *πλὴν ὀλίγων· ὀλίγων γάρ; πάνυ μέντοι ὀλίγων*). Dem. 270. 21 *ὀψὲ γάρ ποτε—ὀψὲ λέγω; χθὲς μὲν οὖν καὶ πρῴην* (a celebrated instance with the rhetoricians: see Schaefer *Apparat. ad Dem.* ii. p. 195). Aristid. ii. 399 *ἐὰν ἴδωσι τὴν Ἑλένην—Ἑλένην λέγω; θεράπαιναν μὲν οὖν . .*[1] Eusebius *πρὸς τὰ Ἱεροκλ.* quotes the sentence, but the reading there seems doubtful. Olearius says 'Morellus in margine observaverat in MS. se invenisse *τί λέγω,* quae lectio, cum in Philostrati quoque textu inveniatur, retinenda videbatur. Editi tamen h. l. habebant *ἄπληστα* pro *τί λέγω.*' Perhaps *ἐντεῦθεν <ἄπλετα χρήματα>—τί . .* or *χρήματα πλεῖστα.*

Imag. i. 11 *Ζεφύρῳ τε χρήσονται (οἱ κύκνοι) πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν ἐλαφρῷ καὶ ἐνοδίῳ. λέγεται γὰρ ξυναυλίαν τοῦ θρήνου τοῖς κύκνοις ὁμολογῆσαι. ταῦτά τοι καὶ πάρεστι τοῖς ὄρνισιν· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ ψάλλειν αὐτοὺς οἷον ὄργανα.* Kayser rightly retained the MS. text, but Benndorf and Schenkl (1893) follow Jacobs and Westermann in adopting Welcker's alteration *ὥστε, ὅρα, καὶ . .* Yet Jacobs himself remarks that *ὥστε ὥρα* with inf. is a common phrase, referring to his own note on Ach. Tat. p. 409. However, he takes *ταῦτά τοι* rightly in the sense 'therefore,' which is common in Philostr., as he shows in his note on *Imag.* ii. 6. The mistake is in supposing it to refer to the following *ὥστε,* whereas it refers to the preceding sentence. Olearius had translated 'haec itaque in avium istarum quoque geruntur aspectu,' and Westermann, like him, makes the blunder of taking *καὶ* with *τοῖς ὄρνισιν* instead of *πάρεστι,* 'hoc igitur apparet etiam in avibus, ac vide, ut ipsos pulset tanquam instrumenta.' It commonly follows *ταῦτά τοι* and such phrases; in English the effect of the particle is expressed merely by

[1] Add Liban. i. p. 182, ii. 318. 17, iv. 153. 6, 23 (Reiske).

intonation, 'that is the reason he is *here*.'—ii. 24 *ὁ γεωργὸς δὲ λίθοις ἐπὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα. καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς στολῆς Δώριος, . .* After *Ἡρακλέα* Kayser (referred to by Benndorf and Schenkl) suspects 'nonnihil excidisse.' Jacobs supposes an ellipse (illustrated in his note on ii. 22), but no more than the rest gives any sign of knowing in what the omission consists. It is merely *χρῆται*: *Apoll.* iv. 10 *ὡς ἀκροβολισμῷ τινες ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐχρῶντο.* Thuc. vii. 70 *τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις ἀφθόνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο*, remembrance of which would have prevented Cobet *V. L.* p. 65 on Alciphr. iii. 54 *καὶ οἱ μὲν πὺξ ἔπαιον ἄλλοι δὲ λίθοις ἐχρῶντο* from remarking 'mire dictum pro *ἔβαλλον*.'—25 (Heracles with Abderos) *τὰ μὲν δὴ δάκρυα τὰ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰ δή τι περιεπτύξατο αὐτῶν ἢ ὀλοφυρόμενος εἶπε, καὶ τὸ βαρὺ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ ἐπὶ πένθει δεδόσθω καὶ ἄλλῳ ἐραστῇ ἄλλο· ἐχέτω τι καὶ ἡ στήλη γέρας, . .* 'vultumque subtristem lugenti condonemus, imo et aliis amantibus alia' Olearius. Heyne read *τὸ ἐπὶ πένθει* (which cod. Par. 1761 has) and is followed by Jacobs, Westermann, Kayser, and Schenkl: Lindau suggests *τοιούτῳ ἐπὶ*, Benndorf *ὅτῳ ἐπὶ*. Heyne also punctuated *ἐραστῇ. ἄλλο ἐχέτω . .* Westermann and Kayser omit *ἄλλο*. But they are obliged to interpret as though the text were *. . δεδόσθω αὐτῷ ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλῳ τινι ἐραστῇ.* The difficulty which all feel is simply removed by reading *. . καὶ τὸ βαρὺ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ ἐπὶ πένθει δεδόσθω καὶ ἄλλως ἐραστῇ. ἐχέτω τι καὶ ἡ στήλη γέρας, . .* This use of *καὶ ἄλλως* is common in Philostr., *e.g. Imag.* ii. 22 *γηγενεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἰσχυροί.* Cod. Par. 1761 omits *ἄλλο*, and Jacobs observed that it might be due to dittography: cod. *F* is now stated to have *ἄλλο**, whence I infer that *ἄλλως* was recorded as a variant for *ἄλλῳ*, and then, being taken into the text, altered for sense to *ἄλλο*. Westermann and Kayser give only *τὸ ἐπὶ πένθει* without mentioning *τῷ*.—26 Jacobs, I found, had already written *οὐ<δὲν> δεῖ βλιμάζειν*, but the later editors pay no regard, unaware, it seems, that *οὐ δεῖ* is not Greek for 'there is no need.'

Heroic. 287 = 667 *τὴν* [*τε*] *γοῦν στρατείαν.*—327 = 744 *λίθοι <δ'> οὖν.*

Epist. 59 *τίς γὰρ οὕτω τυφλὸς ποταμὸς ὡς σὴν γῆν μὴ γεωργεῖν.* I should guess *ὡς τὴν σὴν μή.*

Gymnast. p. 58 *ἀηδεῖς τ' ἰδεῖν αἱ τοιαίδε* for *αἵδε φλέβες* (which words are omitted by D 3), as p. 60 *δυσάλωτοι οἱ τοιοίδε*, p. 54 *κοῦφοι γὰρ δὴ οἱ τοιοίδε* (as Cobet and V for *οὕτως οἵδε*).

Vit. Soph. i. 18 *ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ καταψηφισθέντι Ἀντιφῶντι ἥλω κριθείς*. I should write *ἐπὶ δὲ κ. τῷ Ἀ.* The elegant use of the predicate is familiar and delightful to Philostratus.

Heliodorus *Aethiopica.*

i. 15 fin. *μάλιστα μὲν εἰκὸς σχολάσαι τὸν ἔρωτα· πολλαῖς γὰρ...εἰ δ' <οὖν> ἐναπομείνειεν*, . . Neither Coraes nor Bekker reads or records *γάρ*, which, however, is necessary with the parenthesis, after which *δ' οὖν* is natural.

ii. 16 *δέδοικα μὴ εἰς σὲ τείνοι τὸν ἐνύπνιον. τείνῃ* Bekker: I should prefer *τείνει*.—30 *ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐμὲ περιουσία σχολῇ γοῦν καὶ ἑνὸς εἴη τῶν ὁρωμένων ἰσοστάσιος*. So B and Hirschig. Read *σχολῇ γ' ἂν καὶ* . . The other MSS, to make a construction, insert *σ. γοῦν εἰ καὶ* . . and are followed by Coraes and Bekker.

iv. 4 *ἀντέχεις ἐγρηγορὼς καὶ τὴν διήγησιν μηκυνομένην οὐκ ἀποκναίεις*. The editors retain this, though Coraes comments on the strange construction, suggesting *καὶ <πρὸς> τὴν δ. μ. οὐκ ἀποκναίῃ*. Hase in the *Thesaurus s. v. ἀποκναίω* remarks that it is 'activi singularis usus.' Indeed it would be. Struwe conjectured *ἀποκνεῖς*, but Coraes was nearer the truth. Read merely *ἀποκναίει* (or *-ῃ*). The construction is of those treated by Lobeck on Soph. *Aj.* 136 *σὲ μὲν εὖ πράσσοντ' ἐπιχαίρω*. Suidas *s. v. Χαίρω σε ἐληλυθότα* says *Ὀρωπικοὶ οὕτω λέγουσι*: the ancient grammarians elsewhere call the construction Attic (Schol. Hom. Z 480, Eustath. 737. 1 on I 77). By their aid we have a considerable number of examples with the participle from Comedy as well as Tragedy: in prose it is very rare, but I have recorded Xen. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* ii. 18 *ὥστε οὐδὲ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄχθονται κωμῳδουμένους*, Aristid. i. 360 *ἄχθομαι δ' ἔγωγε ἑτέρους φθάσαντας εἰπεῖν*. There is no need, however, of that confirmation, for Heliod. iii. 16 has *ἤσθην ἀπαγγελθέντα μοι*

τὸν νεανίαν. In Lucian i. 602 ἥδοιντ' ἄν, οἶμαι, μαστιγουμένων, where Bekker conjectured -ένῳ, the right reading might be μαστιγούμενον. By the same construction I believe Eur. *Med.* 896 may be emended: εἰκὸς γὰρ ὀργὰς θῆλυ ποιεῖσθαι γένος γάμους παρεμπολῶντος ἀλλοίους πόσει. It is agreed that ἀλλοίους is spurious: the best conjecture yet made is due I think to Bernardakis, παρεμπολῶντι καλλίους. But I read γάμους παρεμπολῶντ' ἐπεισάκτους πόσιν. This is just the place for the accusative-construction, by which stress is laid upon the act, 'at the importation by a husband of ...' ἐπεισάκτους is exactly the word to be expected (as ἐπεισάγειν *Com. fr. adesp.* 110, Andoc. p. 30. 42, Hel. *Aeth.* i. 9, Ath. 557 d), as Lycophr. *Alex.* 60 πατρὸς μομφῇσιν ἠγριωμένη λέκτρων θ' ἕκατι τῶν τ' ἐπεισάκτων γάμων: Sch. ξένων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων. Hesych. ἐπεισάκτου: ἀλλοτρίου. And it carries out the metaphor in παρεμπολᾶν on which the schol. remarks. Without the participle the accusative is common enough in prose with such words as δυσχεραίνειν: in Ach. Tat. iv. 1 τὴν μὲν ἀναβολὴν ἠχθόμην, though altered to the dative by such a critic as Hirschig, is of course right.—6 I doubt whether here and in viii. 13 Heliod. wrote οἰμώξει for οἰμώξεται, which is rightly found in v. 29, as οἰμώξῃ in v. 31.—17 νυκτός τ' ἀωρίᾳ: only in this place, and it should probably be ἀωρί, which he often has.

v. 5 οὐδένα γὰρ χρόνον εἶναι ὃς ἀμαυρῶσαι . . ἀμαυρώσαι Coraes, Bekker. Read ἀμαυρώσοι.

v. 13 ὡς δ' οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν νεὼν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ παρεγένοντο,..., καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάχιστά τε, οὕτω πρὸς βραχὺ τὰ σπλάγχνα ὁ Καλάστρις ἐπιθεωρήσας, καὶ . . ἐμφήνας, ἐπιβάλλει τὼ χεῖρε τοῖς βωμοῖς . . So B, except that I have omitted a parenthesis after παρεγένοντο and several words before ἐμφήνας. The rest have οὕτω καὶ . . Coraes ii. p. 177 reads τούτων for τε οὕτω, understanding καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά, τούτων τῶν ἱερῶν. Bekker suggests ἐσφαγίαστο for τάχιστά τε. Write καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάχιστα τέθγτο, πρὸς βραχύ . . Hel. has τάχιστα in this position again v. 29 ὡς δὲ ἐκεῖνοι τ. παρῆσαν, as Hdt. vii. 172 ἐπείτε γὰρ ἐπύθοντο τ., Dem. 320. 10, Lucian iii. 48. Antiphon i. 17 p. 113. 16 has καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἐτέθυτο τὰ ἱερά, ἐντεῦθεν . ., Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 1. 23 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐτέθυτο with v. l. δὲ τέθυτο: Hel. prefers the

unaugmented form, and in v. 27 and 32 (= 28 and 33 Bekk.) *ἐκτετάρακτο* (used in viii. 9) of B is probably right (of water in Aelian *N. A.* xiv. 3).—29 (= 30 Bekk.) *καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πάντων ἀτοπώτατον*: *εἶναι* I think.

vii. 8 *καὶ τὸ προκείμενον πεδίον ἐπλήρου* [*διὰ*] *πάσης ἡλικίας*.—14 fin. *οἴχεται ἡ σεμνὴ καὶ μείλιχος, ἡ σοφὴ καὶ πολιὰ τῷ ὄντι φρήν, τῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς εὐεργεσιῶν οὔτ'* (*οὐδὲ* Bekker) *αὐτὴ τέλος ἀραμένη* (*εὐραμένη* Coraes). *τῷ ὄντι* indicates a quotation, and I suspect that the whole is borrowed from an elegiac couplet, as

> *οἴχεται ἡ σεμνὴ καὶ μείλιχος, ἡ πολιὰ φρήν,*
> *τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν οὐ τέλος εὑραμένη* (or *εὑρομ-*).

ix. 22 *ἐπὶ μέγα τὸν Νεῖλον αἴροντες, Ὧρόν τε καὶ τὸν ζείδωρον ἀποκαλοῦντες. τὸν*, though absent in B, omitted by Coraes and Bekker, and bracketed by Hirschig, nor indeed necessary, should probably be read with the adjective: cf. i. 13, Matthiae *Gr. Gr.* § 268 who also emends Eur. *I. A.* 1354.

Achilles Tatius.

i. 8 *τὸ γὰρ κάλλος ἔχει τινα παρηγορίαν τῶν κακῶν* for *τήν*.

iv. 10 *χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ ἐρῶντες πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ προστάγματα* for *πράγματα*.

viii. 14 *μηδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον* for *μήτε*.

Longus.

i. 21 *οἱ κύνες . . , οἷα δὴ κυνῶν ἐν ῥινηλασίαις περιεργία, . . ὥρμησαν*. We must read either *περιεργίᾳ* or better *οἵα*, as *e.g.* Philostr. *Epist.* 73 *οἵα σου σοφία καὶ μῆτις*.

ii. 3 *σισύραν ἐνδεδυμένος, καρβατίνας ὑποδεδεμένος, πήραν ἐξηρτημένος, καὶ τὴν πήραν παλαιάν*. Longus never wrote such Greek, but *καὶ ταύτην παλαιάν*, on which *τὴν πήραν* is a gloss.

iv. 10 *ἦν ἐν τοῖς δώροις καὶ ἀνθοσμίας οἶνος Λέσβιος, ποθῆναι ἥδιστος οἶνος*. The presence of *οἶνος* in two places probably means that it should be ejected from both as a gloss. *ἀνθοσμίας* is often used without it. So in *Epist. Phalar.* 96 *ἡ θρέψασα πόλις τὸν τοιοῦτον*, where there is a variant *ἡ θρέψασα τοῦτον*

πόλις, the substantive is probably an insertion. ἡ θρέψασα is more 'exquisite' without it: Lycurg. 153. 42 τὴν δὲ θρέψασαν αὐτοὺς . . Polyb. xiii. 6. 4 οἷς ἄβατος ἦν ἡ θ. Cf. Eur. *Supp.* 537. Eur. *Tro.* 824 has ἁ δέ σε γειναμένα, where Τροία is inserted. In the later Atticists ἡ ἐνεγκοῦσα is very common.

Chariton.

iii. 6 ὁ δὲ Χαιρέας τῆς ζακόρου παρούσης οὐδὲν εἶπεν ἀλλ' ἀμεῦ ἐσίγησεν ἐγκρατῶς...πόρρω δὲ ἀπελθὼν...Reiske felt the sense required when he conjectured ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν: but read ἀλλὰ α' μὲν *i.e.* ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν. Examples of this confusion are given by the commentators on Greg. Cor. pp. 349, 653, 850, Cobet *V. L.* 122, *N. L.* 212.

vii. 1 τί οὖν ἐγὼ βραδύνω καὶ οὐκ ἀποσφάξω . . Read ἀποσφάζω.—4 ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς: read καὶ ὡς ἀ.

Lucian.

i. 235 καίτοι τί ἐγὼ ἀδικῶ (says Eros) δεικνὺς τὰ καλὰ οἷά ἐστιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ ἐφίεσθε τῶν καλῶν· μὴ τοίνυν ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθε τούτων· ἀλλ' ἢ θέλεις σύ, ὦ μῆτερ, αὐτὴ μηκέτι ἐρᾶν...; Jacobitz retains this, with no reference to the just criticism of Hemsterhuis, that ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ ἐ. does not agree with μὴ τοίνυν . . , on which account he proposed ὑμεῖς γε μὴν ἐ. Sommerbrodt has the clauses μὴ τοίνυν . . and ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ . . transposed, whether with any authority I cannot tell; at any rate with no remark. But the clauses so transposed no longer lead up to the final *argumentum ad hominem.* The logic of the passage requires either Hemsterhuis' γε μήν, or, what I think more likely, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐφίεσθε τῶν καλῶν; 'is it not beauty that you desire?' Again and again sentences have been corrupted through the absence of interrogative punctuation.—240 τὸν μὲν Ζέφυρον . . τῷ παιδὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν τάφον μὲν ἐχωσάμην ἐν Ἀμύκλαις, καὶ . . ἐποίησα. Hemst. and Lehmann give καὶ τάφον, Jacobitz and Sommerbrodt καὶ τὸν τάφον, without other record, all retaining μέν, which has no possible meaning. But it is omitted by Ω Ups., which also omit δὲ after παιδί, Ω

having *καὶ τῷ παιδί*. The reading which can account for all these variations is *τῷ παιδὶ μέντοι καὶ τάφον ἐ.*, wrongly read *τῷ π. μὲν τὸν καὶ τ.*—672 *τοῦτο ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις δεινοῖς ἐλείπετο* rightly Hemst.—768 *δυνατὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ ἴσως ποτε ἐγένετο* [*καὶ*] *ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ. καὶ* is absent in Ω, and omitted by Fritzsche and Sommerbrodt; I suspect *ἴσως ποτε καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν . .*

ii. 111 *ὥστε νεῖν εὐμαρές* for *εὐμαρῶς*?—205 *δοκεῖτε δ' <ἄν> μοι* or *ἄριστ' <ἄν>*.—500 *Δαμασίας ὁ...ἤδη ὑπὸ γήρως ἔξαθλος ὤν. οἶσθα τὸν χαλκοῦν* [*τὸν*] *ἑστῶτα ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ*. So Lexiphanes is made to say by all MSS. except Ω in which *τὸν* after *χαλκοῦν* is rightly absent. Yet Sommerbrodt, who records this, retains *τὸν ἑ.* like all other editors. The meaning of this would be 'the brazen man, the man who stands in the market-place,' whereas it should of course be 'the man who has a brazen statue in,' = *ὃς χαλκοῦς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῇ ἀ.*, a familiar phrase.—590 *τί γὰρ ἡμῖν* [*δοκεῖ*] *τρέφειν τὸν ὄνον τοῦτον πάντα* (*πανταχοῦ*?) *καταπίπτοντα; ῥίψωμεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρημνοῦ*. Cf. Meleag. *A. P.* v. 178 *πωλείσθω· τί δέ μοι τὸ θρασὺ τοῦτο τρέφειν; id.* xii. 68 *τί δέ μοι...λαβεῖν;* Bion vii. 4 *τί μοι πολὺ πλήονα μοχθεῖν;* Opp. *Hal.* ii. 679 *τί μοι...μεμνῆσθαι; A. P.* xvi. 174 *τί μοι σάκος ἀντίον αἴρειν;* Epictet. i. p. 263. Aelian *N. A.* vii. 11. Euseb. p. 446. In Orph. *Arg.* 479 *ἀλλὰ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε πολὺν λόγον ἀμφαδὸν εἰπεῖν;* I suspect that *μοι* should be read.—603 *καὶ τότε δὴ πρᾶσις ἦν ἡμῶν τῶν χηνῶν καὶ κῆρυξ εὔφημος ἐν ἀγορᾷ μέσῃ ἑστὼς ἐκήρυττεν. εὔφημος* is inappropriate, nor is the virtue of the *ἠπύτα κῆρυξ* to be *εὔφημος*, but *εὔφωνος*: Dem. 449. 26 *λογίζεσθ' ὅτι δεῖ κήρυκα μὲν, ἂν δοκιμάζητ', εὔφωνον σκοπεῖν.*—649 *μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεὸς μήτε τις ἄρσην*. Read *θεῶν ἔτι*? Homer's *θεὸς τόγε* (Θ 7) is impossible here, but probably caused the error.—853 *ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς γεωργεῖ οὐ τοῦ γεωργεῖν ἕνεκα καὶ ὁ τέκτων τεκταίνεται οὐχὶ τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι ἕνεκα, ὁ δὲ παράσιτος οὐχ ἕτερον μέν τι <πράττει, ἕτερον δέ τι> διώκει, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα γίγνεται;* cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 468 A *πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;... τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν*...I had supplied this

before finding that Cobet had said 'manifesta lacuna sic explenda videtur: *οὐχ ἕ. μέν τι πράττει, ἕτερον δὲ διώκει.* tum lege: *καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα γ.*' Iacobitz, quoting this, in his venomous jealousy of Cobet calls it 'futilis coniectura'!

iii. 42 *βόθρον* [τε] *ὀρυξάμενος.*—102 *πίθηκος γὰρ ὁ πίθηκος, ἡ παροιμία φησί, κἂν χρύσεα ἔχῃ σύμβολα.* The proverb is so entered without explanation in Apostol. xiv. 33. Macar. vii. 12 has *Πίθηκος ὁ πίθηκος κἂν χρυσᾶ ἔχῃ σάνδαλα· ἐπὶ τῶν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἐπεισάκτου κόσμου ὠφελουμένων.* Golden sandals are mentioned as luxurious often enough (*e.g.* Lucian iii. 105, 177) for this to be a reasonable phrase, but *σύμβολα* too must have a meaning. We can hardly reconcile the two versions in the common origin, *σάμβαλα*: probably one is merely a popular corruption of the other. The version of Hemsterhuis and Gesner is '*etiamsi aurea gestet crepundia*': the English translation of 1711 '*tho*' *he be cover'd with Cloth of Gold,*' Francklin's '*with all his golden ornaments about him,*' Tooke's '*though hung round with gold and jewels.*' This would be suitable enough, according with Greg. Naz. *Carm.* 49 [4]. 173 (cited by Leutsch on Macar.) *τίς χάρις εἰ σὺ πίθηκον ἔχεις, βροτοείδεα λώβην, χρυσείοισι βρόχοισι δέρην περιγυρωθέντα;* and with the similar proverb *Πίθηκος ἐν πορφύρᾳ: οἱ φαῦλοι κἂν καλοῖς* (v. l. *πολλοῖς*, Bernhardy *ποικίλοις*) *περιβληθῶσιν, ὅμως διαφαίνονται πονηροί* (Suid., Diogen. vii. 94, Apostol. xiv. 32), which is commonly referred to the story recounted by Lucian i. 605 and 713 of the apes taught to dance *ἁλουργίδας ἀμπεχόμενα καὶ προσωπεῖα περικείμενα* (cf. Aelian *N. A.* v. 26, xvii. 25, Pind. *P.* ii. 72). But *σύμβολα* cannot mean *περιδέραια.* It means *insignia, badges* of rank or race, such as the golden grasshoppers worn by the ancient Athenians: schol. Ar. *Nub.* 984...*ἐπειδὴ οἱ παλαιοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναπλοκὴν τῶν τριχῶν χρυσῷ ἐχρῶντο τέττιγι, τεκμήριον τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι αὐτόχθονες εἶεν.* (Thuc. i. 6, Heraclid. Pont. (Ath. 512 c), Lucian iii. 249, Aelian *V. H.* iv. 22), Eustath. 395. 34 *τέττιγας γὰρ ἐφόρουν χρυσοῦς, ὡς Θουκυδίδης φησίν, εἰς σύμβολον τοῦ γηγενεῖς εἶναι.* Himer. *Or.* viii. 4 *οὐ κρώβυλος χρυσοῦς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀνακείμενος τῶν Κεκροπιδῶν τὸ σύμβολον.* ii. 2 *ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι σύμβολον, ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν τῆς εὐγενείας ὑπάρχει γνώρισμα.* Philostr.

V. S. ii. 1. 18 *τὸ ξύμβολον τῆς εὐγενείας περιηρτημένος τῷ ὑποδήματι.* Aelian *fr.* 14 *τὸ διάδημα . . σύμβολον δὴ καὶ μαρτύριον ἀρχῆς.* So Plut. *Marcell.* 7 *τεκμηράμενος ἀπὸ τῶν συμβόλων ἄρχοντα τοῦτον εἶναι,* 'from his insignia.' With the proverb cf. also Lucian i. 600, iii. 34, Clem. Alex. p. 253 (Cobet *N. L.* 342), Longus iii. 26 fin.—167 *εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡ ἀναισχυντία <παρ>οῦσα ἐπήμυνε καὶ χεῖρα ὤρεγε καὶ συνηγωνίζετο αὐτῷ.* Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 733 *σοὶ δὲ νῦν τις θεῶν παρὼν ἐμφανῶς ξυλλαμβάνει τοῦ πράγματος.* Plut. *Mor.* 771 E *καὶ τὸν θεὸν προσκυνῶμεν· δῆλος γάρ ἐστι χαίρων καὶ παρὼν εὐμενὴς τοῖς πραττομένοις.* Plat. *Gorg.* 461 C *ἵνα...παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον.*—238 [*ὡς πίοι δή*] I would eject on the same ground as before in 105 *οἱ πόδες δή* (No. 41 p. 80 of this *Journal*). But I was too confident in suggesting there on 106 *ἧς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μὴ ἐξετάζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν πρὸς σέ·* that *αὐτῶν* was inserted by a scribe who did not understand the idiom. It may have been: *e.g.* in Dem. 232. 7 *οὐδέν ἐστι δήπου πρὸς ἐμέ* some MSS. insert *οὐδέν ἐστι* [*τούτων*]. But, though *οὐδὲν πρός..*, *τί πρὸς ἐμὲ τοῦτο,* and the like are infinitely commoner, the other construction is found in Dem. 245. 9 *ἃ μὲν...ἐάσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τούτων εἶναι πρὸς ἐμέ* (so quoted by Dion. Hal. *περὶ τῆς Δημ. δειν.* p. 997. 15), 'none of them concerns me,' 240. 25 *ἕτερος λόγος οὗτος, οὐ πρὸς ἐμέ,* 309. 12 *οὐδ' ὁ λόγος...πρὸς ἐμέ,* Philostr. *Apoll.* vi. 42 '*τὰ μὲν προστάγματα οὐ πρὸς ἐμὲ*' *ἔφη* '*ταῦτα,*' *Epist. Apoll.* 1 *τάδε μὲν οὖν οὐ πρὸς ἐμέ,...ἐκεῖνα δὲ καὶ πάνυ πρὸς σέ,* and that *οὐδέν* is not necessary is proved by Apollodor. Caryst. *fr.* 4 *πρὸς ἐμὲ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτ', ἐκεῖνο δ' οὔ.*—Also in ii. 260 I was ill-advised in doubting *καὶ δῶρα.*—308 *ἔκλαες γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ δεῖπνον, ἐώρων γάρ.* You expect *ἔκλαες γοῦν* in any case, and especially when *γάρ* follows so closely.—541 *τοὺς μὲν δὴ πόδας οὐδὲν φαίνομαι χεῖρον διακείμενος τῶν ἄλλων* [*ἔχειν*]. Just before we have rightly *πότερ' οὖν τὼ πόδε κάκιον ἔχειν δοκῶ σοι;* but here *ἔχειν* was inserted to govern *πόδας,* the critic not understanding the construction of the accusative. This often happens: Ar. *Nub.* 276 sch. *τινὲς οὖν εἰς τὸ '*δροσερὰν *φύσιν εὐάγητον' προστιθέασι τὸ ἀφεῖσαι, ἵνα ἐντεῦθεν τὰς αἰτιατικὰς συντάξωσι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν*

ἀρχαίων βιβλίων εὕρηται. Soph. *Trach.* 1062 *θῆλυς οὖσα* (*φῦσα* Steinhart, Nauck) *κοὐκ ἀνδρὸς φύσιν*] sch. *λείπει τὸ ἔχουσα.* Eur. *Hipp.* 1266 *φύσιν ὀρεσκόων σκυλάκων*] sch. *φύσιν ἔχων θηρός...τῶν ἐν θαλάττῃ θηρίων φύσιν ἔχων* (*ἔχων* om. A). Sch. Pind. *P.* vi. 14, Aesch. *P. V.* 446: *Vit. Aesch.* init. *ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν τὴν φύσιν* M] *τὴν φύσιν ἔχων recc.* Judge now whether Reiske was not right in ejecting *ἔχοντας* from Hdt. viii. 38 *δύο γὰρ ὁπλίτας μέζονας ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων φύσιν* [*ἔχοντας*].—667 *Ὠκύπους v.* 45 *ἀδύνατος γογγύζων γέρων*: read *ἀδύνατα.*—669 *v.* 76, 77 transpose thus: *εἰ γὰρ μάθοιμι τοῦ πάθους τὴν συμφοράν, τὸ δεινὸν ἄλγος τυχὸν ἴσως ἰάσομαι.* —679 *v.* 142 *τί λέξεις ;* for *τί λέγεις ;*—679 (*A. P.* xi. 431):

εἰ ταχὺς εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν καὶ πρὸς δρόμον ἀμβλὺς ὑπάρχεις
τοῖς ποσί σου τρῶγε καὶ τρέχε τῷ στόματι.

τοῖς σου τ. ποσίν Salmas. Read simply *τρώγειν.*

Diogenes Laertius.

ii. 2. 5 for *ἐνθάδε εἰρηνεῖς* in the Epistle of Anaximenes write *ἔνθα δὴ ε.*, a common error.

vi. 2. 27 *ἐπεβάλε<το> τερετίζειν* as vii. 1. 21, ix. 1. 16.

viii. 1. 8 (Pythagoras) *αὐτοῦ λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς Σκοπίαδας, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή,* Μὴ *ἀναίδευ μηδενί.* cod. Arund. *ἀνααίδευ.* 'Folium Sibyllae mihi quidem haec verba sunt.' Is. Casaubon. Grentemenilius *μὴ ἀνάδευ, adligatus sis nemini.* Tanaquil Faber *μὴ ἀηδεῦ, molestus sis nemini.* Mullach *Frag. Philos. Gr.* ii. p. VII *μὴ ἀναιδεύου* (see L. Dind. in *Thesaur. s. v. ἀναιδεύομαι*). Whether that termination should be adopted or not, the verb should, I feel sure, have the prefix *ἐν-*, *μὴ ἐναναιδεῦ* or *ἐναναιδεύου μηδενί,* 'behave not shamelessly towards anyone.' This is enough to account for the reading *ἀνααίδευ* (in Ar. *Vesp.* 61 G. Dindorf has restored *ἐνασελγαινόμενος* for *ἀνασ.*), and at once makes the dative *μηδενί* normal, as with such words as *ἐνασελγαίνειν, ἐννυβρίζειν, ἐνδιαθρύπτεσθαι, ἐντρυφᾶν, ἐγχλίειν, ἐγκιλικίζειν, ἐμπαίζειν, ἐμπαροινεῖν, ἐμπαῤῥησιάζεσθαι.* (*ἐνασχημονεῖν,* for which add to the Lexicons Heliod. *Aeth.* viii. 15, Philostr. *Epist.* 24, does not happen to occur with dative of

a *person*). In the same section below, *καὶ τὸν βίον ἐοικέναι πανηγύρει· ὡς οὖν...*, *γοῦν* is required.

Oppian.

Cyneg. ii. 380 *τάχ' αἰγὸς ἂν ἰσοφαρίζοι τρηχυτάτῃ χαίτῃ δυσπαίπαλος, οὐκ ὀΐεσσι* [cod. Reg. *τάχ' ἂν αἰγὸς*].

The variation of case in *αἰγός, οὐκ ὀΐεσσι* might be defended, but here we have the singular opposed to the plural and *ἰσοφαρίζειν* constructed with a genitive; neither of which is Greek. Write *αἴγεσιν*, letting doubt concerning the omission of *ἄν* be removed by i. 280 *κείνοισιν τάχα μοῦνος ἐναντίον ἰσοφαρίζοι αἰετός...*

Hal. iii. 221 for *κέλσει* write *κέλσῃ*, and in v. 281 *βάλῃ* for *βαλεῖ*.

Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (Nauck 1889).

Aeschylus 134 *ἐπὶ δ' αἰετὸς ξουθὸς ἱππαλεκτρυών*...so in sch. Ar. *Ran.* 932, in sch. Ar. *Pax* 1177 *ἀπὸ δ' αὖτε ξ.* I do not understand Nauck's *αἰετὸς δὲ*... We can hardly suppose *αἰετοῖς δὲ* (Eur. *fr.* 764, Ion *fr.* 5), for Ar. *Ran.* 934 and sch. are definite that the *ἱππαλ.* was a sign upon a ship (cf. *fr.* 133). Perhaps *ἐπάνδετος δὲ*...(*i.e. ἐπανάδετος*).

358 Plut. *Mor.* 625 D *οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτεροι πόρρω τὰ γράμματα τῶν ὀμμάτων ἀπάγοντες ἀναγινώσκουσιν, ἐγγύθεν δὲ οὐ δύνανται· καὶ τοῦτο παραδηλῶν ὁ Αἰσχύλος φησίν 'οὐδὲ ἀπὸ αὐτὸν οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν γέρων δὲ γραμματεὺς γενοῦ σαφής.'* Heath conj. *σὺ δὲ* for *οὐδὲ*, rightly. Read *σὺ δ' ἐξ ἀπόπτου*.. 'from a distance.' See the *Thesaurus s. v. ἄποπτος* and Jebb on Soph. *Phil.* 466 which of itself is enough to make this certain: *καιρὸς γὰρ καλεῖ πλοῦν μὴ 'ξ ἀπόπτου μᾶλλον ἢ 'γγύθεν σκοπεῖν.* Add to the lexicons schol. Aesch. *Supp.* 832 *ἐξ ἀπόπτου τοὺς Αἰγυπτιάδας ἰδοῦσαι.*

387 (sch. Soph. *O. C.* 1049) *ἔφριξ' ἔρως δὲ τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους. ἔρωτι* Brunck, *ἐρῶ δὲ* Dindorf, *ἐρῶσα* Meineke. If the construction is as Soph. *Aj.* 693 *ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι*, then *ἔρῳ δὴ* (ερωιδη) is likely.

Sophocles 153 (Stob. *Fl.* lxiv. 13) *v.* 8

οὕτω δὲ τοὺς ἐρῶντας αὐτὸς ἵμερος
δρᾶν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν πολλάκις προσίεται.

τοῦ γ' ἐρῶντος seems to satisfy the sense.

179 (Erotian. Gl. Hippocr. p. 77. 3) Ἑλένης Ἀπαίτησις.

γυναῖκα δ' ἐξελόντες ἢ θράσσει γένυν
τεὼστοῦμὲνἔωλον γραφίοις ἐνημμένοις.

M. Schmidt conjectures γ. δὲ ζητοῦντες or ἐξαιτοῦντες. In the second line Nauck suggests τρωτοῦ Μενέλεω (Μενέλεων Bergk) γραβίοις (J. G. Schneider: see Ath. 699 E) ἐ. But when was he wounded? Read τρέστογ. Hesych. τρέστης: δειλός. Theognostus also (Cram. Anecd. ii. 12. 15) mentions τρέ<σ>της. The epithet is eminently applicable to 'weak Menelaus,' who is called by Apollo in the guise of Asiades (Hom. P 588) μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής, of whom Orestes says (Eur. *Or.* 746) οὐ γὰρ αἰχμητὴς πέφυκεν, ἐν γυναιξὶ δ' ἄλκιμος, Electra (*Or.* 1202) οὔτε γὰρ θρασὺς οὔτ' ἄλκιμος πέφυκεν, Helen (Coluthus 314) οἶσθα γὰρ ὡς Μενέλαος ἀνάλκιδός ἐστι γενέθλης. Agamemnon on the contrary says to Menelaus (*I. A.* 316) μῶν τρέσας οὐκ ἀνακαλύψω βλέφαρον Ἀτρέως γεγώς;

210 (Ath. 375 D) τοιγαριωδη φυλάξαι χοῖρος ὥστε δεσμίων. χοῖρον ὥστε δεσμίαν Casaub. τὸν γὰρ ἰώδη Bergk, supposing Cerberus to be meant. τοίγαρ, I think, is simply a marginal gloss on τῷ δή 'therefore.'

213 the entry in Phot. should perhaps be <οὐ κωφεῖ:> οὐ κωφίζει· οὐ βλάπτει.

440 Hesych. Δροπά: δρεπτά. Perhaps through ἀρτίδροπα, read as ἄρτι δροπά. See N.

524. 10 εἰς ἀληθῆ δώμαθ'. ἀήθη B. Most likely ἀηδῆ, a frequent confusion, 'uncongenial.'

753 (Plut. *Mor.* 21 F) ὡς τρισόλβιοι
κεῖνοι βροτῶν οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
μόλωσ' ἐς Ἄιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά is not objectionable in itself (Menand. *fr.*

804 *ὅπου γυναῖκές εἰσι, π. ἐ. κ.*), but the repetition of *ἐκεῖ* seems to me vain, as to Herwerden, who conjectures *πάντα δὴ κ.* I should rather write *πάντ' ἔχει κακῶς*, a common phrase, *e.g.* Philemon *fr.* 128.

Euripides 61 *μισῶ <δ' ἐγώ>*
<τὸν> σοφὸν <μὲν> ἐν λόγοισιν ἐς δ' ὄνησιν οὐ σοφόν.

262 *τῶν βροτῶν τὰς ξυμφοράς.*

271 (Stob. *Fl.* cxi. 1)

Πτηνὰς διώκεις, ὦ τέκνον, τὰς ἐλπίδας.
οὐχ ἡ τύχη γε· τῆς τύχης δ' οὐχ εἷς τρόπος.

v. 2. *ἔχει τύχη σε* Hermann, *αὐχῶν τύχῃ γε* Heimsoeth, *οὐκ ηὐτύχησα* Herwerden.

v. 1 = 'you are on a wild-goose chase' (Aesch. *Ag.* 404, Plat. Euthyphr. 4 A, Arist. 1009^{b} 38): B replies *οὔκ, εἰ τύχῃ γε*, 'no, not if I have luck,' and it is probably A that retorts again 'there is more than one kind of luck.'

286 (Justin. Mart. *de monarch.* c. 5 p. 150)

'Does anyone maintain then that gods exist? they do not. Reflect yourselves' (*vv.* 1—4).

5 *φήμ' ἐγὼ τυραννίδα*
κτείνειν τε πλείστους κτημάτων τ' ἀποστερεῖν
ὅρκους τε παραβαίνοντας ἐκπορθεῖν πόλεις·
καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες μᾶλλόν εἰσ' εὐδαίμονες
τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἡσυχῇ καθ' ἡμέραν.

'And I know small states which though they worship the gods are subject to larger but less reverent states: they are overcome by superior force' (*vv.* 10—12):

13 *οἶμαι δ' ἂν ὑμᾶς, εἴ τις ἀργὸς ὢν θεοῖς*
14 *εὔχοιτο καὶ μὴ χειρὶ συλλέγοι βίον,*
* * * * * * *
15 *τὰ θεῖα πυργοῦσ' αἱ κακαί τε συμφοραί.*

The language of *vv.* 5—9 is exactly that put into the mouth of Polus by Plato in the *Gorgias* 471 etc. The argument here is, 'The wicked flourish, *if only they are strong and vigorous enough*, and I fancy that you, if you were to confine yourselves to supplicating the gods, without stirring a finger, <would laugh,

or find them wanting; it is helplessness > and misfortune that exalt the power of heaven.' The admonitions so frequent in Greek *θεὸς δὲ τοῖς ἀργοῦσιν οὐ παρίσταται* (Stob. *Fl.* xxx. 6), *σὺν Ἀθηνᾷ καὶ χέρα κινεῖν* (Paroemiogr.), *αὐτός τι νῦν δρῶν εἶτα δαίμονας κάλει· τῷ γὰρ πονοῦντι καὶ θεὸς συλλαμβάνει* (Eur. *fr.* 432), and the like, are here applied in a natural way: cf. *Hel.* 751—756. It is *ἀπορία* such as that of the Theban maidens, whom Eteocles in vain urges to be practical (Aesch. *Theb. vv.* 165, 192, 202, 209), it is *δυσπραξία* such as that of the routed Persians, when *θεούς τις τὸ πρὶν νομίζων οὐδαμοῦ τότ' ηὔχετο λιταῖσι* (Aesch. *Pers.* 500), that *τὰ θεῖα πυργοῖ.* Herwerden's conjecture, therefore, *αἱ δ' εὐπραξίαι τὰ θ. π.* is not in place, nor is Blaydes right in holding that *vv.* 13—15 are, 'ab hoc loco alieni' and that 15 is 'graviter corruptus.' With these premisses I would suggest that in Menander 310 (Stob. *Fl.* xcv. 10) *ἀεὶ νομίζουθ' οἱ πένητες τῶν θεῶν* where B has *νομίζεθ'*, the right reading may be *ἀεὶ νομίζεθ' οἱ πένητες τοὺς θεούς*, 'you poor people always believe in the gods.'

361 (Stob. *Fl.* cxxi. 15)

ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς καλῶς τεθνηκότας
ζῆν φημὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ βλέπειν τοὺς μὴ καλῶς.

Nauck would write *ζῆν φημί, <φημὶ> δ' οὐ...* But *μᾶλλον* should be retained, 'I on the contrary say,' since *ἐγὼ δὲ* indicates that the speaker is controverting an opinion previously mentioned; and all that is necessary is to write *κοὐ* for *τοῦ.* Cf. Soph. *fr.* 753.

466 (Stob. *Fl.* xciv. 10)

τὰς οὐσίας γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς ἁρπαγὰς
τιμᾶν δίκαιον· οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτός ποτε
βέβαιος ἄδικος.

'*v.* 1 graviter laborat' says Nauck, and Herwerden has proposed *ὁσίους τρόπους γὰρ...*, Heimsoeth *τὰς οὖν δίκας γε*, Blaydes too saying now 'Requiro aliquid ut *τὴν δίκην.*' This is a good example to enforce a principle too seldom followed, that to understand the tragedians we must study the origins from which they draw. Our minds can never be in the

condition to appreciate the sentiments expressed in Tragedy, unless we are as familiar with Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Solon, and the early philosophers and lyric poets, as we are with our own Bible. This passage is clear at once in the light of Hes. *Op.* 320

> Χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἁρπακτά· θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω.
> εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίῃ μέγαν ὄλβον ἕληται,
> ἢ ὅγ' ἀπὸ γλώσσης λῃΐσσεται,...
> ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι
> ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.

So 352 Μὴ κακὰ κερδαίνειν· κακὰ κέρδεα ἶσ' ἄτῃσιν.
356 Δὼς ἀγαθή, ἅρπαξ δὲ κακή, θανάτοιο δότειρα.

Solon 13. 7

> χρήματα δ' ἱμείρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι
> οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.
> πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρί
> ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος εἰς κορυφήν·
> ὃν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
> ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
> οὐκ ἐθέλων ἕπεται, ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτῃ.

Again 4. 11—16, Justice will surely punish when wealth is gotten ἐφ' ἁρπαγῇ. Similarly Theognis 197

> χρῆμα δ' ὃ μὲν Διόθεν καὶ σὺν δίκῃ ἀνδρὶ γένηται
> καὶ καθαρῶς, αἰεὶ παρμόνιμον τελέθει.
> εἰ δ' ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέϊ θυμῷ
> κτήσεται, εἶθ' ὅρκῳ παρ τὸ δίκαιον ἑλών,
> αὐτίκα μέν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
> αὖθις ἔγεντο κακόν.

Pind. *Nem.* viii. 17 σὺν θεῷ γάρ τοι φυτευθεὶς ὄλβος παρμονιμώτερος. By οὐσίας, then, (the plural is used because the statement is general) Euripides means what Hesiod calls θεόσδοτα χρήματα, which is paraphrased by Solon and Theognis, *property* that comes naturally, as by inheritance. So Euripides again *Hel.* 902 μισεῖ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὴν βίαν, τὰ κτητὰ δέ κτᾶσθαι κελεύει πάντας οὐκ ἐς ἁρπαγάς. ἐατέος δ' ὁ πλοῦτος ἄδικός τις ὤν. κοινὸς γάρ ἐστιν οὐρανὸς πᾶσιν βροτοῖς καὶ γαῖ', ἐν ᾗ χρὴ

δώματ' ἀναπληρουμένους τἀλλότρια μὴ ἔχειν (I should read σχεῖν) μηδ' ἀφαιρεῖσθαι βίᾳ: where Hermann rejected 904. It suggests at any rate that our fragment ran ἄδικος <ὤν τις>. Unjust gains are discouraged also in *fr.* 417, 419, 825, *Ion* 390 ἂν γὰρ βίᾳ σπεύδωμεν ἀκόντων θεῶν ἄκοντα κεκτήμεσθα τἀγάθ', ὦ γύναι, where H. Stephanus conjectured ἀνόνητα (cf. *fr.* 502, Plut. *Mor.* 23 F), Wakefield οὐκ ὄντα: the text might be supported by Solon 13. 11 (quoted above), according to whom unrighteous wealth οὐκ ἐθέλων ἕπεται. Menander 625 says μὴ πάντοθεν κέρδαινε· . . τὸ μὴ δικαίως εὐτυχεῖν ἔχει φόβον. Euripides constantly urges that wealth so gotten is unstable: *fr.* 303 οὐδέποτ' εὐτυχίαν κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑπέρφρονα τ' ὄλβον βέβαιον εἰκάσαι χρεών, οὐδ' ἀδίκων γενεάν. 362. 11 (a string of Polonian precepts) ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῶ χρήματ', ἢν βούλῃ πολὺν χρόνον μελάθροις ἐμμένειν· τὰ γὰρ κακῶς οἴκους ἐσελθόντ' οὐκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν. (Stated as proverbial by Choricius *Miltiades* p. 7. 21 Foerster.) But this is also said of great wealth generally, or any wealth: *Or.* 332 ὁ μέγας ὄλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐν βροτοῖς. *H. F.* 509 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ὁ μέγας ἥ τε δόξ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ βέβαιός ἐστι. *Phoen.* 553 ἢ πολλὰ μοχθεῖν πόλλ' ἔχων ἐν δώμασι βούλει; τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον; ὄνομ' ἔχει μόνον· ἐπεὶ τά γ' ἀρκοῦνθ' ἱκανὰ τοῖσι σώφροσιν. οὗτοι τὰ χρήματ' ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοί, τὰ τῶν θεῶν δ' ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα· ὅταν δὲ χρῄζωσ' αὖτ' ἀφαιροῦνται πάλιν. ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος: where Valckenaer (whom see) held the last line to have been originally an illustrative quotation in the margin. With the preceding sentence compare Menander 598. Again Eur. *fr.* 420 ὑπόπτερος δ' ὁ πλοῦτος. 518 τοῦ μὲν (πλούτου) ὠκεῖα πτέρυξ. Menand. 128 περὶ χρημάτων λαλεῖς, ἀβεβαίου πράγματος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ οἶσθα ταῦτα παραμενοῦντά σοι εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον. But while wealth is a precarious accident, φύσις is essential and permanent (ὅτι δ' ἁ φύσις ἀνέρι δῷ, τόδ' οὔποτ' ἂν ἐξέλοις[1], Eur. *fr.* 810 μέγιστον ἆρ' ἦν ἡ φύσις· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐδεὶς τρέφων εὖ χρηστὸν ἂν θείη ποτέ, *fr.* 904, *El.* 389, *Bacch.* 307, *Hipp.* 78): *El.* 937 ηὔχεις τις εἶναι τοῖσι χρήμασι σθένων· τὰ δ' οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ βραχὺν ὁμιλῆσαι χρόνον· ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ παραμένουσ'

[1] Soph. *fr.* 739. I had forgotten.

αἴρει κάρα (Musgrave for *κακά*, comparing Aesch. *Cho.* 494), *ὁ δ' ὄλβος ἀδίκως καὶ μετὰ σκαιῶν συνὼν ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων σμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον.* Soph. *fr.* 195 *ἀρετῆς βέβαιοι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κτήσεις μόναι* (*μόνης* Naber). Antiphanes 327 = Alexis 281 = Menand. 340 *τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὸν πλοῦτον ὕστατον τίθει· ἀβεβαιότατον γάρ ἐστιν ὧν κεκτήμεθα. τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔχουσι παραμένει.* Menand. 1094 *ψυχὴν ἔχειν δεῖ πλουσίαν· τὰ δὲ χρήματα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὄψις, παραπέτασμα τοῦ βίου.* *Epist. Pythag.* 11 *πιστεύει γὰρ χρὴ τῷ τᾶς ψυχᾶς κάλλει τε καὶ πλούτῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τᾶς ὄψιος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ φθόνος καὶ νοῦσος παραιρέεται, τὰ δὲ μέχρι θανάτω πάρεντι ἐντεταμένα.* Pythag. (Stob. *Flor.* i. 29) *πλοῦτος ἀσθενὴς ἄγκυρα...οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος, ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὸ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ βέβαιον μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα λῆρον.* Lucian *A. P.* x. 41 *πλοῦτος ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς πλοῦτος μόνος ἐστὶν ἀληθής.* Clem. Alex. p. 270, 790.

495. 6 *ὀρθοσταδὸν λόγχαις ἐπείγοντες φόνον.*

λόγχαισι τεύξοντες Nauck, *πράξοντες* Humphreys. If the verse is corrupt, the most likely reading would be *τείνοντες* as *Hec.* 261 *τείνει φόνον.*

580 *ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσιν αἱ τύχαι*
μορφὴν ἔχουσι, συντρέχει δ' εἰς ἓν τόδε·...

See N. For *πᾶσιν αἱ* Matthiae conjectured *παντοίαν.* More simply we may read *πᾶσαν.*

636 *ἔα ἔα·*
ὁρῶ τὸν ἀκταῖς νομάδα κυματοφθόρον
ἁλιαίετον· τὸν παῖδα χερσεύει μόρος·

'for if *ὁ κύματ' οἰκῶν ὄρνις* had flown seaward from the land, *ἠρμήνευσεν ἂν* that my son had perished in the waves; but now it has left its haunts and flown hither: *οὐκ οὖν ἔσθ' ὁ παῖς ἐν οἴδμασιν.*' This is quoted by a schol. on Hermogenes. Aelian *N. A.* v. 2 says *ἔοικε δὲ ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἀβασανίστως πεποιηκέναι τὸν Πολύειδον ὁρῶντα τήνδε τὴν ὄρνιν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τεκμηράμενον ὅτι εὑρήσει τὸν Γλαῦκον τὸν τεθνεῶτα τοῦ Μίνω υἱόν.* Dobree restored *χερσεύειν.* Herwerden further suggests *δοκῶ.* The sense, it will be seen, is 'it may clearly be

inferred, it is evident, that my son is on shore,' and the word is τορόν. Finding χερcεγειντορον the scribe wrote, as we see, χερσεύει: upon which the change of what he read as μορον into μορος was a natural consequence. τορόν is not found thus elsewhere as a predicate, but I do not see any objection to it: cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 266 τορὸν γὰρ ἥξει (τὸ μέλλον), 1161 τ. ἔπος, *Supp.* 280 τορὸς ὁ μῦθος, *Ag.* 621, 1046 τ. ἑρμηνέως, *P. V.* 630 τορῶς τέκμηρον, 636 λέξω, *Ag.* 1584 φράσαι, 26, *Pers.* 482 σημῆναι, Eur. *Ion* 705 γεγωνήσομεν. Paul. Sil. *Therm. Pyth.* 31 τρανόν τε μαρτυροῦσα. Philodem. *A. P.* xvi. 234 μανύει τρανῶς. For τὸν Valckenaer read γ' ἐπ'.

781. 12 The reading οὕτως in sch. *Or.* 1389 was an error for ὄντως: *on Ed. Aesch.* p. 142.

Dionysius 3

> θνητῶν δὲ μηδεὶς μηδέν' ὄλβιόν ποτε
> κρίνῃ, πρὶν αὐτὸν εὖ τελευτήσαντ' ἴδῃ·
> ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γὰρ τὸν θανόντ' ἐπαινέσαι.

'for the dead it is safe to approve,' he can suffer no change of fortune. I see no likelihood in F. G. Schmidt's ἔν' ἀσφαλὲς... ἐπολβίσαι, which Nauck adopted, paying here as often too much respect to that critic's baseless and importunate conjectures. For the thought see Soph. *O. T.* 1528 Jebb, and add, besides this, Soph. *fr.* 588, 601.

Chares 1. 4 (Stob. *Flor.* xvii. 3)

> ὅστις δὲ γαστρὸς μὴ κρατεῖν ἐπίσταται
> οὗτος τὰ πλείω τῶν κακῶν ἔχει κακά.

These two lines are also in Anecd. Boissonade iii. 469, which has οὕτως. I have corrected the same error in Timocles *fr.* 34. ὅστις in such sentences is regularly followed by οὗτος. But the line is meaningless unless we read τῶν καλῶν, the construction being as Eur. *Hipp.* 473 ἀλλ' εἰ τὰ πλείω χρηστὰ τῶν κακῶν ἔχεις. I do not recall another example. Logically it should be εἰ πλέω τὰ χρηστὰ τῶν κακῶν ἔχεις, οὗτος πλέω τὰ φαῦλα τῶν καλῶν ἔχει.

COMICORUM ATTICORUM FRAGMENTA (KOCK).

Cratinus 26: see below on *Anth. Append.* Cougny *Addend.* ii. 447 b.

Pherecr. 150 (Ath. 388 f)

ἔξεισιν ἄκων δεῦρο πέρδικος τρόπον.

This is to be explained by the proverb *Πέρδιξ ὄρουσον· ἀντὶ τοῦ Ταχέως ἐλθέ· ἐπειδήπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο ταχὺ μεθάλλεσθαι πέφυκε*, which was cited by Otto Crusius from a Heidelberg MS. (see Kock, vol. iii. p. 722), emending thus Ar. *fr.* 523. Compare Aelian *N. A.* iv. 12, *V. H.* x. 3.

Hermippos 1 *ὁ Ζεὺς διδωνω πολλὰς φησι τοὔνομα.*

So Phot. 61. 26: Suid. (*s. v. ἦ δ' ὅς*) *διδώνα*.. cod. V, *διδωνα πολύ...σι* cod. E, '*δίδωμι Παλλάς*,' *ἠσί*, '*τ.* Porson, but as Kock remarks '*pater fere ὄνομα τίθεται, non δίδωσι*': also the verb is in an unlikely position. Read *ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ἰδών νιν*,.. (or *αὖ*).

Eupolis 94. 2 .. *ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ δρομῆς*
ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ἥρει λέγων τοὺς ῥήτορας.
B. *ταχὺν λέγεις μέν.* A. *πρὸς δέ γ' αὐτοῦ τῷ τάχει*
πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν...

So I should divide. B. 'Well, (that is saying) he was rapid at any rate.' A. 'Yes but besides his speed, . .' *δέ γε* are natural in a *reply*. *ταχὺν μὲν λέγεις* would probably have been used but for the verse; but *ταχὺν λέγεις* is virtually one word: in this common idiomatic use there is never any stress upon the verb.

Antiphanes 227

τίς γὰρ οἶδ' ἡμῶν τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι παθεῖν . .

κάτοιδ' Meineke. Rather I suspect *τίς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον οἶδεν ἡμῶν*, . .

Philetairos 9: . . .

Κοσσύφας δὲ καὶ Γαλήνας καὶ Κορώνας οὐ λέγω
περὶ δὲ Ναΐδος σιωπῶ·

'mirum in modum languet *οὐ λέγω*, cum praesertim sequatur *σιωπῶ*,' says Kock, forgetful of this idiomatic phrase 'I leave unsaid': Soph. *Trach.* 499 *καὶ τὰ μὲν θεῶν παρέβαν, καὶ ὅπως Κρονίδαν ἀπάτασεν οὐ λέγω. El.* 1467. Aesch. *Eum.* 868, Lucian iii. 63, 529, Philostr. *Apoll.* vii. 3. But there is a place where I doubt if the phrase is sound: Ath. 160 d.. *ὦ Κύνουλκε (τούτῳ γὰρ χαίρεις τῷ ὀνόματι, οὐ λέγων ὃ ἐκ γενετῆς σε ἡ μήτηρ κέκληκε*). I suspect ονοματι απολεγων '*repudiating* the name given you by your mother,' or φ(ε)γγων as Hdt. i. 143.

Anaxilas 18. 7 *Ἐφεσήια γράμματα καλά.*

'*κᾶλα* apud Atticos inauditum. an *καινά*?' K. *Ἐφεσήια* is equally 'inauditum apud Atticos.' It is of course a quotation. See Plut. *Mor.* 706 E, Menand. *fr.* 371.

Aristophon 4:

προσβαλεῖν πρὸς οἰκίαν δεῖ, κριός· ἀναβῆναί τι πρός κλιμάκιον Καπανεύς, ὑπομένειν πληγὰς ἄκμων.

κλ. <*εἰμι*> Meineke; but Kock justly says '*πρὸς κλ.* nemo adscendit,' suggesting *ἀναβῆν' ἐσπέρας κλιμάκιον ἐς θυρίδα* K. Help is afforded by Menand. 562 *ἐπὶ κλίμακα πρὸς τεῖχος ἀναβαίνων.* The text may have been τιπροστειχοσ *ἐπὶ κλιμακίδα* K., which would be the usual construction, or *τι πρὸς τεῖχος εἰς κλιμακίδα*—but that must be supported by Eur. *Supp.* 732 *εἰς ἄκρα βῆναι κλιμάκων ἐνήλατα ζητῶν*, where *εἰς* conveys that the topmost rungs are the ultimate goal.

Epicrates 3 (Ath. 570 b) of Lais now and formerly:

17 *εἶδες δ' ἂν αὐτῆς Φαρνάβαζον θᾶττον ἄν.*
ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἤδη τρέχει,
τὰς ἁρμονίας τε διαχαλᾷ τοῦ σώματος,
20 *ἰδεῖν μὲν αὐτὴν θᾶττον ἐστι καὶ πτύσαι.*

20 *ἐστιν* A. *καὶ κύσαι* Jacobs. *ῥᾴον ἐστι* Meineke. *ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἢ πτύσαι* Herwerden, 'facilius est eam videre quam spuere.' I think *θᾶττον* should be kept, as in 17, and the line be

ἰδεῖν μὲν αὐτὴν θᾶττον ἔστ' ἢ καταμύσαι (or *ἔστιν ἢ μύσαι*)

'you may see her quicker than winking,' a proverbial phrase

occurring in Philostr. *Heroic.* 3. 6 p. 675 *τὰ δὲ βέβρωταί τε καὶ πέποται θᾶττον ἢ καταμύσαι.* This is respectfully paraphrased with comic effect by the messenger in Eur. *Bacch.* 736 *θᾶσσον δὲ διεφοροῦντο σαρκὸς ἐνδυτά ἢ σὲ ξυνάψαι βλέφαρα βασιλείοις κόραις.*—But I am now reminded by Mr S. D. Barnett of Theocr. xxix. 27 *χὤτι γηραλέοι πέλομες πρὶν ἀποπτύσαι,* whence it appears that all we require is *θᾶττον ἔστιν ἢ πτύσαι.*

Dionysius 2. 11 <*οἷον*> *στρατηγὸς*...Cf. *e.g.* Axionichus 6. 9.

Philemon 65. 4 *...πάντα σοι γενήσεται,*
φίλοι, βοηθοί, μάρτυρες, συνοικίαι.

For *συνοικίαι* Meineke conjectured *συνήγοροι* (holding that before this line had fallen out another ending in *οἰκίαι*), Krueger *συναίτιοι.* Another line may well have *followed,* but *συνοικίαι* I have no doubt was an item in the list: being a valuable source of income, they are commonly so mentioned as a desirable possession, typical of affluence, *e.g.* Lucian i. 637, ii. 523, iii. 375, 403, Alciphron iii. 50.

74. 4 *ἀρετὴν καὶ φρόνησίν φασι, καί*
πλέκουσι πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τί τἀγαθόν.

Kock reads *λέγουσι* after Brunck, also suggesting *βλέπουσι.* But *πλέκουσι* is better than either.

Menander 97 *εἰμὶ μὲν ἄγροικος, καὐτὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ἐρῶ,* Punctuate *εἰμὶ...καὐτός, ...*

102 (Ammon. *de diff. verb.* p. 110)

τίς γὰρ οὐτοσὶ κακοδαίμων ἔφυ
ὃς οὐκ ἂν ἐκδοίη...

'*τίς γὰρ* non in omnibus. alii *οὔτως ὁ* pro *οὐτοσί*...de emendando certa ratione *v.* 1 Cobetus desperavit. fortasse *τίς γάρ ποθ' οὕτως ὡς σὺ...*' K. But I find that Cobet (*N. L.* p. 43), though he says, 'nihil quod certum et evidens sit ex corruptissimis reliquiis elicias,' had anticipated mainly what to me seems certain, by suggesting *τίς γάρ ποθ' οὕτω τι κ. ἦν, ἔφη* besides *τίς γάρ ποθ' οὕτως ἐστὶ κ., ἔφη.* All that is required is

τίς γὰρ <βροτῶν> οὕτω τι κακοδαίμων ἔφυ

οὕτω τι is so used several times in Comedy: Ar. *fr.* 622 οὕτως τι (so Bekk. Anecd. 434. 5. οὕτω τι Suid. *s. v.* Ἀπόρρητα, but οὔ τϊ A, οὐ το B) τἀπόρρητα δρᾶν ἐστιν μέλι. Alexis 210 οὕτω τι τἀλλότρι' ἐσθίειν ἐστὶ γλυκύ. Poseidipp. 19 οὕτω τι πολύπουν ἐστὶν ἡ λύπη κακόν. Menand. 287 οὕτω τι πρᾶγμ' ἔστ' ἐπίπονον τὸ προσδοκᾶν. Antiphanes 245 οὕτω στερεόν <τι> πρᾶγμα θερμόν ἐσθ' ὕδωρ, Casaubon rightly, and in 147 οὕτως ἔσθ' ἅγιον παντελῶς τὸ θηρίον. Dindorf rightly οὕτως ἁγιόν τι. By Philostratus it is used εἰς κόρον.—In the fragment of Poseidippus Kock suggests πολύχρουν 'non uno colore est, sed variis modis exprimitur.' Cf. Antiphanes 107 ἅπαν τὸ λυποῦν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ νόσος, ὀνόματ' ἔχουσα πολλά.

253 (Stob. *Fl.* cviii. 30)

ἀλογίστου τρόπου
ἀτύχημα φεύγειν ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐθαίρετον.

ἀτύχημ' ἐλέγχειν Heimsoeth. κλάειν Madvig. 'cum autem titulus libri 108 Stob. sit ὅτι δεῖ γενναίως φέρειν τὰ προσπίπτοντα, Engerus *Progr. Posn. Gymn. Mar.* 1868 p. 13 vulgatam defendit φεύγειν interpretatus *fugere velle.* mihi neque haec neque Clerici explicatio probatur: unum video οὐκ αὐθαίρετον necessario esse praedicatum. fortasse 'nequaquam in arbitrio nostro positum est imprudentiae poenas effugere.' ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐθ. pro οὐκ ἔστιν αὐθ.' K. This is entirely off the track. Enger alone is right, though he cannot have supported his interpretation. οὐκ αὐθαίρετον = ἐκ θεῶν δοθέν, as Soph. *Phil.* 1317 ἀνθρώποισι τὰς μὲν ἐκ θεῶν τύχας δοθείσας ἔστ' ἀναγκαῖον φέρειν· ὅσοι δ' ἑκουσίοισιν ἔγκεινται βλάβαις...and φεύγειν is to 'shun,' as Soph. *fr.* 879 θεῶν τὸ δῶρον τοῦτο· χρὴ δ' ὅσ' ἂν θεοὶ διδῶσι φεύγειν μηδέν. Complete explanation will be found in my essay *On Editing Aeschylus* p. 88 sqq.; and to my collection there I take the opportunity of adding Solon 33, Ov. *Heroid.* xvi. 279, Democr. *fr.* 13, Dem. p. 258. 23, Menand. 425, Julian *Epist.* 52, Procop. *Epist.* 101, Plaut. *Aul.* 88, *Anth. Append.* Cougny ii. 584, vi. 36, 173, Rhianus (Stob. *Flor.* iv. 34). Hom. Γ 65 is quoted by Lucian i. 149, Heliod. *Aeth.* v. 15, Philostr. Jun. *Imag.* 14, Dion (Stob. *Flor.* cxxiv. 133). It will be seen now that in Plut. *Mor.* 117 D ὅθεν οὐδὲν φευκτὸν

νομιστέον αὐτοὺς πάσχειν, 'δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς', Hercher was wrong in proposing *ἀπευκτόν*.

462 *τὰς δ' ὀνθυλεύσεις καὶ τὰ κεκαρυκευμένα*
μᾶλλον προσεδέξατ'·

προσδέχεσθαι occurs elsewhere in Comedy only in Ar. *Eq.* 738 where it is used of accepting, welcoming persons. I suspect here it is a gloss on *προσήκατο*, as in Hesych. etc.

552 *ὦ γῆρας ἐχθρὸν...*
καὶ μεταχαράττον τὴν μὲν ἀνδρίαν μελῶν
εἰς τἀπρεπές...

ἁρμονίαν Bergk, *ἀγλαΐαν* Meineke. I think in this passage *ἀνδρίαν* may have been used with reference to the Homeric phrase *λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην* (Π 857, X 363) which we know to have been an ancient reading: Ebeling *Lex. Hom.* p. 28.

693 *ἀπόντι μᾶλλον εὐχαριστίαν ποίει·*
τῷ γὰρ παρόντι γίνετ' εὐτονώτερον.

'... desideratur vox quae idem significet ac *molestior*.' K. That surely is not the point: *εὐτ.* is 'more forcible, impressive,' and the antithesis requires *τοῦ γὰρ παρόντι* (*εὐχ. ποιεῖν τὸ ἀπόντι εὐχ. ποιεῖν*) *γ. εὐτ.*

745 *ἐστὶ δέ*
γυνὴ λέγουσα χρήσθ' ὑπερβάλλων φόβος.

'quid sibi velit *φόβος* non exputo.' K. Prof. Palmer (*Class. Rev.* iii. p. 23) says 'Surely *φόβος* is a fearful prodigy, a *monstrum*: as Juvenal says, if a friend gives us a deposit, it is *prodigiosa fides*.' In that case we must have had *ὑπερβάλλον τέρας*. Explain by Menand. 652 *τότε τὰς γυναῖκας δεδιέναι μάλιστα δεῖ ὅταν τι περιπλάττωσι* (*περιπέττωσι* Salmas.) *τοῖς χρηστοῖς λόγοις*. Sosicrat. *fr.* 4 *ὅταν ποθεῖν λέγῃ σε καὶ στέργειν γυνή, φοβοῦ παρ' αὐτῆς πλείον' ὧν λέγει κακά.*

1114 Stob. *Flor.* cxxvi. 2 (without lemma, except in cod. Vind. which has *Πινδάρου*) *θανόντων δὲ καὶ λόγοι φίλοι προδόται*. It was a pity to regard Gesner's attribution of this to Menander. Menander could not have written thus, but it is exactly Pindar's manner.

1116 Masc. Conf. vi. 24 p. 549 Combéfis: *καὶ φιλεῖν δεῖ ὡς*

μισήσοντας καὶ μισέειν ὡς φιλήσοντας. Μενάνδρου. It should be Βίαντος, as *μισέειν* sufficiently shows: Aristot. 1389^{b} 23 *κατὰ τὴν* Βίαντος *ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες.* Diog. L. i. 5. 87 (Βίας) *ἔλεγέ τε τὸν βίον οὕτω μετρεῖν ὡς καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιωσομένους, καὶ φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας· τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους εἶναι κακούς,* where I do not know whether the other clause should be present; it would of course have been easy to omit. To the passages collected by the commentators on Soph. *Aj.* 666 concerning this famous and melancholy criticism of life, add Dem. 660. 24.

Apollodor. Caryst. 15 (Donatus on Ter. *Phorm.* 87 *nos otiosi operam dabamus Phaedriae*).

ναλκεις δε σιωεμαλι μεολ cod. Antverp. gives
αναλκεις δε συνεμαμμωα εναργης δε συνεπιμελομεθα

For the first word Ellis conjectures *ἐν λέσχῃ.* I think it should be ἡμεῖς δὲ *σχολήν* | *ἄγοντες ἐπεμελούμεθα.* (*συνεπεμ-* Meineke).

Sosipater 1. 56 (Ath. 377 f): a cook is expounding the requirements of his art to Demylus, an unwilling listener, who after various expressions of impatience at last exclaims

τίς δή τι παραδείξας ἐμοί
τὰ δέονθ' ἀπελθὼν αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἄγε

In Nicomachus 1 (Ath. 290 ef) which closely resembles the passage of Sosipater, the victim's final remark is

B. *μίκρ' ἀντάκουσον ἐν μέρει κἀμοῦ.* A. λέγε.
B. *σὺ μηδὲν ἐνόχλει μήτε σαυτὸν μήτ' ἐμέ,*
ἀπραγμόνως δὲ δίαγε νῦν τὴν ἡμέραν.

For *τισδητι* restore *πισθητι i.e. πείσθητι* 'do listen to me—now that you have demonstrated to me the requirements, go and keep quiet yourself.' One more correction, and the passage is nearly perfect. In *v.* 44 (the *artiste* speaking) we find

τί οὖν; ἔτι σοι δίειμι τὰ στρατηγικά.
ἔγωγε τὸν μάγειρον. ἡ τάξις σοφόν
ἁπανταχοῦ μέν ἐστι . .

Dindorf and Herwerden suppose the loss of a line. Kock suggests ΔΗΜ. *ζηλῶ σε τὸν μάγειρον.* Α. *ἡ τ. κτλ.*, rightly as

far as the division. Read *εὖγ' εὖγε τὸν μ.* 'Bravo the cook!' The accusative is good: Teles (Stob. *Flor.* cviii. 82) *ναναγὸς γέγονας· εὖ τὸν ναναγόν· πένης ἐξ εὐπόρου· εὖ τὸν πένητα*, but must be added to the lexicons.

Adesp. 204: Plut. *Mor.* 533 F '*οὐκ οἶδεν ἡμᾶς ὁ βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους ὁρᾷ μᾶλλον.*' Kock merely omits the *ἀλλ'*, but I suspect rather *ἑτέρους ὅρα* 'look to some one else,' which I find anticipated by Madvig and adopted by Bernardakis. I have illustration on Herodas vi. 33.

744 *Ἀστυάναξ γέγονα*, quoted with other phrases by Eustath. 862. 43. Kock takes it from Nauck *Ar. Byz.* p. 168, who says 'Vocabula quae afferuntur pleraque a comicis poetis efficta esse vidit iam Meinekius Com. IV. p. 631, qui dubito num illud Ἀ. γ. (cf. Eust. p. 656. f. p. 1283, 24) recte omiserit.' Meineke omitted it no doubt because it is from Strato *A. P.* xii. 11, which Brunck had already remarked is referred to by Eustathius.

1324 *δῆμος ἄστατον κακόν,*
καὶ θαλάσσῃ πάνθ' ὅμοιον ὑπ' ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται,
καὶ γαληνὸς ἦν τύχῃ, πρὸς πνεῦμα βραχὺ κορύσσεται,
κἄν τις αἰτία γένηται, τὸν πολίτην κατέπιεν.

'Soloni vel Archilocho tribuit Bergk *P. Lyr.*[2] 1047. 8, tragico, fortasse Euripidi, Herwerdenus, comico Meinekius. mihi quidem comicum colorem non videntur habere.' K. It is astonishing to me that scholars should have attributed these lines to Tragedy. The rhythm of them is not more possible to Solon or Archilochus.

I find room here just to mention some new readings in Aesch.: *Supp.* 106 *τὰν ἄπονον δ' ἁρμονίαν ἥμενος ἁμ* (so Buecheler before me) *φρόνημά πως . .* (*P. V.* 569 *οὔποτε τὰν Διὸς ἁρμονίαν θνατῶν παρεξίασι βουλαί*).—254 *τήρον'* ? or *ζητρὸν* (*τὸν δημόκοινον* Hesych.) ?—272 *μηνίσασ' ἄγει* or *μηνιτῇ δίκῃ.*—493 *μηδ' ἀπορριφθῇ λόγος ἐμοῦ κάτ'· ἀρχῆς γὰρ φιλαίτιος λεώς.*—523 *ἀεὶ δ' ἄναρκτόν ἐστι δεῖμ' ἐξαίσιον.*—544 *γενοῦ πολυμνήστωρ, ἔφαπτορ Ἰοῦς, οἵας τοι γένος . .*—607 *τεῦξαι* ? *νεῦσαι* ?—706 *φυλάσσοι <τ' εὖ> τὰ τίμι' ἀστοῖς* (after Bergk).—885 *πικρότερ' Ἀχαιῶν οἰζύος φερωνύμων* (*i.e. παρὰ τὸ ἄχος*).—211 *μὴ 'μνηστεῖν.*—85 *κἀπ πόλεμον.*—*Eum.* 525

καὶ δεούς <μέρος> τρέφων as *O. T.* 294.—ὑμεῖς δέ γ' ἐν γῇ τῇδε μὴ.—982 δι' ὁρμὰν ποινᾶς.—991 προσέρπον.—*Ag.* 921 ἄνευ θράσους.

Euripides.

Phoen. 489

καὶ μήτε πορθεῖν πατρίδα μήτ' ἔτι προσφέρειν
πύργοισι πηκτῶν κλιμάκων προσαμβάσεις.

The variations μήτε τί BF, μηκέτι bc, suggest μήτ' ἐπεισφέρειν.

637 ἔξιθι χώρας· ἀληθῶς δ' ὄνομα Πολυνείκην πατήρ
ἔθετό σοι.

Only late MSS. have ἔξιθ' ἐκ χ., Aldus ἔξελθ' ἐκ, Kirchhoff suggests ἔξιθ' οὖν. I suspect ἔρρε τῆς χώρας or ἐκφθάρηθι γῆς. Moeris Ἀποφθάρηθί μου, Ἀττικῶς. ἀπαλλάγηθί μου, Ἑλληνικῶς. Schol. Ar. *Pax* 72 ἐκφθαρείς: ἐξελθών. οὕτω δὲ ἔλεγον τὸ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐξελθεῖν που. Otherwise ἔξιθι χθονός· (615, *Heracl.* 518) δικαίως δ'.

Med. 698 συγγνωστὰ μεντἄρ' ἦν σε λυπεῖσθαι, γύναι.

σ. γὰρ ἦν BEabcd. γὰρ ἂν ἦν C (τἄρ' ἂν ἦν will not suit here). μὲν γὰρ ἦν *BC*.—896 See above on Hel. *Aeth.* iv. 4.

Hipp. 493 'εἰς τάχος B (Ald.), εἰς τάχη b, ὡς τάχος ceteri' K. The original may have been ᾗ τάχος or ἐν τάχει. ὡς τάχος at any rate was the phrase ἐν τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ.

ΟΔΟΝ

Alc. 1156 νόστιμον δ' ἔλθοις πόρον may have been the source of the different readings ὁδόν, πόδα, δόμον. To the same gloss, ὁδόν on πόρον, is probably due the error in *H. F.* 80 νῦν οὖν τίν' ἐλπίδ' ἢ πέδον σωτηρίας ἐξευμαρίζῃ; where Canter conjectured ἔμπεδον, but Musgrave ἢ πόρον. Cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 390 below.

Androm. 303 παρέλυσε δ' ἂν Ἑλλάδος ἀλγεινούς
μόχθους οὓς ἀμφὶ Τροίαν
δεκέτεις ἀλάληντο νέοι λόγχαις.

Metre requires Τρωΐαν, and probably the transposition οὓς ἀμφὶ Τρωΐαν μόχθους.

1159 ὦ γάμος, ὦ γάμος, ὃς τάδε δώματα
καὶ πόλιν ἐμὰν ὤλεσας
αἲ αἲ ἓ ἔ. ὦ παῖ.
1160—1 = 1147—8
καὶ δέχομαι χερὶ δώμασί θ' ἁμοῖς.
ἰώ μοί μοι αἲ αἲ.

In 1160, to fill the metre, b has καὶ πόλιν καὶ πόλιν ἐμάν and c, as an attempt to improve on this, καὶ πόλι καὶ πόλι ἐμάν. Read καὶ πόλιν ὤλεσας <ὤλεσας> ἁμάν (ἀμάν Musurus). A word repeated in this Euripidean manner is naturally liable to be omitted: so in *Ion* 786 Seidler has rightly supplied ἔλακες <ἔλακες>, in *H. F.* 758 Fix μεταλλαγαί ἔτεκον <ἔτεκον> ἀοιδάς, I in this *Journal* No. 41 p. 98 ἔτερα μεγάλα <μεγάλα> φανερά τ' in *Bacch.* 997.

Troad. 95

μῶρος δὲ θνητῶν ὅστις ἐκπορθεῖ πόλεις,
ναούς τε τύμβους θ' ἱερὰ τῶν κεκμηκότων,
ἐρημίᾳ δοὺς αὐτὸς ὤλεθ' ὕστερον.

Some place a colon at πόλεις, but sacrilege does not necessarily accompany the sack of a town (cf. *e.g.* Aesch. *Ag.* 532). But ναούς τε does no doubt suggest that punctuation. I should prefer ναοὺς δὲ. Hartung conjectured ἐκπορθῶν.

164 μέλεαι μόχθων ἐπακουσόμεναι
Τρῳάδες ἔξω κομίζεσθ' οἴκων·
στέλλουσ' Ἀργεῖοι νόστον.

κομίσασθ' Musurus, the truth of which Kirchhoff admits may be doubted. I read ἐξορμίζεσθ', which is in character with the metre. Cf. *Phoen.* 848 πέλας γὰρ, Τειρεσία, φίλοισι σοῖς ἐξώρμισαι σὸν πόδα (*v. ll.* ἐξόρμισαι, ἐξορμίσαι, Barnes ἐξωρμίσω): sch. Gu. ἐκόμισας, ἔστησας.

Supp. 225 χρὴν γὰρ οὔτε σώματα
ἄδικα δικαίοις τὸν σοφὸν συμμιγνύναι,
εὐδαιμονοῦντας δ' ἐς δόμους κτᾶσθαι φίλους,

because God, confounding the innocent with the guilty, involves both in common destruction. Nauck suggests οὐχὶ. Read οὐδὲ: *even the physical presence, the company,* of the wicked is

to be avoided. For the thought see Blomfield's collection on Aesch. *Theb.* 600 (591 W.), to which add Antiphon v. 82, Phaedrus iv. 10, Soph. *Ant.* 372, Eur. *fr.* 862. Cf. Aelian *V. H.* viii. 5, Thales *fr.* 17 (*Frag. Philos.* i. 229).

467 *σοὶ μὲν δοκείτω ταῦτ', ἐμοὶ δὲ τἀναντία. ἐμοὶ δ' ἐναντία* Heath. Nauck adopts Porson's *τἀντία*, but his own *τἄμπαλιν* I think more likely, or *θἄτερα*.

Ion 402 *ἀλλ' ἐᾶν χρὴ τάδ'* may be a gloss on *ἀλλ' ἐατέον τάδ' ἐστίν*: Cratinus 327 *ἀλλὰ τάδ' ἔστ' ἀνεκτέον*. *Or.* 761 *οἰστέον τάδε*.

1173 . . *παρελθὼν πρέσβυς εἰς μέσον πέδον*. Perhaps *πέδου παρελθὼν πρέσβυς ἐς μεταίχμιον*.

I. A. 534 See below on Aesch. *Supp.* 1023.—1346 ΑΧ. *δεῖν' ἐν Ἀργείοις βοᾶται* ΚΛ. *τίνα βοήν; σήμαινέ μοι*.

'The use of the cognate accusative after the passive verb is to be noticed' Paley says. It is not Greek. Weil reads *τίνα βοήν μοι σημανεῖς*. The text can scarcely be defended, and I should not wonder if the true reading were *βοᾷ τις*.

Bacch. 849 *γνώσεται δὲ τὸν Διός*
Διόνυσον, ὃς πέφυκεν ἐν τέλει θεός
δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος.

In this much-vexed passage I cannot think that the last phrase (which occurs elsewhere, as Aratus 5 of Zeus *ὁ δ' ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι*) is unsound. As the text stands we have an antithesis which I believe to be right. The key to the meaning is *ἐν τέλει*, which those who leave it unaltered render 'proves at the end.' But the Greek for that would be *ἐς τέλος, ἐς τελευτήν*. I understand 'who is *in the rank, company of heaven* (probably *θεῶν*) most terrible, unto men most kindly.' Cf. Aesch. *Theb.* 237 *ὦ ξυντέλεια, μὴ προδῷς πυργωμάτων*. schol. *ὦ ξυντέλεια: τὸ κοινὸν ἄθροισμα τῶν θεῶν, μεταφορικῶς. κυρίως γὰρ ἡ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἄθροισις. τέλος γὰρ τὸ τάγμα. Ὅμηρος* (K 56)· *'ἐλθεῖν ἐς φυλάκων ἱερὸν τέλος.'*

H. F. 1138 *ἢ σάρκα τὴν ἐμὴν ἐμπρήσας πυρί.*

L. Dindorf's *<τήνδε> τὴν ἐμὴν πρήσας* seems more probable than *τὴν νεᾶνιν* (Wilamowitz), the speaker being Heracles.

But the text may be a gloss on *τὰς ἐμαυτοῦ σάρκας*: cf. Apollon. *de Synt.* p. 152 *παρὸν οὖν φάναι 'πρὸς ταῖς ἐμαῖς θύραις ἔστηκα' καὶ μεταλαβεῖν 'πρὸς ταῖς θύραις μου ἔστηκα,' ἀλλὰ καὶ 'πρὸς ταῖς ἐμαυτοῦ θύραις ἔστηκ' ἐγώ'* (Menand. *fr.* 830). *καὶ πάνυ ἀναγκαίως τοῦ Μενάνδρου τὴν σύνθετον παραλαβόντος συμφερομένην ὀρθοτονουμένῃ τῇ 'ἔστηκα ἐγώ'· ἔμφασιν γὰρ ἔχει ὡς οὐ πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλου.* *de Pron.* p. 82. 5.

1146 *φέρ' ἄν τι κρατὶ περιβαλῶ σκότος.*

Paley suggests *ἀντιτείνων*, Wilamowitz adopts Wecklein's *ἀλλὰ πέπλων*: I should expect rather an adjective as *ἀντίνυκτον*.

Elect. 813 *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κομποῦσι τοῖσι Θεσσαλοῖς*
εἶναι τόδ', ὅστις ταῦρον ἁρταμεῖ καλῶς
ἵππους τ' ὀχμάζει.

The editors keep this, though Musgrave, I find, had already said 'videndum an melius sit *ἓν τῶν καλῶν*.' Dindorf quotes Seidler's comment, 'exquisitior lectio librorum: neque de una re sermo est, sed de duabus.' The second argument would hold equally against *τόδε*, and is of no force; both the accomplishments belong to the same department. As to the first, instead of 'exquisitior' I should say 'prorsus inaudita.' Always they say *ἕν*: *e.g.* Aelian *V. H.* xiii. 5 *τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἓν τῶν καλῶν ἐδόκει τὸ . . ἐρᾶν.* Aristid. ii. 492 *εἰ γὰρ ἓν μὲν τῶν καλῶν . . τὸ τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν.* 86. 190. i. 153. 608 *ἕν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων νομίσαντες, ἰδίᾳ μὲν εἰ . ., πόλει δέ . .* Timocles 8 *εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλέταιρον ἕν τι τῶν καλῶν.* Alexis 263 *ἓν γὰρ νομίζω τοῦτο τῶν ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι, τὸ βαδίζειν . .* Isocr. xiii. 3 *ἓν τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν*, so Arist. 1291[a] 8. 1389[b] 27 *ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία.* Plat. *Phaedr.* 263 D *ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν ἔρωτα ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων.* *Gorg.* 447 C, Heliod. *Aeth.* ii. 31, Lucian iii. 46, i. 695 *ἓν γάρ τι καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων καλλωπισμάτων αὐταῖς δοκεῖ, ἣν λέγηται ὡς πεπαιδευμέναι τέ εἰσι καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ποιοῦσιν ᾄσματα . .* The mistake was easy enough in any case, especially if the scribe took EN for *ἐν*. I have just come across Cobet's opinion on this line, *V. L.* p. 606, 'Graecorum consuetudo fert ut *ἓν τῶν καλῶν* dicatur.'

ANTHOLOGIA GRAECA.

vi. 168 a boar *ἄρτι καὶ ἐξ ὕλας πάγχυ λιπόντα βάθος*. This strikes me as it did Boissonade: 'videtur *πάγχυ* pro adjectivo adhibitum. Adverbii quae vis foret? et totus versus valde languet.' I had conjectured *ταρφύ*, which I find is suggested by Stadtmueller as well as *τραχύ*: but though Hesych. gives *ταρφέα*:...*τραχέα, τραχύς* always means *rough, rocky* ground, whereas a thicket is constantly called *δασεῖα* or *βαθεῖα*. Cf. Hom. E 555 *βαθείης τάρφεσιν ὕλης*. O 606. Schol. Hom. T 357 *ταρφεῖαι*] *κυρίως ἐπὶ τῆς εὐτραφοῦς ὕλης ἡ λέξις*.

194 *σῶζε, θεὰ Τριτοῖ, τὰ τεθέντα τε τόν τ' ἀναθέντα* 'lemma: *ἀδέσποτον εἰς σάλπιγγα. εἴρηται δὲ εἰς μέρος σαλπιστικόν*. Quod nondum expedio. In margine scriptum: *Ἀρχίου γραμματικοῦ σάλπιγγες*, et *σάλπιγξ* calami ductu delineata' Duebner. Read *μέλος*: it is an imitation of the sound, and certainly here '*the trump taratantara rattles.*'

vii. 12 *ἄγειν δὲ χόρους* for *ἔχειν*?

79 (Meleager) Heraclitus to a stranger: divide thus

H. *ὦνθρωφ' Ἡράκλειτος ἐγὼ σοφὰ μοῦνος ἀνευρεῖν*
φαμί· τὰ δ' ἐς πάτραν κρέσσονα καὶ σοφίης·
λὰξ γὰρ καὶ τοκέων ἀσίωι, ξένε, δύσφρονας ἄνδρας
ὑλάκτευν. Ξ. *λαμπρὰ θρεψαμένοισι χάρις.*
H. *οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμεῦ;* Ξ. *μὴ τρηχύς.* H. *ἐπεὶ τάχα καὶ σύ τι πεύσῃ*
τρηχύτερον πάτρας. Ξ. *χαῖρε.* H. *σὺ δ' ἐξ Ἐφέσου.*

None of the critics have taken the last line rightly: the stranger says *χαῖρε*. Heraclitus replies 'and you get out of Ephesus!' In *v.* 1 I have corrected the MS. *ἀνευρών*. Cf. Diog. L. ix. 1. 5. In *v.* 3 Reiske's *ἀστῶν* seems right. But *τοκέων ἀστῶν* cannot go together; and if *ἀστῶν* be taken as a partitive genitive after *ἄνδρας, τοκέων* is left without a construction. Yet *καὶ τοκέων* is supported by Leonidas vii. 408 *Ἡράκλειτος ὁ καὶ τοκέων εια* (*ἕο* Plan.) *βαύξας*, whence Boissonade *ὁ καὶ τοκέων ἕο βαύξας*, Brunck *καταβαύξας*. Otherwise I should have inclined to *λὰξ* (*δὰξ*?) *γάρ, κάρτα κύων*,..'like a right Cynic.' *ἀστῶν* would be quite enough for the *θεῖον ὑλακτητὴν δήμου κύνα*

(Theodoridas vii. 479); cf. Diog. L. ix. 1. 2, Iamblich. *de vit. Pythag.* 173. Hecker *Comment. de Anth.* p. 273 (who reads καππατέων and θρυψαμένοισι) argues that θρεψάμενοι could not be said merely of citizens. But the word is undoubtedly right, θ. χάρις = θρεπτήρια, τροφεῖα. I may add that ὑλακτεῖν is usually constructed with an accusative, rarely with a dative as Herodas vi. 14 κύων ὑλακτέω ταῖς ἀνωνύμοις ταύταις. But if Cratinus 25 is sound ἵνα σιωπῇ τῆς τέχνης ῥάζωσι τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, then I should read

> λὰξ γὰρ καὶ τοκέων, ἀτίων, ξένε, δύσφρονας ἄνδρας,
> ὑλάκτευν,

and ὁ καὶ τοκέων ἔο βαύξας with Boissonade in Leonidas. For ἀτίων cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 545, 549.—Otherwise κὰτ in both.

130 Read καὶ σέ<ο>, Πρωταγόρη, φάτιν ἔκλυον.

198. 6 For καὶ θ' ἐτ' ἐφ' read καὶ τρέφεθ'?

223 κεῖθ' ἁ μυρίπνους. Jacobs had conjectured κεῖτ' ἀμύριστος, but I do not think κεῖτ' ἀμυρίπνους is impossible.

488 For κωκύει ἐκ κεφαλᾶς the natural phrase would be ἐκ κραδίας: *On Ed. Aesch.* p. 147.

549 Leon. Alex.

> πέτρος ἔτ' ἐν Σιπύλῳ Νιόβη θρήνοισιν αἰάζει, . .
> λήξει δ' οὐδ' αἰῶνι γόου.

I do not believe αἰάζει can be right in this author. I suspect ἀγάζει, which perhaps may be referred to by Hesych. ἀγάζει: ἀγανακτεῖ, βαρέως φέρει. But the meaning of the word is probably 'to be excessive in': cf. Lobeck *Aj.* 268. Less likely is ἰάζει (Theognost. Cram. Anecd. ii. 18. 3 ἰάζει: βοᾷ).

700 Διοδώρου γραμματικοῦ. εἰς Ῥουφίνου τινὸς γυναῖκα Παῦλαν Ταραντίνην.

> *v.* 3 οὔτι μ' ἀνήρ, ὃ λέγουσι, κατέκτανεν ἐς γάμον ἄλλης
> παπταίνων, τὸ μάτην οὔνομα, Ῥουφιανός·
> ἀλλά με Κῆρες ἄγουσι μεμορμέναι.

So Hecker has rightly emended the MS. τί μάτην οὔνομα, Ῥουφῖνος; but misses the point in his explanation, which Duebner follows: 'verba τὸ μάτην οὔνομα referenda ad λέγουσι, ut dicitur λόγος ταῦτα ἄλλως, et ὄνομα hic est *fama* inter homines

sparsa.' The phrase does not mean 'that idle charge, report,' but 'a name not appropriate to him'—her husband was not what his name implies: see Ducange *s. v. Ruffiani* (South Italian). Cf. Alciphron i. 3 *οὐ μάτην γοῦν ἀνεισιδώραν ταύτην ὀνομάζουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεῖσαν δῶρα δι' ὧν* . . Oppian *Hal.* i. 104 *τρύγων τ' ἀργαλέη καὶ, ἐτήτυμον οὔνομα, νάρκη.* 316 *κήρυκές τε μύες τε καὶ, ἀτρεκὲς οὔνομα, σωλήν.*

ix. 6 *μ' ἐύπνοον ἔκτισας ὄγχην?*

177 *δεινῆς ἦρχεν ἐπεσβολίης* for *κακῆς*? *δεινός*, because it is a word of several meanings, is frequently glossed to indicate which it bears.

540 *ἀτραπιτός.*

653 *αἰπύτερον θάλαμον* or *—ος —ος*, 'loftier even than virtue.'

747 Plato *ὡς ἤδη πάσας ἔμπνοα δερκομένας.* In his variation of this Polemon (746) has *ὡς μίαν, ὡς πάσας ἐ. δ.*, on which Boissonade remarks 'verba *ὡς μίαν* mihi quidem difficilia sunt.' If they are sound, we should read *ὣς πάσας*, 'as one, so all': cf. Theognis 495 *ὁμῶς ἐνὶ καὶ συνάπασιν.*

x. 8 *βαιὸς ἰδεῖν ὁ Πρίηπος ἐπαιγιαλίτιδα ναίω*
χηλήν, αἰθυίας οὔποτε ἀντιβίας (*ἀντιβίης* Plan.).

ἐναντίβιος Hermann *Orph.* p. 769 to avoid the hiatus, which Duebner (q. v.) accepts, preferring however to read *αἰθυίαις*. But there is no authority except for the adverb *ἐναντίβιον*. Perhaps the adjective may have been *ἀμφιβίοις* (*A. P.* vi. 43, etc.: schol. Hermog. on Eur. *fr.* 636, treated above, calls the *ἁλιαίετος* '*ὁ ἀμφίβιος ὄρνις*'), which is appropriate to the *αἴθυια*, a shore-bird.

xi. 196 *οἶμ' ἂν ἀπαγχονίσαι* for *οἴομ' ἀπ.*?

xii. 202 *ἕδραμεν ἄν μου ὕστερον εἰ Ζήτης ἔτρεχεν ἢ Κάλαϊς.* I should think *ὕστερος* or *δεύτερος* more likely, as *e.g.* Eupolis 118 *κἄν τις τύχῃ πρῶτος δραμών. A. P.* vi. 259 *Ἔτρεχε γάρ; καὶ πρῶτος. Anth. Append.* Cougny iii. 41 *οὐδ' Ἐπαμεινώνδα δεύτεροι ἐδράμομεν.* The error is frequent.

212 *ὡς ὁ διδάξας τεθνάτω· οἷόν μου παιδίον ἠφάνικεν.* Place a comma at *τεθνάτω* instead of a colon: the construction is not 'Qualem mihi puerum abstulit!' but *οἷον = ὅτι τοῖον.*

So *e.g.* ix. 704 *ἀλλ' ἀρετάων Ἀσκληπιοδότου τὸ κλέος ἀθάνατον, ὅσσα καὶ οἷα πόρεν γέρα πατρίδι·* which is ill translated 'laus est immortalis *de iis quot et qualia praebuit* decora patriae.' This use of *οἷος*, common especially in Homer, is not appreciated enough by editors; Theocritus xx. 5, for instance, they punctuate wrongly:

μὴ τύ γέ μευ κύσσῃς τὸ καλὸν στόμα μηδ' ἐν ὀνείροις.
οἷα βλέπεις, ὁππoῖα λαλεῖς, ὡς ἄγρια παίσδεις.

It should be only a comma at *ὀνείροις*, as in the Epic passage xxv. 38. Another wrong punctuation is iv. 49

αἴθ' ἦν μοι ῥοικὸν τὸ (or *τι*) *λαγωβόλον, ὥς τυ πάταξα*

'in order that I might.' But Fritzsche, though adopting this variant for *πατάξω*, punctuates . . *λαγωβόλον*! *ὥς τυ πάταξα*! '*quo te nunc verbere caesam redderem!*' 'how I would have,' which is not Greek, any more than Meineke's version 'si pedum mihi praesto esset, *quam te feriissem!*' This familiar aorist with *ἵνα, ὡς, ὅπως* after *εἴθε* etc. (see *e.g.* Cobet *V. L.* 102) is used by Theocritus again vii. 86, xi. 54.

Vol. III ed. Cougny.

I am thankful that the deplorable character of this edition has not been left for me to prove. Had it not been sufficiently indicated by Herwerden (*Studia critica in Epigrammata Graeca* 1891), I could not have borne to touch the book without exhibiting it.

i. 246 (Kaibel* 928) *ἀμφὶ δὲ νίκᾳ* or *νίκαν* 'on account of' for *νίκα*.

325 (K. *Add.* 273 a) *ὃς καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιὴν δόξαν ἔχεν μεγάλην.* Herwerden conjectures *ἐπὶ στρατιῆς*: I should prefer *ἐπὶ στρατίῃ*, 'renown for,' a very common use, *e.g.* Isocr. xiii. 3. 8 *μεγίστην ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ δόξαν σχών* (which is better than the variant *εἰληφώς*).

ii. 163. 4 *ἐπεὶ ῥυτῆρά με τόξου ἤνεσε καὶ Κρήτη πᾶσα κατ' εὐστοχίην* for *Κρῆτα* and *τόξῳ*: cf. 103 *τηλεβόλου ῥυτῆρα*, Hom. *σ* 263, *φ* 173, Ar. *Thesm.* 108, Aratus 301.

302 *τίς ἐλπίδας οὐ[κ ἐδάκρυσεν] τὰς ἀτελεῖς γονέων εἰς ἐμὲ*

δερκόμενος ; so K. 497. Read οὐχὶ δακρύσει as 637 (K. 314) . . τάχα καὶ σὺ δακρύσεις.

324 (see K. 884) Read ὅς κε φίλου λάθαν μηδὲ θανόντος ἔ[χῃ].

iii. 120 οὐρανίων ἄστρων πορείην καὶ κύκλα σελήνης. I think Ptolemy would have written ἄστρων τε φοράν.

vi. 122 εἴπατε τῷ βασιλῆι· for βασιλεῖ.

123 τυ[μ]πάνων.

Addenda ii. 173 c

ἄμφω γηραλέω...δὲ τέκνων τέκ[να...οντα,
ὀλβίστους θά[να]τος γλ . . . . . ος κατέχει.

Cougny suggests παρόντα, hesitating about γλυκύτατος. Read

ἄμφω γηραλέω (τὰ δὲ ?) τέκνων τέκ[ν' ἐπιδ]όντα[ς]
ὀ. θ. π[ρηύτατ]ος κ. or πρηύτερος

as *A. P.* vii. 78 πρηύτερον γῆράς σε καὶ οὐ κατὰ νοῦσος ἀμαυρὴ ἔσβεσεν. For ἐπιδόντας or ἐσιδ-, cf. *e.g.* ii. 602 οὐδένα λυπήσασα τέκνων ἐπιδοῦσα παῖδας where Kaibel *81 inserts τε, Keil ἔτι : but in that case I suspect we should have had τέκνα, as in ii. 668 τέκνα τέκνων ἐσιδών, and that the line was written τέκνων παῖδας δ' (or τ') ἐ. *A. P.* vii. 744 παῖδας εἰσιδόντα.

447 b

ἦλθεν ἀπὸ ξείνης Κλεοφῶν χθονός, ἦλθε δ' ΕΠΑΙΔΟΣ
οἷς μοῖρα προφάνη σχέτλιος ἠδ' ἀλόχ[ου.
εἶδε γὰρ οὓς ἐπό[θησ]ε καὶ ὀρφναίην ἀνὰ νύκτα
τοὺς τρισσοὺς νέκυας σταθμὸς ἔραζε δόμου.
σ]ώθη δ' εἰς γοεροὺς θρήνους, μόνος ἀθρόα μύσας
ὀρφανίην, εὐνήν, οἶκον .π. ὸς πολιήν.

Herwerden p. 43, supplying ἀλόχ[ῳ], reads ἦλθε δὲ παῖδας 'came to his children.' This is favoured by *v.* 5 (which punctuate after, not before, μόνος). I had conjectured ἦλθε δὲ παῖς ὅς, taking the three corpses to include the father Cleophon, since in a second epitaph on the same victims only one son is mentioned : υἱὸς ἐγὼ Κάλλιππος ἀνιηροῦ Κλεοφῶντος· ἐνθάδε καὶ μήτηρ κεῖται Ἀριστόπολις· οὐ κοινῇ μοίρῃ δεδμημένοι, ἀλλὰ πεσόντος τρεῖς ἅμα λυγαίου κεκλιμένοι θαλάμου. νύκτα δὲ πικροτάτην μεταδόρπιον ὑπνώσαντες οἰκοῦμεν μέλαθρον

Πλούτωνος ζοφερόν. *v.* 4 Cougny interprets '*statio subterraneae domus*'! Herwerden takes ἔραζε as = χαμαί, but the sentence is impossible. It must be a verb, ἔραξε (ῥάσσω). The same error seems to me to be certain in Cratinus 26 ἔρραζε πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ὁ δ' ἠσκάριζε κἀπέπαρδε, where ἔρραξε would make an intelligible phrase, 'felled him to the earth, and he lay writhing': cf. Dem. 1259. 10 προσπεσόντες, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξέδυσαν, εἶθ' ὑποσκελίσαντες καὶ ῥάξαντες εἰς τὸν βόρβορον.. *v.* 5 Cougny translates 'solus una silentio premens orbitatem, cubile, *i.e.* coniugium, domum...canitiem.' Read

(ἀθρό' ἀμέρσας?)
ὀρφανίην εὐνὴν οἶκον ὑπὸ σποδιήν (or σποδιῇ).

Cf. Seneca *Thyestes* 282 *ingesta orbitas in ora patris.*

Choricius[1].

Ἐπιθαλάμιος 1. p. 14. 8 βραχέ' ἄττα λοιπὸν ὡραΐσασθαι.—p. 18 Plat. *Phaedr.* 245 A.—p. 15. 16 Ar. *Eq.* 1354, *Thesm.* 930, Dem. 332. 12, Plut. *Ages.* 12.—p. 16. 17 ὁ μὲν οὖν ποιητὴς...φιλονεικεῖ...τὴν μὲν καλλιπάρῃον, τὴν δὲ καλλίσφυρον ὀνομάζων, ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν νύμφην, ὁρᾶτε, ὅπως κέκληται τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ σύντονον βλέπει καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέχει τὰ ὦτα, ἐγὼ οὖν τὴν νύμφην,.. Here we have evidently a resumption after a parenthesis, and κέκληται is pointless. Read τὴν νύμφην—ὁρᾶτε ὅπως κεκ<ήκ>ληται τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ..ὑπέχει τὰ ὦτα—ἐγὼ οὖν: cf. *e.g.* Themist. *Or.* xv. p. 184 D καὶ ταῦτα ᾄδοντι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος τὰ ὦτα ὑπεῖχον οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ ἐκηλοῦντο.—p. 18. 4 εἴ τινα <εἶπε> πρεσβύτην ὁ ποιητὴς λιγὺν Πυλίων ἀγορητήν, F. I think λέγει is more likely to have dropped out before or after λιγύν.

Ἐπιθαλάμιος 2. p. 19. 19 stet ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι.

In Justin. Brumal. p. 3. 7 τεθηπότες τὴν ἀγλαίαν are probably from the passage of Pindar (*fr.* 31). Cf. Lucian i. 670, and with l. 12 Lucian ii. 500, *A.P.* ix. 701.—p. 4. 6 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Μακεδὼν νεανίας ὀξύς τε ἄρα καὶ φιλοπόλεμος ἦν καὶ οὔποτε μᾶλλον ἐσπένδετο πρὸς ἡσυχίαν. οὔκουν εἰρηναῖόν τι παρὰ τὴν θοίνην ἐφρόνει. Foerster suggests ἐσπένδετο <τὸ>

[1] Edited 1891—1893 by R. Foerster, who, I hope, will continue the publication.

comparing Phot. *bibl.* p. 2a 28 *τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην ἐσπείσατο.* I should read *ἐσπεύδετο* (Eunap. 119. 2 *αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον σπευσάμενος*), or *ἔσπευδε τὸ* (Thuc. i. 141 *ὅταν τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ*).—p. 5. 12 *καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἐλάττονι δέει συνεχομένην ἢ ὅτε . .* Read *οὐδὲν ἐλάττονι.*

De Lydis p. 12. 21 *πάλαι ταῦτα ἦν.* Proverbial, Ar. *Vesp.* 1063, Catull. iv. 25.—p. 12. 26 *ἄλλος, ὦ Κῦρε, βίος ἡμῖν, ἄλλα μελέτα.* Foerster writes *ἄλλη μελέτη*, without indicating the proverbial character of the phrase. But cf. Suid., Zenob. i. 22 *ἄλλος βίος, ἄλλη δίαιτα.* Ter. *Andr.* 189 *nunc hic dies aliam vitam defert, alios mores postulat.* I would not write *δίαιτα* here, but I think *ἄλλα μελέτα* may be a Doric quotation.—p. 14. 19 *τὰς ἐλπίδας οἴει τῆς νίκης ἐν ᾄσμασι καὶ λύραις κεκτῆσθαι.* Read *κεῖσθαι*?

Μιλτιάδης p. 4. 22 *χρήσωμαι.*—p. 5. 15 *οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν νομίσας . . τοὺς . . μὴ σωφρονίσαι.* 'Supra *μὴ* praebet *ἀργὸν M*' F. That is, 'idle,' *περισσόν*, which is inapplicable, but indicates that the reading was *μὴ οὐ.* Constantly this *οὐ* is so criticised, and hence wrongly omitted.—p. 7. 22 See Eur. *fr.* 466 above.—p. 8. 12 *ὅσον εὐβουλία ῥώμης ἀμείνων.* Proverbial: Eur. *Heracl.* 110, *Supp.* 163.—p. 9. 7 *τῆς ἀπάτης λυσιτελούσης.* Cf. Aesch. *frr.* 301, 302.—p. 13. 24 *εἰς τοῦτό γε ἔληξαν αἱ Πολυκράτους ἐλπίδες, τοιοῦτον ἔσχεν αὐτοῦ τὰ φρονήματα πέρας, ὥστε κἂν ἐπέγραψέ τις εἰκότως εἰς ἐμὲ ὁρῶν· μὴ θαρρείτω τῇ τύχῃ. ἐμὲ* must be Miltiades, which is absurd, and there is no subject to *θαρρείτω.* Read '*εἰς ἐμέ <τις> ὁρῶν μὴ θαρρείτω τῇ τύχῃ.*' Hdt. ii. 141 (of Sennacherib) *καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἕστηκε . . λίθινος . . λέγων διὰ γραμμάτων τάδε· 'ἐς ἐμέ τις ὁρέων εὐσεβὴς ἔστω.'* Muasalcas *A.P.* vii. 242 *ἀλλά τις ἀστῶν τούσδ' ἐσιδὼν θυάσκειν τλάτω ὑπὲρ πατρίδος.* Liban. *Epist.* 61 *πρὸς ταῦτα ὁρῶν τις μὴ νομιζέτω ῥητορικὴν ἄτιμον.* Aesch. *Eum.* 548 *πρὸς τάδε τις . . αἰδόμενός τις ἔστω.* The construction being mistaken, the second *τις*, which now fills the hiatus, was naturally omitted.

Antiphon v. 94 *νῦν μὲν οὖν γνωρισταὶ γίνεσθε τῆς δίκης, τότε δὲ δικασταὶ τῶν μαρτύρων· νῦν μὲν δοξασταί, τότε δὲ κριταὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἀραῖστῶν δέ τοί ἐστιν ἀνδρὸς περὶ θανάτου φεύγοντος τὰ ψευδῆ καταμαρτυρῆσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ*

παράχρημα μόνον πείσωσιν ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ἅμα τῷ σώματι καὶ ἡ τιμωρία ἀπόλωλεν. οὔτε (read οὐδὲ) γὰρ οἱ φίλοι ἔτι θελήσουσιν ὑπὲρ ἀπολωλότος τιμωρεῖν' . .

Stephanus conj. ἀράσιμον, Reiske ἆρα ἴστ' ὦ ἄνδρες οἷον . . , but πείσωσιν shows that we require a masculine genitive: ἀπαισίων Scaliger, χρηστῶν Valckenaer. The preceding sentence easily persuades me that here too there was a verbal substantive: and the word, I am convinced, was ῥᾳχιστῶν. Phot. Suid. Ῥαχίζειν: τὸ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι. καὶ Ῥαχιστής, ὁ ἀλάζων. Θεόπομπος Παμφίλῃ (*fr.* 43) 'τούτων ἁπάντων ὁ ῥαχιστὴς Δημοφῶν...' Suid. Ῥαχίζων:...ἐκ μεταφορᾶς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μεγάλα πανουργοῦντας ῥαχιστάς φαμεν (so schol. Soph. *Aj.* 56). Hesych. Ῥαχίζειν: τὸ εἰκαίως καὶ ῥᾳδίως ψεύδεσθαι. Ῥαχιστήρ: ψεύστης. ἀλάζων. μεγαλουργός. μεγάλα κακουργῶν. μεγάλα ψευδόμενος. Phot. Ῥαχίζων: διακόπτων. καὶ τοὺς κακουργοὺς ῥαχιστάς. Ῥαχιστής: ὁ διατέμνων. Antiatt. Bekk. *Anecd.* 113. 7 Ῥαχίζει: ἀντὶ τοῦ μεγάλα ψεύδεται. Δείναρχος κατὰ Δημοκλέους. Here is an Attic word in exactly the appropriate sense, the verb being recorded from Deinarchos, but it is not surprising that it was corrupted.

Lysias (Suid. *s.v.* Ἀνάργυρος) p. 488 Bekker ἀσθενήσ<ας>.

Inscriptions of Cos (Paton and Hicks) 38. 11, 15, 22. In all three places is given τὸ ἄτερον ἔτος ἐφ' οὗ κλέωντι Καρνεῖαι, a phrase which Mr Paton discusses in the commentary and on p. 333, stating the difficulties without claiming to solve them. I venture to say, Read ΕΦΟΥΚΑΕΩΝΤΙ as *e.g.* 386. 3 αἴ κα ἔωντι. 37. 24. This implies that (in Cos at any rate) the Carneian festival was held every other year.

Plutarch *Mor.* 655 D ἡμῖν δὲ . . ἐξευλαβητέον ἐστὶν εἰς θέρος ἐμβαλεῖν. Bernardakis, I find, has suggested εἰς θεῶν ἱερὸν (vel θ' ἱερὸν) προσεμβάλλειν: I had conjectured simply εἰς θεοῦ ἐμβάλλειν.

915 E διὰ τί λέγεται 'σῖτον ἐν πηλῷ φυτεύετε τὴν δὲ κριθὴν ἐν κόνει.' Bergk (*Carm. Pop.* 39) reads φύτευε. Here is a place, if anywhere, for reading the infinitive, φυτεύειν. In Ar. *Eq.* 504 ὑμεῖς δ' ἡμῖν προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν . . it has not occurred to the editors that the infinitive is possible; but Lucian iii. 174 has σὺ δὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν.

Aeschylus.

Persae.

571 τοὶ δ' ἄρα πρωτόμοιροι, φεῦ *Str.*
λειφθέντες πρὸς ἀνάγκαν, ἠέ
ἀκτὰς ἀμφὶ Κυκρείας ὀᾶ
574 <ἔρρανται>· στένε καὶ δακνάζου, βαρὺ δ' ἀμβόασον
576 οὐράνι' ἄχη, ὀᾶ
τεῖνε δὲ δυσβάυκτον
578 γοᾶτιν τάλαιναν αὐδάν.
579 γναπτόμενοι δ' ἁλὶ δεινὰ φεῦ *Antistr.*
σκύλλονται πρὸς ἀναύδων ἠέ
παίδων τᾶς ἀμιάντου, ὀᾶ
582 πένθει δ' ἄνδρα δόμος στερηθείς, τοκέες δ' ἄπαιδες
584 δαιμόνι' ἄχη ὀᾶ
δυρόμενοι γέροντες
τὸ πᾶν δὴ κλύουσιν ἄλγος.

In 578 for *βοᾶτιν*, which is immediately preceded by *ἀμβόασον*, I have written *γοᾶτιν*. In 579 the first hand of M wrote *ἀλὶ* and so at first did f. This confirms me in thinking that we have corruption here of an adverbial accusative: possibly *ἐλεινά* (cf. Opp. *Hal.* iv. 547, Hom. B 314, X 37, 408, *A.P.* vii. 487), more likely *ἀιδνά*. It may be observed, however, that 278 *ἁλίδονα* (M has *ἁλιδόνα*) Par. B has adscribed *ἁλιδνά*. If that (or *ἀλιδνὰ*) be a genuine word, it is the word I want in 579: perhaps, again, *ἀιδνὰ* may have been the original word in 278.

601 φίλοι κακῶν μὲν ὅστις ἔμπορος κυρεῖ
ἐπίσταται βροτοῖσιν ὡς ὅταν κλύδων
κακῶν ἐπέλθῃ, πάντα δειμαίνειν φιλεῖ,
ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὐροῇ, πεποιθέναι
605 τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ δαίμον' οὐριεῖν τύχης.
606 ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἤδη πάντα μὲν φόβου πλέα·
ἐν ὄμμασιν τἀνταῖα φαίνεται θεῶν
βοᾷ δ' ἐν ὠσὶ κέλαδος οὐ παιώνιος.

There is no subject to *φιλεῖ*. You can get one by reading *βροτῶν τιν' ὡς ὅταν κλύδων κυκῶν ἐπέλθῃ* (see on *Ag.* 984), in which case *ὅστις ἔμπορος κυρεῖ* is by itself, 'a voyager knows.' I had also (following on the lines of Weil and Wecklein) conjectured *βροτοῖσιν* (or *βροτείων*) *ὅστις ἔμπαιος κυρεῖ ἐπίσταται, κακῶν μὲν ὡς ὅταν τινά κλύδων ἐπέλθῃ*, .. I feel, however, suspicion of interpolation due to misunderstanding of *ὡς*: cf. Eur. *Supp.* 464 *φεῦ φεῦ, κακοῖσιν ὡς ὅταν δαίμων διδῷ καλῶς, ὑβρίζουσ' ὡς ἀεὶ πράξοντες εὖ*. The exclamatory *ὡς* 'how (true it is that)' is more naturally followed by the *γὰρ* in 606 than is *ὅστις..., ἐπίσταται .. ὡς*.

In 605 the repeated *δαίμον'* I take to be a gloss on *τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ τοῦτον οὐριεῖν τύχας*. Cf. my emendation of Longus above, and Mr C. E. S. Headlam's of Karkinos *fr.* 8 *λυπεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὺς κεκτημένους* for *αὐτὸ τὸ κτῆμα*.— In 606 there must be no stop at *πλέα*, or *μὲν* is meaningless: as it is, the opposition is *.. μὲν ἐν ὄμμασιν, .. δ' ἐν ὠσί*.

734 *Βακτρίων δ' ἔρρει πανώλης δῆμος οὐδέ τις γέρων*. *οὐ δή* Dind. *οὐ δή τοι* Hartung. *οὐδέ τις νέος* Blomf. *οὐδέ τις Γαβῶν* Merkel. *εἰ μή τις γ.* Heimsoeth. *οὐδ' ἔσται γ.* Halm. *ἔρρειν πανώλη δῆμον οἷδέ τις γ.* Weil. Read *οὐχί τις γέρων* 'not merely an old man or so, but *πᾶσα ἡλικία*.' This alone is natural, and *οὐδὲ* is often written for it. The prose form of the phrase is Dem. 245. 15 *οὐ τισίν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως*. 457. 14 *εἰ τὰ μάλιστα μὴ τινές, ἀλλὰ πάντες* .. Lucian ii. 852, 876. It is like the commoner *οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ* (*Pers.* 804), for which I have a collection on Herodas vii. 23. One example is somewhat illustrative: Philostr. *Apoll.* vi. 11 *οὐχ ὁ μέν τις ὁ δὲ οὔ, πᾶσα δὲ ἡλικία*.

991 *ἴυγγά μοι δῆτ'*
ἀγαθῶν ἑτάρων ὑπομιμνήσκεις.

992 = 979 *τὰς ὠγυγίους κατιδόντες*. The schol. explains by *φιλίαν*, an impossible meaning. *ἴυγξ*, the bird bound on the wheel and spun to attract affection, is used metaphorically in the sense 'attraction,' 'charm': in later Greek the metaphorical sense is extremely common. Being technical, the words used in connexion with it are constant; the charm *ἕλκει*, and to set

the charm in motion is κινεῖν ἴυγγα (*e.g.* Heliod. *Aeth.* ii. 33, vii. 10); Aristaenetus ii. 18 has πάλιν κατ' ἐκείνης ἀνακινῆσαι τὰς ἴυγγας. Several words have been suggested for ὑπομιμνήσκεις, but nothing is so likely as that it is a gloss on ἀνακινεῖς.

Theb. 106 θεοὶ πολιάοχοι χθονός, ἴθ' ἴτε πάντες
so M with an erasure of 4 or 5 letters after χθονός. πολίοχοι Dind. ἴθ' ἀθρόοι Steusloff, inferring (I suppose) from ἴθ' that πάντες was a gloss on an aspirated word. So I think; but the word I suspect was the Ionic ἁλέες. Cf. Callim. *fr.* 86 Schneider ἐς τὸ πρὸ τείχευς ἱρὸν ἁλέες δεῦτε.

158 ἰὼ φίλοι δαίμονες,
λυπήριοι <δ'> ἀμφιβάντες πόλιν

after the vocative.

257 ἐγὼ δὲ χώρας τοῖς πολισσούχοις θεοῖς,..
εὖ ξυντυχόντων καὶ πόλεως σεσῳσμένης,
261 μήλοισιν αἱμάσσοντας ἑστίας θεῶν,
262 ταυροκτονοῦντας θεοῖσιν, ὧδ' ἐπεύχομαι..

Either 261 and 262 mean the same or something different. In the first case (notwithstanding Blomfield's suggested πᾶσι for θεοῖσι) the tautology, in the second the asyndeton is intolerable. Blomfield said of 261 'Mihi vix dubium videtur quin hic versus aliunde irrepserit.' But how? I take it to be a quotation illustrative of 262; but there is little reason for it unless we also suppose that the true reading of 262 was μηλοκτονοῦντας—or rather μηλοκτονῶν (τοῖς) θεοῖσιν, adapted to the other accusative. In *v.* 43 Weil has already conjectured μηλοσφαγοῦντες in accordance with Ar. *Lys.* 188 for ταυροσφ. (*On Ed. Aesch.* p. 137).

350 δμωίδες δὲ καινοπήμονες νέαι,
τλημόνευνον αἰχμάλωτον = ξυμβολεῖ φέρων φέροντι
ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχοῦντος ὡς (αἷς?) = καὶ κενὸς κενὸν καλεῖ
δυσμενοῦς ὑπερτέρου
ἐλπίς ἐστι νύκτερον τέλος μολεῖν,
παγκλαύτων ἀλγέων ἐπίρροθον.

τλήμονες εὐνὰν M, the schol. appearing to take τλήμονες as governing εὐνάν. Hermann once conjectured τλάμον' εὐνὰν

('Gaisford on Hes. *Opp.* 184 remarks that the termination ες is often confounded with the final elision' Paley), Blomfield *τλάμον' αἰχμ. εὐνάν.* But metre requires pure iambics through 351. *εὐνὰν* therefore cannot stand at all. Yet in some form it must be right—it could not be a gloss on such a word as *λέχος* (Oberdick). The same is the case with *τλήμονες.* I am persuaded, therefore, that my conjecture is true: 'And the young handmaids have a new distress, since they must look to come to..,' all the adjectives going with *τέλος*, as in Hermann's view, who afterwards conjectured *τλᾶμον αἷσιν αἰχμ.* The compound is formed on Hom. Σ 432 *ἐκ μέν μ' ἀλλάων ἀλιάων ἀνδρὶ δάμασσεν, Αἰακίδῃ Πηλῆι, καὶ ἔτλην ἀνέρος εὐνήν πολλὰ μάλ' οὐκ ἐθέλουσα.* The source of the error need not have been palaeographical; but the following account is as likely as that given above: *τλήμον' εὐνὰν* being written, *ἐς* was inserted, as often we find it inserted with *μολεῖν* etc.

This is not the only place where compound epithets have been spoilt in Aeschylus: *e.g.* in *Supp.* 127, 138 *λινοσινεῖ* has been restored by Buecheler and Tucker, in 204 *κατωποσωφρόνων* by Tucker, in *Cho.* 734 *θετοσκυθρωπῶν* by Conington. Another is suggested on *Ag.* 121. Perhaps in *Pers.* 562 *αἱ δ' ὁμόπτεροι κυανώπιδες* = 552 *γαῖ' Ἀσιὰς* ('Ασὶς Blomfield) *ἐκκενουμένα*, where Schuetz conjectured *λινόπτεροι*, Oberdick *αἰνόπτεροι*, the adjective may have been *λινοπτεροκυανώπιδες* or *αἰνοπτεροκ.*

414 *θεοῦ τε γὰρ θέλοντος ἐκπέρσειν πόλιν*
καὶ μὴ θέλοντος φησίν, οὐδὲ τὴν Διός
ἔριν πέδῳ σκήψασαν ἐμποδὼν σχεθεῖν.

πέδοι Dindorf. Hermann interpreted 'neque se Iovis iram impedimenti loco habiturum,' but it has been generally preferred to take *ἔριν* as the subject of *σχεθεῖν*, 'should withhold him,' Paley comparing Hom. Θ 133 *βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινὸν ἀφῆκ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν, κὰδ δὲ πρόσθ' ἵππων Διομήδεος ἧκε χαμᾶζε.* Add *h. Ap.* 150 *οὔτις ἔπειτα θεῶν οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνθάδε με σχήσει,.. οὐδ' εἴ κεν ἑκηβόλος αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων τόξου ἀπ' ἀργυρέου προίοι βέλεα στονόεντα.* Soph. *Phil.* 1197. *Rhes.* 592. Madvig conj. *οὐδ' ἄν νιν* and Weil, like

others desiderating the pronoun, reads *οὐδέ νιν*, as in the imitation of Euripides *Phoen.* 1181 *τοσόνδ' ἐκόμπασεν, μηδ' ἂν τὸ σεμνὸν πῦρ νιν εἰργαθεῖν Διός τὸ μὴ οὐ κατ' ἄκρων περγάμων ἑλεῖν πόλιν.* Compare also Hdt. ii. 169 *Ἀπρίεω δὲ λέγεται εἶναι ἥδε διάνοια, μηδ' ἂν θεόν μιν μηδένα δύνασθαι παῦσαι τῆς βασιληίης, Theb.* 456, *Rhes.* 592. Heimsoeth, at first reading *οὐδέ νιν*, afterwards preferred *οὐδέ τἀν.* Much trouble has been caused by *ἔριν*, for which the schol. suggests two interpretations: *οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς σκηπτὸν εἰς γῆν κατενεχθέντα, ἢ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διὸς φιλονεικήσαντος (αὐτὸν τὸν Δία φιλονείκησαντα ?) ἐμποδὼν γενέσθαι αὐτῷ λέγει.* Now *ἔρις* might be used in the sense 'contention,' 'opposition': *Supp.* 652 *ἀτιμώσαντες ἔριν γυναικῶν.* Pind. *N.* x. 72 *χαλεπὰ δ' ἔρις ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν κρεσσόνων.* Eur. *Andr.* 552 *ἔριν τε τὴν κατ' οἶκον οἶσθά που κλύων τῆς τοῦδε θυγατρός.* Dioscor. *A. P.* ix. 340 *Φοίβου ἔρις.* xvi. 56 *ἀντιβίων ἔριν ἔσβεσεν.* But no doubt it is a strange phrase to use of a thunderbolt; and various substitutes have been proposed, as *ἄρδιν* Hartung, *ῥιπήν* Lowinski, *Ἶριν* Tyrwhitt. The last is the best, for the words are easily and frequently confused, and Iris is constantly sent, especially by Zeus, to *restrain*: Hom. Θ 397, Apoll. Rhod. ii. 286, Callim. *h. Del.* 157. But *τὴν Διός* must then mean 'the daughter of Zeus,' and this can hardly be said of the daughter of Thaumas[1] (Hes. *Theog.* 266). Dr Verrall finds a fatal objection to the MS. in 'the name *Ἔριν*, *Discord*, an inappropriate personage and not properly described as *τὴν Διός*.' The personification is gratuitous. He conjectures *οὐδὲ τὴν Διὸς* (Athena) *ἐραί νιν ἂν σκήψασαν* . . taking *πέδῳ* as a gloss on a locative *ἐραί*. This is impossible, because *πέδον* is not so used: the grammarians, who very frequently speak of *ἔρα*, always explain it by *γῆ*, and *ἔραζε* by *εἰς τὴν γῆν.* I think now I understand the phrase. Aeschylus had in mind, and meant to suggest to the minds of his hearers, the word *ἐρίσκηπτον*: Plut. *Mor.* 664 F *ὥσπερ αἵ τε δρόσοι γλυκυτέραν ποιοῦσι τοῖς θρέμμασι τὴν πόαν, καὶ τὴν ἶριν ἐξανθοῦντα νέφη καθ' ὧν ἂν ἐπερείσῃ ξύλων εὐωδίας ἀναπίμπλησι· καὶ ταύτῃ γνωρίζοντες οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐρίσκηπτα*

[1] Though indeed in Ar. *Av.* 1259 it is of Zeus I suppose that Iris (who comes *παρὰ τοῦ πατρός* v. 1230) says *ἦ μήν σε παύσει τῆς ὕβρεως οὑμὸς πατήρ.*

(Salmas. for *ἱερεῖς αὐτὰ*) *καλοῦσιν, τὴν Ἶριν ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐπισκήπτειν.* Hesych. *Ἐρίσκηπτα: ἱερὰ βοτάνη, εἰς ἣν ἂν ἔρις ἐπισκήψῃ.* Cf. *Ἔριδας: τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴριδας· Ἀττικῶς. Ἤριν: τὴν Ἶριν.*

1002 *τέθνηκεν οὔπερ τοῖς νέοις θνῄσκειν καλόν.*

'Forsan *ὥσπερ*' Blomfield, and my feeling is the same. But the text would more naturally arise from *ᾗπερ.*

Supp. 303 XO. *βοῦν τὴν γυναῖκ' ἔθηκεν Ἀργεία θεός.*
BA. *οὐκοῦν πελάζει Ζεὺς ἐπ' εὐκραίρῳ βοΐ;*
XO. *φασίν, πρέποντα βουθόρῳ ταύρῳ δέμας.*

For *ἐπ'* Schuetz emended *ἔτ'*, which the editors are reluctant to approve: but Prof. Ellis and Prof. Tucker vainly attempt to defend *ἐπὶ*. The Schol. notes that Aeschylus attributes the transformation of Io to Hera instead of (as in Hesiod's account) to Zeus himself. Now it has not been observed that Lucian, *following not the usual version but that of Aeschylus*, has this, i. 305 ΖΕΦ...*νῦν δὲ ἡ Ἥρα τοιαύτην ἐποίησεν αὐτήν, ζηλοτυπήσασα ὅτι πάνυ ἑώρα ἐρῶντα τὸν Διά.* ΝΟΤ. *νῦν οὖν ἔτι ἐρᾷ τῆς βοός;* ΖΕΦ. *καὶ μάλα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐς Αἴγυπτον αὐτὴν ἔπεμψε κ.τ.λ.*

575 *χλωρῷ δείματι θυμὸν*
πάλλοντ' ὄφιν ἀήθη
577 *βοτὸν ἐσορῶντες δυσχερὲς μιξόμβροτον.*

Sch. *ὄψιν ἀήθη ὁρῶντες.* 'Talem versum non scripsit Aeschylus. Genuinum vocabulum ab interpretatione expulsum esse, quoniam non intellectum erat accusativos pendere ex *θυμὸν πάλλοντο*, ostendit a scholiasta ad *ὄψιν ἀήθη* adscriptum *ὄψιν ἀήθη ὁρῶντες*, quod metri causa in *ἐσορῶντες* esse mutatum prodit scriptura codicum M et G *ἐσ ὁρῶντες*' Hermann. Editors generally accept this view, but Dr Tucker finds it 'difficult to understand the criticisms passed upon this verse. ...What the Scholiast meant by his note *ὄψιν ἀήθη ὁρῶντες* was simply that such was the construction. Herein he was wrong, but there is every reason to suppose he read *ἐσορῶντες*.' I find every reason to suppose the opposite. In the first place strong suspicion is aroused by the extraordinary rhythm. Then we

notice that the Schol. has *ὁρῶντες*, not *ἐσορῶντες*, as would be natural if he were merely indicating *τὸ ἑξῆς*. Thirdly, this is a regular scholiastic way of explaining such constructions as are noticed above on Heliod. *Aeth.* iv. 4: Hom. N 353 *ἤχθετο γάρ ῥα Τρωσὶν δαμναμένους*] *λείπει τὸ ὁρῶν· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τῆς φράσεως ἀρχαῖον*, . . on Z 480 *καὶ ποτέ τις εἴποι*, . . *ἐκ πολέμου ἀνιόντα* one says *λείπει τὸ ἰδών*, another opposes, saying *οὐ λείπει τὸ ἰδών, ἀλλ' ἔστι συνήθης Ἀττικοῖς ἡ φράσις*, . . as on I 77 *τίς ἂν τάδε γηθήσειεν ;*] *οὐ λείπει τὸ ὁρῶν, ἀλλ' ἔστι παλαιὰ συνήθεια*... To fill the vacant place many words have been suggested (see Wecklein's *Appendix*), most critics endeavouring to keep exact correspondence with 568 *λειμῶνα χιονόβοσκον ὅντ' ἐπέρχεται*, which is not necessary in an iambic senarius. I should guess *βοτὸν <δίμορφον>* (Lycophr. *Alex.* 111, 892, Aelian *N. A.* xii. 7).

814 *τίν' ἀμφ' αὐτᾶς ἔτι πόρον* = 806 *πρὶν δαΐκτορος βίᾳ*
τέμνω γάμου καὶ λυτήρια ;

815 Schol. *λείπει εὕρω.* Hermann led the way with *ἢ τίν' ἀμφυγὰν ἔτ' ἢ* . . , upon which others try to improve in various ways, but *ἔτι* which many omit should certainly be retained, as *e.g.* Soph. *El.* 958 *ἐς τίν' ἐλπίδων βλέψασ' ἔτ' ὀρθήν ;* Eur. *Alc.* 132 *νῦν δὲ τίν' ἔτι βίου ἐλπίδα προσδέχωμαι ;* where *BC* omit *ἔτι*, which is rightly, therefore, restored by Hermann in Soph. *O. C.* 1749 *ἐλπίδων γὰρ ἐς τίν' <ἔτι> με* . . Read *ἀμφυγᾶς τίν' ἔτι πόρον* . . ; the same transposition of the interrogative has been proposed, rightly perhaps, in Eur. *Alc.* 132 *νῦν δὲ βίου τίν' ἔτ' ἐλπίδα π.* ;

1023 *μόνον φυλάξαι τάσδ' ἐπιστολὰς πατρός,*
τὸ σωφρονεῖν τιμῶσα.

The editors, never alive enough to the hortatory use of the infinitive, silently write *φύλαξαι*. But the inf. is probable with *μόνον*, as in Heliod. *Aeth.* iii. 17, iv. 6, vii. 17; and I should prefer the active, as in 185 *αἰνῶ φυλάξαι τἄμ' ἔπη δελτουμένας*.—In Eur. *I. A.* 534

ἔν μοι φύλαξον, . .
. . *ὅπως ἂν μὴ Κλυταιμνήστρα τάδε μάθῃ*

φύλαξαι is required. Taken for φυλάξαι, it was altered to the imperative.

Agam. 121 βοσκόμενοι λαγίναν ἐρικύματα φέρματι γένναν
βλαβέντα λοισθίων δρόμων.

So M. ἐρικύμονα afh. φέρβοντο fh. I suspect that the origin of all this is a compound epithet, either ἐρικυματοφέρμονα (as ἀσπιδοφέρμονα Eur. *Phoen.* 798) or ἐριφερματοκύμονα. In Ar. *Ran.* 839 Euripides parodies the φρενοτέκτονος ἀνδρὸς ῥήμαθ' ἱπποβάμονα, γομφοπαγῆ by calling Aeschylus κομποφακελορρήμονα.

379 'Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσιν' εἰπεῖν
πάρεστιν τοῦτ<ό τ'> ἐξιχνεῦσαι.
ἔπραξεν ὡς ἔκρανεν.

'*They have felt the stroke of Zeus*, now may one say, and trace this out.' πληγήν, ἕλκος, τραῦμα, ἔχειν are regular expressions for 'be wounded,' ἔχειν serving to form a passive as in αἰτίαν ἔχω, etc. I have collected illustration for Herodas iv. 60, but Blomfield's references in his critical note should be enough for the present purpose. He remarks 'de vera distinguendi ratione nemo semel monitus dubitabit.' Yet, excepting Boissonade, I do not know one critic who has accepted this. Both of them, however, make Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσι a separate statement, Blomfield reading εἰπεῖν πάρεστιν τοῦτο κἀξιχνεῦσαι (which may still be right, cf. *Pers.* 125), Boissonade τοῦτό τ'. All, therefore, that I contribute is making the phrase a quotation of the epitaph: cf. *Theb.* 906 πάρεστι δ' εἰπεῖν ἐπ' ἀθλίοισιν ὡς ἐρξάτην . . Menander 'καλὸν τὸ θνήσκειν' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγειν.

421 πάρεστι σιγὰς ἄτιμος ἀλοίδορος
ἄδιστος ἀφεμένων ἰδεῖν.
=437 τὸ πᾶν δ' ἀφ' Ἑλλάδος αἴας συνορμένοις
πένθεια τλησικάρδιος.

Hermann conj. πάρεστι σιγὰς ἀτίμους ἀλοιδόρους and Bamberger in 437 (of which the metre is certainly wrong) ἀφ' Ἕλλανος αἴας. Dindorf restored ἀφημένων, as Hom. O 106 ὅ

δ' ἀφήμενος οὐκ ἀλεγίζει οὐδ' ὄθεται (with which Leaf compares Θ 207, Λ 81). Add Hdt. iv. 66 ἠτιμώμενοι ἀποκατέαται. Mourners are constantly said to *sit* moping, *e.g.* Hom. κ 497, ξ 41, π 145, Epictet. p. 261. 11 Upton κλαύσεις καθήμενος ὡς τὰ παιδία; so 657. 3, 339. 16 τί οὖν ἐκεῖνον (Achilles) ὠφελεῖ ταῦτα, ὅταν καθήμενος κλαίῃ διὰ τὸ κορασίδιον; 414. 1 μέλλω καθήμενος κλαίειν, ὅτι μόνος ἀπελείφθην καὶ ἔρημος; 486. 6 ἂν δέ τις ἀποδημήσῃ τῶν συνήθων, καθήμενοι κλαίωμεν; see κάθημαι in Upton's index. I have long thought that the right metre will be given in 437 by

ελλαδος
τὸ πᾶν δ' ἀφ' Ἑλλανίας συνορμένοις

as Eur. *H. F.* 411, *Hipp.* 1115, and, to match this, would read

πάρεστι σιγὰς ἄτιμ' ἀλοιδόρους
ἄστως ἀφημένων ἰδεῖν

in which I find myself nearly anticipated by Dindorf, who (with ἀτίμως) conjectured ἄστους. ἄδιστ' could only mean 'in perfect content,' and πολλὰ δ' ἔστενον of 417 shows, I think, that irony is out of place. I am by no means sure, however, whether ἀτιμολοιδόρους 'scorning to upbraid' is not the truth. ἀτιμοπενθεῖς in *Eum.* 796, 826 means 'mourning in (or 'for') ἀτιμία,' as *v.* 827 proves; but ἀτιμαγέλης is 'disdaining the herd.' The origin of the nominatives, we find, was misunderstanding of πάρεστι: just so in Eur. *Tro.* 36 τὴν δ' ἀθλίαν τήνδ' εἴ τις εἰσορᾶν θέλει, πάρεστιν, Ἑκάβην κειμένην πυλῶν πάρος, δάκρυα χέουσαν πολλά, *AB* have Ἑκάβη κειμένη . . δακρυχέουσα.

525 ἦπου πάλαι φαιδροῖσι τοισίδ' ὄμμασιν
δέξασθε κόσμῳ βασιλέα . .

This line has caused a great deal of trouble. Auratus gave εἴ που πάλαι, and εἰ at any rate is right; I should prefer εἴ πω, and we might have εἴπερ. The prayer is of the same form as Hom. E 116 εἴ ποτέ μοι καὶ πατρὶ φίλα φρονέουσα παρέστης δηίῳ ἐν πολέμῳ, νῦν αὖτ' ἐμὲ φῖλαι, Ἀθήνη. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 757 νῦν, εἴ ποτ' ἐμὰς ἐτέλεσσας ἐφετμάς, εἰ δ' ἄγε. Sappho 1. 5 ἀλλὰ τυῖδ' ἔλθ', αἴποτα κἀτέρωτα . . ἔκλυες. 25 ἔλθε μοι

καὶ νῦν. Ar. *Ach.* 405 *ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ πώποτ' ἀνθρώπων τινί.* We expect *καὶ νῦν*, but that is here expressed by *τοισίδε*, which has been a great puzzle to critics: 'with bright eyes now.' Else we should only have had *τοῖσιν* (which h writes), as Alciphron i. 38 *ἡ δὲ οὐκέτι φαιδροῖς τοῖς ὄμμασιν ὄψεται μειδιῶσα.*

563 *τὰ δ' αὖτε χέρσῳ καὶ προσῆν πλέον στέγος.*

We could have *προσῆν δὲ καὶ τὰ χέρσῳ*, but now I should write *καὶ πλέον προσῆν σ.*

679 *γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα· Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν*
680 *πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολεῖν·*
681 *εἰ δ' οὖν τις ἀκτὶς ἡλίου νιν ἱστορεῖ*
καὶ ζῶντα καὶ βλέποντα, μηχαναῖς Διός
οὔπω θέλοντος ἐξαναλῶσαι γένος,
ἐλπίς τις αὐτὸν πρὸς δόμους ἥξει πάλιν.

At present the sentence is quite illogical. If we take 680 as 'first and chiefest expect him to arrive,' then 681 '*if, however*, he is alive, there is some hope for him to come' is absurd as the alternative which it must be[1]. Auratus conjectured *εἰ γοῦν*: '*at any rate, if* he is alive, there is some hope for him to come.' But 'there is some hope' is ridiculously flat after the confident encouragement of 680. Still more significant is it that the exhortation itself of 680 is totally at variance with the despondent language he has been obliged reluctantly to use about Menelaus in the dialogue 622—636. *εἰ δ' οὖν*, then, is sound; and *ἐλπίς τις* is naturally contrasted with absolute despair. Conjectures based on this reasoning are Hartung's *π. θανεῖν*, Wecklein's *π. καμεῖν* (supposed to have been a supplement, at guess, of *προσδοκαμεῖν*). *μογεῖν* would be simpler than this, but the truth I think is *προσδοκᾶν ὀλεῖν* 'you must expect to lose,' the infinitive as *e.g. φάσκειν* in Soph. *O.T.* 462, *El.* 9, *Phil.* 1411, and *ὀλεῖν* 'lose' as Hom. Ω 46 and often

[1] Dr Verrall thinks that 'correctly translated the text does not offer any difficulty,' but his rendering, 'be it first supposed and soonest, that he got home. And at worst, if anywhere the sun's ray is discovering him, Zeus, we may hope, ... will contrive to bring him alive and well ..,' besides giving the sense of a perfect to the aorist *μολεῖν* (which with *προσδόκα* must have had a future sense), mistranslates *εἰ δ' οὖν*, as though another *εἰ* followed.

(Ebeling *Lex. Hom.* p. 48 fin.), Ap. Rhod. iv. 1036, Aesch. *Ag.* 54, Eur. *H. F.* 868. *πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα* is opposed to *εἰ δ' οὖν* as the ordinary phrase *μάλιστα μὲν, e.g.* Heliod. *Aeth.* i. 15 *μάλιστα μὲν εἰκὸς σχολάσειν τὸν ἔρωτα, ...εἰ δ' <οὖν> ἐναπομείνειεν* . . Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 574 e *μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε τὸ . . , δεύτερον δὲ τὸ . .* Isaeus ii. 24 *μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρημίας ἐπείσθη, δεύτερον δὲ διὰ . .* Diog. Laert. ix. 11. 66 *διαγωνίζεσθαι δ' ὡς οἷόν τε πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ γε λόγῳ.* I infer that our *πρῶτον* is neuter. The sentence will now run: 'But we must hope for the best. For indeed Menelaus, though your first and chief expectation must be to lose him, still, if he has been mercifully preserved, there is some hope he will reach home again.'

984 *σπλάγχνα δ' οὗτοι ματάζει,*
πρὸς ἐνδίκοις φρεσὶν τελεσφόροις
δίναις κυκλούμενον κέαρ.

κυκώμενον I think, as Plat. *Cratyl.* 439 *ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται* (cf. *Tim.* 66 A, *Legg.* 669 D), Aristot. *Mirab.* cxxx *τότε δὴ πάλιν σὺν πολλῷ μὲν βρυχηθμῷ μεγάλαις δὲ καὶ ταχείαις δίναις τὴν θάλασσαν ἀναζεῖν καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι κυκωμένην ἐκ βυθῶν*, where E has *κυκλωμένην*, Ald. *κυκλουμένην.* It is properly used of waves, as Hom. Φ 235, 240, 324, *μ* 238, 241, *hymn.* xxviii. 12, *A. P.* vii. 392 *ταῦθ' ἅμα πάντ' ἐκύκησεν ἐμὴν νέα.* 395 *τὸν μὲν δαίσαντο κυκώμενον*[1] *εἰν ἁλὶ θῆρες.* Eumath. xi. 13 *τοῖς κύμασιν ἐκυκώμην.* xi. 7, 22. The passages quoted in connection with ours are Eur. *Cycl.* 459 *οὕτω κυκλώσω δαλόν . .*, Pind. *O.* x. 72 *χέρα κυκλώσαις*, Hegesandr. (Ath. 479 e) *ἔδει γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀριστερὰν ἀγκῶνα ἐρείσαντα καὶ τῇ δεξιᾷ κυκλώσαντα, ὑγρῶς ἀφεῖναι τὴν λάταγα.* In all these the notion of circular movement is appropriate enough. But in Polyb.[2] xi. 29. 10 (also cited for support of our

[1] So in *Pers.* 312 *οἷδ' ἀμφὶ νῆσον τὴν πελειοθρέμμονα νικώμενοι κύρισσον ἰσχυρὰν χθόνα*, Heimsoeth has rightly restored *κυκώμενοι*, comparing Soph. *El.* 734 *κλύδων' ἔφιππον ἐν μέσῳ κυκώμενον.*

[2] Cf. this simile with *Com. fr. adesp.* 1324 (noticed above) from Dio Chrys. xxxii. 665, who has 667 *ὅταν ὑμῖν ἐμπέσῃ τὸ τῆς ἀταξίας πνεῦμα, ὥσπερ οὖν* (l. *ὅταν* or *ἂν*) *ταχὺς ἄνεμος κινήσῃ θάλασσαν* . . Herwerden had already referred to Dem. 383. 2 *ταῦτ' ἤκουσεν ἃ καὶ πρότερόν ποτ' εἶπον ἐγὼ*

passage) *ὅθεν ἀεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καθάπερ γὰρ κἀκείνης ἡ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ τὰ πνεύματα βίᾳ, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις οἱοί τινες ἂν ὦσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ* . . I feel sure that the right reading is *κυκῶντες*, as Alciphron i. 10 *οἱ ἄνεμοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀρασσόμενοι ὅσον οὔπω κυκήσειν τὸ πέλαγος ἐπαγγέλλονται.* We want a general word, 'trouble.' There are, however, other passages, not in the lexicons, with which I proceed to deal. Tryphiodorus 325 *ἴαχε καὶ Ξάνθου ποταμοῦ κυκλώμενον ὕδωρ* so 'Edd. Steph. Port. et Ms. Reim.' '*κυκλόμενον* Edd. Ald. et Frischl.' *κυκλούμενον* Neander. I obtain there the following references: Nonn. *Dionys.* xx. 336 *ἄφνω δ' ἐκ σκοπέλοιο χύθη κυκλούμενον ὕδωρ*: where *κυκώμενον vulgo* and cod. Monac., *κυκοώμενον* Rhodomannus and Graefe; I should read so also in Tryphiodorus. Nonn. *D.* i. 495 *καὶ στέφος αὐτοέλικτον ὁμόζυγον ἥλικι γαίῃ Ὠκεανὸν σπεύδοντα παλινδίνητον ἐρύξω τὴν αὐτὴν περὶ νύσσαν ἄγειν κυκλούμενον ὕδωρ.* This is copied by Joann. Gaz. Ἔκφρασις A 272 *Ὠκεανοῖο, ὃς ῥόον αὐτοέλικτον ἀεὶ στεφανηδὸν ἑλίσσων δινωτὸν περὶ γαῖαν ἄγει κυκλούμενον ὕδωρ.* In neither of these places is there any variation; nor do I want it, for *κυκλούμενον* I believe is sound, in its proper sense, the *circling* water of Ocean, *τοῦ περὶ πᾶσαν εἱλισσομένου χθόνα* (*P. V.* 143): cf. Joan. B 266 *οὐρανὸς . . πυκνὸν ἀναγκαίης νωμήτορα κύκλον ἑλίσσων, . . κυκλώσας ἑλίκεσσιν ὅλην φύσιν.*

I will conclude with two examples of *κυκᾶν*:

Archil.[1] 66

> *θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε,*
> *ἐνάδευ δυσμενῶν δ' ἀλέξευ προσβαλὼν ἐναντίον*
> *στέρνον, ἐν δοκοῖσιν ἐχθρῶν πλησίον κατασταθείς . .*

πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς ἀντεῖπεν, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμός ἐστιν ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ, κινούμενον. ὁ μὲν ἦλθεν ὁ δ' ἀπῆλθεν· μέλει δ' οὐδενὶ τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδὲ μέμνηται. (To this refer Choricius Ἐπιθαλάμ. 2 p. 19. 26 *ὁ μὲν ἦλθεν, ὁ δ' ἀπῆλθε, μένει δὲ ἄφθαρτον τὸ κοινόν . .*)

[1] I quote the passage to suggest an emendation of *v.* 2 (Ἀ *ἀνὰ δὲ εὖ*, Vind. *ἐναδευ* vel *ἀναδευ* Bergk q.v.). Emperius conjectured *ἀντέχευ, μένων*, which

and a Tragic fragment[1] in Clem. Alex. p. 486 (of emotions)

οὗτοι γὰρ, οὗτοι καὶ διὰ σπλάγχνων ἔσω
χωροῦσι, καὶ κυκῶσιν ἀνθρώπων κέαρ.

990 μάλα γάρ τοι . . Triclinius for metre writes μάλα γέ τοι δή, but though μάλα τοι is good, as Xen. *Symp.* i. 2. 46, γέ τοι = γοῦν, and I prefer μάλα τι γάρ. In a seeming fragment in Eumathius iii. 14, ἐρωτοβλήτους γὰρ μάλα τοι φεύγειν φιλεῖ, Boissonade conjectured μάλα τι, and perhaps the order should also be changed to μάλα τι γάρ.

1168 ἄκος δ' οὐδὲν ἐπήρκεσαν
τὸ μὴ πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχειν παθεῖν.

I believe the true reading to be[2] τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἔχειν πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει (cf. *P. V.* 950), corrupted first to τὸ μὴ πόλιν μὲν ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει ἔχειν, παθεῖν being merely an insertion to patch the metre. Constantly, finding μὴ οὐ, scribes omitted the οὐ as περισσόν, and it should always be written in texts at any rate where there is any trace of it.

1337 νῦν δ' εἰ προτέρων αἷμ' ἀποτίσει, . .
1340 τίς ἂν εὔξαιτο βροτῶν ἀσινεῖ
δαίμονι φῦναι, τάδ' ἀκούων;

τίς ἂν <οὐκ> εὔξαιτο Canter, but the sense required is 'who can boast that his lot is free from harm?' (cf. Menand. 355 . . οὐδ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα 'ταῦτ' οὐ πείσομαι'). τίς ἂν <οὖν> Porson, but οὖν cannot stand so *in apodosi*. τίς τἂν Weil, τίς <ποτ'> ἂν E. A. Ahrens, τίς <τίν'> ἂν Verrall, *alii alia*, all but Schneidewin retaining εὔξαιτο. This cannot be. τίς ἂν εὔξαιτο has only one meaning in Greek, 'who would *wish*' (*e.g.*

last word (though Bergk hesitates) is doubtless right, not only because it is technical in military language but because the Homeric model is Λ 348 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ στέωμεν καὶ ἀλεξώμεσθα μένοντες. Bergk may be right with ἄνα δ' ἔχευ after Hom. Η 110 ἀνὰ δὲ σχέο κηδόμενός περ, but I rather suspect ἀνὰ δὲ δηῦ or εἶα δηῦ *i.e.* δὴ αὖ, as the δηῦτε frequent in Anacreon (13 B, 14, 15, 47, 61, 63 *bis*, 68, 89, 91) but usually corrupted, as 63. 6 ἀνὰ δηῦτε βασσαρήσω ('ἀνὰ δηῦτε scripsi, AB ἀναδευτε, PVL ἀναδευ' Bergk).

[1] Not in Nauck. Whose the hand is I cannot say, but the voice is the voice of Aeschylus.

[2] I find now this has lately been proposed by Stadtmueller.

Antiphon VI. 1 *εὐχόμενος ἄν τις ταῦτα εὔξαιτο*, Dem. in Hermog. Rhet. p. 179 *εἶτα ἃ Φίλιππος εὔξαιτ' ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦτα ὑμῶν ἐνθάδε ποιοῦσιν*). In ordinary language it is very common, *e.g.* Isocr. 29 d *καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν εὔξαιτο τῶν εὖ φρονούντων τοιαύτης πολιτείας μετέχειν . . ;* (where G has *δέξαιτο* which is equally common, but means '*be content to*'), Ar. *Ran.* 283 *ἐγὼ δέ γ' εὐξαίμην ἄν* . . and occurs also in Soph. *fr.* 327 *οὔτε γὰρ γάμον, ὦ φίλαι, οὔτ' ἂν ὄλβον ἔκμετρον ἔνδον εὐξαίμαν ἔχειν· φθονεραὶ γὰρ ὁδοί.* I thought once of *τίς ἂν αὐχήσειε*, but though Hesych. gives *αὐχέω: εὔχομαι*, that is the only place I have ever found it so explained, and probably the true reading is Schneidewin's rejected *ἐξεύξαιτο*.

1355 *χρονίζομεν γάρ· οἱ δὲ τῆς Μελλοῦς κλέος*
πέδοι πατοῦντες οὐ καθεύδουσιν χερί.

The word should be written so, not *μελλοῦς*, to indicate that it is a personification or idealisation of a quality. These were formed in Greek as easily by a termination in *ω̄* as in English by a capital letter. Tryphon (*Mus. Crit.* i. 49), quoting this word as an example of *ὀνοματοποιΐα κατὰ παρονομασίαν*, gives *...τῆς Μελλοῦς χάριν*, no doubt by defect of memory. Dr Tucker (*Classical Review* vii. p. 342) holds *κλέος* to be corrupt and reads *δέος*, translating 'awe of the Future.' Μελλώ could not mean 'the Future.' The phrase *τῆς Μελλοῦς κλέος* gives me the impression that it refers to some proverbial commendation of *Delay*, and in this I am supported by an epigram of Antiphilus *A. P.* xvi. 136 *''Αρκεῖ δ' ἁ μέλλησις' ἔφα σοφός.* This may have been the very proverb, from an early gnomic poet. They, the speaker ironically remarks, are paying singularly little respect to the *reputation of Delay*.

1392 *ὡς ὧδ' ἐχόντων, πρέσβος Ἀργείων τόδε,*
χαίροιτ' ἄν, εἰ χαίροιτ', ἐγὼ δ' ἐπεύχομαι.
εἰ δ' ἦν πρεπόντων ὥστ' ἐπισπένδειν νεκρῷ,
τάδ' ἂν δικαίως ἦν, ὑπερδίκως μὲν οὖν.
τοσῶνδε κρατῆρ' ἐν δόμοις κακῶν ὅδε
πλήσας ἀραίων αὐτὸς ἐκπίνει μολών.

πρεπόντων was formerly taken as a partitive genitive with *ἦν*

(as though = ἓν τῶν π.) 'had it been among things fitting,' and Wecklein still takes it so. But Wellauer and Blomfield truly observed that in such phrases the article is used; we must have had τῶν π. Dr Verrall accordingly takes it as a genitive absolute 'under fit circumstances, with good cause,' interpreting 'Could there be a fit case for a libation over the dead, justly and more than justly this would be that case.' The natural construction is πρεπόντων ἐπισπένδειν 'to pour a libation of what is fit,' σπένδειν being often used with a genitive, *e.g.* Longus ii. 31 ἐπισπείσαντες οἴνου. 22. iii. 12. Philostr. *Apoll.* v. 15. *Epist.* 39 οὐκ οἴνου σπένδοντες αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ δακρύων. Heliod. vii. 14 ἀποσπένδω τῶν ἐμαυτῆς δακρύων. iv. 16. Plut. *Mor.* 655 E. Herodian. v. 5. 12. In the sense 'it is possible to' ἔστιν ὥστε is common enough, Plat., Aesch. *Ag.* 389 ἔστω δ' ἀπήμαντον ὥστ' ἀπαρκεῖν εὖ πραπίδων λαχόντα, Soph. *Phil.* 656, Eur. *Hipp.* 701 ἀλλ' ἔστι κἀκ τῶνδ' ὥστε σωθῆναι. ἐπισπένδειν is properly used of pouring a libation upon a sacrifice: Hdt. ii. 39 ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ (the altar) οἶνον κατὰ τοῦ ἱρηίου ἐπισπ., as iv. 62 ἐπεὰν γὰρ οἶνον ἐπισπείσωσι κατὰ τῶν κεφαλέων, iv. 60, vii. 167. Nicand. Thyat. (Ath. 486 a), Plut. *Rom.* 4, Xen. *Ephes.* i. 5: or to the dead, *Anth. Append.* Cougny ii. 485, Nicet. Eugen. ix. 4 τὸ σῶμα συγκαίουσιν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ, χοὰς ἐπισπείσαντες. Clytemnestra, then, I understand to say 'Rejoice, if ye will; I exult. And might one pour a fit libation upon the dead, this would it be in justice—yea in more than justice.' But what is τάδε? Does she point to the *blood* she has just described with such delight (1389—91)? I think rather it is *curses* she wishes it were possible to pour, referring to her declaration ἐγὼ δ' ἐπεύχομαι (in defiance of the proverbial οὐχ ὁσίη κταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι Hom. χ 412) and explaining further by ἀραίων in 1397.

1574 πᾶν ἀπόχρη τῇδ' for μοι?
1662 ἀλλὰ τούσδ' ἐμοὶ ματαίαν ὧδ' ἀπανθίσαι
κἀκβαλεῖν ἔπη τοιαῦτα δαίμονος πειρωμένους
σώφρονος γνώμης δ' ἁμαρτῆτον κρατοῦντα.

g omits δ' ἁμαρτῆτον, leaving a space. ἁμαρτεῖν τὸν Casaubon. H is easily confused with the compendium for EIN (abbreviations

seem to have been used in the text at the end of the play; in 1663 g has *πειρωμένη*, doubtless having mistaken for *η* the compendium for *ους*) *e.g.* in schol. *Theb.* 763. Cf. Hdt. iii. 81 *γνώμης τῆς ἀρίστης ἡμάρτηκε.* ix. 79 *γνώμης μέντοι ἡμάρτηκας χρηστῆς.* Stanley wrote *θ'* for *δ'*, and many supplements have been proposed for the end of the line, but none with the construction I have always thought probable, *i.e. σώφρονος γνώμης θ' ἁμαρτεῖν τὸν κρατοῦντ' ἀρνουμένους.* One may conceive this participle being omitted after *πειρωμένους* above. The Chorus have been refusing to accept Aegisthus, *vv.* 1615, 1633: it is monstrous, says he, that they should so wantonly insult him, and talk so big, tempting fortune, and show such folly in declining to submit to their master: cf. *P. V.* 969 *θῶπτε τὸν κρατοῦντ' ἀεί.* Eur. *fr.* 337 *μὴ νεῖκος, ὦ γεραιέ, κοιράνοις τίθου· σέβειν δὲ τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἀρχαῖος νόμος.* 93 *ἀεὶ δ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κρατοῦσι.*

Cho. 59 *ῥοπὴ δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ δίκαν*
ταχεῖα τοῖς μὲν ἐν φάει,
τὰ δ' ἐν μεταιχμίῳ σκότου
62 *μένει χρονιζον'τἄχη βρύει·*
τοὺς δ' ἄκραντος ἔχει νύξ.

Sch. *ἡ δὲ τῆς δίκης ῥοπὴ τοὺς μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ ταχέως καὶ ἀμύνεται, ἄλλους δὲ ἐν ἀμφιβόλῳ ἐᾷ τὴν τιμωρίαν, οὐκ ἀθρόως αὐτοὺς ἀμυνομένη, ὥστε τοὺς ἠδικημένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν λυπεῖσθαι· ἄλλους δὲ σκότος καλύπτει ὥστε μηδ' ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῆς.* The passage has been a great stumbling-block to critics. Most indeed have seen that three classes of persons are spoken of, or three periods of time; but what these are, or who, their interpretations are by no means agreed. The chief difficulty, it will be noticed, is *ἄκραντος νύξ*: Peile '*others impracticable night arrests*. . . Under cover of the Night, it might be thought, vengeance must be impracticable; it is the season wherein no work is done, and Justice can now no longer pursue her victims—but no!' etc., quoting Schuetz 'Hoc sensu *ἄκραντος νὺξ* sic dicitur, ut Latinis *intempesta nox* i.e. Servio interprete *inactuosa*. Seu ut est ap. Macrob. Saturn. i. 3 *quae non habet tempus idoneum rebus gerendis*.' Others think the meaning is

just the opposite, that some are *not* arrested at all: Paley (followed by Sidgwick and Verrall) 'Three periods are spoken of: the present time or prime of life, when the stroke of Justice falls most heavily and least expected; the twilight or evening of life; and the night, or death, which comes *ἄκραντος*, before punishment has overtaken its victim.' Davies (who takes *τοὺς ἐν φάει* as one phrase) says 'A third class consists of offenders altogether unknown, against whom justice can do nothing. The three classes therefore are—manifest, doubtful, and unknown crimes.' Similarly Wecklein, who finds an opposition (not expressed, and in my opinion, quite contrary to the logic of the passage) between crimes of blood and *other* crimes: 'Other wrong is punished sometimes soon, sometimes late, sometimes not at all; for murder punishment is in store under all circumstances.' Finally, Bamberger and Hermann give an interpretation adopted and thus stated by Conington: 'the three parties being Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, who are having their day; Orestes and Electra, whose day is yet to come; and Agamemnon whose day is past.'

But there is another and an older yet. In one of his best-known essays Plutarch has the following passage: *de sera numinis vindicta* 564 E (an account given by a *ψυχή*) *ὡς Ἀδράστεια μέν, Ἀνάγκης καὶ Διὸς θυγάτηρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι τιμωρὸς ἀνωτάτω τέτακται τοῖς ἀδικήμασι· καὶ τῶν πονηρῶν οὔτε μέγας οὐδεὶς οὕτως οὔτε μικρὸς γέγονεν, ὥστ' ἢ λαθὼν διαφυγεῖν ἢ βιασάμενος. ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλη τιμωρία τριῶν οὐσῶν φύλακι καὶ χειρουργῷ προσήκει· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν σώματι καὶ διὰ σωμάτων κολαζομένους μεταχειρίζεται Ποινὴ ταχεῖα, πράῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ καὶ παραλείποντι πολλὰ τῶν καθαρμοῦ δεομένων· ὧν δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὴν κακῶν ἰατρεία, τούτους Δίκῃ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ὁ [ἡ ?] δαίμων παραδίδωσι· τοὺς δὲ πάμπαν ἀνιάτους ἀπωσαμένης τῆς Δίκης, ἡ τρίτη καὶ ἀγριωτάτη τῶν Ἀδραστείας ὑπουργῶν Ἐρινύς, μεταθέουσα πλανωμένους*[1] *καὶ περιφεύγοντας ἄλλον ἄλλως, οἰκτρῶς τε καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντας ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον.* I think it

[1] This is the meaning of *Eum.* 98 where Clytemnestra says *αἰσχρῶς δ' ἀλῶμαι.* The word is technical.

will be admitted that if this is not a paraphrase of our passage, it is at least an exposition of the doctrine there contained. The three periods then, are in Christian terminology, *life* (*ἐν τῷ βίῳ* Plut. 565 A—this is the usual meaning of *ἐν φάει*, very common in Euripides), *Purgatory*, and *Hell* (cf. the schol. on 63 *ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰώνιος θάνατος*, the writer of which Butler inferred to be a Christian). Perhaps now it will be felt that the right sense is given not by the puzzling *ἄκραντος* but rather by the suggestion of Schuetz (adopted, I think, by none but Dindorf, Keck and Herwerden) 'Haud scio tamen an Aeschylus scripserit *τοὺς δ' ἄκρατος ἔχει νύξ*. Sic enim *ἄκρατος νὺξ* bene opponeretur *τῷ μεταιχμίῳ σκότου*.' For the phrase cf. *Fr.* (Aelian *fr.* 329) *ap.* Suid. *s. v.* 'Επιτολμῆσαι: . . *νυκτὸς γενομένης ἀκράτου*, whence Hercher emended Aelian *N. A.* xii. 33 *τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ ἀόρατον* (remarked as singular by Jacobs) to *ἄκρατον*. Plut. *Nic.* 21 *νυκτὶ μήτε σκότος ἄκρατον μήτε φῶς ἐχούσῃ βέβαιον*. *Mor.* 932 B *βαθεῖαν σκιὰν καὶ ἄκρατον*. Weil, however (who thought only one set of persons were meant, giving an impossible rendering), conjectured from the last words of the schol. that the text arose from *ἄιστος* (ακτος) with a gloss *ἀόρατος*, comparing *Ag.* 472 *ἐν δ' ἀίστοις τελέθοντος οὔτις ἀλκά*: Plutarch's *ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον* might certainly be a paraphrase of that word.

As to details: Turnebus emended *δίκας*, and read *τοὺς* for *τοῖς* which others retain closely with *ταχεῖα*. After *βρύειν* in 68 *v.* 63 is wrongly repeated in M: I agree therefore with those who regard *βρύει* as probably sound in 62. The schol. has *ἀνθεῖ* (cf. 1008 *μίμνοντι δὲ καὶ πάθος ἀνθεῖ*), and is right in explaining *ὅσα δ' ὑπερτίθεται, ταῦτα 'σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν'* (Hom. Δ 161). Unless *ἄχει* was a misreading of *ἀνθεῖ*, I should guess it came from *οὐ ταχέα* on *χρονίζοντα* or *οὐ ταχεῖα* on *χρονίζουσα* (Stanley): cf. Hesych. *ταν*ύ*ποδας*: 'Ερινύς· *ταχύποδας, ἐν τάχει τιμωρουμένους*. Schol. Lycophr. 144 *χωλαὶ δὲ παραδίδονται ὅτι οὐ ταχέως μετέρχονται*. The accentuation of M agrees with this.

160 Σκυθικά τ' ἐν χεροῖν παλίντον' [ἐν] ἔργῳ βέλη
'πιπάλλων Ἄρης.

The scholl. *ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, ἐν τῷ βάλλειν* and *σὺν ἔργῳ πάλλων*

indicate that they were written on ἔργῳ. ἐν spoils the metre and is intolerable after ἐν χεροῖν.

449 δι' ὥτων δὲ συν-
τέτραινε μῦθον ἡσύχῳ φρενῶν βάσει.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει,
452 τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ὀργᾷ μαθεῖν.
πρέπει δ' ἀκάμπτῳ μένει καθήκειν.

The Chorus are still addressing Orestes. What is the meaning of 452? Two accounts are given by the Scholia: (1) ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ γνῶναι ὁ πατήρ, τουτέστι τὴν τιμωρίαν, 'he (Agamemnon) himself yearns to hear.' (2) μάθε τῷ τρόπῳ σου, as though ὀργᾷ were the substantive. We might take it in the sense 'learn with anger,' but αὐτός is pointless. Scaliger conj. ὄργα, but though a person may *be* all agog to hear, you cannot *bid* him be so. Wecklein[1] takes ὀργᾷ for the 2nd person, citing[2] Suid. and Phot. ὀργωμένοις: ἐντεταμένως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Now in M αὐτὸς has been corrected from αὐτοῖς (not αὐτῶς, as Hermann says: the *o* was always separate), which suggests to me that the right reading is τὰ δ' αὖ τις ὀργᾷ μαθεῖν. Cf. Soph. *Trach.* 950 τάδε μὲν ἔχομεν ὁρᾶν δόμοις, τάδε δὲ μένομεν ἐπ' ἐλπίσιν. Similar errors are frequent.

692 καὶ νῦν Ὀρέστης, ἦν γὰρ εὐβό[υ]λως ἔχων
ἔξω κομίζων ὀλεθρίου πηλοῦ πόδα—
νῦν δ' ἥπερ ἐν δόμοισι βακχείας καλῆς
ἰατρὸς ἐλπὶς ἦν παροῦσαν ἐγγράφει.

[1] Who also proposes in *Theb.* 380 ἵππος χαλινῶν ὡς κατασθμαίνων μένει, ὅστις βοὴν σάλπιγγος ὁρμαίνει μένων to read ὀργᾶται κλύων. The last word was conjectured by Brunck and adopted by Blomfield, the schol. paraphrase having ἀκούων. It may of course be right, as Virg. *G.* iii. 83, Ov. *Met.* iii. 704, Lucan iv. 750, Val. Flacc. ii. 385 (Blomfield justly cites Job xxxix. 25). But this, being the more obvious version, may well have been an inadvertence; μένων, however, is a right phrase: *Rhes.* 981 χρὴ μένειν Τυρσηνικῆς σάλπιγγος αὐδήν. Tryphiodorus 78 οὔατα δ' ἀκροτάτοισιν ἐπὶ κροτάφοισιν ἄρηρεν ὀρθὰ μάλ', αἰὲν ἑτοῖμα μένειν σάλπιγγος ἀκουήν, after Callim. *Del.* 230 οὔατα δ' αὐτῆς ὀρθὰ μάλ', αἰὲν ἑτοῖμα θεῆς ὑποδέχθαι ὁμοκλήν. The horse chafes at having to wait for the signal—he wants to be off before: cf. Apoll. Rhod. iii. 1259 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀρήιος ἵππος, ἐελδόμενος πολέμοιο, σκαρθμῷ ἐπιχρεμέθων κρούει πέδον κ.τ.λ. This is more closely applicable to the case of Tydeus. (Other examples of the simile are Ov. *Trist.* v. 9. 29, Lucan i. 293, Stat. *Theb.* vi. 396.)

[2] But Phot. has ὀργιωμένοις emended by Dobree, Suid. ὀργιωμένοις emended by Cobet, to ὀριγνωμένοις.

694 *νῦν δήπερ* M, corr. Weil, who reads *ἥπερ ἦν* and *παραπεσοῦσαν ἔκγραφε*. The Scholia on 694—5 are *ἡ εὐφροσύνη τῶν βασιλείων οἴχεται*, and *τάξον αὐτὴν ἀφανισθεῖσαν ἀρᾷ* (*'ἀρᾰ́*, ut videtur, m' Vitelli). *ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἐλπὶς δ' ἀπέδωκεν*, 'he makes the participle go with the *ἐλπίς*,' instead of with Orestes who was the *ἐλπίς* (*v.* 772), as Schol. on 693 says. Hence Stephanus read *ἔγγραφε*: I should prefer *ἐγγράφειν* ('you must, you may'). For the participle many conjectures have been made, as *ἀποῦσαν* Canter, *μὴ παροῦσαν* Schwerdt. Enger read *ἀρά* in the Schol., as voc., 'O Curse' as *v.* 688. If it should be *ἄρα*, this is in favour of something like *οὐκ ἄρ' οὖσαν* (Ludwig), *μηδ' ἄρ' οὖσαν*. But I should expect *μηκέτ' οὖσαν*. Perhaps the truth may be *πρὶν οὖσαν*, an idiomatic phrase as Eur. *Tro.* 583 *πρίν ποτ' ἦμεν*. Ar. *Vesp.* 1063 *πρίν ποτ' ἦν, πρὶν ταῦτα· νῦν δ' οἴχεται*. Catull. iv. 25 *sed haec prius fuere*. In *Ag.* 180 Aeschylus goes beyond this: *οὐδὲν λέξαι* (*οὐδ' ἐλέγξεται* Margoliouth) *πρὶν ὤν*. For the sentence cf. Menand. 236 *ὅταν δ' ἐρῶντος τόλμαν ἀφέλῃς, οἴχεται, εἰς τοὺς ἰαλέμους δὲ τοῦτον ἔγγραφε*. Alexis 147 *εἰς τοὺς σοφιστὰς τὸν μάγειρον ἐγγράφω*. Eur. *El.* 1072 *γυνὴ δ' . . ἥτις . . , διάγραφ' ὡς οὖσαν κακήν*. The construction with *εἰς* is the commonest; the dative also is used, as Liban. *Epist.* 216 *ἔγγραφε δὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς φίλοις*. 700. Heliod. *Aeth.* ii. 34; with *ἐν A. P.* ix. 4. We might therefore read (*ἐν*) *πρὶν οὖσιν*, much like Eur. *Alc.* 333 *αὐτίκ' ἐν τοῖς μηκέτ' οὖσι λέξομαι*, but Alexis 274 has *ἱερὰν ἐγγράφων τὴν οὐσίαν.—ἰατρός* is strange, unless we read *κακῆς* with Portus (Emperius conj. *βακχίας ζάλης*, but this could not be said except literally). *βακχεία* might be used in either sense: if *καλῆς*, cf. Liban. *Epist.* 575 *τῆς βακχείας δὲ ἡμῖν ἴσθι τὸ πλέον ἀμβλύνας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπουσίας*. With this I had thought of ΤΑΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ.

793 *τίς ἂν σωζόμενον ῥυθμόν*
τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν δάπεδον = *διὰ δίκας πᾶν ἔπος*
ἀνομένων βημάτων ὄρεγμα; ἔλακον' . .

τοῦτ' ἴδοι (Portus) *διὰ πέδον* Blomfield, which is possible; but I rather suspect *τοῦτ'* (or *τῷδ'*) *ἴδοι 'ν γαπέδῳ* (Hermann conjectured *γάπεδον*, the tragic form, restored by Porson in

P. V. 855). *ἰδεῖν δαπέδῳ* or *γαπέδῳ* may have been in one of the scholia: *...ἴδοι δέ τις . . μηδὲ ὑπερδραμὼν ἐν τῷ δαπέδῳ . .* But *ἰδεῖν* could not = *ἴδοι* as the scholia say: whereas *τίς ἂν ἴδοι* is a common way of expressing 'O might one see!' *σωζόμενον* is to be taken actively, governing *ῥυθμόν*. In the *strophe* M has *διαδικᾶσαι* (meant for the aorist inf.) corrected by Pauw (*κατὰ δίκαν* schol.). For *πᾶν ἔπος*, which I have not seen illustrated, I have collected the following: *P. V.* 1065, Eur. *Hipp.* 180, Callim. *Ep.* 1 (*A. P.* vii. 89), *A. P.* ix. 162, *Lyr. fr. adesp.* 86 A, Anaxarchus (Stob. *Flor.* xxxv. 19).

Str. 796 *οἵ τ' ἔσωθε δωμάτων*
πλουτογαθῆ μυχὸν νομίζετε,
793 *κλύετε, σύμφρονες θεοί,*
799 *ἄγετε, τῶν πάλαι πεπραγμένων*
λύσασθ' αἷμα προσφάτοις δίκαις·
γέρων φόνος μηκέτ' ἐν δόμοις τέκοι.
Antistr. 808 *ξυλλάβοι δ' ἐνδίκως*
809 *παῖς ὁ Μαίας ἐπιφορώτατος*
810 *πρᾶξιν οὐρίαν θέλων*
811 *πολλὰ δ' ἀλλὰ φανεῖ χρῄζων·*
812 *κρυπτά· ἄσκοπον δ' ἔπος λέγων*
813 *νύκτα πρό τ' ὀμμάτων σκότον φέρει*
καθ' ἡμέραν δ' οὐδὲν ἐμφανέστερος.

796 *ἔσω* Hermann (if so, *ἔσωθε* is probably due to 786). *ἔσωθεν δόμων* Wellauer. 809 *ἐπεὶ φορώτατος* Emperius rightly. It will be seen that in the *antistrophe* there is a line too much: for there is no reason to suppose with Lachmann and Hermann that a line has fallen out in the *strophe*. I have no doubt now what to get rid of: *πρᾶξιν οὐρίαν* (*φέρων*) was an explanation of *φορώτατος*. In what follows Hermann has shown the way by reading *τὰ δ' ἀλά' ἀμφανεῖ χρῄζων*, and ejecting *κρυπτά* as the gloss on *ἀλαά*, confirming this by the schol. *τὰ δὲ κρυπτὰ νῦν φανερώσει*. Now in the unmetrical line 799 Schuetz ejected the superfluous *ἄγετε*. But it would never have been inserted idly. How then does it come here? I think I see now: the true reading is *δεῦτε, σύμφρονες θεοί*, and *ἄγετε* is, as elsewhere, a gloss on this, *κλύετε* a conjectural reading of

it (less likely on *ἀίετ' εὔφρονες*). The way is clear now in 811 to read *τὰ δ' ἀλά' ἀμφανεῖ θέλων* or, as I should prefer, *ἀλαὰ δ' ἀ. θ.* But we must account for *χρῄζων*. It was probably adscribed because *θέλων* is used just as in 339 *ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἂν ἐκ τῶνδε θεὸς χρῄζων θείη* .. In 813 long ago I hit on Bamberger's *νύκτ' ἀντ' ὀμμάτων*: and just lately in 818 for *ὁμοῦ κρεκτὸν*, where M has *ὁμο* in erasure, I was congratulating myself on restoring *ὀξύκρεκτον*, only to find it in Wecklein's appendix due to Kirchhoff. I am so accustomed, as in this pursuit one must be, to finding that others have made my emendations three hundred years or less before me, that I should not have mentioned this, were it not that (though accepted by Nauck on Soph. *fr.* 425) the editors had left it unknown to me.

831 *τοῖς θ' ὑπὸ χθονὸς φίλοις*
τοῖς τ' ἄνωθεν προπράσσων
χάριτος ὀργᾶς λυπρᾶς.

The last line is probably a misreading from uncials of *χρέος σφαγᾶς λυγρᾶς*: cf. Pind. *O.* iii. 7, *P.* ix. 104. *Cho.* 309, *Pers.* 479. It must be remembered that *χάριν πράσσειν* with the dative means 'to do a favour to' (Eur. *Ion* 36, 903). *προπράσσων*, if it were 'exacting on behalf of,' would surely take a genitive. *τοῖς ἄνωθέν τε πράσσων* (Emperius) may be right, or *τοῖς τ' ἄνωθ' ἀντιπράσσων.*

952 Much of the following *strophe* has been happily restored:

τάπερ ὁ Λοξίας ὁ Παρνάσσιος
μέγαν ἔχων μυχὸν χθονὸς ἐπορθίαξεν ἀδόλως δολίας
955 *βλάβαν ἐγχρονισθεῖσαν ἐποίχεται*
κρατεῖται πῶς τὸ θεῖον τὸ μὴ
ὑπουργεῖν κακοῖς.

953 Meineke for *ἐπ' ὄχθει ἄξεν*: cf. 270, and Hesych. *ὀρθιάζειν*: *μαντεύεσθαι.* 955 H. L. Ahrens for *βλαπτομέναν*, Bothe, Hermann for *ἐν χρόνοις θεῖσαν.* For *δολίας* I conjecture *δόμοις*, which may go with *ἐπορθ.* (cf. *Ag.* 28, 1108) or with *ἐγχρ.* The error is very easy palaeographically, especially when prompted by the preceding *ἀδόλως*. In the *antistrophe* 965 I read *μύσος <ἄ>παν* (Hermann) *κλύσῃ*

(Sidgwick for ἐλάσῃ) καθαρμοῖσιν ἀτᾶν ἐλατηρίοις (Schuetz for ἅπαν ἐλατήριον). But the import of κλύσῃ is more than simply 'wash away': like ἐλατηρίοις it is a medical word, cf. Soph. *fr.* 770 πικρὰν πικροῖς κλύζουσι φαρμάκοις χολήν, and κλύσμα, κλυστήρ etc. This is better, I think, than μύσος ἅπαν ἐλάσῃ: which however could be matched with ἄδολα δολίοις. The sense of 956 is uncertain: but I incline to think we want the active, 'the power of heaven prevails'; perhaps κρατεῖ τ' ἀρτίως or τ' αἰσίως. For the construction cf. Thuc. iv. 104 κρατοῦντες ὥστε μὴ τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι. M has παρὰ τὸ μὴ, a misreading of πρός, which is commonly added to explain this construction. Perhaps τὸ μὴ 'ξυπουργεῖν.

967 τύχα δ' εὐπροσώπωκοίται τὸ πᾶν
ἰδεῖν [ἀκοῦσαι] θρεομένοις
μετοικοδόμων πεσοῦνται πάλιν.

I cannot think for a moment that εὐπροσωποκοίτης is a possible epithet of τύχη: it could not be equivalent to εὖ κειμένη. But εὐπρόσωπος is often used metaphorically, as *Lyr. fr.* (Simon. 23 Bergk) in Plut. *Mor.* 798 D εὐπ. ἔρωτες, Eur. *Phoen.* 1341 εὐπ. φροιμίοις: so εὐῶπα ἀλκάν Soph. *O. T.* 188. The simplest reading is τύχα δ' εὐπρόσωπα (adverbially) κεῖται τὸ πᾶν ἰδεῖν πρευμενής or ἐραμένοις—as 781 δὸς τύχας δὴ τυχεῖν (or τυχεῖν δὴ τύχας for τύχας· τυχεῖν δέ μου which the schol. shows is an error for μοι—and that was an insertion) κυρίως τὰ σώφρο[συ]ν' εὖ μαιομένοις ἰδεῖν—μέτοικοι δ. (Aegisthus) π. π.

Eum. 22 ἔνθα Κωρυκὶς πέτρα
κοίλη, φίλορνις, δαιμόνων ἀναστροφᾶ'.

So M, ἀναστροφαί fgh, ἀναστροφή Victorius from schol. on 24. Hermann is right in preferring the plural; cf. *Supp.* 548 ἐπωπάς, Eur. *Cycl.* 293 Γεραίστιοί τε καταφυγαί. But Aeschylus always has ἐπιστροφαί: *fr.* 249 Σπερχειὲ ποταμὲ βούνομοί τ' ἐ. *Theb.* 635 πατρῴων δωμάτων ἐπιστροφάς, quotation or recollection of which may have caused the order in *Eum.* 550 ξενοτίμους δωμάτων ἑ. Hesych. 'Επιστροφαί: διατριβαί, δίαιται. Αἰσχύλος Φρυξίν (*fr.* 271), to which Bergk refers the frag. (*adesp.* 162) quoted by Eust. 1517. 12 and Aristid. i. p. 388

Κίλιξ δὲ χώρα καὶ Σύρων ἐπιστροφαί. So Eur. *Hel.* 441. *Ag.* 963 δῶμ' ἐπιστρωφωμένου. On the other hand ἀναστροφή (in the singular), ἀναστρέφεσθαι are always so used in ordinary language: *e.g.* Poseidipp. *fr.* 14. 22, Plut. *Mor.* 216 A, Hesych. Ἦθος: .. ἀναστροφή, Schol. Eur. *Phoen.* 279, *E.M.* Πόλις: .. ἐν ᾗ ἀναστρέφονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

254 ὅρα, ὅρα μάλ' αὖ
λεύσσε* τὸν πάντα μή

'erasis aliquot post λεύσσε literis M' Wecklein. λεῦσσέ τε πάντα Hermann. I suspect λεύσσειν πάντα.

377 σφαλερὰ ταυυδρόμοις <ὅμως> or ὁμῶς.

384—391 should be divided thus:

μένει γάρ· εὐμήχανοί τε καὶ τέλειοι κακῶν τε μνήμονες
σεμναὶ καὶ δυσπαρήγοροι βροτοῖς
ΑΤΙΜΑ ἀτίετα διόμεναι λάχη
θεῶν διχοστατοῦντ' ἀνηλίῳ λάπᾳ
δυσποροπαίπαλα
δερκομένοισι καὶ δυσομμάτοις ὁμῶς.

καὶ in 387 and τὸν in 395 may be insertions: cf. *e.g.* *Ag.* 1453 = 1473.—388 ἀτίεται M, corr. Canter. Wellauer would eject λάχη: surely it is much more likely that ἄτιμα was a gloss on ἀτίετα, as elsewhere it explains ἄτιτος, ἀτίτης.—διέπομεν Heath.—390 δυσποροπαίπαλα Heimsoeth, see above on Eur. *Alc.* 1156.

Scholia to Aeschylus.

P. V. 438 νέμονται (on νέμουσιν). οἱ Κόλχοι.—1080 *rec.* κινεῖται ῥιπὴ καὶ ... τρίχωμα ἀπὸ τοῦ Διός. Read ταραχὴ (or τάραγμα).

Pers. (just edited by O. Daehnhardt) 144 στέος is merely an inadvertence in Wecklein's ed. That is the text (for στέγος), there is no schol.—184 πρόσεχε τῇ (τῇ ϛ m) τοῦ ὀνείρου ἀναγνώσει (as given by Vitelli). The note happens to encounter a stray ·ϛ· (here written ·ϛ), one of the ordinary signs used,

as we use asterisks etc., to connect note with text. But in the text here there is nothing to correspond.

—876 *κατὰ κοίνου γεγένηται.* Read *γεγένηνται*, which he means is to be understood with the participles.

Theb. 113 *rec. ἄλλοι δὲ δοχμολόφων φασὶ, διότι..* Read *ἄλλοι δὲ, δ. φησὶ διότι..* Similarly 270 *τινὲς δέ* (or *κατὰ δέ τινας*), *πολέμιον φόβον τὸν ὀλ. ἐξηγήσατο.. καὶ γὰρ πολέμιον φόβον λέγει..* wrongly altered by Dind. to *ἐξηγήσαντο* and *λέγουσι.* Cf. *e.g.* sch. M on *P. V.* 31, *Supp.* 408, 570, 816, *Cho.* 96, *Theb.* 387, Eur. *Or.* 196, *Alc.* 756, Hom. E 587, and also *Eum.* 45.—211 *rec. βελῶν* for *βλέπων.*—521 *τῆς παιδικῆς* (on *ὥρας*). *ταρφύσεως πεπυκνωμένη.* Kirchhoff read *ταρφύς : π.*, but Papageorgius has lately proposed *ταρφύς : <δασ>έως π.* Now the *adjective* is used in explaining, *e.g.* here sch. B *δασυτάτη ἢ τρυφερά*, and so are the substantives *δάσος δασύτης*, *e.g.* sch. Soph. *O. C.* 676; but the *adverb δασέως* never in my knowledge: no doubt because it might lead to confusion if not confined to its technical meaning 'with the rough breathing')(*ψιλῶς.* I suppose simply that the author of the error wrote ΤΗΣ ΠΑΙΔΙΚΗΣ ΓΑΡ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ. *πεπυκν.* is quite enough, as gloss M^2 on Hes. *Theog.* 693.—572 *rec. κατα<τα>ράξαντα.*

Supp. 474 *ἐξήρτημαι τῶν θεῶν.* Stephanus rightly *ἐξηρτημένη.*—303 *τὴν Ἰώ* (on *γυναῖκα*).—638 *τῷ Ἀργείῳ.*—In text 643 *ξὺν ἀχόρῳ βοᾷ.* 655 *τοι κότον.* 699 *τοι.*

Ag. 107 *ἡ παρὰ θεῶν πειθώ* and 109 *διὰ τὴν εἰς θεοὺς πίστιν...πέποιθα γάρ..*—1422 *ἀναγκαίως ἀπειλεῖ, ἵνα.. 'l. καιρίως'* Wecklein. *ἀν.* is sound, a technical word, much like *οἰκονομικῶς*: see Papageorgius' index to the scholia on Sophocles.

Eum. 173 *παλαιγενεῖς τε Μοίρας φθίσας.* 174 *κἀμοί γε λυπρός*] *ἡμᾶς, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί.* Read *ἡμᾶς* (on *Μοίρας*). 174 *ὅσον ἐστὶ σοί.*

Pers. 96 *rec.* It cannot be true that schol. O. P. has *τίς οὖν ὁ ἐν ταχυτάτῳ ποδὶ ἀνάσσων τοῦ.. πηδήματος.* Schol. B has *κρατῶν. ὃς γὰρ ταχύτατός ἐστιν ἄλλεσθαι πηδήματος εὐπετέος ἄρχει*, and all MSS. have *ἀνάσσων* in the text, 'master of,' rightly, as Eur. *Hel.* 10 *ὄχων, I. T.* 17 *στρατηγίας, fr.* 705 *κώπης* (which Ar. 1405[a] 29 calls *ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν*

ἢ κατ' ἀξίαν): so ἄναξ κώπης *Pers.* 381, ναῶν 386, ὅπλων Eur. *I. A.* 12, πύλης Soph. *fr.* 707, ὑπήνης Plat. Com. *fr.* 122 paratragic, ἄνασσα πράγους τοῦδε καὶ βουλεύματος Eur. *fr.* 699. Cf. δεσπόζειν *Ag.* 548, *Cho.* 187. It is strange that ἀναίσσων of Turnebus and Victorius should have been supported by Brunck, Hermann, Dindorf, Emperius etc. and Wecklein's margin.

Scholia to Aristophanes.

Acharn. 1001 πρὸς σάλπιγγος δ' ἔπινον. ὑπὸ with gen. or πρός with accus. is Greek.

Equit. 56 πανούργως.—59 τῷ β.

Nub. 296 πρὸς τὸ σκώπτειν.—529 δά<κτυ>λος.—1264 <ἔμπει>ροι.—1466 λείπει τὸ υἱὲ ἢ παῖ. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπιγράφεται. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν υἱὸν μετέβη. Read τοῦτο παρεπιγράφεται or -γέγραπται or παρεπιγραφή: see *e.g.* sch. *Av.* 222, *Thesm.* 100, *Pax* 424, *Plut.* 8.

Vesp. 1332 ὑποκοριζόμενος.

Pax 82 Read ὡς ἱππικῆς ἔμπειρος.—476 ὑπεμφαίνει.—668 παροιμία ἐστί.—763 ὡς τῶν νικώντων τοῦτο ποιούντων καὶ εἰς ὕβριν ἐξελκομένων. This phrase is strange to me, and I suspect should be ἐξοκελλόντων, a verb very commonly used with εἰς ὕβριν, τρυφήν etc.: *e.g.* Phylarchus (*Ath.* 521 c, d), Timaeus (*Ath.* 522 a), *Ath.* 523 c, 526 a, 528 c, Plut. *Mor.* 654 E, Aelian *V. H.* ix. 24, xii. 24.—99 R <ῥυπαροὺς> τόπους as *rec.* and Suid.

Av. 383 ἐπὶ πόδα.—584 μισθοῦ or <ἐπὶ> μίσθῳ.—1008 λείπει τὸ ἵνα, <(ἵν' ᾖ) ἵνα δ'> ὥσπερ ἀστέρες.—1083 γλωσσηματικοί.—1375 δηλονότι.

Ran. 48 ἐπὶ τῷ π. for τοῦ.

Plut. 1 ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἔργον for ἔργου.—153 ἔτυχον διαβολῆς (Lysias 171. 30) for διὰ βίου.—ὑποχλωρόν.—344 κρεῖττον ἢ παρὸ.. strange that πρὸ should be a puzzle.—608 ἦ μὴν] ὄντως δή, not δέ.—1145 ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴσων.—1192 τὸ ἐξιδρυσόμεθα τὸν Πλοῦτον. Read τὸ ἑξῆς, ἱδρ. τὸν Π.

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